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1. The subject of the study
This work analyses the disclosure of information in national and international 
criminal proceedings. One of the major problems faced by all procedural systems 
is how to deal with a lack of information, who is responsible for the gathering 
of information, and what the consequences are when vital information is not 
disclosed.
Disclosure is a complex legal issue that covers different branches of law as it 
involves procedural aspects as well as considerations that belong to the realm of 
human rights law. In fact, rules regulating the functioning of the disclosure process 
are an important element of any procedural system and their investigation assists 
in appreciating the different ways in which disclosure can be achieved as well as 
highlighting their strengths and weaknesses. 
Having said that, disclosure is one of the most important steps in the preparation of 
the defence enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights; 
it goes to the heart of the fairness of criminal proceedings. Withholding certain 
material significantly affects the fairness of the proceedings, sometimes to a degree 
that cannot be remedied. 
A democratic society must act firmly against those who have committed a crime 
but it is equally important that it shows that its criminal system guarantees their 
fundamental rights. Indeed, “society wins not only when the guilty are convicted 
but when criminal trials are fair”.1  Therefore, criminal proceedings must provide 
several core rights to the accused and defend them against possible abuses. Among 
these rights, the right to disclosure holds a prominent position. 
Disclosure is also the practical manifestation of the principle of the equality of 
arms. The prosecutor, who enjoys more investigative resources, is compelled to 
disclose information and material relevant to the defence. Without the prosecutor’s 
disclosure of this material, the defence would have no access to certain information. 
Disclosure obligations reduce the structural gap that exists between the two parties. 
Disclosure is the act or process of revealing or uncovering; it brings to light what 
could not be seen before. It is an essential feature of any criminal proceeding and 
it must be assessed against the background of a procedural system as a whole. 
Disclosure allows the defendant to gain knowledge of the case against him and 
therefore puts him in the position to mount an informed defence. At the same 
time, the issue of disclosure is also relevant when it is tackled from the perspective 
of the prosecutor and even from that of the judge. It therefore requires a thorough 
analysis of the legal and cultural characterisation of the role of these figures in a 
criminal law system. 
Moreover, the way disclosure is structured is influenced by the legal tradition of 
the system in which it operates. Systems of common law origin adopt complex 
_______________________
1 US Supreme Court, Brady v Maryland 373 US 83 (1963), para. 87.
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technical rules or provisions while civil law systems embrace an open case file 
or dossier approach. Furthermore, some criminal systems imported elements of 
another procedural background showing trends and possible evolution in the 
regulation of disclosure.
While disclosure is an essential feature of criminal proceedings, it is not an absolute 
right. Circumstances exist that may justify restrictions to the right of disclosure. 
Disclosure in fact involves balancing different and sometimes competing interests. 
For instance, the interest of safeguarding an ongoing investigation or the interest in 
protecting witnesses as opposed to the interest of the defendant to gain knowledge 
of information. Such scenario calls all the different actors in a criminal trial into 
play, namely the defence, the prosecutor and the judge. 
In addition to this, disclosure of information plays a crucial role in facilitating 
the efficiency and expeditiousness of the proceedings. Poor disclosure generates 
lengthy and time-consuming litigation that affects the smooth conduct of a 
criminal trial sometimes to the extent that it hampers the reaching of a verdict.  
These few preliminary remarks already allow appreciation of the complexity of the 
subject, to depict the perspectives from which the analysis of disclosure is carried 
out in this research project and at the same time to introduce the context of this 
work.  
2. The scope of the study  
The purpose of the study is to scrutinise and evaluate the regulation of disclosure 
in national and international procedural systems in order to gain knowledge of the 
different ways in which the disclosure of information can be achieved. 
The comparative analysis will draw the lines of the scrutiny conducted singling out 
and addressing the different main critical aspects of the disclosure of information 
that each system presents. 
The jurisprudence2 of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the right 
to a fair trial and, more specifically, on the disclosure of information provides the 
background against which these systems can be evaluated.
Throughout this process, several questions arise such as: what is the influence that 
different legal traditions such as common law and civil law exercise on disclosure? 
What role should the defence, the prosecutor and the judges play in the disclosure 
process? What judicial supervision, if any, should be envisaged in the disclosure 
process and at what stage? How can disclosure be accommodated with competing 
interests? What should the consequences of disclosure violations be? 
Finally, taking on board the results of the research and the answers that the 
systems investigated provide to these and other legal questions in their criminal 
procedure, an attempt is made to suggest possible improvements in the regulation 
of disclosure in criminal proceedings.
_______________________
2 Aware of the different legal meaning of the terms “case law” and “jurisprudence” I chose to use them interchangeably in this work.
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3. The method
The research project investigates, on a comparative basis, the rules of procedure 
and evidence regulating disclosure in five criminal procedural systems. Three of 
these systems are national and two international. 
The choice of the systems has been guided by the intention to offer a representative 
sample of the different possible ways to achieve and regulate disclosure in criminal 
proceedings. As far as the national plane is concerned, England, Italy and France 
have been selected. England and France as representatives of the common law/civil 
law divide and Italy as it adopted a criminal procedure code that moved towards 
an adversarial procedure rather than the long-standing inquisitorial tradition. In 
relation to this part of my research, I drew on my experience as a lawyer in Italy and 
several meetings with a number of specialists, lawyers and judges, who provided 
me with helpful and accurate feedback and information about my work. 
As far as the international plane is concerned, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ITCY) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
were chosen among the numerous international and internationalised courts 
and tribunals which have soared in number over the past twenty years. The ICTY 
was chosen due to its extensive experience and its significant jurisprudential 
contribution to the development of disclosure in international criminal 
proceedings. The ICC was selected because of its permanent nature, the innovative 
features of its procedural structure and because disclosure has already played a 
substantial role in several of its proceedings. 
As far as this part of the research is concerned, I benefited from my internship in 
the Trial Chambers of the ICTY. 
The analysis of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the 
right to a fair trial and on the issue of disclosure is an important component of 
this research. In fact, it allows the singling out of some of the critical aspects of 
disclosure stressing its solid nexus with human rights law as well as appreciating the 
contribution that the ECtHR’s jurisprudence gave to the development of disclosure 
in criminal proceedings. In fact, while the Strasbourg Court does not tell us which is 
the preferable way to regulate disclosure it makes clear which features of a criminal 
procedure conflict with the right to a fair trial and with the right of disclosure. 
The jurisprudence of the Court is therefore of assistance in the assessment of the 
disclosure process in national systems and that is why the procedural systems 
chosen are all subjected to the jurisdiction of the Court. However, also in relation 
to the international criminal bodies scrutinised in this work the ECtHR case-law is 
useful considering that, even if they are not bound by its jurisprudence, their legal 
instruments enshrine the obligation to respect the right to a fair trial. In relation to 
this segment of the research, I could benefit from my professional experience as a 
lawyer in the Registry of the European Court of Human Rights that equipped me 
with unique first-hand experience of the functioning of the Court and it allowed 
me to advance my knowledge of its jurisprudence.
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The pattern followed and the order chosen in the redaction of the chapters present 
the characteristics of a pyramid structure where the analysis of the three domestic 
legal systems, through the filter of the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights, guides us to the international plane. 
Each of the procedural systems investigated presents its own peculiarities and in 
order to assess the rules regulating the disclosure process it is necessary to gain an 
understanding of the functioning of the whole system. To this end, each chapter 
provides a description of how the procedures developed over time as well as an 
overview of their current operative framework. Having become familiar with the 
context in which the obligations to disclose are discharged it will then be easier 
for the reader to understand the description and the analysis of the rules and legal 
provisions regulating the disclosure of information in the system assessed which 
are provided in each chapter. The analysis will give account of the different aspects 
that the prosecutor, the defence and the judges present in the system scrutinised as 
well as of the ramifications that these differences bear in relation to the disclosure 
process.
Finally, against this background an attempt is made to suggest possible improvements 
of the current regulation of disclosure. Particular attention is devoted to modern 
international criminal proceedings due to their relatively young age as well as in the 
light of the ongoing debate about the possibility of establishing a single common 
criminal procedure applicable to all international criminal courts and tribunals.
The research for this work ended in May 2014.3 
_______________________
3  However, in the context of the English/Welsh criminal procedural system, reference has been made to the latest edition of 
the Criminal Procedure Rules that entered into force on 6 October 2014.
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I. Disclosure of information in the English/Welsh criminal 
law system
Introduction
“Non-disclosure is a potent source of injustice and even with the benefit of hindsight 
it will often be difficult to say whether or not an undisclosed item of evidence might 
have shifted the balance or opened up a new line of defence…”1
“…in our adversarial system in which the police and the prosecution control the 
investigatory process, an accused’s right to fair disclosure is an inseparable part of his 
right to a fair trial.”2
These two statements summarise the essence and the complexity of common law 
regarding disclosure. The adversarial system is based on a construct envisaging 
two parties preparing their own case in the pre-trial stage and presenting it at trial, 
referred to as the “two cases approach”.3 The system relies on the presumption that 
in criminal proceedings both parties to a trial enjoy roughly equal resources to 
guarantee the fairness of the trial.4  While this presumption sounds less naïve when 
a trial is ongoing, it is rather unsound when considered in relation to the pre-trial 
stage where the prosecutor has investigative resources and powers at his disposal 
that no defendant will ever be able to match. Consequently, the only possible 
remedy to this rather significant disparity is the obligation upon the prosecution 
to make available all the material gathered that might assist the defence in the 
preparation of its case.5
This in turn involves a deeper consideration of the role that the prosecution is 
expected to play in the criminal justice system. The responsibilities that rest on 
the prosecution have blurred the edges of the adversarial system in the name of 
the fair administration of justice; the prosecutor is requested to perform tasks that 
might benefit the opponent.6 Furthermore, when the prosecutor decides what 
material has to be disclosed he performs acts that are administrative rather than 
judicial in character.7 In a purely adversarial system there would be no or limited 
room for disclosure obligations. The prosecution, in fact, would focus exclusively 
on building its case. Despite the reforms that have taken place in common law on 
disclosure and the introduction of some sort of judicial supervision the tension 
between the cultural tradition of the prosecution and the duties placed upon him 
in relation to disclosure remain vivid. 
_______________________
1 R v Ward, (1993) 96 Cr App R 1, Judgment, p. 22. 
2 R v Brown, (1995) 1 Cr App R 191, Judgment, p. 198.
3 Schuon C., International Criminal Procedure a Clash of Legal Cultures, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010; Heinze A., Internation-
al Criminal Procedure and Disclosure: An Attempt to Better Understand and Regulate Disclosure and Communication 
at the ICC on the Basis of a Comprehensive and Comparative Theory of Criminal Procedure, Dunker & Humblot, Berlin, 
May 2014, p. 110.
4 Report to the Home Secretary on Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases, (HC 338, London: HMSO, 1976) para. 1.17.
5 Niblett J., Disclosure in Criminal Proceedings, Blackstone Press Limited, 1997, p. 14.
6 Plater D., The Development of the Prosecutor Role in England and Australia with Respect to its Duty of Disclosure: Par-
tisan Advocate or Minister of Justice?, The University of Tasmania Law Review, Vol 25, No. 2, 2006. Also Niblett, above 
n. 5 and R v Preston, (1994) 98 Cr App R. 405, p. 415.
7 R v Preston, above n. 6.
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Disclosure is a complex topic also because of its intrinsic imperfection caused by 
the fact that the system entrusts a party to a trial with the discretion to decide 
on what to disclose to the other side. It is therefore difficult, if not impossible, 
to assess with absolute certainty in each case whether material that should have 
been disclosed was indeed disclosed. Disclosure has been characterised as the 
“battleground of the modern legal system”.8 In the English/Welsh legal system, the 
law on disclosure has evolved and changed constantly over the past thirty years. 
Both common law and statutory law have boosted this process trying to correct the 
faults in the system. 
For the purposes of the present analysis disclosure can be divided into three 
categories: pre-trial prosecution disclosure, prosecution disclosure of unused 
material and defence disclosure. In relation to the first category, the principle that 
the prosecution needs to disclose its case to the accused before the trial begins is 
settled and uncontroversial in the English/Welsh criminal justice system. An accused 
has the right to know what material the charges against him are based on. Without 
knowledge of the prosecution’s case the defence cannot effectively prepare for trial. 
Interestingly enough it has not always been so. Disclosure of the prosecution’s 
case, which in modern criminal procedure is a basic right of the accused, was not 
contemplated by the system in early modern age trials (sixteenth and seventeenth 
century). In fact, as it will be seen, it was believed that an accused could only 
benefit from the ignorance of the case against him as the spontaneity (and therefore 
genuine) of his reaction was considered the key element of an effective defence. 
Things are more complicated in relation to prosecution’s disclosure of unused 
material, which is material generated and gathered during an investigation that 
will not be part of the prosecution’s case. It is in this area that disclosure law 
has witnessed the most change over the past thirty years. Disclosure of unused 
material may require finding the balance between the right to a fair trial and the 
protection of the public interest. This equilibrium comes under scrutiny when the 
prosecution intends to withhold material on public interest grounds. This scenario 
leads to another delicate matter concerning the adoption of effective safeguards of 
the rights of the accused in the context of prosecution ex parte applications seeking 
non-disclosure.  
Finally, the Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act (entered into force in 
1997) introduced specific disclosure obligations for the defence in the criminal 
procedure. This was a remarkable departure from the adversarial tradition where 
the prosecution has to prove its prima facie case with no cooperation of the defence 
whose attitude was passive and limited to responding to the prosecution’s case. The 
ratio behind defence’s disclosure is that by clarifying and defining issues of the case 
it can contribute to its fairness. Defence practitioners opposed the introduction 
of defence disclosure obligations, as they are perceived to be going against the 
adversarial tradition and to disadvantage the accused. 
_______________________
8 Zander M. and Henderson P. (1993) Crown Court Study, Research Study No. 19, Royal Commission.
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This section focuses on the prosecution’s duty to disclose unused material and the 
defence’s disclosure obligations. A brief introductory description of the trials in the 
early modern age and the first appearance of disclosure provisions is the starting 
point of the analysis. This description will assist in understanding the opposite 
conceptions of disclosure which characterise the modern English/Welsh criminal 
procedure. Scrutiny of the jurisprudence’s main contribution to the development 
of the current disclosure process is carried out and it is followed by an analysis of 
the main statutory laws on disclosure in order to shed light on the role played by the 
police, the investigators, the prosecution and the defence in the disclosure scheme. 
Finally, an assessment of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
involving the United Kingdom and its disclosure process in criminal proceedings 
is provided. A chronological approach is followed in the analysis of the common 
law and statutory law on disclosure before discussing the public interest immunity 
procedure and the legal issues related to it. The analysis is limited to the procedure 
followed in Crown Court trials which deal with the most serious criminal offences.
1. The origins of the duties to disclose in criminal trials  
The adversarial legal system is the defining feature of the English/Welsh criminal 
justice system based on English common law. English criminal trials from the 
seventeenth to the early twentieth century were very different from those of today. 
The work of Langbein, which provides a detailed account of these proceedings have 
been largely used in this section.9 
In the sixteenth and seventeenth century (the so-called early modern period) the 
criminal procedure of England relied on the principle that an accused should defend 
himself without the services of an attorney. The criminal trial was a “lawyer - free 
contest of amateurs”.10 The victim of the crime (or his family in murder cases) would 
prosecute the case and the accused would defend himself without the assistance of a 
professional lawyer. The responsibility for reporting crimes and gathering evidence 
was placed on the victims as until the third decade of the nineteenth century in 
London there was no police force that could perform these tasks. 
The main function of the trial was to grant an opportunity to the accused to 
confront the prosecution’s case and the evidence gathered against him. In order 
to do so he had to give his own version of the events at the trial. The accused was 
not granted the right to remain silent but, on the contrary, he was considered a 
source of information. His genuine reaction to the charges against him was the 
key element for the jury to assess whether he was innocent or guilty. The most 
significant corollary to this conception of the trial was that the accused had to 
remain ignorant of the prosecution’s case and the evidence collected against him 
until confronted with it at trial. Disclosure of information was therefore a concept 
_______________________
9 Langbein J.H., The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Trial, Oxford University Press, 2003. Also Baker J. H., An Intro-
duction to English Legal History, Butterworths Lexis Nexis, 2002; Beattie J.M., Policing and Punishment in London 
1660-1750, Oxford University Press, 2001; King P., Crime, Justice and Discretion in England, 1740 – 1820, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2000; May A.N., The Bar and the Old Bailey, 1750-1850, Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 
2003; Bentley D., English Criminal Justice in the Nineteenth Century, London: The Hambledon Press 1998; Post J.B., The 
Admissibility of Defence Counsel In English Criminal Procedure, The Journal of Legal History, 5:3, 23-32.
10 Langbein, above n. 9 at p. 11.
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foreign to the criminal procedure. When the accused had to enter his plea the 
indictment was read to him for the first time. The absence of previous disclosure 
was considered beneficial to the accused as only through spontaneous reactions to 
the prosecution’s case could he prove his innocence.11 
The rule against the defence counsel must be contextualised as it applied only to 
matters of fact. The engagement of a lawyer by a defendant was allowed in relation 
to matters of law whereas the realm of facts were inaccessible to lawyers as it was 
believed that no lawyer could speak about the events of the case better than the 
defendant. Consequently, lawyers had a role in the pre-trial phase, which would 
lead to the plea of the accused. In fact, pleading guilty or not guilty was a matter 
of law. Nonetheless, also in the pre-trial stage legal assistance was not effective as 
lawyers experienced limits on access to their client. Furthermore, the opportunity to 
elaborate any objection to the indictment was slim considering that the indictment 
was read to lawyers and the accused for the first time when the latter was called to 
enter a plea. The trial was about facts and the accused was the sole protagonist. The 
(false) assumption was that every person accused was able to defend his own case 
by effectively speaking of the facts and cross-examining witnesses. 
Both parties could call witnesses although only the prosecutor’s witnesses were 
sworn in before giving testimony. The accused and his witnesses did not render 
their testimony under oath. Clearly, this difference affected the credibility of both 
the defendant and his witnesses. In addition, the prosecution’s witnesses could be 
summoned by the judge to compel them to appear in court whereas such possibility 
was not granted to the accused.
The absence of professional lawyers from the scene of the trial conferred a relatively 
active role on the judges. The judges could detect, motu proprio, procedural flaws 
in the prosecution conduct. Defendants were often uneducated and unable to put 
forward effective, if any, cross-examination. Occasionally judges intervened and 
examined witnesses on behalf of the accused. They also summed up the case for 
the jurors at the end of the trial. It was not uncommon for a judge to recommend 
a certain verdict to the jury or shared his opinion about the case and its most 
welcome outcome with the jurors. Until the last quarter of the seventeenth century 
the judges could fine jurors who failed to return the verdict they had been advised 
to return. The judges were active in the management of the trial. Their role went 
far beyond that of an impartial umpire as modern English criminal procedural law 
conceives it.
Juries heard up to twelve cases before retiring to deliberate.  The average time for 
a case to be tried including the verdict was less than twenty minutes.12 The jury 
returned the verdict and determined the appropriate sentence in case of guilt. The 
accused could not put his arguments before the jury in what later would become a 
sentencing hearing as he could only speak in relation to facts.
_______________________
11 Ibid. at p. 15.
12 Ibid. at p. 16.
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Summing up, the trial was an altercation between the victim and the accused. 
The core element of the trial was the accused speaking about the facts of the case. 
He was a source of information for the judge and the jurors. This was the English 
criminal trial’s major concern in the early modern age. Contemporaries considered 
the unpreparedness of the accused essential for the effectiveness of the proceedings. 
Spontaneity was the key element of the truth finding process. Lawyers were 
perceived as a threat to the status quo and therefore their engagement was strictly 
limited. Disclosure of information and evidence to the accused was a danger to the 
effectiveness of the system and therefore needed to be avoided. The unfairness of 
the altercation system was not evident when compared to the Middle Ages. 
2. The 1696 Treason Trials Act and the first disclosure obligation
The altercation system was proven flawed when some major treason trials, between 
1678 and 1685, resulted in the false convictions of innocent persons.13 These major 
miscarriages of justice caused deep concern over the criminal procedure followed 
in treason trials. The response to these concerns was the adoption of the 1696 
Trial Treason Act, which introduced a duty of disclosure for the prosecution. The 
defendant was in fact granted the right to obtain a copy of the indictment at least 
five days before the commencement of the trial. This first disclosure obligation 
did not encompass the names of the witnesses the prosecution intended to call. 
The disclosure of the indictment to the defendant enhanced the effectiveness of 
the assistance of a lawyer in the pre-trial phase. It gave the opportunity to the 
defendant and his lawyer to analyse and comprehend the charges in the indictment 
and eventually to detect flaws of law.
The Treason Trials Act granted the accused the right to counsel during the trial.14 In 
1730, judges began permitting legal representation for defendants in felony cases.15 
Interestingly, this fundamental change from the previous system did not occur 
through legislation but rather through the judicial management of the cases.   The 
advent of lawyers in felony trials soon led to the gradual silencing of the accused. 
The adversarial trial became a trial governed by lawyers who used their skills to 
blur the distinction between matters of facts and matters of law. The Prisoners’ 
Counsel Act of 1836 allowed defence lawyers to address the jury. A side effect of 
the progressive silencing of the accused due to the predominant role acquired by 
defence counsel was the affirmation of what is now known as the privilege against 
_______________________
13 Three sets of trials outraged the public and shocked England: a) The Popish plot of 1678 where a perjurer alleged that 
there existed an extensive Catholic conspiracy to assassinate Charles II. These accusations eventually led to the execu-
tion of at least 15 innocent men. See Kenyon J., The Popish Plot, 2d ed., 1985, repr. Phoenix Press 2001 and Pollock J., 
The Popish Plot: A Study in the History, Kessinger Publishing, 2005; b) The Rye House Plot of 1683 which was a plan to 
assassinate King Charles II of England and his brother. The treason trials arising from this plot led to the conviction and 
execution of two leading figures of the Whig party. See Greaves, R.L. Secrets of the Kingdom: British Radicals from the 
Popish Plot to the Revolution of 1688-89 (Stanford University Press) 1992 and Milne D.J., The Results of the Rye House 
Plot and Their Influence upon the Revolution of 1688: The Alexander Prize Essay Transactions of the Royal Historical So-
ciety 5th Series, 1 (1951), p. 91-108; c) The Bloody Assizes, which were a series of trials started at Winchester on 25 August 
1685 in the aftermath of the Battle of Sedgemoor, which ended the Monmouth Rebellion in England. Over 1,000 rebels 
were in prison awaiting the trials, which started in Winchester on 26 August. The first notable trial was that of an el-
derly gentlewoman called Dame Alice Lyle.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bloody_Assizes - cite_note-som-2#cite_note-
som-2 The jury reluctantly found her guilty, and the law recognising no distinction between principals and accessories 
in treason, she was sentenced to be burned. This was commuted to beheading, with the sentence being carried out in 
Winchester marketplace on 2 September 1685. See Dunning R., Monmouth Rebellion: Guide to the Rebellion and Bloody 
Assize, Dovecote Press, 1984. 
14 Langbein, above n. 9; Baker, above n. 9 at pp. 93-96. See also Bentley, above n. 9.




In the adversarial criminal procedure, judges gradually lost their judicial activism 
and assumed the modern role of impartial umpires arbitrating the contest between 
barristers. By the end of the eighteenth century, the focus of the trial in the 
adversarial system had shifted from the defence’s case to that of the prosecution. 
In the altercation system, the trial was an opportunity for the defendant to confront 
the charges and the evidence put before him, which were not disclosed in advance. 
With the affirmation of the adversarial procedure and the silencing of the accused 
the main question was whether the prosecution’s case would prove solid once the 
defence counsel had tested it at trial. 
3. The development of the common law on disclosure
Until 1946 there was no authority validating the assumption that the prosecutor 
had a duty to disclose material in his possession to the defence.16 There are two 
categories of material held by the prosecution: the evidence and the unused 
material. The former is the material the prosecution intends to rely on in order to 
prove his case. The second includes all the other material gathered in a criminal 
investigation that the prosecution does not intend to use at trial. This material 
could prove useful to the defence nonetheless. 
As far as the evidence is concerned, the prosecution’s duty to disclose the case 
against the accused is settled and uncontroversial. On the other hand, disclosure 
of unused material has been a hotly debated topic. Until 1982, the obligations 
imposed on the prosecutor to disclose unused material were rather limited.17 The 
system placed great trust on the prosecution’s integrity and fairness in assessing 
the material in his possession. The jurisprudence of the English criminal courts 
was the engine that led to the introduction of the prosecution’s duties into the 
criminal procedure to disclose to the defence evidence and material that is relevant 
to the case even if it will not be part of the prosecution’s case.
In 1946 the Court of Appeal delivered the Bryant and Dickson judgment which 
marked the shift from the idea that the system itself guaranteed the fairness and 
impartiality of those who acted on behalf of the Crown in criminal cases to the 
conception of disclosure as a fundamental right of the accused.18 Interestingly 
enough the case was a civil case and not a criminal one. This is not extraordinary 
considering that disclosure was common practice in civil proceedings in the 
twentieth century whereas it found no place in criminal proceedings. In Bryant and 
Dickson the plaintiff, who had been acquitted in a previous criminal judgment, 
claimed that the police had acted maliciously by withholding exculpatory material. 
Specifically, he claimed that a witness statement that should have been disclosed 
by the prosecution had been kept from him. The Court of Appeal set the first 
prosecution disclosure obligation stating that in a criminal case the prosecution 
_______________________
16 Report to the Home Secretary on Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases, above n. 4 at para. 5. 
17 Corker D. and Parkinson S., Disclosure in Criminal Proceedings, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 1.
18 R v Bryant and Dickson, (1946) 31 Cr App R 146.
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has the duty to “make available to the defence a witness whom the prosecution 
know can, if he is called, give material evidence.”19 The standard was rather low as 
the judges found that the prosecution had no obligation to disclose to the defence 
the statement that was eventually made by the relevant witness, but only to make 
the witness available to the defence. This ruling was absorbed into criminal cases. 
Almost twenty years went by before another civil judgment broadened the 
prosecution’s duty of disclosure. In 1965 the Court of Appeal heard the Dallison 
v Caffrey case where, again, the plaintiff claimed that the police had maliciously 
withheld a witness statement that corroborated the accused’s alibi.20 The 
prosecution responded by showing its compliance with the Bryant and Dickson 
standard. It had indeed provided to the defence the witness’s name and address 
but not the statement. However, the judges found that the duty of a prosecuting 
counsel or solicitor was such that “if he knows of a credible witness who can speak 
to material facts which tend to show the prisoner to be innocent, he must either 
call that witness himself or make his statement available to the defence”. 21
The judgment broadened the prosecutor’s obligation to disclose requiring him 
to supply the defence not only with the details of a relevant witness but also his 
statement. An important distinction was drawn between witnesses considered 
credible and those whose reliance was considered scarce by the prosecutor. In the 
latter case, the names and whereabouts of the witness would suffice to comply with 
the disclosure standard. Obviously, a credible witness statement that strengthens 
the alibi of an accused must be disclosed. “It would be highly reprehensible to 
conceal from the court the evidence which such a witness [a credible witness] can 
give”.22  Therefore, although the prosecution had abided by the Bryant and Dickson 
standard the Court of Appeal found that it was not sufficient to guarantee justice 
was served. Justice and fairness had to be the guiding light in matters concerning 
disclosure and not the literal reading and application of the law.  The accused’s 
right to disclosure rather then the integrity of the prosecution was now considered 
to be the best guarantee of a fair criminal trial.23 
Finally, in the case of R v Hennesy the Court of Appeal remarked the importance 
of full disclosure by the prosecution stating that “those who prepare and conduct 
prosecutions owe a duty to the courts to ensure that all relevant evidence of help to 
an accused is either led by them or made available to the defence.”24
Concluding, the above case law shows that the disclosure process involved only 
the prosecutors that were entrusted with discretion in deciding what ought to be 
disclosed to the defence. In discharging his responsibility, the prosecutor had to 
look beyond the literal interpretation of the rules and let the overall fairness of the 
trial guide him through the process.
_______________________
19 Ibid. at 151.
20 Dallison v Caffrey, [1965] 1 QB 348. 
21 Ibid. at 369. 
22 Ibid. at 369.
23 Corker and Parkinson, above n. 17 at p. 7.
24 R v Hennessy (1979) 68 Cr App R 419, at 426.
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4. The 1981 Attorney General’s Guidelines 
The first government attempt to codify the rules of disclosure and to define their 
functioning occurred in December 1981 when the Attorney General issued a set of 
guidelines. They did not have the force of law and were the product of a working 
group appointed in 1972 given the task of investigating new policies and practices 
for the discharge of the prosecution’s duties to disclose unused material. The 
guidelines broke up the judiciary’s monopoly in the development of the disclosure 
regime in the criminal justice system.25 
The Attorney General guidelines defined “unused material” as:
“(i) All witness statements and documents which are not included in the committal bundle 
served on the defence; (ii) the statements of any witnesses who are to be called to give 
evidence at the committal and (if not in the bundle) any documents referred to therein; (iii) 
the unedited version(s) of any edited statements or composite statement included in the 
committal bundles.”26 
Any item falling within this definition was to be made available to the defence if “... 
it ha[d] some bearing on the offence(s) charged and the surrounding circumstances 
of the case”.27  The standard adopted to define the category of material that the 
prosecution was under a duty to disclose could not be wider. The timeline for 
disclosure was not strictly defined and the guidelines stated that disclosure had 
to be made as soon as possible before the date set for the beginning of the trial.28 
However, the prosecution was granted the discretion to withhold material in several 
cases.29 The exercise of such discretion was regulated with no reference to the Court 
or the defence. The idea underlying the guidelines was that the prosecution “could 
be trusted to do what was right and proper”. 30
Non-disclosure was allowed when: (i) disclosing a statement might lead to the 
intimidation of a witness; (ii) the statement is believed to be wholly or partly untrue 
and might be of use in cross-examination if the witness is called by the defence; 
(iii) the statement is favourable to the prosecution who, nonetheless, fears that its 
disclosure might lead to the witness giving false account that is favourable to the 
accused; (iv) the statements is quite neutral but it is feared that the witness might 
change his story and give evidence for the defence.31  
Furthermore, the guidelines envisaged another case where the prosecution can 
withhold material; that is when (v) the statement is to a greater or lesser extent 
“sensitive” and its disclosure is against the public interest. Such sensitivity applies, 
inter alia, to statements that deal with matters of national security, statements 
_______________________
25 Corker and Parkinson, above n. 17 at p. 7.
26 Attorney General’s Guidelines 1981, para. 1. 
27 Ibid. at para. 2. 
28 Ibid. at para. 3. 
29 Ibid. at para. 6. The working party had considered that “the discretionary power to withhold statements by “suspects” 
witnesses has been exercised by Counsel for as long as any of us can remember”. 
30 Corker and Parkinson, above n. 17 at p. 9. 
31 Attorney General’s Guidelines 1981, para. 6.
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that disclose the identity of a member of the security services or statements that 
disclose the identity of an informant or a witness when there are reasons to believe 
that their disclosure would put them or their family in danger.32  
“In deciding whether or not statements containing sensitive material should be 
disclosed, a balance should be struck between the degree of sensitivity and the 
extent to which the information might assist the defence”.33 The decision as to 
whether or not the balance in a particular case requires disclosure of sensitive 
material had to be made by the prosecution, although any doubt should be resolved 
in favour of disclosure.
By the beginning of the 1990s, the Court of Appeal made clear its disapproval of 
the way in which prosecutors exercised their wide discretion.34 The dissatisfaction 
concerned the prosecutors’ attitude of strictly observing the letter of the law rather 
than the spirit with which it was written.35  
In R v Brown, the Appeal Court made clear that the guidelines were “merely a set 
of instructions to Crown Prosecution Service lawyers and prosecuting counsel.”36 
The court remarked that the guidelines were out of date because they did not 
conform to the requirements of the law on disclosure as they had been drafted 
before major developments in the field occurred. The Court stressed the “useful 
purpose” that the guidelines had served but noted that “they had been eroded 
by other legal advancements, particularly the developments in the field of public 
interest immunity”.37 
The scheme set up by the guidelines was based on the idea that the discretion 
granted to the prosecution in the exercise of its responsibility was well placed due 
to the intrinsic fairness of its role. The guidelines did not contemplate judicial 
supervision or control of the way in which the prosecution carried out such 
delicate tasks. At the beginning of the 1990’s several major miscarriages of justice 
caused by misconduct of the prosecution proved this construct of the law on 
disclosure to be fallacious.
5. The Case of Judith Ward
 
The case of Judith Ward38 was one of a series of cases that, due to prosecutors’ 
willful non-disclosure of relevant material to the defence, turned out to be among 
_______________________
32 Sensitivity characterises also statements which contain details that might facilitate the commission of other offences 
or alert someone not in custody that he was a suspect or statements that disclose some unusual form of surveillance or 
method of detecting crime; statements supplied only on condition that the content will not be disclosed at least until 
a  subpoena has been served upon the supplier; statements related to other offences by, or serious allegations against, 
someone who is not an accused, or disclose previous convictions or other matters prejudicial to them; statements con-
taining details of private delicacy to the maker and/or might create risk of domestic strife. 
33 Attorney General’s Guidelines 1981, para. 8.
34 See R v Lawson, (1990) Cr App R 107; R v Phillipson, (1990) 91 Cr App R 226; R v Sansom, [1991] 2 QB 130. 
35 Corker and Parkinson, above n. 17 at p. 11. 
36 R v Brown, (1995) 1 Cr App R 191, at 197.
37 Ibid. at 197.
38 R v Ward, (1993) 96 Cr App R 1, Judgment.
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the gravest miscarriages of justice that had ever occurred in England.39  
On 14 February 1974, Judith Ward was arrested in the course of the investigations 
that followed three different explosions, which had occurred in London, Manchester 
and Buckinghamshire between September 1973 and February 1974. One of these 
incidents was extremely severe leading to the death of 12 passengers, including two 
children, of a coach carrying English soldiers and their families.
During her detention, Ms. Ward was interviewed on several occasions by police 
officers. She was charged with 15 counts, including 12 counts of murder. She 
pleaded not guilty to all counts. The trial lasted four weeks at the end of which she 
was sentenced to a total of 30 years imprisonment. Miss Ward did not seek leave to 
appeal the sentence or the conviction.
On 17 September 1991, the Home Secretary referred the case of Judith Ward to the 
Court of Appeal. Section 17 (1) (a) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 regulates this 
procedure stating that:
Where a person has been convicted on indictment, or been tried on indictment and 
found not guilty by reason of insanity, or been found by a jury to be under disability, 
the Secretary of State may, if he thinks fit, at any time…(a) refer the whole case to 
the Court of Appeal and the case shall then be treated for all purposes as an appeal 
to the Court by that person. The prosecution’s case at trial in 1974 was based almost 
entirely upon confessions and admissions made by Ms. Ward to police officers 
and on expert evidence. During the appeal hearings, held in April, May and June 
1992, allegations of non-disclosure of material evidence by the prosecution were 
heard. These allegations were the basis for the defence’s argument that Ms. Ward’s 
confessions were unsound and the expert evidence was not reliable.
The Home Secretary referred the case to the Court of Appeal making clear that 
the reason for the referral was the concern about the validity of expert evidence 
relied upon at trial. Specifically, doubts arose concerning the validity of the tests 
carried out by forensic scientists that had proved fallacious in the so-called 
“Birmingham six” appeal.40 A test known as “the Griess Test” was used to detect 
traces of nitroglycerine on Ms. Ward’s hand and belongings. Interestingly, in the 
case of the Maguire Family41, whose conviction had been quashed by the Appeal 
Court, it had emerged that some other substances could lead to the same result as 
testing positive for nitroglycerine. This led to the inference that substances other 
than nitroglycerine could have provided the results of the tests carried out on Ms. 
Ward’s hands, on her baggage and in her caravan.
Ms. Ward’s defence raised three grounds of appeal.42 First, it argued that a material 
irregularity had occurred before and during trial due to the prosecution’s failure 
_______________________
39 The Court of Appeal between 1989 and 1991 had quashed the convictions of the “Guilford Four” in R v Richardson and 
others, The Times, 20 October 1989; the “Birmingham Six” in R v McIlkenney, (1991) 93 Cr App R 287 and the “Maguire 
Seven” in R v Maguire & Ors, (1992) 94 Cr App R 133. All these cases were related to the IRA bombings campaign that 
spread terror and death along the UK in the middle of 1970’s.  All of the accused during the mid-1970s had been tried 
and convicted on terrorist charges.
40 R v McIlkenney, (1991) 93 Cr App R 287.
41 R v Maguire & Ors, (1992) 94 Cr App R 133.
42 Following the reference of the case by the Home Secretary, the appellant is entitled to raise at his appeal any relevant issue.
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to disclose relevant evidence that it was under a duty to disclose to the defence. 
Second, that fresh evidence was available which casted considerable doubt over 
the scientific evidence relied upon by the Crown during the trial. Third, that fresh 
evidence was available which proved that Ms. Ward suffered from a personality 
disorder so severe that none of her admissions could be considered true. For the 
purpose of this research, attention is devoted only to the first ground of appeal due 
to its major relevance to disclosure law.
The Appeal Court was satisfied that the prosecution’s failure to disclose relevant 
evidence had constituted material irregularity in the course of the 1974 trial of 
Ms. Ward. The judges (for the purposes of the review of the case) considered the 
prosecution as an entity composed of the West Yorkshire Police, the staff of the 
Director of the Public Prosecutor (DPP), the psychiatrists who prepared medical 
reports on Ms. Ward, and the forensic scientists who gave evidence for the 
prosecution at trial. 
The West Yorkshire Police had collected statements from over 1,700 people. Of 
this collection, only 225 statements had been forwarded to the DPP. “The principal 
relevance of the statements in question lies in their bearing on the appellant’s 
proclivities for attention seeking, fantasy and the making and withdrawal of untrue 
confessions”.43 Among the statements, which were withheld by the police, some 
recorded the almost immediate retraction of the appellant’s confession that she 
had been visiting the Thiepval Barracks on behalf of the IRA in order to reconnoiter 
it. This emphasises the importance of the role played by the investigators in the 
disclosure process. This responsibility remains a delicate and rather controversial 
topic in the modern law on disclosure. Failure to disclose relevant material to the 
defence was also detected in relation to the conduct of the DPP and the psychiatrists 
who prepared medical reports on Ms. Ward.
The bulk of the Appeal Court’s judgment related to the way in which expert evidence 
had been gathered and revealed to the prosecution and judges by forensic experts. 
The expert evidence was based upon what the prosecution had asserted, that in 
1974, Ms. Ward had been handling (at relevant times) nitroglycerine in relation 
to all three incidents. The forensic experts’ conduct was harshly criticised by the 
judges.
The judges found that the forensic scientists had been biased and corroborated 
the prosecution’s case by lying and suppressing evidence at the trial. It is useful 
to briefly describe their conduct to appreciate its gravity and its devastating effect 
on the outcome of the 1974 trial. The test for nitroglycerine conducted on Ms. 
Ward in relation to the Euston station explosion showed a “faint trace” on the right 
hand and “negative” for the left hand and for the nail scraping. Nevertheless, the 
experts described the results to the prosecution and the defence as “positive” for 
nitroglycerine. What had proved to be “faint trace” was portrayed to the defence as 
“positive”. There was no disclosure to the prosecution, the court and the defence of 
_______________________
43 R v Ward, (1993) 96 Cr App R 1, Judgment.
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the true results, which could have led the defence to contest the conclusion that 
nitroglycerine had been detected on Ms. Ward. 
Furthermore, the forensic scientists had run several tests to determine whether 
it was possible that the debris caused by the explosion had contaminated Miss 
Ward. The results of the so called “firing cell tests” showed “faint”, “very heavy” 
and “extremely heavy” traces of nitroglycerine on the hands of staff members 
who had touched objects in the firing cell. If these results had been disclosed at 
trial, they would have shown that there existed an alternative explanation for the 
traces of nitroglycerine detected on Ms. Ward. Only the most convenient test for 
the prosecution case was disclosed at trial and one of the experts explained to the 
Court that the result of such test had been “negative”.
During the 1974 trial, the defence’s forensic expert had argued that there existed 
substances, other than nitroglycerine, that the tests (carried out by the Crown 
experts) could confuse with nitroglycerine, but he was unable to name one. This 
clearly weakened his assertion. The Crown’s forensic scientists had superior 
knowledge as in 1973 they had conducted several experiments on dyestuffs 
present in black shoe polish and had concluded that the dyestuff was very similar 
to nitroglycerine when tested with the TLC test they used. The prosecution was 
unaware of these results although their relevance for the ongoing trial was clear. 
On the contrary, one of the experts advised the prosecution that the test could not 
confuse any other commodity with nitroglycerine. 
The Court of Appeal concluded that in the case of Ms. Ward “the disclosure of 
scientific evidence was woefully deficient. Three senior RARDE44 scientists took 
the law into their own hands, and concealed from the prosecution, the defence and 
the court, matters which might have changed the course of the trial”. The appeal 
was allowed on all counts and the conviction of Ms. Ward was quashed. 
6. On the common law on disclosure 
The case of Judith Ward marked a turning point in the regulation of the 
prosecution’s obligation to disclose material to the accused in a criminal trial. The 
appeal judgment in this case, which was handed down in 1992, remedied one of 
the clearest miscarriages of justice that had occurred in the history of the English 
criminal system. The impact of this case on the following developments of the 
common law on disclosure in criminal cases was remarkable.
The appeal judgment of Judith Ward and the severe criticisms of the prosecution’s 
non-disclosure occurred in that case was a watershed moment.45 In this case, two 
main principles regarding the common law on disclosure were affirmed and they 
were profoundly different from the previous disclosure regime.
First, it was stated that in a criminal trial all relevant evidence that can help the 
_______________________
44 Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment.
45 Corker and Parkinson, above n. 17 at p. 14. 
Disclosure of information in the English/Welsh Criminal law System
17 18
defendant must be either led by the prosecution or made available by him to the 
accused. “All relevant evidence of help to the accused is not limited to evidence 
which will obviously advance the accused case. It is of help to the accused to have 
the opportunity of considering all the material evidence which the prosecution 
has gathered, and from which the prosecution have made their own selection of 
evidence to be led.”46 In other words, the previous disclosure regime was broadened 
to the extent that, except in cases where the court upholds an application for non-
disclosure on public interest immunity grounds, everything else that has been 
gathered during a criminal investigations has to be disclosed.
Second, in Ward, the Court considered instances where the prosecution claims 
that certain material, relevant to the case, should be withheld and not disclosed 
to the defence because its disclosure would conflict with the public interest. This 
potential conflict can confer the so-called public interest immunity (“PII”) on the 
material. Whether the public interest must prevail over the right of a defendant to 
disclosure was conceived as the outcome of a balancing of all the interests involved. 
With Ward, the prosecutions’ discretion in carrying out such an assessment had 
proved defective. The Court intervened removing the balancing exercise from the 
hands of the prosecution and placing it in the hands of the judiciary. The rights of 
the defendant would be better guaranteed if it were the trial’s judge and not a party 
to it to decide on the right balance to be struck. 
The Court found that “when the prosecution acted as judge in their own case on the 
issue of public interest immunity in this case they committed a significant number 
of errors which affected the fairness of the proceedings. These considerations 
therefore powerfully reinforce the view that it would be wrong to allow the 
prosecution to withhold material documents without giving any notice of that fact 
to the defence. If, in a wholly exceptional case, the prosecution is not prepared to 
have the issue of public interest immunity determined by a court, the result must 
inevitably be that the prosecution will have to be abandoned.”47 
The Ward judgment reflected the distrust of the public opinion in the unlimited 
discretion granted to the prosecution, which had grown because of the major 
injustices discovered. The disclosure scheme was broadened as far as the subject 
matter of disclosure was concerned and was narrowed in relation to the disclosure 
exception whose assessment was removed from the prosecution and entrusted to 
the court. These changes on the law on disclosure modified the system moving it 
towards a more liberal approach to disclosure.
7. The “post Ward” jurisprudence
This section focuses on the judicial developments that followed the judgment 
delivered in the case of Judith Ward. In the years following the Ward case, the Court 
of Appeal delivered several judgments that framed and narrowed the contours of 
_______________________
46 R v Ward, (1993) 96 Cr App R 1.
47 Ibid. at p. 632-633.
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the disclosure obligations drawn by the Ward judgment. 
In R v Davis, Johnson and Rowe, the Court of Appeal stressed that the prosecution 
was not under a duty to notify the defence of the filing of a public interest immunity 
(PII) non-disclosure application to the judge in every circumstance.48 The Court 
identified three different procedures. In the first procedure, to be adopted in the vast 
majority of cases, the prosecution gives notice to the defence of the PII application and 
describes at least the category to which the material whose non-disclosure is sought 
belongs. Consequently, the defence will be in a position to make submissions to the 
court. The second scenario refers to cases in which the prosecution cannot disclose to 
what category the relevant material belongs. In these cases, the prosecution notifies 
the defence that an application is being filed, but the category of the material is not 
mentioned and the application is ex parte. Finally, the third procedure, to be employed 
in exceptional circumstances, applies to cases where giving notice that a PII application 
is being made would equate to revealing the evidence in question. In this case, the 
prosecution can apply to the judge ex parte without notice to the defence.
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that an ex parte application affects the right 
of the accused to a fair trial but held that it would be against the public interest 
to compel the prosecution to choose between an inter partes procedure or the 
abandonment of the prosecution. According to the Court’s reasoning, the control 
exercised by the trial judge over the views of the prosecution as to the proper 
balance to be struck represents a valid safeguard of the defendant’s interests. 
The new procedure of the ex parte applications was a novelty in criminal proceedings. 
The Court of Appeal seems to have conceded that the Ward regime had gone too 
far. The idea that information might reach the judge without any knowledge by 
the defence became a cause for concern among practitioners. On the other hand, 
this restrictive characterisation of Ward was better than the system in place before 
where the prosecution’s discretion was not subject to judicial control.49
What had been underestimated in Ward was that by taking away the prosecution’s 
discretion the judiciary would be flooded by applications from the Crown to 
withhold material and defence applications to inspect or have a copy of material 
they believed to be relevant to their case. The Courts were not comfortable with the 
new role they had been given in the aftermath of Ward.  
In Ward the judges had used the term “material to the case” to characterise the 
evidence that needed to be disclosed to the defence. A narrow interpretation of 
this rather broad and undefined terminology was offered in Keane where it was 
held that the prosecution was under a duty to put before the judge only those 
documents that it considered to be material but wished to withhold on grounds of 
_______________________
48 R v Davis, Johnson and Rowe, (1993) 97 Cr App R 110. 
49 Niblett, above n. 5 at p. 79. 
Disclosure of information in the English/Welsh Criminal law System
19 20
public interest immunity.50 Evidence that was “material to the case” was defined as 
evidence which could be seen “on a sensible appraisal” by the prosecution: 
(1) to be relevant or possibly relevant to an issue in the case; 
(2) to raise or possibly raise a new issue whose existence is not apparent from the evidence 
which the prosecution proposes to use; 
(3) to hold out a real (as opposed to fanciful) prospect of providing a lead on evidence which 
goes to (1) or (2).51 
This characterisation of evidence that is material to the case gave assistance to 
the prosecution in the exercise of his “sensible appraisal”. The Ward regime was 
significantly revised by this new characterisation. Although the judicial scrutiny 
of what the prosecution intended to withhold remained in place, the discretion 
of the prosecution was restored in relation to a previous stage of the procedure. 
The “sensible appraisal of the prosecution” in deciding what evidence is “material” 
meant that the prosecutor decided what evidence the Court was and was not able 
to see.
8. The 1996 Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act
The discomfort with the Ward liberal law of disclosure was felt within both the 
judiciary and the executive power around the mid-1990s. The Court of Appeal was 
unhappy with the new workload it was facing and began encouraging the prosecution 
to deny disclosure and courts to be careful in examining defence applications for 
disclosure that could transpire to be totally unsound and groundless.
In R v Turner, the Court of Appeal noted that since the Ward judgment defence 
allegations of entrapment and duress followed by extensive disclosure applications 
had multiplied. It alerted “judges to the need to scrutinise applications for disclosure 
of details about informants with very great care. They will need to be astute to see 
that assertions of a need to know such details, because they are essential to the 
running of the defence, are justified. If they are not so justified, then the judge will 
need to adopt a robust approach in declining to order disclosure.”52  In R v Bromley 
Magistrates ex p Smith, courts were invited to exercise some skepticism in treating 
defence challenges to prosecution’s assertion that documents are not “material to 
the case”.53  
The political climate in the mid-1990s had also changed and the indignation 
caused by the miscarriages of justice of the early 1990s had allowed the opinion 
to develop that the balance had shifted too much in favour of criminals.54 The 
burden of disclosure borne by the prosecution went beyond what was considered 
_______________________
50 R v Keane, [1994] 2 All ER 478. 
51 Ibid. at 484.
52 R v Turner, (1995) 2 Cr App R 94. 
53 R v Bromley Magistrates ex p Smith, [1995] 4 All ER 146 at 152. 
54 Corker and Parkinson, above n. 17 at p. 17.
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reasonable.55 The system in place after Ward demanded too much of the prosecution 
and not enough of the defence. Many advocated legislative regulation of the law 
on disclosure.  
Against this background the Criminal Prosecution and Investigation Act (“CPIA”) 
was enacted and entered into force in April 1997. This new statutory provision 
revised the law on disclosure introducing a system based on three stages. Section 
3 of the Act regulated primary disclosure and stated that the prosecution has a 
duty to disclose all undisclosed material that in its opinion “might undermine the 
case for the prosecution against the accused.”  Sections 5 and 6 stated that, after 
primary disclosure by the prosecution, the defence must give the prosecution and 
the court a statement in which it describes, in general terms, the nature of the 
accused’s defence and highlights the matters on which the defence takes issue with 
the prosecution. In the third stage, under section 7 of the Act, the prosecution 
makes a secondary disclosure of all previously undisclosed material, which, in light 
of the defence’s statement, “might be reasonably expected to assist the accused’s 
defence”.
The Act introduced a double test in relation to primary and secondary disclosure 
by the prosecution. The test for primary disclosure was a subjective test relying 
on the prosecution’s opinion of what it believed could “undermine the case for 
the prosecution against the accused”. The Act also introduced for the first time, 
an obligation on the defence to disclose the nature of its case on cases tried on 
indictment. Only the defence’s disclosure triggers the secondary disclosure by 
the prosecution. Prosecution material was defined in section 3 as material that 
the prosecutor possesses or has inspected in connection with the case against the 
accused. 
The defence’s failure or delay in giving a defence statement can lead the judge and 
the jury to draw negative inferences in deciding whether the accused is guilty. Such 
inferences cannot lead solely to the conviction of the accused. 
One of the major criticisms of the scheme introduced by the Act targeted 
the double disclosure test applicable to primary and secondary disclosure. In 
2001, a comprehensive review of the criminal justice system commissioned by 
the government to Sir Robin Auld, a senior judge of the Court of Appeal, was 
published.56 The review noted, inter alia, that the differently formulated tests for 
disclosure tended to suggest a narrow subjective approach at the primary stage and 
a broader and objective one at secondary stage creating confusion and pre-trial 
delays and disputes.57 It concluded that the system caused the “frequent failure to 
exchange adequate disclosure at an early stage to enable both parties to prepare for 
trial efficiently and in a timely way.”58
_______________________
55 Report of the Royal Commission On Criminal Justice, para 49. It went on underlying how “The defence can require the 
police and the prosecution to comb through large masses of material in the hope either of causing delay or of chancing 
upon something that will induce the prosecution to drop the case rather than to disclose the material concerned. The 
defence may do this by successive requests for information, far beyond the stage at which it could be reasonably claimed 
that the information was likely to cast doubt on the prosecution case.”
56 The Review of the Criminal Courts in England and Wales (“the Auld Report”), 2001.
57 Ibid. at para 162.
58 Ibid. at para 167.
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There were also criticisms of the introduction of the defence’s duty to give to the 
court and the prosecution a defence statement, which was rather revolutionary in 
an adversarial criminal law system. Defence disclosure had previously not been 
contemplated. Defence lawyers contrasted this reform, arguing that it led to an 
inversion of the burden of proof and constituted a duty to help the better-resourced 
prosecution.59 The defence was requested to put forward the nature of its case “in 
general terms”. However, such an obligation had the effect of tying the defendant to 
the specific defence put forward without having full knowledge of the prosecution’s 
material. In fact, only after the defence statement had been given to the prosecution 
was the latter under a duty to proceed with secondary disclosure. In other words, the 
accused had to construct his defence on the basis of the material given to him after 
primary disclosure and to stick to it even after secondary disclosure had occurred. 
The judge and the jury could draw inferences from any discrepancies between what 
was in the statement and the case being presented by the defence at the trial. The 
court should hear the defence’s possible explanations for the discrepancy. 
Defence lawyers approached the new disclosure duties with skepticism and 
managed to formulate rather vague statements leaving alternative defences open at 
trial.60 Nonetheless, such an approach frustrated the prosecution and potentially 
led to very limited secondary disclosure. The way it was applied in practice defeated 
the purpose of the 1996 CPIA. 
The studies conducted on the implementation of the 1996 CPIA revealed a 
“widespread dislike of the legislation” by defence practitioners and a “manifested 
unwillingness of the defence to submit meaningful defence statements and judicial 
reluctance to deny defence applications to see unused material”.61 Consequently, 
the functioning of the entire disclosure scheme was frustrated by this conduct.
9. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the current system of disclosure
 9.1 Introduction
The drafters of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (“CJA”) intended it to be an 
endorsement of the Auld Report’s recommendation to create a single and simply 
expressed instrument regulating disclosure rather than the confusing combination 
of different legislations.62 However, the CJA did not abolish the 1996 Criminal 
Prosecution and Investigation Act but amended it. This choice proved to be 
unfortunate as it encouraged the proliferation of different provisions from different 
sources.  
_______________________
59 Taylor R., Wasik M. and Leng R., Blackstone’s Guide to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 
39-40. 
60 Plotnikoff J. and Woolfson R., “A fair Balance?” Evaluation of the Operation of the Disclosure Law, RDS Occasional Pa-
per No 76, 2001, p. 136. Their study showed that “defence cynicism about the CPIA was reflected in the failure of defence 
statements to address the issues set out in the legislation… In the Crown Court, judicial reluctance to resist late service 
or defence disclosure requests has done little to encourage timely or meaningful defence statements. None of the judges 
who commented on defence statements found them useful in their current form.”
61 Ibid. at para 145. 
62 Sir Auld stated that “the present combination of the cumbrously drafted 1996 Act and Rules, the Code, the Attorney 
General’s Guidelines and the Joint Operational Police Instructions is confusing and hard work for anyone to master, not 
least busy policemen and prosecutors”.
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The absence of one consolidated text on disclosure is indeed a characteristic of 
the English/Welsh law on disclosure. The plurality and combination of protocols, 
manuals, guidelines and statutory law on disclosure generates confusion rather 
than clarity. 
To give an idea of the current system it is sufficient to state that the operation of 
the CPIA, as amended by the Criminal Justice Act, is guided by several tools among 
which are the Criminal Procedure Rules (2014) and the Code of practice which was 
issued in part 2 of the CPIA.63  
Furthermore, the judiciary issued a disclosure protocol for the Crown and the 
Magistrate’s Courts (2006)64 as well as a judicial protocol on the disclosure of 
unused material in criminal cases (2013).65  The Attorney General issued guidelines 
in 2000 in order to assist the operation of the statutory regime on disclosure. In 
April 2005, the Attorney General issued new guidelines on the disclosure of unused 
material in criminal justice proceedings. In July 2011, the Supplementary Attorney 
General’s Guidelines on Disclosure, Digitally Stored Material were issued. In 
December 2013 new Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure were issued and 
replaced the previous ones.
In addition, in 2005 a disclosure manual for the police and the Crown Prosecution 
Service (hereafter CPS or Prosecution Service) was created.66 Finally, operational 
instructions for investigators and prosecutors can be found in the disclosure 
manual issued by the Association of Chief police officers and the CPS.
This subsection analyses the main provisions of the 2003 Criminal Justice Act and 
their impact on the law on disclosure. Specifically, attention is paid to the changes 
that the new statutory law introduced in relation to the investigation stage, the 
prosecution disclosure and the defence disclosure.  
 9.2 The investigation stage
In England and Wales, the Crown Prosecution Service is responsible for the 
prosecution of persons charged with a criminal offence. The CPS is an independent 
body established in 1986 to prosecute criminal cases. It is a non-ministerial 
department of the Government of the United Kingdom. It is independent from the 
police although it works closely with them at all times. The director of the public 
prosecutor heads the CPS and the Attorney General for England and Wales, who is 
answerable for it in Parliament, supervises its operation.
_______________________
63 The Criminal Procedure Rules regulate the way a criminal case is managed. They apply in all magistrates’ courts, the 
Crown Court and the Court of Appeal. The latest edition entered into force on 6 October 2014. The Code of Practice, as 
recorded in its Preamble, sets out “the manner in which police officers are to record, retain and reveal to the prosecutor 
material obtained in a criminal investigation and which may be relevant to the investigation, and related matters”. 
64 The protocol’s title is: Disclosure: A Protocol For The Control And Management Of Unused Material In the Crown Court 
(the Disclosure Protocol). It was issued by the Courts service in February 2006. 
65 As stated in its foreword, the Protocol (which is applicable to all criminal Courts in England and Wales) was prepared 
following the recommendations of Lord Justice Gross in his September 2011 ‘Review of Disclosure in Criminal Pro-
ceedings’. It also takes account of Lord Justice Gross and Lord Justice Treacy’s ‘Further review of disclosure in criminal 
proceedings: sanctions for disclosure failure’, published in November 2012. 
66 The combined efforts of the CPS and the association of Chief Police Officers gave birth to the Disclosure Manual that 
provided operational instructions in the implementation of disclosure principles and procedures. The Manual reflected 
the Prosecution approach to disclosure obligations and was the authoritative guidance on practice and procedure for all 
police investigations and CPS prosecutors.
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Another important function of the CPS is to advise the police during investigations 
on a possible prosecution; for instance by clarifying the elements of a specific crime. 
Moreover, the CPS prepares cases for court, prosecutes them before the Magistrate 
Courts and instructs barristers to prosecute cases before the Crown Courts and 
higher jurisdictions. 
The Criminal Justice Act intervened on the charging process that up until 2005 was 
the responsibility of the police. It was, in fact, up to the police to decide whether to 
charge a suspect. The Crown Prosecution Service would then receive the case and 
assess whether there is sufficient evidence and whether is in the public interest to 
prosecute.67 
Currently, the police power to charge a suspect is limited to less serious offences 
and it is the CPS who charges the suspects and subsequently decides whether or 
not to prosecute. 
The Code for the Crown Prosecutor dictates the procedure to be followed, in order 
to assess whether or not to prosecute.68 The Prosecutor must ask himself whether 
there is enough evidence for a realistic prospect of conviction and whether it is in 
the public interest to prosecute. Such questions must be answered in this order. 
Therefore, in the absence of sufficient evidence there will be no room for public 
interest considerations. 
There is therefore a tripartite structure to the English prosecution service, which 
involves the police, the prosecutor and barristers. An essential aspect of the law 
on disclosure in the English/Welsh legal system is the process of providing the 
prosecution with the material gathered in a criminal investigation by the police. 
This is a very delicate juncture of the disclosure procedure. A mistake made at this 
stage may potentially compromise the effectiveness of the disclosure process and 
the fairness of the whole trial.
The prosecution’s duty to disclose continues throughout the trial which implies 
that the prosecution has to assess what material must be disclosed to the defence 
at any given moment. Such a delicate task can only be carried out if the prosecution 
is fully aware, from the outset of a case, of the existence of material that should 
potentially be disclosed. It is therefore essential that police officers fulfil their 
obligations to retain, record and schedule all the material with a large degree of 
attention and competence. 
In relation to this, it is noted that the 2013 Attorney General’s guidelines emphasise 
that “whatever the approach taken by investigators or disclosure officers to examining 
the material gathered or generated in the course of an investigation, it is crucial 
that disclosure officers record their reasons for a particular approach in writing”.69 
They also stress that “disclosure officers must seek the advice and assistance of 
prosecutors when in doubt as to their responsibility as early as possible”.70  
_______________________
67 Heinze, above n. 3 at p. 259.
68 The Code for Crown Prosecutors is a key document for the CPS. It provides guidance to prosecutors on the general 
principles they should apply when making decisions about prosecutions. See http://www.cps.gov.uk/ 
69 Attorney General’s Guidelines 2013 para. 22.
70 Attorney General’s Guidelines 2013 para. 27.
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Scheduling is particularly important in the English/Welsh criminal procedure 
in light of the fact that different and independent players such as investigators, 
prosecutors and counsel compose the prosecuting apparatus. The schedule is a 
formal link between the investigator’s role and that of the prosecutor.71 
The primary source that regulates the process is the CPIA Code of Practice (“Code”) 
issued under section 23 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act as amended 
by the Criminal Justice Act.72 
The Code divides police officers and others involved in a criminal investigation into 
three categories; the investigator, the officer of the case and the disclosure officer.  
The investigator is “any police officer involved in the conduct of a criminal 
investigation”.73 The investigator records and retains the relevant material gathered 
during a criminal investigation. The latter must be conducted by the investigator 
pursuing “all reasonable lines of inquiry, whether this points towards or away from 
the suspect”.74 This task requires the exercise of considerable professional expertise. 
The officer in the case is the second role delineated by the Code. This officer’s duty 
is to ensure that proper procedures are followed in recording information and 
retaining records of information and other material. 
Finally, the disclosure officer is in charge of the examination of the material retained 
by the police. He has to schedule and reveal the material to the prosecution during 
the investigation and any criminal procedure resulting from it and disclose material 
to the defence when the prosecution so chooses. The disclosure officer’s misconduct 
can have serious consequences on the fairness of the disclosure process and on the 
overall fairness of the trial.  
What kind of material is “relevant to an investigation”75 and therefore has to be 
retained and recorded? The Code defines relevant material as all the material that 
has “some bearing on any offence or investigation or any person being investigated”76 
or on other aspects of the case. What is not relevant is the material that has no 
impact on the case. This very overarching definition omits very little material. 
The process that leads to the disclosing of the material to the prosecution is 
characterized by different moments. The material relevant to the investigation has 
to be recorded in a durable and retrievable form and retained by the investigator 
and the officer of the case. Interestingly, the Code requests recording and retaining 
of the relevant material but not its inspection, at least not in this phase. 
In addition, all the relevant material, which the disclosure officer believes will not 
form part of the prosecution’s case, must be inspected and scheduled.77 Here the 
_______________________
71 See the Review of Disclosure in Criminal Proceedings, Lord Justice Gross, September 2011, para. 120.
72 Other relevant legal sources are the 2006 Disclosure Manual, the Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure issued 
in April 2005, the protocol issued by the Court Service, “Disclosure: A Protocol For The Control and Management of 
Unused Material in The Crown Court (the Disclosure protocol) in February 2006 and the judicial protocol “Control and 
Management of Heavy Fraud and Other Complex Criminal Cases”(the Fraud protocol) issued in March 2005.
73 The CPIA Code of Practice issued under section 23 of the CPIA, para. 2.1. 
74 Ibid. at para 3.5. 
75 Ibid. at para. 2.1. 
76 Ibid. at para. 2.1.
77 There are two exceptions to the duty to schedule the material retained. The first applies to cases in which “super sensi-
tive” material has been gathered. In these cases, the disclosure officer does not have to schedule and describe in writing 
the items retained, but may reveal them to the prosecution in other ways. The second exception refers to cases in which 
a large bulk of material has been gathered. Such material will be revealed to the prosecution in electronic form. 
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definition of unused material makes its appearance in the disclosure scheme. The 
scheduling procedure is intended to allow the prosecution to rely on the schedule, 
when undertaking the disclosure test, with no duty to examine or inspect any of 
the unused material.  Therefore, the description of the material should be accurate 
and detailed.
According to the Code, the unused material must be divided into schedules. For 
this purpose, unused material is divided into sensitive and non-sensitive material, 
which are scheduled separately. The former is the material whose disclosure, in the 
opinion of the disclosure officer, would “give rise to a real risk of serious prejudice 
to an important public interest”.78 This important characterisation of the material 
as sensitive or non-sensitive is a subjective decision made by the disclosure officer. 
Once all the unused material gathered during an investigation has been inspected 
and scheduled, the disclosure officer is required to write and submit to the 
prosecution a report describing the activity he has carried out. The report is 
intended to draw the prosecution’s attention to material that, in the disclosure 
officer’s opinion, may be disclosed to the defence. Furthermore, the disclosure 
officer must sign a personal undertaking certifying that to the best of his knowledge 
all relevant material that has been gathered and retained has been revealed to the 
prosecution in accordance with the Code of practice.79 This requirement stresses 
the relevance and delicacy of the duty to the disclosure officer. The prosecution 
will rely on his work when making the decision as to whether to disclose the items 
listed in the schedule to the defence. 
The statutory law entrusts the police with the crucial responsibility of compiling the 
schedules. The police are required to play an inquisitorial role in an adversarial context. 
The police are expected to pursue any reasonable lines of inquiry as to whether these 
point toward or away the guilt of the suspect. Nonetheless, the police are still perceived 
by themselves and the public opinion as acting on behalf of the prosecution.80 
Critics of this system argued that there is no historical justification, in the English 
legal system, to invest the police and the prosecution with this degree of trust but 
have also acknowledged that it is difficult if not unrealistic to find an alternative.81
Before the advent of the 2003 CJA, different recommendations had been made on 
possible improvements in the system. Plotnikoff and Woolfson argued in their 
study against the removal of responsibility from the police for the decision on 
disclosure. They held that the “ability to identify what undermines the evidence 
against an accused is a crucial investigative skill”.82 They suggested an improvement 
of the checks and balances to ensure that police disclosure decisions are fully and 
thoroughly reviewed. 
_______________________
78 The CPIA Code of Practice issued under section 23 of the CPIA, para. 6.12. 
79 Ibid. at para 9.1. See also the Disclosure Manual, chapter 10, paras. 16-17. 
80 Quirk H., The significance of culture in criminal procedure reform: Why the revised disclosure scheme cannot work, 
(2006) 10 International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 42-59, p. 48.
81 Leng R., Disclosure: A Flawed Procedure, a paper given at a Justice Seminar on 12th June 2000 for the Criminal Courts 
Review. 
82 Plotnikoff and Woolfson, above n. 60 at p. 19. 
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Sir Robin Auld took a different view. He believed that better training of police 
officers would suffice to continue relying on them to gather, record and schedule 
relevant material but he advised a shift, from the police to the prosecution, of 
the responsibility to decide upon initial, as well as ultimate, disclosure.83 The 
prosecution should act in the procedure as early as possible to relieve the police 
from their initial responsibility of deciding what has to be disclosed. This task 
requires a skilled assessment of the relevance of certain material to issues that lie 
at the core of a criminal trial and therefore it should be performed by prosecution 
lawyers. 
The Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act, as amended by the Criminal 
Justice Act and its Code of Practice did not entirely follow either of the above 
recommendations. Under the present system, the police retain not only the duty 
to schedule all the relevant material gathered during the investigation but also the 
delicate responsibility of making initial decisions on what material is sensitive or 
not and therefore which material will be disclosed to the defence. However, the 
prosecution must control and assist the police in this process.84 In cases that are 
more important the prosecution and the police are required to cooperate from the 
onset of the investigation.85 The prosecution is characterised as a superintendent 
and its role assumes great importance if seen from the defence’s perspective. The 
latter will have no opportunity to see the sensitive schedule and therefore the 
prosecution is the only authority able to scrutinise the police assessment. 
Studies conducted on the implementation of the disclosure officers’ duties to 
compile the schedules have shown the prosecution’s dissatisfaction with and 
concern regarding the way in which this important activity is carried out.86 Most 
of the schedules listing non-sensitive material described material so poorly that it 
was impossible for the prosecution to assess the nature of the material.87 
 9.3 The prosecutor’s duties to disclose
The CJA ended the double prosecution disclosure and introduced one single test 
applicable by the prosecution in assessing what must be disclosed to the defence. 
The secondary disclosure triggered by the defence statement was removed. The 
new test requires the prosecution to disclose all the material that “might reasonably 
be considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution against the 
accused or of assisting the case for the accused”.88 
Although secondary disclosure has been abolished under the Criminal Justice Act, 
a narrow interpretation of the new test can lead to the same situation envisaged 
_______________________
83 “The Review of the Criminal Courts in England and Wales” (“the Auld Report”), 2001, para. 176. 
84 See Disclosure: A Protocol For The Control And Management Of Unused Material In the Crown Court, above n. 64 at para 
17.
85 See Disclosure Manual, at chapter 29. 
86 Quirk, above n.80 at p. 52.
87 Plotnikoff and Woolfson, above n. 60 at para 29. 
88 Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 3(1)(a).
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by the former 1996 Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act. If the expression 
“the case for the accused” is interpreted as meaning the specific line of argument 
that the defence will take at trial then it will be impossible for the prosecution 
to know that until the defence statement has been received. This interpretation 
would leave the procedure unchanged despite the spirit of reform that inspired the 
CJA and it is therefore to be discarded. A better approach is to consider “the case 
for the accused” as meaning every possible defence that is reasonable to consider as 
available to the accused in the relevant case.89 
The new test envisaged by the Criminal Justice Act, unlike the former one, is an 
objective test that the prosecution applies to detect which material it must disclose 
to the defence. The test does not rely on the prosecution’s opinion but gives him 
guidelines to objectively identify the material he needs to disclose. 
As far as the initial disclosure is concerned, prosecution material is defined as 
material that is in the prosecution’s possession and came into its possession or has 
been inspected by it in connection with the case for the prosecution against the 
accused. Therefore, material assessed by the disclosure officer that has not been 
sent to the prosecution does not qualify as prosecution material.90  
The secondary prosecution disclosure stage is replaced by the continuing duty 
to disclose. The prosecution has to monitor the state of the proceedings and its 
development in order to check whether there is material in its possession that 
must be disclosed as the trial unfolds. The CJA does not require the prosecution 
to inspect the material in its possession during the trial to check whether it meets 
the test for disclosure, but states that the prosecution has to review the material. 
This subtle difference implies that the prosecution can keep on relying on the 
schedule prepared by the disclosure officers and the description of the material 
given therein, without any critical analysis.91  
Although the prosecution’s second disclosure stage was removed from the 
procedure, the prosecution still faces similar duties once the defence has given 
the statement underlying the nature of the accused’s defence.92 If, in the light of 
the defence statement, the prosecution identifies more material in its possession 
capable of undermining the case for the prosecution against the accused or of 
assisting the case for the accused, it would have to disclose it. The logic is therefore 
similar to that which was behind the previous secondary disclosure. 
The CJA regulates the possibility for the accused to make an application to the 
court for disclosure at any time when he has reasonable cause to believe that there 
is prosecution material that should have been disclosed to him and was not.93 This 
_______________________
89 Taylor, Wasik and Leng, above n. 59 at p. 37. 
90 Corker and Parkinson, above n. 17 at p. 89.
91 Taylor, Wasik and Leng, above n. 59 at p. 38.
92 Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 7A(5).
93 CPIA 1996 s. 8. The procedure for making such applications is regulated in the Criminal Procedure Rules 2014. 
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possibility is granted only if a defence statement has been provided.94 In relation 
to this procedure, it is notable that an expanded definition of prosecution material 
applies as it includes material that the prosecution has not seen because it has been 
retained by the investigators. Therefore, prosecution material for the purpose of 
a defence application for disclosure is not limited to material in possession of the 
prosecution but includes also material which is still in possession of the police. 
It is unfortunate that the government did not intervene to reform the existing 
procedure as drafted in the CPIA, given that the accused will have to rely on the 
accuracy and completeness of the descriptions of non-sensitive material offered by 
the disclosure officers in their schedule in order to make an effective application for 
further disclosure. Specific research had demonstrated that these functions, which 
are essential for the correct functioning of the disclosure procedure, were poorly 
performed.95 
The Criminal Justice Act, as the Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act, does 
not lay down strict timing for initial disclosure by the prosecution, which has to 
be done “as soon as reasonably practicable” after the accused pleads not guilty or is 
committed for trial.96
 9.4 The defence’s duties to disclose 
The first statutory defence obligation to disclose was articulated in the 1987 
Criminal Justice Act. It applied to a very limited number of cases, regarding serious 
fraud. Before 1987 there was no statutory or other provision regulating defence pre-
trial disclosure. In the adversarial tradition, the right of the accused to keep his 
defence secret until the commencement of the trial was strictly linked to the right 
to remain silent and the prosecution’s burden of proof. By 1997 defence disclosure 
had however been extended to criminal proceedings.
As previously mentioned, the CPIA introduced a defence disclosure obligation 
in criminal trials. Accordingly, the defence, following the prosecution’s primary 
disclosure, ought to give to the prosecution and the judge a statement setting out, 
in general terms, the nature of its defence, the matters on which it takes issue with 
the prosecution and the reasons why it does so.97 
In his review, Lord Justice Auld stated that defence disclosure should be guided by 
the principle that “a defendant’s right of silence is not a right to conceal in advance 
of trial the issues he is going to take. Its purpose is to protect the innocent from 
wrongly incriminating themselves, not to enable the guilty, by fouling up the 
criminal process, to make it as difficult as possible for the prosecution to prove 
their guilt, regardless of cost and disruption to others involved”.98 
_______________________
94 Corker and Parkinson, above n. 17 at p. 78.
95 Quirk, above n. 80 and Plotnikoff and Woolfson, above n. 60.
96 Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 13(1). 
97 The 1996 CPIA, chapter 25, article 5(6), Compulsory Disclosure by the Accused.
98 The Review of the Criminal Courts in England and Wales (“the Auld Report”), 2001, para 183.
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In assessing the functioning of the disclosure regime put in place after 1997 it emerged 
that the majority of the defence statements did not comply with the requirements 
set out in the Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act. Defence counsels opposed 
the new duty to disclose their case before trial and circumvented it through the 
redaction of very vague statements. These were mostly a broad negation of all 
charges and contained extended requests addressed to the prosecution to disclose 
material with no explanation of the relevance of that material to their case. 
The debates that anticipated the adoption of the CJA 2003 were characterised by 
frequent reference to the importance of pre-trial defence disclosure and the need to 
rebalance the criminal justice system in favour of the victim.99 Mandatory broader 
disclosure was agreed to be the route to follow. 
The 2003 CJA regulates the content of the defence statement adding further 
requirements. Specifically, section 6A still requires the defence to set out the 
nature of its case, but the expression “in general terms” has been removed from 
the text as it was considered too vague and prone to being narrowly interpreted by 
the defence’s counsel. The statement must also indicate any specific defence the 
accused intends to rely upon at trial. This change suggests that the court expects a 
more detailed description of the defence’s case. 
Furthermore, the defence statement must set out any particular matters of fact 
on which the defendant intends to rely for the purposes of his case. It also has to 
indicate any point of law (including any point as to the admissibility of evidence) 
which the defence wishes to take, and any jurisprudence it intends to rely on for 
that purpose. 
Unlike under the CPIA, the defence statement cannot limit its content to issues of 
fact but it will have to disclose points of law that will be at the core of the defence’s 
case. This strict requirement places a considerable burden on the defence. What 
seems to be unreasonable is that the prosecution will benefit from this preliminary 
detailed disclosure of the defense’s arguments, whereas the defence could still 
be taken by surprise at trial, as there is no corresponding obligation on the 
prosecution. Should this happen, the defence could have a fair trial only if the court 
granted adjournments to permit the analysis of the new arguments put forward by 
the prosecution. On the other hand, this approach would conflict with the goal of 
efficient judicial administration.100 
Disclosure obligations were also envisaged in cases where the accused intends to 
rely on an alibi. Evidence that corroborates an alibi is defined as evidence showing 
that, by reason of the presence of the accused at a particular place or in a particular 
area at a particular time, he was not or was unlikely to have been at the place where 
the offence is alleged to have been committed at the time of its alleged commission. 
The CJA slightly broadened the defence’s obligation in relation to details of 
_______________________
99 Corker and Parkinson, above n. 17 at p. 110-111.
100 Taylor, Wasik and Leng, above n. 59 at pp. 41-42. 
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proposed alibi witnesses. Besides the name and address of the witness, the defence 
statement must indicate the date of birth and all details that might help to identify 
such witnesses. 
One of the most harshly criticised changes implemented by the Criminal Justice 
Act was the extension of the disclosure obligation pertaining to alibi witnesses to 
all defence witnesses. Section 6C requires the accused to give notice to the court 
and the prosecution of the witnesses he intends to call and to disclose their details. 
If at a later stage, the accused decides not to call a witness or to call an additional 
one or any other change to the previous notice, the defendant must give amended 
notice to the court and the prosecution. The defence has no obligation to disclose 
the content of each proposed witness testimony but only details related to their 
identification.
Two concerns follow these provisions. First, it is a one-side obligation, which is 
not reflected on the prosecution. The second concern relates to the possibility that 
police and investigators might interview defence witnesses after their identities 
have been revealed. During parliamentary debates over the CJA, a Home Office 
Minister explained that the justification for this new obligation was, inter alia, 
to allow the police to make criminal record checks on defence witnesses to help 
the jury to assess their credibility and to enable the police to interview defence 
witnesses before the trial, and if necessary to make further enquiries.101
Scholars submitted that such an understanding of the defence disclosure in 
relation to defence witnesses might conflict with the European Convention on 
Human Rights.102 Article 6.3 states that everyone charged with a criminal offence 
has the right to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions 
as witnesses against him. It seems indeed questionable that the defence has to 
disclose details of his witnesses (and allow the police to interview them) whereas 
no such obligation is placed on the prosecution and the defence might not be 
entitled to seek contact with prosecution witnesses. Indeed, the prosecution, in 
serious cases, may apply to the court for an order that forbids the accused from 
seeking direct or indirect contact with certain prosecution witnesses.
In relation to expert witnesses, the CJA requires the defence to give notice to the 
prosecution and the court of the name and address of every expert it instructs to 
provide an expert opinion that might be used at trial. The aim of this provision was 
to deter the defence practice of “expert shopping” that consists of instructing several 
experts to provide opinions until one is found that can corroborate its case.  Second, 
unused reports might be potentially used as evidence by the prosecution. Initially, 
the government planned a more stringent obligation that included disclosure of 
unused expert reports. However, such an obligation would have proved ineffective, 
_______________________
101 Standing Committee B, column 247, 9 January 2003, quoted in David Corker and Stephen Parkinson, Disclosure in 
Criminal Proceedings, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 119.
102 Corker and Parkinson, above n. 17 at p. 121
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as the expert report would be covered by litigation privilege.103 The same line of 
argument applies to the possibility that the prosecution, once defence discloses the 
details of an expert they plan to use, calls him as a witness.
An example might help to understand the point. In R v Davies the defence had 
instructed a psychiatrist to examine the accused. The expert did not confirm the 
defence’s argument of diminished responsibility. Nonetheless, the expert could not 
testify for the prosecution because what the accused had told her was privileged.104 
On the other hand, disclosure of a defence expert’s details might benefit the 
prosecution in other ways such as by pointing to a different methodology or 
technology of analysis (on which the expert relied) which was unknown to the 
prosecution before. This possibility, although rare, raises questions about this new 
disclosure obligation, which might be perceived of as unfair.105  
The CJA responded to the criticism that defence disclosure under the CPIA was 
a “once and for all” event that took place 14 days after prosecution disclosure and 
ended at that very moment. It introduced a duty on the defence to provide a further 
updated defence statement or a statement indicating that no change will be made 
by the accused to his previous defence statement.106  
Moreover, the Criminal Justice Act envisaged the possibility that in criminal 
proceedings involving more than one accused, the defence statement made by one 
defendant is disclosed to the other co-accused.107 The Act provides that the courts, 
at the request of any party or motu proprio, can order such disclosure. 
Finally, the CJA introduced amendments aimed at strengthening the possibility of 
enforcing the defence’s disclosure. Judges and the prosecution, under the Criminal 
Procedure and Investigation Act regime, had shown uneasiness in inviting juries 
to draw negative inferences from the defence’s failure to disclose. The possibility 
of drawing adverse inferences arises when the defence fails to provide a defence 
statement or it provided it late, when the statement contains inconsistent defences 
or when the defence at trial goes beyond the statement. Inconsistencies between 
the statement and the trial may arise when the accused has put forward a defence 
during the trial, which was not outlined in the previous statement, when he calls 
witnesses or alibi witnesses not indicated in the statement or when the accused 
provides an alibi for the first time. In other words, negative inferences can be 
drawn when the conduct of the defendant at trial is not coherent with the defence 
statement given before unless a justification for that exists and is accepted by the 
court. The CJA provides that adverse inferences no longer require the leave of 
the court to be drawn by the jury. The prosecution or a co-defendant can simply 
underline the failure. However, where the defence has not disclosed a point of law 
_______________________
103 Litigation privilege arises when litigation is in contemplation. It prevents the disclosure of documents that come to 
existence at the request of a lawyer or client in relation to that specific litigation. In the UK when experts are retained to 
assist counsel to prepare for trial the communications between the expert and the lawyer are confidential and subject 
to litigation privilege. All solicitor communications (bar material instructions) with the expert are covered by litigation 
privilege.
104 R v Davies, [2002] EWCA Crim. 85.
105 Redmayne M., Criminal Justice Act 2003: Disclosure and Its Discontents, Criminal Law Review, 2004.
106 CJA 2003, Section 6B.
107 CJA 2003, Sections 5A – 5D.
Chapter 1
31 32
that was then relied upon in the trial or did not provide details of a witness the 
leave of the court (to the jury in order to draw negative inference) is still needed. 
 9.5 The 2011 Review of Disclosure in Criminal Proceedings and the 2013 
Judicial Protocol on the Disclosure of Unused Material in Criminal Cases
In 2011, a review of the disclosure in criminal cases was carried out at the request 
of the Lord Chief Justice, prompted by concerns as to the operation of the 
disclosure regime contained in the CPIA as amended by the CJA. The review was 
not concerned with disclosure of security and intelligence material, which calls 
into play the concept of public interest immunity. For this reason, the review’s 
recommendations are analysed in this subsection before moving to the conflict 
between confidential material and disclosure in the following section.
While the review did not advocate changes to the existing provisions, it made 
several recommendations for improving the way in which the parties involved 
conducted the existing disclosure process. It referred to several failures on the part 
of the prosecution in the disclosure process, which led to the collapse of several 
high profile criminal cases, as contributing to the persistent lack of confidence in 
the prosecution’s performance of its disclosure obligations.108
The review supported the existing tripartite structure of the English prosecution 
(investigators, prosecutors and counsel). However, it remarked that it contributes 
“to a lack of ownership in the prosecution case, lower motivation and the 
inability of the prosecutor to exercise appropriate direction and control over the 
investigation”.109 This would be particularly problematic considering that important 
decisions as to the scope of disclosure may have to be made at a very early stage 
where the prosecutor may not yet be involved in the case.
In relation to this point, the review recommended an early, sensible and sustained 
cooperation between prosecutors and investigators, together where appropriate, 
with the early involvement of trial counsel, with respect to disclosure matters.110 
Moreover, it stressed the importance of accurate training for police investigators, 
who play a fundamental role in the disclosure process as it is conceived in the 
CPIA.111 Provided that the prosecution’s disclosure is carried out correctly, the 
review considers it “unacceptable for the defence to refuse to engage in the early 
identification of the real issues in a case”.112   
Furthermore, the review envisaged a “robust management of disclosure matters” 
by the judiciary as an essential contribution to the improvement of the disclosure 
process. Specifically, judges should be prepared to give early guidance or indications 
_______________________
108 Review of Disclosure in Criminal Proceedings, Lord Justice Gross, September 2011, para. 64.
109 Ibid. at para. 63.
110 Ibid. at Annex D, para. 7.
111 Ibid. at Annex D, para. 8.
112 Ibid. at Annex D, para. 11.
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as to the prosecution’s approach to disclosure as well as excluding untimely 
disclosed material from the trial.113 
Finally, the review acknowledged that the consolidation into one single text of all 
the disclosure provisions would assist in the effectiveness of the system. However, 
it noticed that due to the different nature and origin of such legal instruments such 
a goal would be unrealistic.114 
As mentioned above, following this review a new judicial protocol for the disclosure 
of unused material in criminal cases was issued in December 2013 (hereafter the 
protocol).115 
The protocol emphasised that the meaning of disclosure switched from being “a 
matter to be resolved between the parties” with the court only coming into play “if 
a particular issue or complaint was raised” to being a matter that “gives judges the 
power – indeed, it imposes a duty on the judiciary – actively to manage disclosure 
in every case”.116 
 
The protocol took on board several of the 2011 review recommendations. It stressed 
the important role the judges have in monitoring the timetable for prosecution 
and defence disclosure as well as in asking the parties to “identify the issues of the 
case” inviting them “to indicate whether further disclosure is sought, and on what 
topics”.117 Furthermore, should problems arise in the disclosure process judges, in 
“exercising appropriate oversight of disclosure” should address the issues and give 
instructions.118 
The protocol reaffirms the prosecution’s obligation to review the unused material 
in its possession applying the relvant test for disclosure. It stipulates that judges 
should not allow the prosecutor to bypass such obligation by “the expedient of 
permitting the defence to have access to (or providing the defence with copies 
of) the material listed in the schedules of non-sensitive unused prosecution 
material irrespective of whether it satisfies, wholly or in part, the relevant test for 
disclosure”.119  
Finally, in relation to the defence’s engagement in the disclosure process the 
protocol states that in order to prepare a “properly completed defence statement” 
the defence should have access to “the case papers and consider initial disclosure”.120 
It emphasises the importance of the defence statement for the effectiveness of the 
_______________________
113 Ibid. at Annex D, paras. 13-14. On the issue of managerial judging, see also the Criminal Procedure Rules 2014, which 
envisage that the court must actively manage the case. This includes, inter alia, achieving certainty as to what must be 
done, by whom, and when, in particular by the early setting of a timetable for the progress of the case and ensuring that 
evidence, whether disputed or not, is presented in the shortest and clearest way.
114 Ibid. at Annex D, para. 18.
115 As stated in its introduction “this judicial protocol sets out the principles to be applied to, and the importance of, dis-
closure; the expectations of the court and its role in disclosure, in particular in relation to case management; and the 
consequences if there is a failure by the prosecution or defence to comply with their obligations.”
116 Judicial Protocol on the Disclosure of Unused Material in Criminal Cases, 2013, para. 56.
117 Ibid. at para. 7.
118 Ibid. at para. 16. 
119 Ibid. at para. 13.
120 Ibid. at para. 10.
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disclosure process and states that it must be served “within 28 days of the date when 
the prosecution complies with its duty of initial disclosure”.121 The protocol makes 
it clear that the defence’s failure to serve its statement within a given deadline may 
lead the court to draw an adverse inference at trial.122 Moreover, it underlies that the 
defence application for diclosure should not be heard when a defence statement 
has not been submitted.123 
10. The development of the Public Interest Immunity doctrine
The balance between two conflicting interests is never simple to handle and it is 
even more problematic when the right of an accused to a fair trial is involved. In 
criminal proceedings, the right to an adversarial trial means that both prosecution 
and defence must be given the opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on 
the observations filed and the evidence adduced by the other party.124 However, 
although all material evidence for or against the accused must be disclosed, the 
right to disclosure is not an absolute right. The Public Interest Immunity (PII) 
doctrine enables the prosecution to withhold relevant information when the court 
determines that its disclosure would prejudice the public interest. PII is a principle 
of English common law that gave rise to significant litigation on disclosure matters 
and led to the adoption of provisions regulating the test that must be carried out in 
order to assess the interests at stake. As such, the analysis of this aspect of disclosure 
is limited to the English/Welsh criminal law system.
The PII doctrine has been developed in criminal proceedings only in the past 20 years 
whereas it was already settled law in civil proceedings from which it was imported. 
In civil law, the PII doctrine had been characterised as a balancing exercise to assess 
whether the interest in the proper administration of justice outweighed the interest 
in withholding certain material to protect the public interest.125  
The first trace126 of the PII doctrine in criminal proceedings can be detected in R v 
Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Osman (No 1) where Mann LJ observed that 
“the seminal cases in regard to Public Interest Immunity do not refer to criminal 
proceedings at all. The principles are expressed in quite general terms. Asking 
ourselves why those general expositions should not apply to criminal proceedings, 
there is no clear answer that they do. It seems correct in principle that they should 
apply. The reasons for the development of the doctrine seem equally applicable 
to criminal as well as civil proceedings.”127 It was made clear though, that where 
disclosure of evidence appeared necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice it 
outweighed the public interest and there was no room for a balance to be struck. In 
_______________________
121 Ibid. at para. 17. 
122 Ibid. at para. 20.
123 Ibid. at para. 26.
124 Brandstetter v. Austria, ECHR, no. 11170/84, 28 August 1991. 
125 See Duncan v Cammell Lair and Co Limited, [1942] AC 624 and Conway v Rimmer, [1968] AC 910.
126 Before the ex parte Osman, in criminal trials, public interest had been contemplated in relation to witnesses who might not 
be asked to reveal information or documents that might be prejudicial to the state or the public interest. This was the so-
called crown privilege. It was extremely rare that a criminal court was asked to withhold material evidence from the defence. 
127 R v Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Osman, (1991) 93 Cr App R 202, p. 208. 
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_______________________
128 R v Keane, 2 All ER 478. 
1994 in R v Keane, the judges reiterated that when the disputed material can prove 
the innocence of the accused or avoid a miscarriage of justice, then the balance 
comes down resoundingly in favour of disclosing it.128 In ex parte Osman it was 
argued that in these circumstances there would be no balance to be struck whereas 
in R v Keane the judges preferred to stress the natural outcome of the balancing 
exercise on such occasions. The common ground that these slightly difference 
approaches have is that they are both based on the goal that an innocent person 
must not be condemned and that this prevails over any other interest. 
The 1981 Attorney General’s guidelines accorded the prosecution wide discretion 
to withhold material from disclosure in the circumstances analysed above. The 
guidelines were in fact inspired by the idea that the prosecution alone was entrusted 
with the delicate function of deciding what should be disclosed and what should 
be withheld. The court and the defence were not involved in this procedure. The 
wide discretion granted to the prosecution was believed to be well placed as the 
integrity and fairness of the prosecution was a guarantee that it would act rightly 
and properly. 
Ten years later the guidelines were abolished. In Ward, the Court of Appeal held 
that only when PII was at stake could material be withheld from disclosure and, 
most importantly, such assessment was no longer given to the prosecution but fell 
within the judiciary powers. The prosecution had become a mere keeper of the 
material pending the court decision on its disclosure. The judges concluded that 
the prosecution must give notice to the defence of its intention not to disclose 
material evidence. When the prosecution was not inclined to have the court decide 
upon a PII matter the natural consequence would be the abandonment of the 
prosecution. 
11. The UK, the European Court of Human Rights and non-disclosure
 11.1 Introduction
The United Kingdom has been brought, several times, before the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR, Strasbourg Court or Court) for alleged violations of article 
6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention). Several judgments 
concerning the English criminal justice procedure will be analysed in detail in 
the section dedicated to the ECtHR jurisprudence and disclosure. However, this 
paragraph offers a short overview of a selection of cases concerning the conflict 
between the right to disclosure and the interest in withholding material from 
disclosure on public interest grounds. 
On 16 February 2000, three judgments were delivered by the Grand Chamber of 
the ECtHR, which involved the United Kingdom and concerned the public interest 
immunity procedure and its compliance with article 6 of the Convention. All the 
applicants in these trials complained that non-disclosure by the prosecution of 
Chapter 1
35 36
relevant evidence on the ground of public interest immunity meant that they were 
denied a fair trial in breach of Article 6, Section 1 and 3 (b) and (d) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
 11.2 Rowe and Davis v. The United Kingdom
Mr. Rowe and Mr. Davis were convicted of murder, assault and robbery in relation 
to three different incidents that occurred on the night of 15/16 December 1988. The 
prosecution had withheld, during their trial at the Crown Court, without notifying 
the court or the defence, evidence in relation to the fact that a witness had claimed 
a reward in order to testify at trial. Only during the appeal trial did the Court of 
Appeal on two different occasions hear an ex parte application by the prosecution 
and ruled that the material should not be disclosed. The defence had no role in 
these hearings. 
The Court found that the “procedure, whereby the prosecution itself attempts to 
assess the importance of concealed information to the defence and weighs this 
against the public interest in keeping the information secret, cannot comply with 
the above-mentioned requirements of Article 6 (1)”. 129
The fact that in the case at stake there had been a subsequent assessment of the 
interests involved by the Court of Appeal could not be considered an appropriate 
remedy. The ECtHR held that the judges of the Court of Appeal, unlike the trial 
judge, were dependent on transcripts of the Crown Court hearings and on the 
account of the issues given to them by the prosecution for their understanding of 
the possible relevance of the undisclosed material. The trial judge was in a better 
position to make that assessment as he had seen the witnesses give their testimony 
and was fully versed in all the evidence and issues in the case. Furthermore, the 
Court of Appeal could not assess the need for disclosure throughout the entire 
trial but was obliged to render its decision ex post facto and may even, to a certain 
extent, have unconsciously been influenced by the jury’s verdict of guilty into 
underestimating the significance of the undisclosed evidence.130 
Consequently, the ECtHR found that there had been a violation of article 6(1) of the 
Convention as the prosecution’s failure to lay the evidence in question before the 
trial judge and to permit him to rule on the question of disclosure had deprived the 
applicants of a fair trial.
 11.3 Jasper v. The United Kingdom and Fitt v. United Kingdom
The case of Jasper v. the United Kingdom131 and the case of  Fitt  v. the United 
Kingdom132 are very similar. In both cases, during the domestic trial, the 
_______________________
129 Rowe and Davis v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, [GC], no. 28901/95, 16 February 2000, para 63. 
130 Ibid. at para. 65. 
131 Jasper v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, [GC], no. 27052/95, 16 February 2000. 
132 Fitt v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, [GC], no. 29777/96, 16 February 2000.
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prosecution made ex parte applications to the trial judge to withhold material in its 
possession on the ground of public interest immunity. The defences were notified 
of the application and could argue their cases before the trial judge but they had 
no knowledge of the category of material involved. In both cases the trial judges 
analysed the material and ruled that it should not be disclosed. No reasons for this 
finding were given to the defence counsels. 
The Court found no violation of the right to a fair trial and the principle of equality 
of arms because, unlike in the case of Rowe and Davis, the ex parte applications had 
been made to the trial judge who “was fully versed in all the evidence and issues in 
the case and in a position to monitor the relevance to the defence of the withheld 
information both before and during the trial.”133 The Court was satisfied that the 
defence counsels were kept informed and were permitted to make submissions 
and participate in the decision-making process as far as it was possible without 
revealing to them the material which the prosecution sought to keep secret on 
public interest grounds.
The Grand Chamber composed of the same 17 judges delivered both judgments 
on 16 February 2000. The verdicts were very close, being reached by nine votes to 
eight. The eight judges who did not accept the conclusions drawn by the majority 
appended dissenting opinions to the judgment. 
Some of the dissenting judges were not satisfied that the procedure followed by the 
English court could be said to respect the principles of the adversarial proceedings 
and equality of arms.134 They argued that the defence had been excluded by the 
decision-making process which led to the exclusion of the material from disclosure. 
The fact that the defence could state its case before the judges could not remedy 
the injustice of the procedure. The defence was in fact unaware of the nature of 
the evidence at stake and “it was purely a matter of chance whether they made any 
relevant points”.135 Moreover, the judges felt that, in order to be able to fulfil his 
functions in a fair trial, a judge should be informed by the opinions of both parties, 
not solely the prosecution.
Judge Hedigan reached the same conclusion in his dissenting opinion, albeit by 
different reasoning. His point of departure was the well-established principle that 
“any measures restricting the rights of the defence should be strictly necessary. If 
a less restrictive measure can suffice then that measure should be applied.”136 He 
argued that in the cases at stake, despite the fact that the government argued that 
there were insurmountable difficulties in this regard, there was a viable and less 
restrictive alternative measure able to protect both interests involved which ought 
to be preferred and was not. Judge Hedigan referred to the appointment of a special 
_______________________
133 Jasper v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, [GC], no. 27052/95, 16 February 2000, para. 56 and Fitt v. The United Kingdom, 
ECHR, [GC], no. 29777/96, 16 February 2000, para. 49.
134 Dissenting opinions of Judges Palm, Fischbach, Vajić, Thomassen, TsatsaNikolovska and Traja, appended to the Jasper 
v. the United Kingdom and Fitt v. The United Kingdom judgments. 
135 Ibid.
136 Van Mechelen and Others v. The Netherlands, ECHR, no. 21363/93, 23 April 1997. 
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counsel acting on behalf of the defence in the context of the ex parte application. 
This matter will be analysed below.
 11.4 Edwards and Lewis v. The United Kingdom
In the case of Edwards and Lewis the defendants claimed to have been entrapped 
by the police in committing the offences they were charged with.137 
Under English criminal law entrapment is a technical term to describe a situation 
in which a defendant would not have committed an offence if not for the activity of 
an undercover police officer or an informer acting on police instructions. Although 
entrapment it is not a defence under English criminal law once it appears that it 
has occurred, the judge has discretion to order the stay the proceedings.138 In other 
words, the trial judge had to make an important decision, which potentially could 
bring the proceedings to a close. 
Before the ECtHR the defendants claimed that their domestic trial was unfair. They 
stressed that the trial judge, who had to decide on the entrapment claim, had been 
exposed to material in the course of an ex parte application for non-disclosure, 
which might have influenced his judgment. 
The delicacy of the situation can be better appreciated considering that in relation 
to Mr. Edwards (one of the applicants) evidence disclosed to the trial judge in the 
ex parte hearing included material suggesting that the accused had been involved 
in the same crime (drug dealing) prior to the events which culminated in his arrest. 
Such evidence goes to the heart of the allegation of entrapment and it weakens 
the allegation in the eyes of the same judge who will be called upon to decide. 
It is reasonable to contend that the judge might be influenced by the previous 
involvement of the defendant in the same crime when deciding on the entrapment 
claim. The fact that the defence was not represented at any phase and could not 
counterbalance such an allegation was a grave breach of the principles of a fair trial 
and equality of arms. In the case of Jasper and Fitt the situation was different as the 
trial judge who decided the ex parte application, was not called upon to decide on a 
question of fact and the separation between the judge and the jury maintained the 
equality of arms ensuring a sufficient safeguard of the rights of the accused.
The Court agreed with the applicants and was satisfied that under the circumstances 
of the case, the procedure employed to determine the issues of disclosure of 
evidence and entrapment did not comply with the requirements to provide 
adversarial proceedings and equality of arms and thereby not incorporating 
adequate safeguards to protect the interests of the accused.
_______________________
137 Edwards and Lewis v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, [GC], no. 39647/98, 27 October 2004.
138 See R v Looseley, [2001] UKHL 53. 
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12. The Special Counsel Scheme
 12.1 Introduction
 
Throughout the above case law the European Court of Human Rights seemed to 
suggest that when the accused’s right to disclosure conflicts with public interest 
there are alternative and less restrictive measures than a pure ex parte hearing with 
no defence representation. One of these measures which is mentioned in several 
of the ECtHR judgments is the appointment of a so-called “special counsel” to 
represent the accused in ex parte applications where the prosecution seeks the 
authorisation to withhold material from the defence.
On 15 November 1996, the ECtHR delivered its judgment in the Chahal v. United 
Kingdom case.139 In this case one of the applicants argued, inter alia, that the reliance 
placed on national security grounds as the justification for his detention pending 
deportation prevented the domestic courts from considering whether it was lawful 
and appropriate. Under English Law (in force at the time) when national security 
was the ground for a deportation order there was no right to appeal against such an 
order. The only available means to challenge the lawfulness of the detention was a 
non-statutory advisory procedure in which the appellant could not be represented 
although he could make written and/or oral representations to an advisory panel 
and call witnesses on his behalf. The Home Secretary decided the amount of 
evidence that would be shown to the person concerned and the panel’s advice to 
the Home Secretary, which was not binding, was not disclosed to the appellant. 
In this case the ECtHR granted leave to several human rights organisations to submit 
observations for the case. They all agreed that the advisory procedure described above 
did not constitute an effective remedy in cases involving national security. Amnesty 
International drew the attention of the Court to the procedure followed in Canada in 
analogous cases. Under the Canadian Immigration Act 1976 a recorded hearing of all 
the evidence is held before a Federal Court judge.140 During this hearing the applicant 
is provided with a statement summarising, as far as possible, the case against him. He 
has the right to be legally represented and to call evidence. When the confidentiality 
of security material requires examination in the absence of both the applicant and his 
or her representative, their place is taken by a “security-cleared counsel” instructed 
by the court who cross-examines the witnesses and generally assists the court to test 
the strength of the State’s case. The applicant is then provided with a summary of the 
evidence obtained by this procedure with necessary deletions.141 
Following the Chahal judgment, the United Kingdom introduced the Special 
Immigration Appeals Act 1997. This bill set up the Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission which, following in the footsteps of the Canadian model, adjudicates 
_______________________
139 Chahal v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, [GC], no. 22414/93, 15 November 1996.
140 The Canadian Immigration Act 1976 has been amended by the Immigration Act 1988.
141 Chahal v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, [GC], no. 22414/93, 15 November 1996, para. 144. 
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the appeals on the merits against the decisions of the Secretary of State (or an 
immigration officer) made on the grounds of, inter alia, national security. This 
procedure contemplates the possibility of the appointment of a special advocate 
to step in when the appellant and his lawyer are excluded on grounds of national 
security.142 The appellant has the right to be provided with a summary of the evidence 
taken in his absence to the extent possible without disclosing information contrary 
to the public interest. 
Rule 7 of the Special Immigration Appeals Act 1997 described the role of the special 
advocate stating that:
“…The function of the special advocate is to represent the interest of the appellant by -
(a) making submissions to the Commission in any proceedings from which the appellant or 
his representative are excluded;
(b) cross-examining witnesses at any such proceedings; and
(c) making written submissions to the Commission.
(5) Except in accordance with paragraph (6) to (9) the special advocate may not communicate 
directly or indirectly with the appellant or his representative on any matter connected with 
proceedings before the Commission.
(6) The special advocate may communicate with the appellant and his representative at any 
time before the Secretary of State makes the material available to him.
(7) At any time after the Secretary of State has made the material available under rule 10(3), 
the special advocate may seek directions from the Commission authorising him to seek 
information in connection with the proceedings from the appellant or his representative.
(8) The Commission shall notify the Secretary of State of a request for direction under 
paragraph (7) and the Secretary of State must, within a period specified by the Commission, 
give the Commission notice of any objection which he has to the request for information 
being made or to the form in which it is proposed to be made.
(9) Where the Secretary of State makes an objection under paragraph (8) rule 11 shall apply 
as appropriate. ...”
_______________________
142 This procedure was first introduced by section 6 of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 and rule 7 of 
the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules 1998 (SI 1998/1881), in proceedings concerned with ex-
clusion or removal of a person as conducive to the public good or in the interests of national security. Similar provision 
was made by section 91(7) and (8) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 in relation to national security certificates issued 
under section 42 of the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976, although no appointment has yet been made 
under section 91. Similar provision was again made by section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and rule 10 of the Proscribed 
Organizations Appeal Commission (Procedure) Rules 2001 (SI 2001/443); section 70 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001 and rule 8 of the Pathogens Access Appeal Commission (Procedure) Rules 2002 (SI 2002/1845); and by 
the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998, Schedule 2, paragraph 7(2) and the Life Sentences (Northern Ireland) Order 
2001 (SI 2001/2564), Schedule 2, paragraph 6. The courts have recognized the potential value of a special advocate even 
in situations for which no statutory provision is made. Thus the Court of Appeal invited the appointment of a special 
advocate when hearing an appeal against a decision of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission in Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v Rehman [2003] 1 AC 153, paragraphs 31-32, and in R v Shayler [2002] UKHL 11, [2003] 
1 AC 247 paragraph 34, the House recognized that this procedure might be appropriate if it were necessary to examine 
very sensitive material on an application for judicial review by a member or former member of a security service.
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On 10 July 1998, in Tinnelly, the ECtHR took note of the above remarking how “in 
other contexts it had been found possible to modify judicial procedures in such 
a way as to safeguard national security concerns about the nature and sources 
of intelligence information and yet accord the individual a substantial degree of 
procedural justice”.143 Therefore, the possibility of safeguarding the right to a fair 
trial through the appointment of a “security-cleared counsel” to represent the 
accused in circumstances in which national security and public interest concerns 
would impose his absence was available for immigration cases. The principle of a 
“third” or “special” counsel acting on behalf of the defendant had become part of 
the English legal system.144  
The Auld Report showed sympathy to the special counsel scheme, recommending 
its introduction in cases where the prosecution wished to seek ex parte non-
disclosure on grounds of public interest immunity. Sir Auld stressed that the 
introduction of a special counsel “would restore some adversarial testing of the 
issues presently absent in the determination of these often critical and finely 
balanced applications”.145
The case of Edwards and Lewis seemed to suggest that the appointment of a special 
counsel to represent the accused in criminal cases where a PII application was 
filed could be a viable possibility for avoiding violations of the defendant’s right 
to a fair trial. The Court dwelled on the introduction in the English legal system 
of legislation envisaging the appointment of a “special counsel” in certain cases 
involving national security.146 This judgment and its potential impact on domestic 
criminal procedure raised concerns over the practicability of this option on a 
regular basis. Following Edwards and Lewis, the whole procedure was under the 
spotlight in criminal courts up and down the country.147
  
The case of R v H and C gave the House of Lords the opportunity to shed some 
light on the interpretation of the ECtHR judgment.148 In this case, the defendants 
were charged with conspiracy to supply heroin. The defence sought disclosure of 
material pertaining to covert intelligence sources, including surveillance, which 
had led to the arrest of the two defendants. Part of their defence was that there 
had been serious police misconduct that could lead, if proven, to the stay of the 
proceedings or to the exclusion of evidence.149 The prosecution opposed such a 
request on public interest immunity grounds.
_______________________
143 Tinnelly & Sons Ltd and Others v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, no. 20390/92, 10 July 1998, para 78.  
144 The ECtHR mentioned the new figure of the “special counsel” in Rowe and Davis, Jasper, and Fitt, quoting extensively 
the Special Immigration Appeals Act 1997.
145 The Review of the Criminal Courts in England and Wales (“the Auld Report”), 2001, para. 194. 
146 Edwards and Lewis v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, [GC], no. 39647/98, 27 October 2004, paras. 43-45. Specifically the 
Court referred to the provisions contained in the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 and the Northern 
Ireland Act 1998.
147 Comment of Mr. Mccoubrey, acting on behalf of the Crown, in R v H and C, interlocutory appeal judgment [2003] 
EWCA Crim. 2847.
148 R v H and C, [2004] UKHL 3.
149 At a preparatory hearing, the counsel of H indicated that his client wished to mount a challenge to the legality and 
propriety of the police operation, and the integrity of the police surveillance evidence. He indicated that his client’s 
case would involve allegations of the planting of evidence, and the falsification of observations. He indicated that it was 
his client’s intention to make an application to stay the prosecution as an abuse of process on the grounds of serious 
executive misconduct and/or illegality on the part of the investigating officer and/or to seek the exclusion of evidence 
on the same grounds under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
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Before the trial judge, the defendants relied heavily on the judgment of the ECtHR 
in Edwards and Lewis, claiming that, since the judge might be called upon to stay 
or dismiss the case or to exclude evidence, he was required to appoint a special 
counsel to act on behalf of the defendants at any public interest immunity hearing 
held in the absence of the defendants and their legal representatives. 
The trial judge agreed and stated: 
“I have just said, I do not feel able to ignore or to circumvent the decision in Edwards. 
That its consequences are inconvenient or novel or unusual are no grounds for concluding 
that the present case does not fall within its ambit. I have already ruled that Edwards does 
not have the consequence in this case of making the examination of sensitive material a 
matter for an open court investigation. What the decision in Edwards and Lewis does tell 
me, however, is that if there is not an independent Counsel appointed, so as to introduce an 
adversarial element into the public interest immunity enquiry, there is a risk that the trial 
will be perceived to be unfair, and therefore to be a violation of Article 6.1 of the Convention. 
I am not prepared to contemplate that.” 150 
The prosecution filed an interlocutory appeal that was successful. The Court of 
Appeal accepted that in “rare and exceptional cases” the appointment of a special 
counsel might be necessary to safeguard the right of the accused in PII but it 
found that in the case at stake it was premature.151 It held that Edwards and Lewis 
did not bind the trial judge in the way in which he would be bound by a decision 
of the Court of Appeal and in any event, Edwards and Lewis did not require the 
appointment of a special counsel at that stage. 
The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal to the House of Lords and asked two 
questions:
“Are the procedures for dealing with claims of public interest immunity made on behalf 
of the prosecution in criminal proceedings compliant with Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms? If not, in what way are the 
procedures deficient and how might the deficiency be remedied?”
The House of Lords acknowledged the possibility of the appointment of a special 
counsel to represent a defendant in an ordinary criminal trial when PII matters 
arise. It made clear that even this appointment would not suffice to resolve all the 
problems connected to PII applications. It went on to state that all the ethical and 
practical problems linked to this choice might not be a deterrent where the interest 
of justice requires such an appointment. Nevertheless, the judges stressed that 
“such an appointment will always be exceptional, never automatic; a course of last 
and never first resort. It should not be ordered unless and until the trial judge is 
satisfied that no other course will adequately meet the overriding requirement of 
fairness to the defendant.” 152 
_______________________
150 R v H and C, Trial judgment, paras 42-43. 
151 R v H and C, [2004] UKHL 3, para 34. 
152 Ibid. at para. 22. 
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The House of Lords provided an interpretation of the Edwards and Lewis ECtHR 
judgment that reduced its impact on the criminal procedure in PII matters. The 
appellants argued that following Edwards and Lewis there would be a violation 
of article 6 of the Convention if a judge ruled on PII matters in the absence of 
adversarial arguments on behalf of the accused, where the material the prosecution 
is trying to withhold is or may be relevant to an issue of fact on which the judge has 
to decide. This is especially so when such a decision can effectively determine the 
outcome of the proceedings.
The House of Lords refused those submissions that “seek to place the trial judge 
in a straitjacket.”153 The House reclaimed a case-by-case approach to the matters 
rather then a general and strict rule. It found that it would be “entirely contrary to 
the trend of Strasbourg decision-making to hold that in a certain class of cases or 
when a certain kind of decision has to be made a prescribed procedure must always 
be followed.”154
The UK was satisfied with this narrow interpretation to the extent that it decided 
to discontinue its appeal, pending before the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, of the 
Edwards and Lewis judgment. This judgment restated the predominance of the 
prosecution discretion in disclosure matters. The House of Lords was satisfied that 
if the prosecution correctly applies disclosure the occasion where a judicial ruling 
is necessary would be scarce. 
The special advocate or special counsel scheme has been employed rarely so far 
in criminal trials. The Attorney General, in consultation with the Criminal Bar 
Association, has prepared a list of eligible special advocates. Once a special counsel 
is appointed, he acts on behalf of the defendant. He studies the case to familiarise 
himself with it. He then meets the defence in order to understand the essence of 
the defence’s case and to identify what material they are trying to have disclosed 
and why. The special advocate then goes into a closed session where he is shown 
all the material the prosecution had withheld from the defence. In the closed 
session, the judge will only be shown the material whose disclosure the special 
advocate considers relevant to the case. If the special advocate, after having seeing 
the material, needs further instructions he has to submit in writing to the judge the 
questions he would like to ask to the defence. The special counsel can speak again 
with the defendant only when authorised by the judge. Finally, the special advocate 
hands his submissions in to the judge.
The procedure is rather elaborate and its adoption on a routine basis entails the 
resolution of ethical and practical problems. As noted by the House of Lords, ethical 
concerns arise from the way in which the special counsel is required to act which is 
“unknown to the legal profession.”155 The relationship between the special advocate 
and the accused is, indeed, rather unusual considering the impossibility of the 
former to take full instructions from his client, to report to him, not to mention 
_______________________
153 Ibid. at para. 33. 
154 Ibid. at para. 34. 
155 Ibid. at para. 22. 
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his lack of responsibility toward the accused and the absence of the customary 
confidence inherent in any ordinary client-lawyer relationship. Practical obstacles 
emerge in relation to the delay that the appointment of a special advocate might 
cause due to the time he must be allocated to familiarise himself with the case; 
in relation to the high expenses that the engagement of a skilled and experienced 
counsel adds to the case; and in relation to the necessity of his presence throughout 
the trial or at least his availability in order to assist the court in its continuing duty 
to review disclosure. 
 12.2 The special counsel scheme applied to terrorism cases
This subsection analyses the employment of the special advocate scheme in delicate 
cases concerning terrorist suspects. Dealing with the threat of terrorism is very 
difficult not only because of the covert nature of the threat, but also because it is a 
field that from a legal perspective amplifies the stark contrast between the need to 
conceal information from the suspect on public interest grounds, such as national 
security, and the suspect’s right to a fair trial. 
In 2009 the European Court of Human Rights and the House of Lords (HL) 
delivered two judgments concerning the effectiveness of the employment of 
the special advocate scheme in procedures regulating closed hearings where a 
suspected international terrorist would be denied participation and disclosure of 
the information on which the government based its suspicion. This jurisprudence 
shaped the contours of the role of the special advocate and it will be examined in 
order to understand the implications of the use of this rather peculiar legal figure. 
First, a brief description of the relevant domestic law and the procedure envisaged 
therein is provided for a better understanding of the tension between the relevant 
interests at stake and the balance that the Courts struck. 
 12.2.1 Relevant domestic law
Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the United Kingdom enacted the 
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) that conferred to the Secretary 
of State the power to issue a certificate in order to detain an individual suspected 
of being an international terrorist with a view to his intended deportation.156 This 
provision also applied to cases where the individual’s deportation was temporarily 
prevented.157 The act regulated the possibility of appeal against the “deportation 
certificate” before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC). The SIAC 
is a tribunal composed of independent judges. The procedure envisaged the right 
to appeal (on a point of law) against its decisions to the Court of Appeal and the 
_______________________
156 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, part 4, article 21-23.
157 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, part 4, article 21-23. This may be the case, for example, if the person has 
established that removal to their own country might result in treatment contrary to Article 3 that prevents removal or 
deportation to a place where there is a real risk that the person will suffer treatment contrary to that article (e.g. tor-
ture). If no alternative destination is immediately available then removal or deportation may not, for the time being, 
be possible even though the ultimate intention remains to remove or deport the person once satisfactory arrangements 
can be made. See A. and Others v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, [GC], no. 3455/05, 19 February 2009, p. 5.
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House of Lords.158 The procedure regulating the appeal before SIAC allowed it to 
consider not only material which could be made public (open material) but also material 
which, for reasons of national security, could not become public (closed material). The 
appellant or his representatives could not see the closed material. Consequently, in these 
cases one or more security-cleared counsels, referred to as “special advocates”, would be 
appointed by the Solicitor General to act on behalf of each appellant. The open material 
was served to the appellant and his legal representative who could discuss it together 
with the special advocate. In the course of the closed hearing the special advocate was 
also shown the closed material but from that moment on he could not interact with 
the appellant without authorisation from the SIAC. In respect of each appeal against 
certification the SIAC issued both an open and a closed judgment. The special advocate 
could see both but the detainee and his representatives could only see the open judgment.
In 2004, the House of Lords held by a simple majority that this procedure (regulated 
by section 23 of the ATCSA) was incompatible with the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Individual Freedoms (Convention).159 
A majority of judges thought that the 2001 ATCSA was contrary to the Convention (Art. 
14 ECHR) because it discriminated between British nationals and foreign nationals. 
The provisions of the act were indeed applicable only to non-British nationals. 
The Parliament responded by enacting the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA). 
This piece of legislation granted the Secretary of State the power to make control 
orders.160 The relevant provision states that:
The Secretary of State may make a control order against an individual if he: 
(a) has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual is or has been involved in 
terrorism-related activity; and 
(b) considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the 
public from a risk of terrorism, to make a control order imposing obligations on that individual.
A control order is “an order against an individual that imposes obligations on 
him for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of 
terrorism”.161 A control order may impose on the targeted individual (controlee) any 
obligation that the Secretary of State considers necessary for purposes connected to 
the prevention or restricting of involvement by that individual in terrorist activity. 162 
_______________________
158 The Special Immigration Appeals Commission (“SIAC”) was set up in response to the Court’s judgment in Chahal v. The 
United Kingdom. See paragraph 9.
159 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56. 
160 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, section 2(1).
161 Ibid. at section 1(1).
162 Ibid. at section 1(3)(4). Obligations which might be imposed by a control order include: restrictions on the possession 
of specified articles or substances (such as a mobile telephone); restrictions on the use of specified services or facilities 
(such as internet access); restrictions on work and business arrangements; restrictions on association or communi-
cation with other individuals, specified or generally; restrictions on where an individual may reside and who may be 
admitted to that place; a requirement to admit specified individuals to certain locations and to allow such places to be 
searched and items to be removed there from; a prohibition on an individual being in specified location(s) at specified 
times or days; restrictions to an individual’s freedom of movement, including giving prior notice of proposed move-
ments; a requirement to surrender the individual’s passport; a requirement to allow the individual to be photographed; 
a requirement to cooperate with surveillance of the individual’s movements or communications, including electronic 
tagging; a requirement to report to a specified person and specified times and places.
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Section 3 of the PTA regulates the judicial supervision of the way in which the 
Secretary of State exercises his power to impose control orders. Specifically, the 
court must assess the Secretary of State’s decision concerning the requirements 
for a control order and the necessity of the obligations imposed by the order. 
This determination is made in the course of the hearing provided for in section 
3(10) of the PTA (the section 3(10) hearing). In the section 3(10) hearing the 
special advocates, appointed by the Attorney General, safeguard the interest of 
the controlees.163 For the purpose of this research, it is not necessary to dwell on 
all aspects of the procedure but it is sufficient to point out that it resembles the 
procedure that takes place before SIAC in relation to the appointment of a special 
advocate. The latter in fact represents the interest of the controlee in the course of 
the closed hearings where he can make both written and oral submissions to the 
court and cross-examine witnesses.164 Once the special advocate has been shown 
the closed material he cannot communicate with the controlee without the leave 
of the Court.
Both pieces of legislation analysed above disciplined the appointment of a special 
advocate in order to represent the individual targeted by a provision that in essence 
limited his right to disclosure in hearings where material withheld on public 
interest grounds would be used by the judge to form his opinion. 
As mentioned above, the UK, following the relevant case law of the ECtHR in relation 
to the PII hearings discussed above, introduced the special advocate scheme in 
order to assure the compliance of the procedure with the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Nonetheless, through very recent jurisprudence of the ECtHR and 
of the HL it has emerged that there are circumstances where the appointment of a 
special counsel is not sufficient per se to avoid a breach of the Convention.
 12.2.2 The Judgment of the ECtHR in A. and Others v. The United 
Kingdom
The ECtHR was faced with 11 applications filed by individuals who had been 
detained pursuant to the provisions of the 2001 ATCSA.165 They all complained 
about the SIAC procedure and in particular about the lack of disclosure of material 
evidence except to special advocates who were not allowed to consult with the 
detainees.166 They argued, inter alia, that the procedure violated article 5(4) of the 
Convention which states:
Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court 
and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
The applicants stressed that the SIAC’s judgments upholding the certification 
against them were based on closed material that had not been shown to them. 
_______________________
163 Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), Part 76.2. 
164 Ibid. at Part 76.24. 
165 A. and Others v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, [GC], no. 3455/05, 19 February 2009.
166 Ibid. at para 195.
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The applicants claimed that “it could never be permissible for a court assessing the 
lawfulness of detention to rely on such material where it bore decisively on the case 
the detained person had to meet and where it had not been disclosed, even in gist 
or summary form, sufficiently to enable the individual to know the case against 
him and to respond.”167 To respond to the case effectively implied the possibility of 
giving informed instructions to the special advocate so to enable him to challenge 
the closed material in light of the dispositions of the detainee. In order to do so the 
latter had the right to be provided at least with the core of the information upon 
which the certification had been issued. 
The government argued that there were valid public interest grounds for not 
disclosing the closed material and that it was a settled principle in the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence that the right to disclosure was not an absolute right. It suggested 
that the applicants’ view, if upheld, would elevate the right of an individual to 
disclosure of relevant evidence to an absolute right privileged over the rights of 
others including the right to life and the interests of the state in preserving the 
effectiveness of its intelligence. Such an erroneous interpretation of the right of 
disclosure would put the protection the state must grant its citizens in jeopardy 
as well as ignoring the well-settled principle, inherent in the Convention, that 
the general interests of the community must be balanced against the rights of an 
individual.168 
A human rights organisation that was granted leave to intervene highlighted 
how special advocates had complained about serious difficulties encountered 
in representing appellants before the SIAC in closed proceedings due to the 
prohibition of consulting with the appellants in relation to closed material. 
Particularly, the lack of instructions received from the appellants minimised their 
role in such proceedings.169 
Furthermore, it was brought to the attention of the ECtHR that in the Canadian 
procedure, which inspired the establishment of SIAC, in closed proceedings 
before the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC)170 special advocates 
were allowed “to maintain contact with the appellant and his lawyers throughout 
the process and even after the special advocate was fully apprised of the secret 
information against the appellant.”171  
The Court reaffirmed the principle that, although the right to a fair criminal trial 
includes a right to the disclosure of all material evidence in the prosecution’s 
possession, sometimes it may be necessary to withhold certain material from the 
_______________________
167 Ibid. at para 195.
168 Paragraph 4.77 of the Government’s Memorial to the Court quoted at paragraph 50 of the Judgment.
169 A. and Others v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, [GC], no. 3455/05, 19 February 2009, para. 199. The submission of the spe-
cial advocate quoted by Liberty were received as evidence by the House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee 
in the course of its inquiry into the operation of SIAC and its use of special advocates which followed the the judgment 
of the House of Lords in December 2004, declaring Part 4 of the 2001 Act incompatible with Articles 5 and 14 of the 
Convention. 
170 The Security Intelligence Review Committee considered whether a Minister’s decision to remove a permanently resi-
dent foreign national on national security grounds was well founded.
171 A. and Others v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, [GC], no. 3455/05, 19 February 2009, para. 198. 
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accused on public interest grounds. In these cases there is a need to counterbalance 
the restriction of the accused’s rights through certain procedural tools. 
The ECtHR accepted that “during the period of the applicants’ detention the 
activities and aims of the al’ Qaeda network had given rise to a public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation.”172 Consequently, there was a strong interest in 
maintaining the secrecy of the government sources of information concerning the 
terrorist network. The applicant’s right to procedural fairness provided for in article 
5(4) of the Convention had to be balanced against these crucial considerations.173  
The judges found that the SIAC, being a fully independent court and being 
familiar with both open and closed material was in the best position to assess what 
had to be disclosed to the applicants to enable them to effectively challenge the 
allegations against them. It considered that the special advocate “could perform an 
important role in counterbalancing the lack of full disclosure and the lack of a full, 
open and adversarial hearing by testing the evidence and putting arguments on 
behalf of the detainee during the closed hearings.”174 However, and this is the core 
of the judgment, the effectiveness of the special advocate’s function was impaired 
unless “the detainee was provided with sufficient information about the allegations 
against him to enable him to give effective instructions to the special advocate.”175  
Although such assessment needs to be done on a case-by-case basis, the Court 
stated that the procedural requirements of article 5(4) of the Convention would 
not be satisfied if (where the open material was made solely of general assertions) 
the SIAC based its decision to uphold a certification and maintain the detention 
only or to a decisive degree on closed material. This circumstance in fact would 
render it impossible for the applicants to challenge the allegations against them. 
Applying this important principle to the case at stake the ECtHR considered that 
the main allegations against the two applicants were that they had been involved in 
fund-raising for terrorist groups linked to al’ Qaeda. The open evidence concerned 
solely large sums of money moving through the bank account of one applicant 
and the involvement of the second applicant in raising money through fraud. The 
applicants were not disclosed any material about the link between the money raised 
and terrorism. The Court found that there had been a violation of article 5(4) of the 
Convention because these applicants were not in a position to effectively challenge 
the allegations against them.176 
This judgment elevated the discussion surrounding the special advocate scheme to 
a different level. It recalled that the appointment of a special advocate might indeed 
counterbalance the restriction of an accused’s right to disclosure but it went further by 
_______________________
172 Ibid. at para. 216. 
173 The Court at paragraph 217 stated that “in the circumstances of the present case, and in view of the dramatic impact 
of the lengthy - and what appeared at that time to be indefinite - deprivation of liberty on the applicants’ fundamental 
rights, Article 5 § 4 must import substantially the same fair trial guarantees as Article 6 § 1 in its criminal aspect (Garcia 
Alva v. Germany, no. 23541/94, § 39, 13 February 2001 and see also see Chahal, cited above, §§ 130-131).”
174 A. and Others v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, [GC], no. 3455/05, 19 February 2009, para. 220. 
175 Ibid. at para. 220. 
176 Ibid. at para. 223. 
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giving guidance on its functioning. In other words, the Court stated that the appointment 
of a special advocate is not sufficient, per se, to guarantee that proceedings comply with 
the Convention when the accused is not given sufficient information to enable him to 
give effective instructions to the special advocate in relation to the allegations against 
him. This finding balances the right to a fair trial, including the right to disclosure, 
and the public interest. Furthermore, it highlights that a special advocate must be put 
in a position to be as effective as possible in his function through disclosure of a core 
irreducible minimum of information to the accused person.
 12.2.3 The Judgment of the House of Lords in Secretary of State for 
the Home Department v. AF
This ECtHR judgment analysed above assisted the House of Lords in delivering its 
judgment in the case of the Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF on 
10 June 2009.177  
Previously, in 2007, the House of Lords had issued a judgment related to the 
tension between the control order procedure under the 2005 PTA and article 6 
of the Convention.178 On that occasion the majority of the HL acknowledged that 
in relation to the hearing held pursuant to article 3(10) of the PTA there might be 
cases, albeit rare ones, where the failure to disclose material to the controlee would 
be incompatible with the article 6 requirement of a fair trial. 
Baroness Hale of Richmond was not confident on that occasion that Strasbourg 
would find that every control order hearing where the special advocate procedure 
had been used would be sufficient to comply with article 6. Nevertheless she 
held that, with strenuous efforts from all, it should usually be possible to accord 
the controlled person “a substantial measure of procedural justice”, quoting the 
expression adopted by the ECtHR in Chahal.179  
The House of Lords, at the time, adopted a flexible approach and whilst recognising 
the potential conflict between the article 3(10) hearing and article 6 of the 
Convention held that even in cases where the decision to uphold a control order 
was based solely on or to a decisive degree on closed material, substantial justice 
might still be possible. The main question was whether the article 3(10) hearing, 
taken as a whole, had been fair. In this assessment it is essential to investigate how 
effectively the special advocate had been able to challenge the withheld material 
on behalf of the controlled person and what difference its disclosure would have 
made. The House of Lords therefore did not declare the PTA incompatible with the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
On 10 June 2009, the HL delivered its judgment in the case of Secretary of State for 
the Home Department v AF. In this case the three appellants were subject to control 
_______________________ 
177 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF [2009] UKHL 28, 10 June 2009.
178 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2007] UKHL 46, 31 October 2007. 
179 Chahal v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, [GC], no. 22414/93, 15 November 1996, Concurring Opinion of Judge Jambrek, para. 1. 
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orders involving significant restrictions of their liberty which had been issued by 
the Secretary of State pursuant the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) 2005. The 
appellants claimed that their right to a fair hearing had been violated insofar as 
the judge confirming the order relied upon material received in closed hearing 
the nature of which was not disclosed to the appellants. The main question that 
the House of Lords had to answer was again whether the procedure regulating the 
article 3(10) hearings, where the issuance of control orders was at stake, complied 
with the right to a fair hearing provided for in article 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. The judgment of the ECtHR in A. and Others v. The United 
Kingdom inevitably influenced the answer the House of Lords gave to this question. 
The Secretary of State suggested that the ECtHR’s judgment had not laid down an 
“inflexible principle that there can never be a fair trial if the basis of the Secretary 
of State’s suspicion [on which the control order is based] is to be found solely or 
to a decisive degree in the closed material” and a case by case approach should be 
followed.180 
The House of Lords received submissions from the special advocates who had 
represented the appellants in the closed hearings. They explained what they are 
able to do in the course of a typical closed control order hearing and what precisely 
the difficulties they encounter are due to the lack of adequate disclosure to the 
appellants of a sufficient statement of the allegations against them. It is interesting 
to quote the relevant parts: 
“…Cross-examination by special advocates can usually deal with evidential reliability, 
possible alternative and innocent inferences, internal consistency or contradictions, the 
significance of pieces of evidence and the strength of the case overall. What they cannot do 
without instructions or evidence is to provide evidence or explanation which contradicts or 
explains the closed essential features of the case against him or offer alternative inferences 
which they are not aware of or lack any support for…181
…The real value lies in the potential for a controlled person to provide evidence 
which shows a different picture or an innocent interpretation or explanation which 
counters the basis for the adverse inferences and does so beyond that which the 
special advocates may suggest. This would either be because there would now be an 
evidential basis for those suggestions or because the special advocate may not be 
able to anticipate or put together what the controlled person’s position is. He may 
also be able to provide the special advocate with information or statements to be 
deployed as the special advocate sees fit, which the court and SSHD [Secretary of 
State for the Home Department] may never know of.”  
The special advocates were able to shed light on the principles applied by the courts 
in article 3(10) hearings in relation to disclosure of closed material. They stated 
that the fact that closed material might contain exculpatory documents is not an 
_______________________
180 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF [2009] UKHL 28, 10 June 2009, para 52.
181 Ibid. at para 54. 
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effective argument to prove the necessity of disclosure; that disclosure is considered 
as publicising the information to the whole world and not just the controlee; and 
that the security services raise serious national security concerns and accordingly 
very convincing material is required before such powerful considerations can be 
overcome.182 
The submissions stressed the importance of the disclosure to the controlee of the 
essential features of the case against him in order to enable the special advocate to 
discharge his functions effectively. It also made clear that the scope for contesting 
the Secretary of State’s objections to disclosure is very limited and that the vast 
majority of those objections are upheld despite the fact that they seem to be class 
of claims related to the type of information rather than to the specific case. 
The Lords identified two main policy considerations in support of the rule that 
a trial procedure is never fair when a party is not aware of the case against him. 
First, that there are cases where the court is not in the position to be confident that 
disclosure would make no difference. “Reasonable suspicion may be established 
on grounds that establish an overwhelming case of involvement in terrorism-
related activity but, because the threshold is so low, reasonable suspicion may also 
be founded on misinterpretation of facts in respect of which the controlee is in a 
position to put forward an innocent explanation. A system that relies upon the judge 
to distinguish between the two is not satisfactory, however able and experienced 
the judge.”183 The second consideration concerns the resentment felt by a party to 
legal proceedings where they cannot influence the result. Such resentment cannot 
be underestimated as it belongs to the entire community whose confidence in the 
justice system is essential. It is therefore crucial that justice is seen to be done rather 
than asking the community to unquestionably accept it.184 
A corollary of this judgment is the refusal of what was referred to as the “makes 
no difference” principle that supported the non-disclosure of the case against a 
party to proceedings when the closed material was so probative of his guilt (in 
these cases of his involvement in terrorist activity) to believe that any contribution 
from the controlee would make no difference from the point of view of reaching 
the right decision. The House of Lords stated that the answer to the question what 
difference disclosure might have made is that it is almost impossible to know 
and that for a judge to hold that a hearing where the party affected has had no 
opportunity to answer is a fair hearing negates the judicial function which is crucial 
to the controlled order system.185 In sum, the core principle is that even in cases 
where the accused is thought to have no conceivable answer to the case against him 
in light of the closed evidence he must be given “sufficient information to enable 
his special advocate effectively to challenge the case that is brought against him.”186
_______________________
182 Ibid. at para 104. 
183 Ibid. at para 63. 
184 Ibid. at para 63.
185 Ibid. at para 84, Lord Hope of Craighead recalling the dissenting opinion of Sedley LJ in the Appeal Court Judgment in 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF [2009] 2 LR 423, para 113.
186 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF [2009] UKHL 28, 10 June 2009, para 85.
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Interestingly, the House of Lords noted that the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR 
had not insisted on the disclosure of evidence but had limited its findings to the 
necessity of disclosing to the accused a statement of the allegations against him. 
The Lords therefore stated that the controlee is not entitled to the disclosure of the 
underlying material or the sources from which it derives but solely to the disclosure 
of sufficient information about the allegation against him. The House of Lords 
acknowledged, nonetheless, the existence of cases where the allegations and the 
underlying material cannot be separated. In these cases, if the Secretary of State is 
not willing to disclose more closed material the control order will be quashed. The 
fact that this scenario might be common to a considerable number of cases can be 
seen as an indication that the “system is unsustainable.”187  
The House of Lords concluded that “the Grand Chamber has now made clear that 
non-disclosure cannot go so far as to deny a party knowledge of the essence of the 
case against him, at least where he is at risk of consequences as severe as those 
normally imposed under a control order.”188 In other words, a control order cannot 
be confirmed by the court if the controlled person has not had a fair hearing and a 
hearing is only fair if the controlee has had the possibility to effectively challenge 
the allegations against him. To do so he has to be put in the position of giving 
informed directions to the special advocate to challenge the adverse evidence. 
Therefore, the disclosure of sufficient information about the allegation against the 
controlee must always be provided.  It will be for the judges to assess how much 
disclosure is necessary in each case for the controlee to effectively challenge it.189 
13. Concluding remarks 
The law on disclosure has been in constant development over the past 30 years. Case 
law and statutory law have characterised it alternatively more or less narrowly. The 
process has been compared to a pendulum swinging periodically between more 
open and more restricted disclosure of unused material.190 Political trends have 
played a role in the statutory interventions and the major miscarriages of justice 
detected in the early 1990s have also been influential. 
By the end of the Middle Ages, England had developed an adversarial criminal 
system. A lengthy process that had begun from a radically different conception of 
the trial in general and of disclosure in particular than from that in place today. In 
fact, in the late sixteenth to early seventeenth century, the trial was conceived as an 
altercation between the victim and the accused. Lawyers were not contemplated 
and could act neither for the prosecution nor for the defence. The system was based 
_______________________
187 Ibid. at para 87. 
188 Ibid. at para 65. 
189 Ibid. at paras 102-103 and 106, Baroness Hale of Richmond. The question of how much information to disclose was 
decided in the context of litigation before the domestic courts, following the principles laid down in this case. See, 
for example, Secretary of State for the Home Department v AS [2009] EWHC 2564 (Admin); Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v CE [2011] EWHC 3159 (Admin); AH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 
787; and AN, AE & AF v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 869. See also Resolution CM/
ResDH(2013)114 adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 6 June 2013 at the 1172nd Meeting 
of the Ministers’ Deputies. 190 Calvert-Smith D. QC, The prosecuting authority’s role; Disclosure under the CPIA 1996: British Academy of Forensic 
Sciences seminar, Gray’s Inn, 1 December 1999.
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upon the idea that no disclosure of the prosecution’s case (or rather, the victim’s 
case) should occur before trial. The defendant remained unaware of the charges and 
the evidence against him and could not prepare his case beforehand. The essential 
feature of the criminal trial was the spontaneous reaction to the defendant to the 
charges against him. Preserving this spontaneity was crucial for the effectiveness 
of the truth seeking process. Therefore, pre-trial disclosure was perceived as a 
weakness of the system the functioning of which would be undermined by any 
information received by the accused concerning the case against him. 
This characterisation of disclosure is in stark contrast with the relevance that 
the disclosure of information has gained in modern English/Welsh criminal 
procedure. From the analysis carried out it emerges that the pre-trial disclosure of 
the prosecution’s case and evidence against the accused is an uncontroversial and 
settled principle of justice. In a criminal justice system using an adversarial model, 
based on the “two cases approach” it is fundamental that the accused is informed 
in advance of the case being made against him, and specifically of the evidence 
gathered, in order to allow him to prepare his defence. This principle is in line 
with the adversarial idea of the trial as a confrontation between two parties under 
the supervision of an impartial umpire that is the judge. Only through pre-trial 
disclosure is the defence in a position to fight its battle.
What appears more controversial and difficult to reconcile with the adversarial 
tradition is the prosecution’s duty to disclose unused material, which consists of all 
the material gathered in the course of a criminal investigation that the prosecutor 
does not intend to use at trial. In addition, the introduction of defence disclosure 
obligations, which have become even stricter under the 2003 CJA, has proved difficult 
to digest for the defence practitioners and its application has been of a poor standard. 
As noted by Quirk, as far as prosecution’s disclosure of unused material is 
concerned, the difficulties experienced by the system belong to two different but 
intertwined levels: the practical level and the cultural level.191  
On the practical level, the golden rule is that full disclosure of unused material 
should be made in order to avoid the recurrence of major miscarriages of justice 
caused by the arbitrary withholding of such material.192 The disclosure of unused 
material is merely the last stage of a more articulated and complex process whose 
functioning relies on the accuracy of the activities carried out by different actors in 
the process. The process can be compared to an assembly line in a factory where the 
quality of the final product depends on the precision and diligence of the previous 
stages where all the components were assembled. A minor mistake earlier in the 
chain could lead to unforeseen and major defects in the final product marketed. 
Prosecution in England and Wales is carried out by different protagonists who 
play separate roles in the same framework. They are the police, investigators, 
disclosure officers, prosecutors and trial counsel. The English/Welsh criminal 
system entrusts the police with delicate functions in relation to the retaining, 
_______________________ 
191 Quirk, above n. 80.192 R v H and C [2004] UKHL 3, at 147. 
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recording and scheduling of material. The prosecution bases its decisions to 
disclose on the work conducted by investigators and disclosure officers. Compiling 
the schedule of sensitive material requires not only fairness and impartiality but 
also an assessment of the “materiality” of the information to the issues potentially 
at stake in a criminal trial. The disclosure officer in fact will schedule material as 
sensitive if he believes that its disclosure might create a real risk of prejudicing an 
important public interest. 
This crucial assessment should be performed by the prosecutor rather than by police 
investigators. The prosecution should decide what material has to be recorded and 
to which schedule it should be allocated. On this point, the recommendations 
made by the 2011 review are sensible insofar as they advocate the prosecutor’s 
early involvement with the investigators. A deeper and earlier involvement of the 
prosecution at this stage would allow him to rely on his own assessment of the 
material and in turn to have an “early grip” on disclosure obligations. The police 
would retain the task of generating, gathering and recording material in the course 
of criminal investigations. Police officers are trained for these tasks and possess the 
necessary skills, whereas they lack the capacity to assess material in terms of its 
possible relevance in a trial. In other words, the system places all the responsibility 
for disclosure on the prosecution but it does not take the maxim that “lawyers are 
only as good as the material given to them” into account.193 
The status quo seems problematic also from the perspective of the defence, as it appears to 
have not sufficiently safeguarded possible misconduct and mistakes made by the police. 
Frequently, the police disregard or simply lose material or evidence.194 To a certain extent a 
broader involvement of the prosecution in the assessment of the material could guarantee 
more accurate and competent scrutiny. The police hold a key responsibility that is not 
subordinated to regular supervision and therefore a mistake at this stage will most likely go 
undetected and if detected would be difficult if not impossible to remedy at a later stage. 
On a cultural level, it seems that the disclosure process regulated by the CJA does 
not take the tradition of the criminal system in which it operate into account and the 
characterisation of its main figures.195 
With regard to the police, the disclosure regime requires them to pursue any line of 
inquiry regardless of whether they point towards the guilt or innocence of the suspect. This 
investigative role clearly belongs to an inquisitorial tradition rather than an adversarial one. 
Studies have shown that the police still perceive themselves (and third persons perceive 
them) as an agent for the prosecution.196 This perception could lead them to undertake 
investigations with a view to corroborating the case of the prosecution against a suspect 
rather than pursuing lines of inquiry that indicate otherwise.  
The disclosure scheme seems to confer a double role on the prosecution. In fact, alongside 
building the case against the accused, the prosecution discharges certain functions 
that should safeguard the right of the accused to a fair trial as part of the disclosure 
 
_______________________
193 Quirk, above n. 80 at p. 52
194 Plotnikoff and Woolfson, above n. 60 at p. 25. 195 Quirk, above n. 80 at 42-59.
196 Quirk, above n. 80 at 42-59.
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regime. Specifically, the prosecutor should apply a test when deciding upon disclosure 
which, although objective in nature, requires the assessment of material from the 
defence’s perspective or, in other words, to empathise with his opponent. Requiring 
the prosecution to act as a minister of justice is a rather high expectation that in 
essence goes against its nature and its tradition in an adversarial system. The heavy 
responsibilities placed on the prosecution have blurred the edges of the adversarial 
system.197 In the name of the fair administration of justice the prosecution is expected 
to perform tasks that might benefit the opponent.198 Based on these premises, 
the effectiveness of the system depends on the way in which the police and the 
prosecution handle the conflict between the responsibilities and expectations placed 
on them and their cultural tradition. Such a conflict can be difficult to reconcile.   
As far as the defence’s disclosure is concerned, its introduction into the criminal 
justice system represents a radical change in criminal procedure and a clash with the 
adversarial tradition where the defence ought not to disclose its case before trial. A 
defence non-disclosure provision is perceived as part of an adversarial scheme where 
the prosecution has to prove its case and the accused has the privilege of avoiding self-
incrimination. It is therefore understandable that it was difficult for many scholars 
and practitioners to accept. 
Nonetheless, the adversarial model is not immutable and it can be argued that in 
England, it has departed from its pure version in many other respects (for instance 
attributing a more active role to the judges) and that also other adversarial systems 
(e.g. the U.S.) have adopted defence disclosure provisions in an even stricter fashion 
than England.
However, it seems that the way the CJA characterised the defence disclosure 
obligations is too strict and not reflected by similar obligations on the side of the 
prosecution. In its original version, the CPIA merely required that the defence 
statement contain an outline, laid out in general terms, of the nature of the proposed 
defence and an indication of the matters on which the accused took issue with the 
prosecution. Although it proved ineffectual, this rather light obligation imposed on 
the defence was easier to reconcile with the idea that defence disclosure can improve 
the disclosure scheme by drawing the prosecution’s attention to material relevant to 
the defence outlined. It was also coherent with the disclosure process envisaged by 
the CPIA where the test of second prosecution disclosure depended on its materiality 
to the issues in the case highlighted by the defence.
On the contrary, the CJA introduced more strict and demanding defence obligations. 
The defence statement has to outline the nature of the defence that will be offered at 
trial. The expression “general terms“ has been removed. Furthermore, the accused has 
to indicate not only points of fact but also points of law that he intends to take to trial 
and any authority he intends to rely on for that purpose. What is also questionable 
is the defence’s duty to disclose the details of all the experts that it has contacted to 
commission a report to potentially use during the trial.
A dissenting member of the commission who had worked on the Auld report 
(discussed above) noted that disclosure is designed to be helpful to the prosecution 
_______________________
197 Plater, above n. 6. Also Niblett, above n. 5.
198 R v Preston, (1994) 98 Cr App R 405, p. 415.
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and more generally, to the system. However, he also stated that it is not the job of the 
defendant to be helpful either to the prosecution or to the system. His task is simply 
to defend himself. Rules requiring the disclosure of an alibi and expert evidence in 
advance are reasonable exceptions to this general principle.199 Nonetheless, what the 
system seems to expect is cooperation between the accused in order to accomplish 
effective administration of justice. This is a high expectation, which does not consider 
the nature and the tradition of the defence in the criminal system or the attitude 
of defendants towards such a system that is prosecuting them. Whereas a general 
outline of the defence’s case might be helpful to discharge disclosure obligations and 
to steer the trial towards the most relevant legal issues, the defence obligations as 
depicted in the CJA seem too strict and unbalanced. They require too much from 
a defendant and tend to tie him to the defence indicated in the statement exposing 
him to the risk of negative inferences should discrepancies arise between the content 
of the statement and the defence during the trial.
The disclosure scheme seems to ignore the wide ranging and proven malfunctioning 
of the previous milder defence disclosure duties. In fact, it introduced stricter 
requirements for the defence statement but did not tackle all the concerns expressed 
by defence practitioners nor the prosecution’s discontent with the lack of the content 
of most defence statements. 
The English/Welsh criminal justice system, after a somewhat liberal beginning 
following from the Ward judgment, seems to have shifted back towards a more 
restrictive approach to disclosure. It reduces the prosecution’s disclosure of unused 
material and requests more detailed and specific pre-trial disclosure of the defence’s 
case. The disclosure scheme appears to expect its players to carry out their duties in 
a rather peculiar fashion. Police officers are expected to pursue any line of inquiry in 
their investigations. They are entrusted with the delicate responsibility of dividing the 
material gathered into sensitive and non-sensitive. Usually, the prosecution will not 
supervise the police’s work in this regard and will rely on the schedule given to it. The 
system requires the prosecution to build the case against the defence and at certain 
stages of the disclosure procedure to empathise with its adversary by safeguarding his 
rights. The defence has been burdened by strict disclosure requirements but it has 
not been granted adequate safeguards in ex parte applications for the withholding of 
material from disclosure on a PII ground. The protocol on the disclosure of unused 
material in criminal cases and the Atorney General’s guidelines both issued in 2013 
seem to address a certain extent some of these criticisms. However, it is a question 
of waiting to see the concrete effects of such instruments on the way the disclosure 
process is carried out. 
Finally, as correctly highlighted by the 2011 review, it is submitted that the disclosure 
scheme would benefit in terms of clarity and effectiveness from the consolidation 
of the multitude of guidance in the form of rules, codes, protocols, manuals and 
guidelines which underpin the operation of the CPIA as amended by the CJA. 
 
_______________________
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II. Disclosure of information in the Italian criminal law system
Introduction
“There are two ways to conceive the criminal process, standing on opposite sides. On 
one side, the one that conceives the criminal process as the instrument for ascertaining 
the historical truth of the facts; on the other side, the one that conceives the process as a 
system to solve a controversy between two parties, as a competition where the winner is 
the party who is more capable, more persuasive, more brilliant. . . .The essential problem 
lies just here: what type of process do we want? That of the continental tradition, or that 
of common-law? The difference is abyssal, because if I choose the second option truth 
does not matter anymore.” 1
This section focuses on the analysis and discussion of the main provisions 
regulating the disclosure of information (or the “discovery” process as it is referred 
to by Italian scholars) in the Italian criminal justice procedure. 
On October 24, 1988, the Italian Parliament adopted a new code of criminal 
procedure (hereinafter CPP) that entered into force a year later. The adoption of 
the new code marked a major shift in Italy’s criminal law system from a mainly 
inquisitorial criminal procedure to a procedure inspired by adversarial principles.2 
The code replaced the 1930 code of criminal procedure, which was influenced by 
the French tradition. Over the past twenty years following its enactment, the 1988 
code of criminal procedure has been substantially amended on several occasions. 
The aim of these shifts was to reconstruct the Italian criminal procedure in an 
adversarial fashion and to adopt a more efficient procedure in order to deal with 
the significant backlog in the system.3
In the beginning of the 1990’s the Constitutional Court handed down several 
judgments that have eroded the adversarial structure of the newly enacted reforms.4 
The quoted interpretation of the civil/common law clash, given by a respected judge 
of the Court of Cassation, is self-explanatory in reflecting the Italian judiciary’s 
lean towards an inquisitorial criminal law system and therefore its difficulty in 
adjusting to a different conception of the criminal justice proceedings. 
In 1999, the Parliament responded to the judiciary’s offensive by undertaking 
constitutional reform. Constitutional law n. 2/1999 added five new sections to 
article 111 of the Constitution conferring constitutional status to the adversarial 
principles contained in the original version of the 1988 code of criminal procedure. 
The new characterisation of the criminal law system had important bearings on 
the regulation of the disclosure of information to the suspect/accused in criminal 
_______________________
1 Davigo P., Sete di Giustizia e Sepolcri Imbiancati, Micromega II, 209 1999.
2 See Law n. 81, 16 February 1987, article 2, paragraph 1. 
3 Grande E., Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and Resistance, American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 48, 2000, p. 227.
4 The Constitutional Court is a judicial body composed of 15 judges one-third appointed by the President of the Republic, 
one-third elected by Parliament, and one-third elected by the ordinary and administrative supreme courts. The most im-
portant function of the Court, according to article 134 of the Constitution is to rule on controversies or disputes “regarding 
the constitutional legitimacy of the laws and acts having the force of law issued by the State and the Regions”.
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justice proceedings. 
In order to assist the reader in grasping the main elements of the structure of 
the criminal system in which the disclosure of information operates as well as to 
appreciate the changes that have taken place with the adoption of the new code, 
this section provides a brief description of the main features of the 1930 and 1988 
codes of criminal procedure. This includes an overview of the main developments 
concerning the 1988 code of criminal procedure which have occurred since its 
adoption, the pre-trial and trial phases of the current criminal proceedings, the 
role of the prosecutor and the constitutional fair trial reform.
Against the results of this analysis, the main provisions regulating the discovery 
process during the preliminary investigation and the pre-trial stage will be 
investigated. In the second part of this section, their effectiveness and compliance 
with the provisions of the Italian Constitution regarding a fair trial as inspired by 
the European Convention on Human Rights will be assessed. Finally, attention will 
be paid to the regulation of the defence’s investigations envisaged by the code in 
connection to disclosure and some conclusions will be drawn.
1. The 1930 criminal procedure code
The so-called Rocco code of criminal procedure was enacted in 1930.5 It embodied 
the main characteristics of the codes of 1865 and 1913 and was inspired by the 
French inquisitorial legal tradition. Under the Rocco code, the criminal procedure 
envisaged two important stages; the investigative stage (investigazione) and the 
public trial (dibattimento). Unlike the current system, the findings made at the first 
stage played a predominant role during the trial. 
The protagonist of the investigation stage was the investigating or “instruction” 
judge (giudice istruttore) who enjoyed extensive powers. The investigating judge 
conducted the investigations impartially with the aim of ascertaining the truth. He 
was in charge of gathering and collecting all the evidence both against and in favour 
of the accused. This included hearing witnesses, ordering arrests and searches as 
well as the summoning and questioning the accused. 
Investigations were mainly secret and in the original version of the code, the accused 
was not allowed to take part in any of the investigative activities. This situation 
improved slightly following the intervention by the Constitutional Court, which 
handed down several judgments that granted the accused the right to participate 
in some pre-trial activities.6 All the evidence collected would be retained and 
recorded in the investigative dossier. At the end of the investigative stage, the 
giudice istruttore, based on the evidence gathered, decided whether to acquit the 
accused or to formally charge him. 
The second stage was the public trial which was conducted before the trial judge. 
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Although in this phase the evidence was submitted in the presence of the defence 
who was granted the right to challenge it and to offer proof to the contrary, the 
defendant (and the prosecutor) could not cross-examine the witnesses directly. 
Both parties had to pose their questions through the trial judge who was fully 
aware of the nature of the case well in advance of its commencement thanks 
to the investigative dossier delivered to him. In addition, the conception of the 
investigative judge as an impartial fact finder conferred, in the eyes of the trial 
judge, a considerable weight to the evidence gathered and recorded in the dossier. 
The latter was therefore in a position to analyse the evidence collected, often with 
no intervention from the defence, and form his own opinion before the beginning 
of the trial.
The powers of the defence were limited and their effective deployment at trial 
was frustrated. The prosecutor’s witness statements that were collected during 
the investigations could be admitted as evidence even if the witnesses were not 
present in court and written summaries of the evidence gathered during the 
investigations could be received at trial limiting the accused’s right to challenge 
the evidence against him and to confront the prosecution’s witnesses.7 In practice, 
the public trial was often a repetition and confirmation of the investigative stage. 
The investigative dossier was the crucial element determining the outcome of the 
public trial and the accused could also be convicted based solely on the evidence 
gathered in secret during the investigation.
As far as the disclosure of evidence is concerned, the previous criminal law system 
was characterised by the powers of the investigating judge. The criminal justice 
system regarded him as an impartial organ and granted him the right to investigate 
with no obligation to inform the person who was being investigated.  The system 
believed that the rights of the accused were safeguarded by the super partes 
nature of the investigating judge. The latter had to be placed in the position to 
carry out the investigations in the most efficient and effective way in the interest 
of ascertaining the truth which was also in the interest of the suspect. “Truth 
necessitated unlimited freedom of search”.8 This consideration left no room for 
disclosure obligations during the investigations.  
2. The 1988 Code of Criminal Procedure 
The new code of criminal procedure, enacted in 1988, marked a significant 
departure from the deeply rooted inquisitorial legal tradition that had 
characterised the three former codes of criminal procedure dated 1865, 1913 and 
1930, to a criminal procedure moving towards the implementation of accusatorial 
principles. Article 2 of the law n. 81/1987, with which parliament delegated the 
preparation of a new code of criminal procedure to the government, stated that 
“the code of criminal procedure shall apply the principles of the Constitution and 
Chapter 2
_______________________ 
7 Grande, above n. 3 at pp. 227 – 243. 
8 Panzavolta M., Reforms and Counter-Reforms in the Italian Struggle for an Accusatorial Criminal Law System, North 
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conform to international conventions. It also must implement in the criminal trial 
the characteristics of the adversarial system”. 
It is important to delineate the main features of the new criminal procedure 
in order to identify the context in which disclosure obligations operate. This 
subsection provides an overview of the functioning of the criminal procedure from 
the investigations to the beginning and development of the trial. The analysis is 
tailored to the provisions regulating ordinary criminal proceedings although some 
of the characteristics described below, especially in relation to the investigations 
phase, are applicable to the trial alternatives introduced by the new code.9
The adversarial nature of the 1988 CPP is reflected, inter alia, by the role conferred 
to the prosecutor, the adversarial presentation of evidence at trial characterised by 
the principle of orality and immediacy and the attempted reduction of the judge’s 
power to introduce evidence at trial.10 Broadly speaking, the new code of criminal 
procedure is based on two main grounds; the separation between the function 
of the prosecution and the function of the judge in criminal proceedings and the 
individuation of two separate and independent phases: the pre-trial and the trial 
phase.11
The prosecutor, assisted by the police, conducts the investigation. In this phase, the 
changes implemented by the new code of criminal procedure are in stark contrast 
to the former system. The scope of the preliminary investigation is no longer about 
the finding of truth as it was under the Rocco code. Article 326 of the CPP (headed 
“purposes of the preliminary investigations”- finalitá delle indagini preliminari), 
states that the aim of the preliminary investigations is the completion, by the public 
prosecutor and the police, of the investigations necessary to determine whether or 
not to begin prosecution.
The CPP presents a clear distinction between the investigative and the judicial 
functions in the preliminary investigation stage (indagini preliminari). The former 
is assigned to the prosecution and the latter to the judge for the preliminary 
investigation (giudice per le indagini preliminary or GIP).12 The figure of the 
investigating judge (giudice istruttore) clearly inspired by the inquisitorial tradition 
of French origin, which combined both functions, was abolished.
Interestingly, the lawmakers, while embracing an accusatorial model were not 
inclined to relinquish the inquisitorial principle of the obligatory nature of the 
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enables the preliminary hearing to be omitted and have an immediate trial, based on the strength of the evidence against 
the defendant. In order to avoid the trial the code envisages three different procedures called “sentencing by the parties 
request” (applicazione della pena su richiesta delle parti), summary proceedings (giudizio abbreviato) and the proceedings 
by penal decree (procedimento per decreto penale). All these alternatives are tempting for the defendant as they involve a 
significant reduction of the sentence in exchange for the waiver of the right to trial. 
10 See Illuminati G., The Frustrated Turn to adversarial Procedure in Italy (Italian Criminal Procedure Code of 1988), Wash-
ington University Global studies Law Review, Vol. 4, 2005.
11 See Amodio E., The Accusatorial System Lost and Regained: Reforming Criminal Procedure in Italy, The American Journal 
of Comparative Law, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2004, pp. 489-500. 
12 See Articles 326-328 of the CPP.
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prosecution in favour of the discretion to prosecute. Consequently, once the public 
prosecutor learns of a notitia criminis (notizia di reato) or motu proprio collects 
information about a crime, he is compelled to register it in the crime reports register 
(registro delle notizie di reato) and to commence the preliminary investigations 
(indagini preliminari).13
The role of the preliminary investigation conferred to the judge is important in 
relation to the suspects’ rights. The latter, in fact, in the worst-case scenario, may 
remain ignorant that investigations are being carried out on them until they are 
concluded. It is therefore the GIP’s supervisory function over the prosecutor’s 
activity that safeguards the suspect’s rights. If the prosecutor considers it necessary 
to adopt measures that affect the individual freedom or the privacy of the suspect 
he cannot proceed motu proprio but needs to submit a request for preliminary 
investigations to the judge. Specifically, the GIP upon request of the prosecutor, 
may issue arrest warrants and permit wiretapping. Furthermore, the judge for the 
preliminary investigation ensures that the prosecutor acts within the time limits 
set by the code in relation to the length of the investigation.14
Once the investigation is concluded the prosecutor, based on the evidence 
collected, decides whether to file a formal charge against the suspect or to dismiss 
the case. Article 112 of the Italian Constitution mandates compulsory prosecution; 
consequently, the prosecution can only dismiss a case if it believes that the evidence 
gathered is too weak to lead to a conviction at a trial.15 When the prosecutor decides 
to dismiss a case, the judge for the preliminary investigations reviews the decision 
and if he disagrees, can order the prosecutor to undertake further investigations or 
to charge the suspect.16
When the prosecutor considers that he has collected enough material through the 
investigations to obtain a conviction at a trial he formally requests that the suspect 
is committed to trial (richiesta di rinvio a giudizio).17 This formal request marks 
the acquisition of the status of accused or defendant (imputato) by the suspect. 
Following the prosecution’s request for a committal, a so-called preliminary hearing 
(udienza preliminare) takes place before the judge of the preliminary hearing 
(giudice per l’udienza preliminare or GUP). The latter cannot be the same person who 
acted as the judge for the preliminary investigation.18 The accused is notified of the 
hearing and can participate putting forward his arguments against the prosecutor’s 
request. The judge for the preliminary hearing analyses the investigation’s dossier, 
hears the accused and assesses the viability of the prosecution’s case in order to 
decide whether the case should be referred to trial. When the GUP cannot decide 
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13 See Articles 330 and 335 CPP. 
14 Articles 405-407 CPP. The prosecutor is required to complete the investigation within six months (one year for certain 
crimes related to criminal organizations) from the registration of the notice of the crime in the registry of the notices 
of crimes. He can apply to the GIP for an extension of time. Such an extension may be granted for up to 18 months or, in 
exceptional cases, two years.
15 See Grande, above n. 3 at pp. 227 – 243. 
16 Article 409 CPP. 
17 Article 416 CPP.
18 Article 34 CPP.
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on the basis of the information before him he can order further investigations 
be made by the prosecutor on the points he considers necessary.19 The judge for 
the preliminary hearing can also introduce motu proprio the evidence he believes 
indispensable for a dismissal order.20 The preliminary hearing is a filter between 
the investigation stage and the trial stage. It marks the end of the pre-trial stage. 
The decree committing the case for trial sets the date of the first trial hearing. 
The trial judge must remain ignorant of the investigation stage to preserve his 
impartiality. This goal is pursued by the criminal procedure through the so-called 
“double dossier system” (doppio fascicolo); the investigation dossier and the trial 
dossier.21 The trial judge is not allowed to see the investigation dossier, which 
remains available to the prosecutor and the defence to prepare for trial. The GUP 
and the parties draw up the trial dossier (fascicolo per il dibattimento) immediately 
after the case is referred for trial.22 In theory, the trial dossier should be empty 
when it reaches the trial judge but in practice the code allows for certain exceptions. 
Consequently, the participation of the parties and the supervision of the GUP in the 
formation of a dossier whose content will be used at trial is an essential safeguard. 
The trial dossier may take from the investigative dossier, inter alia, the charging 
documents, the records of investigative activity that is objectively impossible to 
reproduce in court, the records of evidence admitted during the investigation 
through the confrontation of the parties before a judge,23 the records concerning 
the corpus delicti and the records of prior convictions of the accused. If the parties 
agree, further documents collected during the investigations (both defence and 
prosecution documents) can be inserted in the trial dossier. In other words, the 
trial dossier should contain the bare minimum in order to limit the trial judge’s 
knowledge of the investigation stage and preserve his neutrality. The sources of 
information contained in the prosecutor’s dossier are transformed into evidence 
only through their production in court coherently with the adversarial principles 
of orality and immediacy that inspire the code.
According to article 468 CPP, at least seven days before the date set for the beginning 
of the trial, both parties must submit a list to the registry of the court with the 
names of the witnesses, experts and technical counsel they intend to call to testify 
indicating the circumstances in which their testimony will be given. This provision 
aims to avoid the introduction of surprise evidence during the trial envisaging a 
disclosure obligation whose violation is sanctioned with the inadmissibility of the 
oral evidence not previously disclosed. 
The trial begins with the discussion of any preliminary matters and continues 
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19 See Article 421 bis  CPP added by Law n. 479/1999
20 See Article  422 CPP amended by Law n. 479/1999.
21 See Illuminati, above n. 10 at p. 572.
22 Article 431 CPP.
23 Articles 392 – 404. The so-called incidente probatorio is the admission of evidence during the investigation stage. It takes 
place when there is a serious risk of deterioration or disappearances of potential evidence before trial. For example if there 
is an important witness who is in a life threatening condition (may be due to the perpetration of the crime prosecuted) 
his testimony may be heard immediately and admitted as evidence because of the risk that any further delay might cause 
the impossibility to hear the witness. This procedure takes place before the judge for the preliminary investigation in 
presence of the prosecutor and the suspect. Evidence so admitted can be used at trial only in relation to the accused whose 
attorneys participated in the hearing in which such evidence has been admitted. 
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with the opening statements from the prosecutor, the private parties (for instance 
the plaintiffs asking for damages)24 and the defence. The prosecutor and then the 
defence present their evidence. Under article 190 CPP the trial judge is compelled 
to admit all the evidence presented by the parties unless inadmissible, forbidden by 
law or clearly superfluous or irrelevant. The defendant is not compelled to take the 
stand as was obliged under the Rocco code. No inference can be drawn by his choice 
and he cannot be held liable for perjury if it emerges that he lied to the court because 
he is not put under oath. The parties question the witnesses, experts and technical 
counsel through direct examination, cross-examination and re-examination. Article 
507 CPP states that the trial judge, once the parties have presented their evidence, 
and when it is “absolutely necessary” can sua sponte decide to include more evidence. 
This provision clearly erodes the adversarial principles showing a certain reluctance 
to completely abandon the traditional judicial activism that had long characterised 
the criminal justice system. 
Once all the evidence has been presented, the court hears the closing arguments of all 
the parties and decides on the case on both the merits and the sentencing giving its 
reasons for its findings in writing. 
3.The figure of the prosecutor in the Italian criminal law system
The role that the code of criminal procedure expects the prosecutor to play in 
criminal proceedings is important in order to assess the repercussions on the 
disclosure of information that flow from the nature of this figure.
As previously mentioned, the new code of criminal procedure abolished the 
inquisitorial investigating judge (giudice istruttore) who was in charge of gathering 
all the evidence in an impartial way. The new code portrays the prosecutor as a party 
to the criminal proceedings in accordance with the adversarial legal tradition. This 
is confirmed by the function conferred to the preliminary investigations conducted 
by him, which do not pursue truth, as was previously the case, but are designed to 
enable the prosecutor to assess, based on the elements gathered, whether his case is 
likely to overcome the judicial scrutiny and reach trial.25
The provision of article 358 CPP justifies the interpretation that the prosecutor is still under 
the duty to safeguard the interests of the suspect and conduct an impartial search for the truth. 
This provision goes as far as stating that “the prosecutor completes every activity necessary 
under article 326 CPP and also assesses the facts and circumstances favouring the person 
under investigation”. Nevertheless, as underlined by leading scholars, the prosecutor in the 
course of the preliminary investigations collects material favourable to the accused in order to 
test the strength of his case and avoid defending a weak case before a judge.26 Consequently, 
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24 Grande, above n. 3 at pp. 227 – 243. 
25 See Article 326 CPP.
26 Cordero F., Procedura Penale (8th Edition), 2008. Cordero states that if the prosecutor disregards [evidence favourable 
to the suspect], looking just in one direction, he risks a failure at trial or even before at the preliminary hearing; that the 
prosecutor must also consider the suspect’s side is a matter of elementary caution, it is not a matter of inquisitorial op-
portunity. 
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it is in the interest of the prosecutor to assess all the elements available to him, 
which does not equate to carrying out investigations in the interest of the suspect 
in an impartial fashion as it was in the previous code. 
On the other hand, despite the provisions of the criminal procedure code and 
their adversarial connotation, it is evident that the Italian criminal law system has 
not relinquished all the inquisitorial characteristics of the role of the prosecutor. 
The cultural factor in the conception of this delicate figure still plays a role in 
the current system. The prosecutor, in fact, maintains his predominant, and 
sometimes monopolistic, role in the preliminary investigation. That a suspect 
might not know they are being investigated until the completion of the process 
is tolerated because of the prosecution is still seen as being fully impartial as it 
was in the previous system. This is understandable if we consider that, as far as its 
professional collocation is concerned, the prosecutors continue to belong to the 
same judicial body to which preliminary investigation judges, preliminary hearing 
judges and trial judges belong. They are all appointed through the same national 
competition and they can, upon request, move back and forth from one position to 
another with no formal restriction.27 In other words, they are colleagues belonging 
to the same professional group but exercising different functions within criminal 
justice proceedings.
Having such a strong structural, cultural and professional bond between the super 
partes organ called to adjudicate the trial and the prosecutor, who is a party to that 
same trial, appears inconsistent with the adversarial model. The lack of separation 
between the prosecuting and adjudicating function within the judiciary has been 
subject to criticism and many have advocated a reform of the system. This peculiar 
connotation of the prosecution has an impact on the defence’s rights in relation to 
disclosure as is discussed further in this chapter. 
4. The judiciary reaction to the 1988 CPP and the Constitutional reform
An organ transplant is a complicated operation with the risk that the human body 
rejects the new organ. Similarly, the transplant of important elements of a criminal 
procedure significantly based on the adversarial legal culture in a deeply rooted 
inquisitorial legal environment is an operation that can be expected to encounter 
some resistance. The enactment of a new code is not sufficient per se to consider 
the operation successful if those who are called to apply the core principles of the 
reform do not share them. 
In Italy, the judiciary was not involved in the preparation of the reform and it 
was obliged to give up most of the judicial power it enjoyed under the previous 
long-lasting criminal procedure.28 The idea that the truth would emerge from the 
parties’ initiatives clashed with the judges’ conception of their role as truth seekers. 
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In the aftermath of the entry into force of the 1988 CPP, the application of the new 
criminal procedure in courtrooms proved problematic. In many cases the judges 
believed that several provisions of the code conflicted with the Constitution and 
challenged them before the Constitutional Court. In the first few years after the 
entry into force of the new criminal procedure code, the Constitutional Court 
received more applications challenging the provisions of the CPP than it had 
received in relation to the Rocco code in the 40 years since the enactment of the 
Italian Constitution in 1948.29
Between January and June 1992, the Constitutional Court handed down three 
judgments that eroded the foundation of the adversarial principles of orality and 
immediacy in relation to the acquisition of the evidence at trial.30 These decisions 
had the effect of broadening the material in the investigative dossier that could be 
transferred to the trial dossier, attacking the clear-cut separation between the two 
phases that laid the foundation of the new code. In its judgments the Court also 
recalled the primary duty of the judge as a truth seeker forbidding any limitation to 
that function. Any information available in a case should be used at trial regardless 
of how it was collected. In other words, the Court restored the principle of “no 
dispersion of the evidence” over the principles of orality and immediacy.31 Only few 
years had been necessary to show that the criminal procedure introduced by the 
1988 CPP could not resist the “counter offensive” from the judiciary that, shielded 
by the Constitution, eroded its adversarial nature. 
The parliament reacted vigorously by tackling the problem at its root and undertook 
a constitutional reform that was named the “fair trial reform” (riforma del giusto 
processo).32 Interestingly, the constitutional reform was embraced by both left and 
right wing parties and quickly approved showing a common understanding of the 
need to a better protection to be afforded to the defendants. Constitutional Law 
n. 2 dated 23 November 1999, amended article 111 of the Constitution through the 
addition of five more paragraphs that read as follow:
“Justice must be administered by fair trials defined by law.
Trials are based on equal confrontation of the parties (contraddittorio tra le parti) before 
an independent and impartial judge. The law has to define reasonable time limits for the 
proceedings.
In the criminal trial the law guarantees that the person accused of a crime be confidentially 
informed as soon as possible of the nature and the reasons of the charges against him; 
that the accused has enough time and viable conditions to prepare his defence; that the 
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29 See Illuminati, above n. 10.. 
30 Corte Costituzionale, sentenze n. 24/1992, n. 245/1992 and n. 255/1992. The Court stated that the prohibition of the ad-
mission at trial of hearsay by police officers violated the constitutional right to equality, as it did not apply to witnesses. 
Furthermore, it allowed, in the defendant’s trial, the use of out of court statements of an accomplice, tried separately, who 
does not appear in court or appears and remains silent. Finally, the Constitutional Court stated that the provision of the 
code that forbade the use of prior statements recalled by the parties during cross-examination violated the Constitution.
31 Following these judgements, in August 1992, the Parliament passed Law 397 which increased the exceptions to the rule 
that only evidence produced at trial was admissible. See Law 397/1992 in Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 185, 7 August 1992. 
32 Article 138 of the Constitution requires a qualified majority in both houses of the Parliament that have to approve the 
amendments twice in a period of not less than three months. 
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accused has the possibility to examine or to have examined the witnesses against him, to 
have favourable witnesses summoned for being examined at trial on equal standing with 
the prosecution, as well as any other evidence in his favor; that the accused be assisted by a 
translator in the event he does not understand or speak the language used in the trial.
The criminal trial is regulated by the principle that evidence may only be established 
according to the confrontation between parties (principio del contraddittorio nella 
formazione della prova). The accused cannot be proved guilty upon declarations of anybody 
who willingly avoided to be examined by the accused or by his lawyer. 
The law defines in which cases evidence may be established without confrontation between 
the parties, either by consent of the defendants or because of an objective impossibility or 
of a proved unlawful conduct….”
Article 111 of the Constitution as amended reflects the core elements of article 6 
of the European Convention on Human Rights and Individual Freedoms. Among 
others, the defendant is granted the constitutional right to be informed about the 
charges against him as soon as possible, to offer counter evidence and to confront 
and cross-examine witnesses. Above all the Constitution now clearly states the rule 
that evidence must be established at trial through the confrontation of the parties 
and no guilty verdict can be handed down based on the out of court statements of 
witnesses who have not been cross examined by the defence. 
The next step was the adjustment of the CPP to the new draft of article 111 of the 
Constitution. In 2001, parliament passed law n. 63 that modified many of the code of 
criminal procedure’s articles.33 In particular those articles found unconstitutional by 
the Constitutional Court in 1992 that regulated the way in which evidence at trial was to 
be acquired were targeted.34 In other words, the constitutional reform and the following 
statutory provisions that implemented it brought the criminal procedure closer to the 
original adversarial characterisation envisaged by the drafters in 1988. The restored 
adversarial basis of the criminal procedure was now backed by the Constitution and that 
made the difference when the Constitutional Court was once again called to scrutinise 
the constitutionality of the recently amended code provisions. Between 2000 and 2002, 
the Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality of the prohibition of hearsay for 
police officers rendering their testimony at trial and the constitutionality of limiting 
the use of prior statements solely in order to attack the credibility of a witness. The 
separation between the investigation stage and the trial in relation to the admission of 
evidence had been granted constitutional status. 
A peculiarity of article 111 paragraph 3 of the Italian Constitution lies in the 
confidentiality of the information to be given to the accused. This characteristic 
is not included in the international provisions. Finally, the Italian version did not 
adopt any reference to the “detailed” and “understandable” requirements of the 
information as conceived by the ECtHR and the ICCPR. 
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5. The “discovery” scheme in the preliminary investigation stage
 
 5.1 Introduction
Having described the structure of the criminal proceedings as envisaged by the 
1988 criminal procedure code and the fair trial constitutional reform that conferred 
constitutional status to several rights of the accused, this subsection will analyse the 
provisions of the CPP that regulate the disclosure scheme during the preliminary 
investigations.  
The Italian criminal justice proceedings are based on a clear-cut division between 
the investigative stage and the trial stage. It is therefore essential that, in accordance 
to the European Convention on Human Rights and the Italian Constitution, the 
suspect’s right to “be confidentially informed as soon as possible of the nature and 
the reasons of the allegations against him” is safeguarded from the beginning of 
the investigations. On the other hand, this right must be balanced with the public 
interest in the effectiveness of the investigations into a crime that might require a 
variable degree of secrecy. 
Article 329 CPP, in fact, states that the acts performed by the prosecutor during the 
investigations shall be confidential and the suspect must be informed in any case 
no later than the closing of the preliminary investigations.
Many questions arise in relation to such a delicate topic. How does the system enable 
a person to know that he is being investigated? Are the provisions in the code, 
which set up the disclosure scheme in relation to the preliminary investigations, 
consistent with the ratio of article 111 of the Constitution, and the ECtHR fair trial 
principles? What are the powers of the defence once it is known that investigations 
are being conducted? An analysis of the text of the relevant provisions, their 
functioning and their effectiveness can provide the answers to these questions.
 5.2 Article 335 CPP: Record of crime reports (Registro delle notizie di reato)
In the Italian judicial system, criminal proceedings begin when the prosecutor 
receives notice of a crime (notizia di reato) or when he, motu proprio, collects 
information about a crime and registers it in the record of crime reports.35 A 
crime report (or crime notice) has been defined as the embryo of hypothetical 
criminal proceedings.36 In sum, it can be defined as an information, received by 
the police or the prosecutor, on a fact/conduct that may be described as a crime.37 
The jurisprudence has stressed the necessity of the identification of the person 
who is giving the relevant information therefore, anonymous information does not 
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35 See Articles 330 and 335 CPP. 
36 Zappulla, Le Indagini per la Formazione della Notitia Criminis: il Caso della Perquisizione Seguita dal Sequestro, Cassazio-
ne Penale, 1996, 1099.
37 Santoriello C., La Definizione della Notizia di Reato, 2001, www.deaprofessionale.it. On the elements of a crime report see 
Santoriello C., Pseudo-notizie di reato e poteri del pubblico ministero, Giurisprudenza Italiana 2001, 8-9.
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qualify as notitia criminis although they might spur the prosecutor into starting 
investigations motu proprio. 
Article 335 paragraphs 3 and 3(b) regulate the right of a person to be informed 
that the prosecutor has recorded a crime report allegedly committed by him and 
that consequently an investigation is being carried out. These provisions have been 
amended (paragraph 3(b) was added) by law n. 332 dated 8 August 1995. 
It is worth stressing that, although the registration by the prosecutor of a 
notitia criminis might seem a mechanical and rather simple operation, the poor 
performance of such operation can affect the suspect’s rights. To enter in the record 
a notice of a crime there must be a real notice; the mere conjecture, suspicion or 
assumption of a crime does not constitute a notice of a crime. Nonetheless the 
prosecutor can and should investigate what he believes could lead to a real notitia 
criminis. 
In the Rocco code, article 335 prohibited the communication of the registration 
of a notice of a crime to the suspect until he was officially charged therefore at 
the end of the investigation. The current version envisages the opposite rule and 
the registrations are communicated to the suspect (indagato), to his lawyer and 
to the victim of the crime, but only upon their request. The provision does not 
apply to certain crimes such as, inter alia, homicide or crimes related to criminal 
organisations for which there is no duty to communicate.38 Paragraph 3(b) states 
that the prosecutor while deciding upon the suspect’s request (or his lawyers or the 
victim) and when the exigencies of the investigation so require, may dispose that 
the registration of the notice of crime remains secret for a period which cannot 
exceed three months (not extendable). The prosecutor’s assessment in this regard 
is not subject to any judicial scrutiny.  
It is also noted that in practice it is difficult to expect that a person would ask 
all the prosecution offices in Italy whether there is any crime report registered 
that concerns him unless he is aware of the criminal implications of certain acts 
perpetrated by him. 
Moreover, it is remarked that although the prosecutor is compelled to answer, 
there is no prescribed time limit within which the prosecution must answer and 
therefore no sanctions can be imposed in cases of delayed answer, leaving once 
again the functioning of article 335 CPP to the prosecution’s discretion.
A timely response may still leave the suspect in doubt given that article 110 bis of 
the disposition for the implementation of the criminal procedure code lay down 
the wording of the two possible answers in details. The prosecutor can respond, 
“Yes, there are the following registrations that can be communicated” or “No there 
are no registrations that can be communicated”. The second answer, through its 
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choice of words, is ambiguous. Indeed, it can mean that there are no registrations 
of crimes relating to the suspect but it could also mean that there are registrations 
that cannot be communicated as the prosecutor has kept them secret or that the 
investigations concern a crime for which there is no duty to communicate the 
registration to the suspect.39 In addition, it can also mean that the request has been 
addressed to the office of the prosecutor outside of the jurisdiction and therefore 
not competent to investigate that crime. 
There are three main records in each office of prosecution (Procura della Repubblica) 
in Italy. One contains all the notitiae criminis for which there is a suspect; one 
contains all the notices of crimes without suspects and a third one containing the 
conjecture/suspicion/assumption that does not yet qualify as a notitia criminis 
(non notizie).
Investigations can be carried out by the prosecutor in relation to conjecture/
suspicion/assumption without any duty to communicate the registration to the 
suspect who requests it as only the registration in mod. 21 and 44 triggers the 
provision of article 335 CPP. Moreover, as long as there is a registration in mod 45 
the calculation of the terms of the preliminary investigations does not begin. The 
prosecutor might delay the transfer to the two other registries avoiding interferences 
in his investigations and circumventing the already limited effectiveness of article 
335 CPP.40
Concluding, the amendment of article 335, whose aim was, in essence, to enable 
a person to be informed that he is being investigated in order to “defend himself 
by proving” (difendere provando), appears ineffective. Rather than providing a 
suspect’s rights it is merely a possibility that depends above all on the prosecution’s 
discretion. This structure conflicts with the adversarial basis that the criminal 
procedure should have embraced and with the suspect’s constitutional rights at 
this stage. 
 
 5.3 Article 369 CPP: Notice of investigation (Informazione di garanzia)
The provision of article 369 CPP (also amended by law n. 332/1995) regulates the 
duty of the prosecutor to inform the person who is being investigated about the 
provisions of law that have been allegedly violated, the date and place in which this 
violation would have taken place and to inform him of his right to appoint a lawyer. 
In compliance with the Constitution, this communication is carried out through 
recorded mail so as to guarantee its confidentiality.
The effectiveness of this provision is essential for the efficient exercise of the 
defence rights at the preliminary investigation stage and especially of the right 
of the suspect “to defend himself by proving” (difendere provando), namely by 
collecting evidence to prove his innocence and avoid trial. On the other hand, this 
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39 Crimes listed in Article 407 para. 2(a).
40 See Maddalena M., Registro delle Notizie di Reato: I Problemi del Dopo Riforma I) Il Punto di Vista di un Magistrato, Di-
ritto Penale e Processo, 1996, 4, 487.
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interest must be weighed against the necessity of safeguarding the investigative 
activity of the prosecutor that might be jeopardised by the suspects’ knowledge of 
the on-going investigation. Therefore, the question is how does the code strike the 
right balance between these conflicting interests?
The mechanism envisaged by the code subordinates to the prosecutor’s investigative 
activity the communication to the suspect. Specifically, article 369 CPP states 
that only when the prosecutor intends to carry out an investigative activity to 
which the defence lawyer has the right to assist (atto garantito), is he compelled 
to communicate the information to the suspect as mentioned above. Therefore, 
the prosecutor triggers such duty through his conduct during the preliminary 
investigation. The broad discretion that the system grants to the prosecutor is 
evident. The latter, in fact, can decide to postpone a specific investigative activity, in 
which the defence lawyer would have the right to participate, delaying the moment 
at which the suspect is informed of the ongoing investigations. 
What are these investigative activities whose performance triggers the obligation to 
inform the suspect? Article 364 CPP outlines the interrogation, the inspection and 
the charge to which the suspect is called to answer. There are other investigative 
activities aimed at gathering information that, due to their nature, would be 
prejudiced by the previous communication to the suspect. Article 365 regulates the 
search and the arrest for which preventive information is not required although the 
defence lawyer is entitled to assist them and the records of such activities are made 
available to the parties at the office of the prosecutor within three days from their 
performance.  
The provision of article 369 CPP rather than being characterised by the informative 
scope seems to be intended to enable the suspect to exercise his rights of defence 
in relation to a specific investigative activity carried out by the prosecutor. Indeed, 
once the suspect has been informed pursuant to article 369 CPP, the code does 
not envisage a further right to be informed if the prosecutor, in the course of the 
preliminary investigations, decides to describe the conduct differently in light of 
the material gathered. If the ratio, underlying article 369, is to inform the suspect, 
such an important change in the legal characterisation of the crime allegedly 
committed should be notified to him. In addition, the content of the information 
given to the suspect is limited to merely informing that the investigations are 
taking place, the activity that is about to be carried out (interrogation, arrest etc.) 
and the provisions of the law that have allegedly been violated, but it says nothing 
about the information gathered during the investigations. Moreover, article 369 
CPP states that the victim of the crime must also be notified together with the 
suspect. These considerations corroborate the impression that the norm is crafted 
to enable the suspect to exercise his rights of defence in relation to a specific action 
undertaken by the prosecutor rather than being based on the ratio of informing the 
suspect of the essence and connotations of the alleged crimes under investigation 
and attributed to him. Consequently, the norm seems to fall short of implementing 
the ECtHR and the suspect’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and 
the reasons of the allegations made against him. 
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In relation to the timing of the communication, it should be noted that a proposal 
of reform that would fix the term at 60 days from the registration of the notitia 
criminis with the possibility of extension in cases of wiretapping or when the 
investigations so required was not accepted. 
The notice of investigation should take the need for a more detailed and articulated 
description of content supplied to the suspect in relation to the allegations made 
against him so as to enable him to exercise his right to defend himself and prove 
his innocence. Moreover, the informazione di garanzia should be conceived and 
construed as an indispensable condition for the effectiveness of the suspect’s right 
to be informed of the ongoing investigations protecting it from the prosecutor’s 
discretion.41 
The 1995 reform has reduced suspect’s rights through the amendment of article 369 
CPP trying to counterbalance it by envisaging the possibility that the registration 
of a notitia criminis is communicated to the suspect upon request (ex article 335 
CPP). So under the current criminal procedure a person may not be aware of 
being suspected of the commission of a crime until the end of the preliminary 
investigations, preventing him from exercising the rights that the adversarial 
interpretation of the CPP grants him at such a delicate stage. There seems to be 
therefore, a contrast between the safeguards of the suspect’s rights envisaged by 
the criminal system and their real effectiveness.  
 5.4 Article 415 bis CPP: Notice to the suspect of the conclusion of the 
preliminary investigations (Avviso all’indagato della conclusione 
delle indagini preliminari)
   5.4.1 Introduction 
 
Article 415 bis CPP states that before the expiry of the deadline for the conclusion 
of the preliminary investigations the prosecution, unless it is leaning towards the 
dismissal of the case, must notify the suspect and his lawyer of the conclusion of 
the preliminary investigations. The information contains, inter alia, a summary 
description of the facts underlying the proceedings, the rules of law allegedly 
violated and the locus commissi delicti.
This provision did not feature in the original version of the 1988 criminal procedure 
code but it was introduced by law n. 479 of 1999. Before the introduction of article 
415 bis the prosecutor could ask the committal of the case without any duty to 
notify the suspect of the proceedings nor to interrogate him. Consequently, a 
person first discovered the criminal charges against him when summoned for the 
preliminary hearing. Due to the considerable lapse of time between the beginning 
of the preliminary investigation and the preliminary hearing, the suspect’s effective 
possibility for gathering evidence favourable to him was significantly affected. 
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Article 415 bis, in its second paragraph, shapes the prosecutor’s obligation to 
disclose with regard to the documents and material gathered during the preliminary 
investigations that must be made available (at the office of the prosecutor) to the 
suspect and his lawyer for consultation with the possibility of making copies of 
them. The suspect must be informed of this pursuant to article 415 bis. 
The informative function of the notice given to the suspect emerges in paragraph 
three of article 415 bis, which states that the suspect is informed that within twenty 
days from the notification he can file submissions, exhibits, documents as well as 
present the material gathered through the defence investigations carried out. The 
suspect can also ask the prosecutor to undertake further investigations on his behalf 
and he can request that he be interrogated. While the prosecutor is not obliged to 
meet the suspect’s request in relation to further investigations he is compelled to 
interrogate him if the suspect so requests.
When the prosecution decides to undertake further investigation, in accordance 
with the suspect’s request, it must to complete them within thirty days from the 
request. The term can be extended by the judge only once for the preliminary 
investigation for no longer than sixty days. 
Article 415 bis may mark the first moment where the suspect is officially informed 
of the existence of criminal proceedings against him. The code of criminal 
procedure identifies this moment as the “point of no-return” beyond which it is not 
acceptable that a suspect is unaware of the existence of criminal proceedings, of 
the material gathered during the preliminary investigations and cannot challenge 
the prosecutor. A person who, under investigation, may have been informed at a 
previous stage of the ongoing criminal proceedings under article 335 and 369 CPP 
but this is just a possibility. On the contrary, when the preliminary investigations 
are on the verge of completion and the prosecutor is determined to try the case 
the procedure guarantees that the suspect is informed, that the results of the 
investigations are revealed and made available to him so that he can challenge 
the prosecutor. The notice given to the suspect pursuant to article 415 bis is an 
instrument that triggers an informed and adequate defence activism.42
From the description of this provision a question arises: Does the scheme envisaged by 
article 415 bis put the suspect in the position to play a role in the prosecutor’s decision 
of whether to ask for the dismissal of the case or to request its commitment to trial? 
To answer this question some considerations must be made. As discussed, article 
415 bis operates inbetween the conclusion of the preliminary investigations 
and the preliminary hearing. Therefore although based on the findings of the 
preliminary investigations, the prosecutor’s decision request the committal has 
already been made, though there is still some room for the suspect to influence 
this determination. Whether this is a feasible possibility is a different issue. 
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The suspect can ask (rectius has the right) to be heard by the prosecutor in order to 
give his version of the events as they occurred and he can do so in light of what the 
prosecutor has gathered in the preliminary investigations. The disclosure allows the 
suspect to be aware of what he is facing and to file submissions, tender documents 
and undertake investigations for the purpose of defence. These defence activities 
must be completed within the somewhat restrictive term of twenty days. It seems 
that the timing affects the effectiveness of the defence’s potential influence on 
the prosecutor’s decision. When a person is aware of criminal justice proceedings 
underway against him (through the information ex article 415 bis), the allocation 
of twenty days to form a case for the defence seems ineffective when compared to 
the time (not to mention the resources) available to the prosecutor for completing 
the preliminary investigation. 
The lawmaker’s decision to allow the prosecutor discretion over whether they begin 
investigations as requested by the defence appears debatable. The Constitutional 
Court has upheld the constitutionality of the absence of an obligation of the 
prosecutor to carry out the investigations requested by the defence.43 Nonetheless, 
the rule lends itself to distorted implementation. In fact, in the context of a 
criminal law system, supposedly based on an adversarial model, it is incorrect for 
one of the parties to be granted discretionary power over the other party’s request 
for investigation so to be able to affect its efficiency. It would be recommendable 
that a super partes organ (i.e. the judge for the preliminary investigation - GIP) 
decides over the defence’s request for further investigation. Furthermore, when the 
prosecutor conducts the requested investigations the system expects him to inquire 
about elements favourable to the suspect in line with an inquisitorial approach 
rather than an adversarial one. 
In this context, supported by the above arguments, it seems unlikely that a suspect 
could effectively challenge the prosecutor’s decision.
  5.4.2 The disclosure to the suspect
The disclosure scheme envisaged by article 415 bis must be analysed in the context 
of the above context. The disclosure of all the material gathered and collected by 
the prosecutor during the preliminary investigations is crucial for respecting the 
suspect’s rights. The prosecutor’s disclosure is the first moment at which a person 
under investigation is granted access to the prosecutor’s dossier. In fact, once a 
suspect has been informed of the existence of criminal proceedings against him he 
has no right to inspect the files during the preliminary investigations except those 
related to investigations where the defence lawyer has the right to be present. 
The full discovery of the results of the preliminary investigations is essential in 
order to allow the suspect’s effective participation to the proceedings and give 
him the opportunity to make an informed decision on the possibility of opting 
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for alternatives to trial. The rights granted to him by article 415 bis would be 
prejudiced in their enforcement if the prosecutor selected the material to discover 
and withheld part of it. This prejudice could not be remedied in later stages of the 
trial. Rather, the suspect would exercise his rights of defence ex article 415 bis CPP 
on the basis of a partial discovery that would irreversibly shape his defence. 
The completeness of the discovery in this phase of the criminal proceedings is also 
relevant for the judge for the preliminary hearing (GUP) who is called upon to 
decide on the prosecutor’s request to commit the case for trial. The preliminary 
hearing, as described above, is conceived by the criminal procedure as functioning 
as a pre-assessment of the merits of the prosecutor’s case. The judge is granted 
extensive power to request that the prosecutor undertake further investigations 
or to call evidence himself.44 The GUP makes his determinations based on the 
prosecutor’s dossier (and the submissions and documents that the defence may 
produce). Consequently, if the preliminary investigations’ files are incomplete the 
GUP decision will not be an informed one. 
The discovery can potentially benefit the prosecutor as the adversarial interaction 
with the accused and the elements adduced by him may lead to the prosecutor 
reconsidering the case (in relation to the request to commit the case for trial as well 
as in relation to the legal qualification of the facts). In other words, through the 
confrontation with the suspect the prosecutor avoids the risk of prosecuting a case 
that is unlikely to overcome judicial scrutiny.
The importance of the notification to the suspect pursuant to article 415 bis is 
reflected in the severe sanction envisaged in case of its omission by the prosecutor 
(or in case of disregard of the obligation to interrogate the suspect who has 
requested it) leading the nullity of the request to commit the case for trial. The 
proceedings are consequently regressed to a previous stage in order to ensure the 
correct notification. 
In relation to disclosure, in the absence of the text of article 415 bis, there was debate 
concerning which sanction would be appropriate when the prosecutor withholds 
certain material from the suspect. The Court of Cassation’s jurisprudence (Corte 
di Cassazione) on this issue states that if the prosecutor omits certain documents 
from the dossier, this conduct does not affect the validity of the prosecutor’s 
request to commit the case for trial but it does entail a ban on using such material 
during the preliminary hearing or at trial.45 It has been argued that this approach 
might affect the suspect’s rights as much as the non-disclosure itself when the 
prosecutor has omitted material favourable to the suspect that will be declared 
no longer usable.46 The nullity of the prosecutor’s request to commit the case for 
trial is a remedy advocated by part of the doctrine. In fact, through the regression 
of the proceedings the incomplete disclosure of evidence can be remedied thereby 
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safeguarding the suspect’s right to full access to the material from the preliminary 
investigation.47
This consideration leads to a broader one regarding the way in which a legal system 
conceives the truth-seeking process in criminal justice proceedings and more 
specifically, it concerns the truth as the goal to be pursued in criminal trials. If 
the truth is intended to the ultimate goal whose discovery must be ensured and 
cannot be left at the disposal of the parties’ procedural conduct, then it is not 
acceptable that material relevant to the truth-seeking process might be excluded 
from trial due to a mistake or even worse due to distorted conduct on the part of the 
prosecutor. For example, let us suppose that the prosecutor, for any reason, does not 
discover, pursuant to article 415 bis, a video portraying the suspect committing the 
alleged crime. This material could not be used in the trial affecting the conclusion 
emerging from it as a result of the prosecutor’s conduct. Such consequence would 
be less of a problem in a system that contemplates the truth as emerging from the 
struggle between two parties in a more adversarial fashion. 
6. The disclosure in the pre-trial stage
 6.1 Introduction
At the end of the preliminary hearing if the GUP decides to uphold the prosecutor’s 
request he issues a decree that orders the trial of the suspect (decreto di rinvio a 
giudizio). The decree sets the date for the beginning of the trial and the dossier 
for the trial (formed by the GUP with the assistance of the parties) is given to 
the competent court. The lapse of time between the issuance of the decree and 
the beginning of the trial is the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings (pre-
dibattimento) in which the parties prepare for the trial. Pursuant to article 466 
CPP, the criminal justice procedure grants the right to the parties and their lawyers 
to consult the trial dossier and to make a copy of the material included therein. 
Moreover, the code envisages further disclosure duties for the parties that intend 
to request the admission at trial of oral evidence. This disclosure obligation is 
regulated by article 468 CPP whose provisions are analysed below. 
 6.2 Article 468 CPP: Summoning witnesses, experts and technical 
counsel (Citazione di testimoni, periti e consulenti tecnici)
Article 468 CPP states that when the parties intend to request the admission of 
the testimony of witnesses, experts and technical counsel they must deposit in the 
Registry of the Court, at least seven days before the date set for the beginning of 
the trial, a list indicating the circumstances in which these witnesses will testify.  
The ratio of this provision is to avoid the possibility of one party submitting 
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surprise evidence in the trial without any previous warning for the other party. 
Article 468 CPP performs a function of discovery of the evidence (rectius evidence 
whose admission will be sought at trial) before the beginning of the trial.48 From 
the analysis carried out so far it emerges that the disclosure that takes place in this 
segment of the proceedings is not the first disclosure of the prosecutor’s material 
to the accused. In fact, through the provision of article 415 bis CPP, the latter is 
granted full knowledge of the elements of the prosecutor’s case upon completion of 
the preliminary investigation and before the preliminary hearing. Nonetheless, the 
disclosure scheme regulated by article 468 CPP discloses to the accused a further 
element, namely the circumstances on which testimony will be given at trial. 
Given that article 415 bis does not regulate any disclosure obligation for the defence 
(the defence has the ability and right to create its own dossier to be joined to that 
of the prosecutor’s), the provision of article 468 CPP might be the first moment in 
which the prosecutor discovers the elements of the defence’s case.49 The disclosure 
mechanism regulated by article 468 assists the prosecutor in understanding the 
strategy followed by the defence rather than benefiting the defence.50 It can be 
concluded that, unlike other disclosure duties analysed so far, the duty envisaged 
in article 468 is characterised by equal responsibility.51
The list the parties deposit in the Registry of the Court must indicate the 
circumstances that will be covered by the testimony of the witnesses, experts and 
technical counsel. By the term “circumstances” the code indicates a particular 
situation referable to a determined fact. Primary facts to be proven in the context 
of a criminal trial are those underlying the indictment and, from the perspective of 
the defence, those able to poke holes in the prosecution’s theory. Secondary facts 
are those that if proven might generate inferences over the existence of a primary 
fact.52 The circumstances indicated in the list circumscribe the issues that a certain 
testimony may cover. Nonetheless, questions on circumstances not listed ex article 
468 are admissible at trial as long as they are linked directly or indirectly to those 
mentioned in the list. In other words, the indication of the circumstances in the 
list aims to give a picture of the intended effect that such testimony should produce 
within the defence’s or prosecutor’s strategies but it is not intended to limit the 
questioning of a witness. During the examination of a witness, circumstances 
which are logically linked to those listed emerge and therefore need to be explored 
without constituting surprise evidence for any of the parties. 
Although this is not explicitly required by article 468 CPP, it seems arguable that the 
list should also contain the names of the witnesses, experts and technical counsel 
that each party intends to call, this being an important element of the enforcement 
of the other parties right to defend themselves by questioning, allowing them to 
Disclosure of information in the Italian Criminal law System
_______________________ 
48 See ex plurimis, Cordero F., Commento all’art. 468, in codice di Procedura Penale Commentato, Torino, 1992, p. 574.
49 See Grilli L., Il Dibattimento Penale, Padova, 2003, p. 44. 
50 Iacoviello F.M., Processo di Parti e Poteri Probatori del Giudice, Cassazione Penale, 1993, p. 291.
51 Iafisco  L., Gli atti Preliminari al Dibattimento Penale di Primo Grado, Giappichelli Editore, Torino, 2009, p. 55. 
52 Ibid. at 59.
77 78
prepare an informed cross-examination. The latter, in fact, is built up differently in 
relation to the subjective characteristics of the person under examination.53
On several occasions, the Court of Cassation has embraced a broad interpretation of 
this requirement. For instance, it allowed the alternative indication of witnesses in 
the list as long as their testimony covers circumstances which are the same as those 
indicated.54 Furthermore, the Corte di Cassazione recognised the admissibility of 
the testimony of a person informed on the facts relevant to the trial in substitution 
of a witness indicated in the list ex article 468 CPP.55 Finally, the Court of Cassation 
held that the prosecutor’s failure to provide the name of a witness in the list, ex 
article 468, neither violates the defence’s rights nor constitutes the (prohibited) 
presentation of surprise witnesses as long as the name is easily available and 
knowable by the accused in light of the qualification of the witness offered 
in the list.56 In this particular case, concerning the failure to pay social security 
contributions, the Court considered the testimonies of witnesses whose names had 
not been mentioned on the list admissible (ex article 468), as they were described 
as inspectors of the National Institute of Social Security. 
If the jurisprudence described above is taken too far it may defeat the purpose of 
article 468 CPP. Specifically, testing the oral evidence through the assessment of the 
reliability of the witness based on his personality in “moral, cultural, professional 
and social aspects” might be impossible if the other parties do not know in advance 
the name of the witness they have to cross-examine.57 The same argument applies 
to cases where the names of the witnesses indicated in the list are changed shortly 
before their testimony, frustrating the defence’s preparation for cross-examination. 
The pre-trial disclosure regulated by article 468 also has the important function of 
enabling the other parties to request the admission of “evidence to the contrary” 
(witnesses, experts and technical counsel) in relation to the circumstances 
indicated in the lists deposited.58
Article 468 CPP foresees the inadmissibility of testimonies not included in the list 
or included in a list that breached the seven day deadline. Furthermore, testimony 
can be declared inadmissible, also ex officio, by the judge when the list does not 
mention (or only vaguely mentions), the circumstances that will be covered by the 
testimony, or does not indicate the names of the witnesses (with the exception 
discussed above). The sanction does not affect the list but rather the subsequent 
request for the admission of evidence that takes place during the trial.59
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The lawmakers have limited the applicability of the disclosure obligation regulated 
by article 468 CPP to the testimony of witnesses, experts and technical counsel.60The 
disclosure scheme is subject to certain exceptions in relation to oral evidence. 
The examination of the accused is also admissible without previous mention in 
the list ex article 468 CPP. This is obvious considering that it is a free choice of 
the accused that can also be influenced by the way in which the trial unfolds. This 
freedom of choice must be balanced with the other party’s need to have adequate 
time to prepare the cross-examination in case the accused decides to testify and 
with their right to have evidence to the contrary admitted. 
Another exception occurs when, during the examination of a witness indicated in 
the list ex article 468 CPP, it emerges that the witness’ knowledge of the testimony 
is not direct but indirect In other words, he has learned about it through a third 
person, having a knowledge de relato and not first hand. In this case, the testimony 
of the direct source of knowledge is admissible despite not being previously named 
on the list.
 
In relation to written evidence, the disclosure ex article 468 CPP does not apply. 
The ratio underlying this choice lies in the nature of such evidence in that, unlike 
oral evidence, is preconceived and does not come into being at the trial making 
the need to safeguard the other parties from surprise evidence less important. It 
also reflects the basis of the criminal procedure as an adversarial model where oral 
evidence is predominant. In the current system, the disclosure of the documental 
evidence takes place at trial when the parties tender the documents asking the 
judge for their admission and the other parties can analyse each document whose 
admission is also sought.61
The Constitutional Court has upheld the constitutionality of the differentiation 
in the disclosure regime in relation to oral and written evidence.62 It underlined 
that the procedure safeguards each party’s right to analyse the written evidence 
admitted through the provision of article 477 CPP that allows the judge, in cases 
of absolute necessity, to suspend the trial. However, to link the effectiveness of the 
discovery of written evidence to the judge’s discretion to suspend the trial and to 
determine its length (maximum of ten days according to article 477 CPP) is a lesser 
safeguard for the parties than the automatic disclosure duty envisaged in article 
468 CPP. The code seems to portray the written evidence as rather comfortable to 
be adversed in the course of the trial through the concession of an ad hoc term.63
Asides from the above described exceptions to the rule, even when one of the parties 
has incurred in the inadmissibility of a testimony, the criminal procedure code 
envisages a safety net of having the evidence admitted. Article 493 CPP, second 
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paragraph, states that the acquisition of evidence not listed ex article 468 CPP is 
permitted when the party that is requesting its admission, proves that it was unable 
to disclose evidence in advance. The rather lenient wording of this provision, 
especially in relation to the threshold of what constitutes late disclosure, leaves 
ample room for the admission of oral evidence not previously discovered with the 
other parties. In this case the other party has the right to request the suspension of 
the trial.64
The code offers another possibility for overcoming the pre-trial discovery restriction 
ex article 468 CPP. The judicial activism in relation to the admission of evidence, in 
fact, allows the trial judge (pursuant article 506 CPP) to direct the parties toward 
new or broader evidence that he considers necessary for the trial. He may also 
question the witnesses, experts and technical counsel directly on any subject he 
deems necessary for fully understanding the relevant facts. Furthermore, once the 
admission of the evidence tendered by the parties has been completed the trial 
judge can, when he considers this absolutely necessary, order the admission of new 
evidence motu proprio, pursuant article 507 CPP. 
In relation to article 507 CPP, it is worth mentioning the jurisprudence’s decisive 
contribution to its interpretation in relation to the disclosure obligation ex article 
468 CPP. In 1992 the Corte di Cassazione, sitting as a full court, stated that the 
evidence that the trial judge can admit motu proprio includes the evidence that 
for any reason has not been disclosed by the parties through article 468 CPP. 
Moreover, the judge can also do so when requested by the same party that did 
not disclose the evidence within the time limits set.65 The Constitutional Court 
embraced this interpretation and added that the power given to the judge ex article 
507 CPP is supplementary to the power of the parties to introduce evidence but it 
is not exceptional.66
7. The defence’s investigations
The adversarial system is based on the idea of a contest between two equal parties 
whose struggle will lead to the discovery of truth; consequently, an adversarial 
criminal procedure should grant and safeguard the defence’s right to investigate its 
own case in order to generate favourable evidence for submission during the trial. 
This approach differs from the inquisitorial one where the figure of the giudice 
istruttore is predominant in the preliminary investigations and his impartiality 
safeguards the defence’s rights. In the Italian criminal justice system, due to its 
deep-rooted inquisitorial legal tradition, it was difficult for such powers to be 
allocated to defence lawyers despite the system embracing an adversarial model. 
The original version of the 1988 criminal procedure code did not regulate the 
investigative powers of the defence counsel in detail. Article 38 of the dispositions 
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for the implementation of the code vaguely stated that in order to exercise the 
“right to prove” (ex article 190 CPP) the defence counsel had the right to undertake 
investigations with the intention of gathering evidence favourable to their clients 
and to question persons who could give information. In 1995, Law n. 332 added two 
extra paragraphs that envisaged the important possibility for the defence counsel 
to present the outcome of his investigation directly to the judge. In other words, 
the right of the defence to carry out its own investigations was recognised, but the 
implementation of such right was not regulated.
In 2000, Law n. 397 introduced the regulation of the defence’s right to investigate 
in the criminal justice system. The lawmaker’s intention was to adapt the system 
to the constitutional reform of the fair trial (giusto processo) that had taken place 
only a year earlier. Specifically, they intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the 
defendant’s right (envisaged in article 111 of the Constitution) to defend himself by 
putting forward evidence to prove his case in a trial that had turned out to be run 
by the parties.
In sum, nine articles (391 bis – 391 decies) were added to the code of criminal 
procedure under the section concerning the defence’s investigation. The defence 
was granted the rights, inter alia, to receive or solicit statements from people 
informed of the facts relevant to the proceedings,67 to directly request the 
documents important for the investigation from the relevant public authority,68 to 
access places in order to describe their state and to perform technical, graphical, 
photographic or audiovisual surveying,69 as well as to access, following judicial 
authorisation, places not accessible to the public.70 The result of the defence’s 
investigation is included in the defence dossier that can be presented directly to 
the judge (be it the GIP, the GUP or the trial judge).71 The reform also envisaged 
the possibility for the defence to carry out preventive investigations, before the 
beginning of proceedings, as well as investigations following the issuance of the 
decree that commits the case for trial.72
In the context of the present work, it is relevant to assess the effectiveness of the 
defence’s right to investigate. Moreover, it is important to investigate if and to what 
extent the defence’s investigations are intertwined with disclosure obligations. 
In this perspective, two controversial aspects of the regulation of the defence’s 
investigations in the code of criminal procedure arise.
First, from a reading of the provisions regulating the defence’s investigations it 
emerges that the defence has no right or power to seize material relevant to its case. 
Supposing that a suspect has known about the ongoing preliminary investigations 
Disclosure of information in the Italian Criminal law System
_______________________ 
67 Article 391 bis CPP.
68 Article 391 quater CPP.
69 Article 391 sexies CPP.
70 Article 391 septies CPP.
71 Article 391 octies CPP.
72 Article 391 nonies CPP, article 327 bis CPP and article 430 CPP. The preventive investigative activity is limited to those acts 
that do not require judicial authorization. 
 
81 82
and his defence deems it necessary to acquire a specific item, it has to submit a 
request to the prosecutor who can deny it with no requirement for justification.73 If 
the request is not met, a party can turn to the judge for the preliminary hearing to 
have it reassessed. This procedure compels the defence to disclose to the prosecutor 
the source of evidence it is trying to gather. Furthermore, while requesting the 
prosecution’s cooperation, the defence has to show the relevance of the specific 
material to its case broadening the disclosure of its strategy to its opponent. The 
prosecutor, on the other hand, can decide freely on the acquisition of any element 
he considers necessary to its case with no duty to disclose it during the preliminary 
investigations. It would be recommendable that the defence could address its 
request directly to a judge who could proceed with the seizure on behalf of the 
defence with the cooperation of the police.74 This consideration applies particularly 
to cases involving indigent defendants where the defence counsel encourages 
a more inquisitorial approach to the investigations in relation to investigative 
activities whose cost is significant. 
Second, it is worth dwelling on the provision of article 391 bis CPP that regulates 
the defence’s right to receive or solicit statements from people informed of 
the facts relevant to the proceedings. The defence has been granted the right 
to collect statements directly with no interference from the prosecutor. The 
statements collected have the same weight and value as statements collected by 
the prosecutor. Problems arise when the person requested to give his statement 
refuses to collaborate with the defence. The difference between the defence and the 
prosecutor is striking considering that the latter can summon the person compelling 
him to appear whereas the defence has no such power. The defence can either 
obtain the subpoena through the prosecutor who will then be present (asking his 
own questions) at the questioning of the person summoned or alternatively opt to 
proceed directly with the anticipated acquisition of the testimony before the judge 
(incidente probatorio).75 Again, the defence is forced to disclose to the prosecutor 
its strategy in relation to the evidence demonstrating the relevance and use of the 
requested interrogation. Such assessment is in the hands of the prosecutor when 
the defence opts for the first alternative mentioned above. 
It is problematic (particularly in the context of a system that leans towards an 
adversarial model) that the enforcement of the defence’s right to investigate 
depends on the prosecutor’s involvement. Moreover, it is unfortunate that the 
defence, in order to convince the prosecutor to act on its behalf using his coercive 
powers is obliged to disclose its strategy and to prove the relevance of the evidence 
that the defence intends to acquire. While acknowledging the structural differences 
existing between the prosecutor and the defence in the criminal justice system, it 
is essential that the defence be put in a position to carry out its own investigations 
effectively without an obligatory interaction with the opposing side. 
Chapter 2
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73 Article 368 CPP.
74 Sammarco A.A., Tempo e Condizioni delle Investigazioni Difensive: Un Caso di Inesistenza del Giusto Processo, Diritto 
Penale e Processo, 2008, 4, 525. 
75 Article 391 bis paras. 10 and 11.
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It is contended that two interventions by the lawmakers appear necessary to grant 
and safeguard the effectiveness of the defence’s investigations. Preliminarily, the 
adoption of provisions able to grant the defendant knowledge of the ongoing 
investigations in advance is desirable. The provision of article 415 bis is not sufficient 
to ensure the effectiveness of the defence’s right in relation to the creation of the 
evidence. The defence’s intervention when the prosecutor’s material has been 
largely collected and the limited period the defence has for gathering evidence 
envisaged by the code prejudices the effectiveness of the defence’s investigation. 
The regulation of the defence’s investigation is emptied of its intended meaning 
if it is not strictly linked to the provision of a summary of the existence of the 
proceedings at the preliminary investigation stage.
This intervention should be coupled with the adoption of provisions aimed at 
sparing the defence’s investigation from intervention by the prosecutor. A super 
partes organ should be the referent of the defence in relation to the request to 
carry out an arrest or to summon a person able to explain relevant facts. This 
solution would safeguard the rights granted to the defendant in relation to the 
defence’s investigations and would eliminate the link between the enforcement 
of such rights and any indirect disclosure to the prosecutor which occurs in the 
current system. However, it cannot be overlooked that the suggested course of 
action implies significant costs which may constitute an important obstacle to its 
practical realisation.
The analysis carried out shows that disclosure plays a crucial role in the defence’s 
investigation. It seems arguable that, from the perspective of the defence, positive 
and negative disclosure can be identified. The first is the disclosure to the suspect 
of the existence of proceedings against him that leads to the defence beginning 
an investigation of its own The second disclosure affects the investigations being 
carried out by the defence, as it is the obligatory price to pay for the prosecutor’s 
collaboration in the enforcement of the defence’s right in the structure created by 
the code. 
8. Concluding remarks 
Italian criminal procedure is an interesting and peculiar example for comparative 
study in light of its recent attempt to shift from its deeply rooted inquisitorial nature 
to a criminal justice procedure inspired by the core principles of the adversarial 
tradition. The analysis conducted shows that several elements of the previous 
inquisitorial procedural system have not been relinquished in this process. 
For instance the system, being reluctant to leave the truth seeking process entirely 
in the hands of the parties maintained the power of the judiciary, inter alia, in 
relation to the admission of evidence that if considered necessary can be admitted 
motu proprio by the judges. Also the role played by the prosecutor remains closer 
to the inquisitorial tradition, although the system formally requires him to act 
as a party on the same footing as the defence. The defence’s position during the 
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preliminary investigations is safeguarded by the impartiality that is still recognised 
in the prosecutor who continues to be part of the same professional judicial body as 
the judges.  This conception of the role of the prosecutor seems to be the heritage 
of the inquisitorial figure of the giudice istruttore. 
The Italian choice of adopting the principles of the adversarial model while 
maintaining inquisitorial elements bears important consequences on the regulation 
of the disclosure of information in criminal justice proceedings.  
The analysis conducted reveals that, in the light of the structure of the Italian 
criminal procedural system envisaged by the 1988 CPP, disclosure assumes 
a different meaning and consequences depending on at which stage of the 
proceedings it operates. It is possible to configure two different types of disclosure. 
An “external disclosure” that refers to the information to the relevant person of 
the beginning/existence of criminal proceedings (although at its embryonic 
phase) against him and an “internal disclosure” that refers to the material gathered 
through the investigations and to the evidence the parties intend to present at trial 
and therefore the essence of the case. It can be imagined as an architect unveiling a 
project showing first the structure of the building and then its interior. 
The “external disclosure” of the preliminary investigations to the suspect is an 
essential feature of the criminal procedure because the defence can exercise its right 
to participate in the investigation, gathering material to counter the prosecution’s 
allegations only once it knows of the existence of the investigation. Once the 
preliminary hearing judge has committed the case for trial the disclosure of 
information (“internal” disclosure) assumes a more classical function of disclosing 
the material gathered by the parties so as to avoid the introduction of surprise 
evidence at trial. 
The scrutiny carried out revealed some critical aspects of criminal procedure in 
relation to the disclosure process. The structure of the discovery scheme in the 
preliminary investigation stage, in fact, does not grant the certainty of the suspect 
being informed of the ongoing investigations. It merely allows for the possibility 
that such disclosure will take place linking it to the key role played by the prosecutor. 
The prosecutor is in the best position to determine whether and when a person must 
be informed that they are under investigation. Moreover, in several segments of the 
procedure, he becomes the authority the defence has to turn to for the enforcement 
of its disclosure rights. The provisions of articles 335 and 369 CPP have set up a 
scheme that allows the request for disclosure to be made by the suspect and the 
decision to do so is left to the prosecutor conducting the investigation. This lack of 
certainty is coupled by the vagueness of the information a suspect might obtain. 
Such information is indeed limited to the provisions of the law allegedly violated and 
the time and place in which it may have occurred. The content of the information 
corroborates the idea that disclosure during the preliminary investigations enables 
an “external” knowledge of the proceedings rather than knowledge of its merits. 
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The combined reading of articles 329 and 415 bis CPP identify the end of the 
preliminary investigations as the moment at which a suspect (if the prosecutor is 
leaning towards asking for the committal of the case) enjoys the certainty of the 
disclosure of information about the existence of an investigation and the material 
it may have gathered. Striking the balance between the public interest in the 
effectiveness of the investigations and the suspect’s right to be informed at such 
a late stage of the criminal proceedings might prejudice the effectiveness of the 
defence’s investigation.
In addition, the analysis carried out has stressed that the defence might be compelled 
to seek the assistance of the prosecutor (with no guarantee of success) in order to 
carry out further investigation. The same situation applies to the enforcement of 
certain powers of investigation that the defence has (such as the right to collect 
witness statements) which the system grants to the accused.  The defence has to 
disclose the nature of the evidence it is trying to gather and above all, it has to show 
the relevance to its case, broadening the compulsory indirect disclosure the system 
requires in exchange for the prosecutor’s potential cooperation. 
The defence’s investigation is reduced of its meaning if the system does not ensure 
that the defence is informed in advance of the existence of the proceedings against 
it as well as if it links the enforcement of these investigative powers enjoyed by the 
defence to the prosecution. 
Finally, the permissive jurisprudence analysed and the judicial activism in the 
admission of evidence (that allows the judge to present evidence motu proprio) 
reflect an inquisitorial conception of the truth as a superior value and creates 
ground for the admission of relevant evidence that whether intentional or not has 
been withheld from the opposing party. This approach, while perfectly legitimate, 
appears difficult to reconcile with the proclaimed attempt to establish an adversarial 
criminal justice procedure to regulate a trial led by the parties. 
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III. Disclosure of information in the French criminal law system
Introduction
“The adversarial system of justice is by nature unfair and unjust. It favors the strong 
over the weak. It accentuates social and cultural differences, favoring the rich who 
are able to engage and pay for the services of one or more lawyers. Our own system 
is better, both in terms of efficiency and the rights of the individual. I prefer, and I 
want to make this quite clear, an independent judge who investigates the evidence for 
and against the suspect, to a system where police officers carry out a large part of the 
investigation without any form of judicial supervision”.1
This section examines the French criminal procedure and the way in which it 
regulates disclosure obligations. This investigation begins with an overview 
of the main historical developments taken from the Ancien Régime, through 
the enactment of the 1808 Napoleonic code d’instruction criminelle, until the 
adoption of the current code of criminal procedure (code de procédure pénale) of 
1958. This brief description of the roots of the criminal law system facilitates the 
understanding of the main elements that characterise the modern code of criminal 
procedure.  
The French criminal justice procedure (in relation to the most serious offences, to 
which this analysis is limited) can be artificially divided into three distinct phases 
made up of the police investigation and prosecution, the judicial investigation and 
the trial. An overview of each of these stages, their protagonists and their main 
procedural steps allow the segments of the criminal  procedure where disclosure 
plays (or should play) a role to be singled out. In this context, the role of the 
prosecutor is investigated. Moreover, the main reforms of criminal procedure of 
1993 and 2000 are discussed in order to single out their essential features in relation 
to the rights of the defence. 
Furthermore, attention is paid to the relationship between French criminal 
procedure and the European Convention on Human Rights (European Convention) 
regarding the protection of the rights of the defence.  The European Court of Human 
rights has influenced the development of the French criminal procedure through 
its jurisprudence, which on multiple occasions has found France in violation of the 
Convention. 
This preliminary analysis paves the way for the description and assessment of the 
functioning of the disclosure of information to the suspect/accused with particular 
attention to the right to be informed of the nature of the accusations, the right to 
have access to legal assistance and the possibility of having access to the dossier. 
Finally, a few concluding remarks are offered summarising the outcome of the 
analysis carried out. 
_______________________
1 The then Justice Minister, Elisabeth Guigou, presenting the reform project to the Sénat, 15 June 1999.
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1. The origins of the contemporary French criminal procedure
Under the Ancien Régime, which preceded the 1789 Revolution, there was no 
centralised system of justice. The king was the focus of the system and he delegated 
the administration of justice to his officials through the establishment of sovereign 
and seigniorial courts. The Monarchy, the Church, the Nobility and the so-called 
Third Estate characterised the social context in which authoritarianism, inequality 
and feudalism were at the core of the administration of justice.2 People were 
subjected to different laws according to their affiliation to one or another social 
group and were tried before regional courts. Laws depended on local customs 
and the king (or other feudal authorities) could arbitrarily dispense privileges and 
exemptions from the applicability of the laws.  The lack of legislative consistency 
characterising the Ancien Régime was partly due to geographical differences 
within the French territory. Specifically, in the south of France the written law (le 
droit écrit) rooted in the Roman tradition was in force whereas in the central and 
northern regions of France the customary law (le droit coutumier) of German origin 
was applied. In addition, feudal law and canon law also played a relevant role in the 
fragmentation of the legal and judicial system of France under the Ancien Régime.3 
It was only under the reign of King Louis XIV, whose legislative power had gained 
wide recognition throughout the kingdom, that the first comprehensive bodies 
of laws were enacted in the form of ordinances. In 1670 a criminal ordinance 
(Ordonnance criminelle de 1670) was enacted and came into effect on 1 January 1671. 
It covered both criminal procedure and criminal law. This text was the first attempt 
to codify provisions of the criminal procedure applicable throughout all of France 
and remained in force until the 1789 French Revolution. The procedure enforced 
through the Ordonnance criminelle had scarce consideration for the rights of the 
defendant who was denied access to legal representation and remained ignorant of 
the charges against him. In addition, the inquisitorial character of the procedure 
characterised both the pre-trial stage and the trial itself. The detention of the 
suspect in order to obtain proof was a routine procedure and torture was allowed 
in the preliminary stage in order to extort a confession. Another striking element 
of the criminal procedure enacted in 1670 was the cruelty of the punishments that 
were imposed with sentences such as hanging, beheading, burning at the stake 
and mutilation, which were inflicted publicly as a deterrent. Due to the lack of a 
separate criminal code and the ordinance’s considerable omissions in the definition 
of crimes and punishment, judges were granted wide discretionary powers. For 
instance, where the ordinance did not envisage a punishment for a specific crime 
or did not qualify a certain conduct as a crime, the judges could determine what 
constituted a crime and choose the punishment they considered appropriate 
among those applicable to other crimes. The concentration of powers on the judges 
and public prosecutors gave rise to many abuses of power.4 
_______________________
2 Hodgson J., French Criminal Justice, A Comparative Account of the Investigation and Prosecution of Crimes in France, 
Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland Oregon, 2005, pp. 14-15.
3 See Hodgson, above n. 2.
4 See Lawson Oates J., The Influence of French Revolution on Legal and Judicial Reform, Simon Fraser University, 1980.
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Although in the years preceding the French Revolution proposals for the reform 
of the criminal procedure system as regulated by the 1670 Ordonnance criminelle5 
existed, it was only with the advent of the Revolution that the Ancien Régime’s 
criminal procedure was reformed. Philosophers such as Montesquieu, Voltaire 
and Beccaria contributed to moving the public opinion towards a possible reform 
of the system whose cruelty and arbitrariness were still perceived as “necessary 
harshness”.6 Their contribution was the promotion of the abolition of the death 
penalty and the physical punishments, the affirmation of the certainty of the crimes, 
the proportionality of punishments and the importance of crime prevention rather 
than merely crime punishment. The philosophers also thought that legal reforms 
could only be achieved by bypassing the judiciary, which (with few exceptions) was 
rather conservative and not prone to the implementation of any of their ideas.  
The 1789 Revolution intended to eradicate the inequality and discrimination 
upon which the system was based, affirming a new order founded on the people’s 
sovereignty. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (Déclaration 
des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen), adopted by the Constitutional Assembly on 
25 August 1789, embodied the core of the revolutionary ideas of liberté, égalité and 
fraternité. In relation to the legal and judicial reform, the Declaration envisaged, 
inter alia, a single legal system equally applicable to all, the presumption of 
innocence, the abolition of cruel and inhuman punishments as well as the abolition 
of arbitrary arrest and detention. The declaration became the preamble to the 1791 
French Constitution that established a constitutional monarchy. 
In September 1791, the Constituent Assembly passed a decree that reformed 
the criminal procedure introducing the jury trial (based on the English system) 
characterised by a predominance of oral arguments throughout the procedure. The 
decree provided guarantees to the accused in the jury trial whereas the provisions 
concerning the pre-trial examination were less effective in granting rights to 
the suspect. The justice of the peace, who was a police magistrate, could initiate 
proceedings and therefore combined the two important functions of prosecutor 
and examining magistrate. In relation to disclosure it is worth mentioning that 
while the written statements taken during the preliminary examination (which 
were not usable at trial) were not provided to the jury, they were made available at 
trial to only the prosecutor and not the defence.
Moreover, the Constituent Assembly promulgated a Penal Code in September 
1791, which clarified the definition of crimes and confirmed that the application 
of punishments must be independent of the social status of the perpetrator. The 
code limited the death penalty and abolished physical punishment. In 1795, a 
comprehensive code of criminal procedure and criminal law was promulgated. The 
code focused mainly on the criminal procedure and it granted to the defendant the 
Chapter 3
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5 These proposals advocated, inter alia, the introduction of the legal representation of the accused, the public celebration 
of the criminal trials and the restriction of the powers of the examining judge and more importantly the compilation of 
a criminal code able to grant certainty to the definition of crimes and the punishments. 
6 Lawson Oates, above n. 4 at p. 21.
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right to have access, during the trial, to the written statements collected during the 
preliminary examination on the same footing as the prosecution. 
Following the establishment of the first French Republic in 1792, a more centralised 
system of administering justice was put in place under Napoleon Bonaparte 
following his rise to power in 1799. The republican state was based on the idea 
that the sovereignty of the people was exercised through a very centralised state 
(étatisme). Consequently, the state became the “representative and guardian 
of the public interest”.7 This conception of the role of the state is still central in 
contemporary France. Napoleon reformed the French legal system in accordance 
with the ideas of the 1789 Revolution. A unique and centralised legal system 
replaced the many different local ones. 
In November 1808, a code d’instruction criminelle was enacted.8 The code forms 
the basis of the modern so-called inquisitorial system of criminal procedure. It 
combined the core principles of the Revolution and the Ancien Régime. The code 
d’instruction criminelle had a remarkable life span considering that it was replaced 
only in 1958 by the code de procédure pénale, which is still in force.
The code re-introduced an inquisitorial pre-trial investigation (which had been 
removed following the 1789 revolution) and maintained a more adversarial 
character at the trial stage. This combination is still the foundation of the French 
criminal procedure. In contrast with the acknowledgment of the presumption of 
innocence of the defendant, the code envisaged remanding a suspect in custody in 
serious cases as a routine procedure, establishing a de facto presumption of guilt. 
The preliminary investigation regulated by the code d’instruction criminelle 
restricted the suspect’s rights stating that, inter alia, the accused could not request 
any investigation be carried out by the magistrate and that he would remain 
ignorant of the nature of the charges brought against him until the trial. Trials 
were held in public and the accused had the right to be assisted by a lawyer and to 
have his witnesses interrogated. 
2. The French 1959 code of criminal procedure 
 2.1 Introduction
The code of criminal procedure currently in force in France entered into force in 
1959 and was subsequently amended several times due to various reforms of the 
criminal procedure undertaken by different governments. The code of criminal 
procedure is the result of the work of a commission presided over by the then 
Procureur Général, M. Antoine Besson. The commission worked without any 
contribution from the judiciary or academia.  
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7 Ibid. at p. 16. 
8 In 1810, also a new Penal Code was enacted under Napoleone Bonaparte. 
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Article 111-1 of the penal code states that criminal offences are categorised, according 
to their seriousness, as felonies, misdemeanors or petty offences (crimes, délits et 
contraventions). This distinction is important, as the rules of criminal procedure 
have developed around it. For instance, an instruction is mandatory only for serious 
crimes, punishable by imprisonment from five to twenty years and life imprisonment 
and is only occasionally used for delits and contraventions. Furthermore, crimes 
will be tried before the assize court (cour d’assises) whereas misdemeanors (délits), 
which include the vast majority of crimes such as theft, fraud and less serious drug 
cases (punishable with imprisonment of up to five years or a fine of €3,750 or more) 
will be dealt with in the correctional court (tribunal correctional). Petty offences 
(contraventions), which are punishable by a fine up to €3,750 are exempted by the 
instruction and tried in the police court (tribunal de police). 
As mentioned in the introduction the current criminal procedure envisages three 
separate stages of criminal proceedings for the most serious crimes: the police 
investigation and prosecution, the judicial investigation and the trial. The main 
characteristics of these three stages are illustrated below. 
 2.2 The police investigation 
In France, the judicial police (la police judiciaire) consists of two different types, 
the Police nationale and the Gendarmerie. Two main kinds of police investigations 
(enquête) can be carried out namely the preliminary investigation (enquête 
préliminaire)9 and the flagrant offence enquiry (enquête à cas d’infraction 
flagrante).10
The judicial police carry out a preliminary investigation (enquête préliminaire) on 
the reported crimes under the prosecutor instruction or on their own initiative. 
In both cases, the police are subject to the supervision of the public prosecutor 
(procureur général). The preliminary investigation can be described as non-
coercive in nature. The police can carry out searches, house visits and the seizing 
of exhibits only with the written consent of the person concerned. When consent 
is denied only the liberty and custody judge, upon request of the public prosecutor, 
can authorise the police to proceed with force.11 The non-coercive character of the 
police investigation is subject to two main exceptions; the right to conduct identity 
checks and the so-called garde à vue. 
In relation to the first, the police have the power to ask any person to prove his 
identity by any means, where one or more plausible reasons exist to suspect “that 
the person has committed or attempted to commit an offence or that the person 
is preparing to commit a felony or a misdemeanor; or that the person is able to 
give information useful for an inquiry into a felony or misdemeanor; or that the 
Chapter 3
_______________________
9 Articles 75-78 code de procédure pénale. For the English version of the French Code of Criminal procedure the following 
source has been used: www.legifrance.gouv.fr. 
10 Articles 53-74 code de procédure pénale.
11 Article 76 code de procédure pénale. This applies to inquiry into a felony or a misdemeanor punished by a prison sentence 
of five years or more.
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person is the object of inquiries ordered by a judicial authority”.12 In case the person 
concerned refuses or is unable to provide his identity the police can detain him for 
up to four hours while enquiries are made.
The garde à vue (literally watched by sight), allows the police, where necessary for 
an inquiry, to arrest and detain any person against whom there exist one or more 
plausible reasons to suspect that he has committed or attempted to commit an 
offence.13 This practice has been the subject of heated debates on the restriction of 
the defence’s rights and its compliance with the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Recently, the main provisions regulating the garde à vue have been found 
unconstitutional and several changes have been adopted for the regulation of this 
form of custody.14 These issues will be analysed in detail below in its relation to 
disclosure. 
The police are granted powers that are more extensive when a flagrant offence 
enquiry is carried out (enquête à cas d’infraction flagrante). That happens in 
relation to crimes or délits that are in the course of being committed or have just 
been committed.15 The police immediately inform the district prosecutor of the 
flagrant crime detected.16 The police officers visit the scene of the crime where 
they can secure all the evidence, seal off the area, carry out identity checks and 
compel the attendance of anyone thought to be able to provide useful information. 
Searches during the enquête à cas d’infraction flagrante may be carried out without 
the consent of the person concerned. At this stage, judicial involvement is rather 
limited and the police might seek the cooperation of the prosecutor when they do 
not have sufficient powers to deal with a specific situation.17 The judicial direction 
of the prosecutor is more frequent in high profile and complex cases.18
 2.3 The prosecution
When the police consider the investigation complete, or that there is enough 
evidence to start a judicial investigation, they transmit the dossier to the prosecutor 
who is in charge of the decision of whether or not to commence judicial proceedings. 
The prosecutor can order the police to investigate further if he considers the dossier 
insufficient and is therefore unable to make a decision. Article 40-1 of the code de 
procédure pénale states that the prosecutor decides whether to initiate prosecution, 
to implement alternatives to prosecution19 or to close the case without any further 
action where the content of the dossier justifies this choice. The public interest is 
the main consideration in the prosecutor’s assessment of whether or not to proceed 
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12 Article 78-2 code de procédure pénale. 
13 Article 62-2 code de procédure pénale. 
14 Constitutional Council, Decision n. 2010-14/22 QPC of 30 July 2010. Available in English at  http://www.conseil-con-
stitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/english/priority-preliminary-rulings-on-the-issue-of-constitutionality/deci-
sions-of-the-constitutional-coucil-qpc.48658.html. See also Law n. 391/2011 and Law n. 535/2014.
15 Article 53 code de procédure pénale. 
16 Article 54 code de procédure pénale.
17 Vogler R. and Huber B., Criminal Procedure in Europe, Dunker and Hublot, Berlin, 2008, p. 201.
18 Ibid at p. 201.
19 The code of criminal procedure envisages alternatives to prosecution such as, inter alia, a bail or a penal fine. See Article 
41-2 and 41-3 code de procédure pénale.
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(opportunité de la poursuite). 
When the prosecutor decides to prosecute a case, he can request (by warrant) 
the commencement of a judicial investigation (instruction) by an investigating 
judge (juge d’instruction).20 This procedure is mandatory in case of crimes. It is 
also mandatory in cases of délits and contraventions of the fifth category, which 
have been committed by a juvenile, or in case the perpetrator of an offence is 
unknown.21 The prosecutor can, where the case does not concern a serious offence 
(crimes), summon the defendant (citation directe). The summons, which is served 
to the defendant by a court bailiff, informs him that he is being charged and of the 
place, date and time of the hearing. The lawyer for the defence may at any time 
examine the case file.22 This procedure is usually used when there is no urgency 
and the defendant is not in custody. Alternatively, if the prosecutor believes that 
the case is ready for trial, the comparution immédiate allows him to bring the 
defendant immediately before the court (tribunal correctionnel).23 This procedure 
is applicable to cases pertaining to offences (délits) for which the maximum term 
of imprisonment is no less than two years (six months in case of flagrant offences). 
Also in relation to this procedure, defence lawyers will be granted immediate access 
to the dossier. 
 2.4 L’ instruction
The judicial investigation’s main goal is the discovery of the truth (la 
manifestation de la vérité).24 The investigation must be objective and must 
address all the evidence available both in favour and against the suspect (à 
charge et à décharge). An investigation may be opened only through a request 
by the public prosecutor (réquisitoire afin d’informer)25 or occasionally through 
a complaint made by the victim alongside a petition to become a civil party to 
the trial (plainte avec constitution de partie civile).26 The investigating judge 
(juge d’instruction) is responsible for the judicial investigations and it is only 
the judge who can order their closure.27 The public prosecutor, in fact, once 
the instruction has been opened becomes a party to the proceedings losing his 
former leading role. 
The Investigating Chamber (Chambre de l’Instruction) is the judicial organ that 
is granted the power to review the whole process of the judicial investigation. 
Where particular acts have been carried out in breach of the law it can pronounce 
their nullity and, where necessary, it can determine the nullity of all or part of the 
subsequent proceedings.28 Every four months the juge d’instruction must inform 
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20 Article 80 code de procédure pénale.
21 See Vogler and Huber, above n. 17 at p. 203. 
22 Article 394 code de procédure pénale.
23 Article 395 code de procédure pénale.
24 Article 81 code de procédure pénale.
25 Article 80 code de procédure pénale.
26 Article 51 code de procédure pénale.
27 The Law n. 2007-291 envisages the introduction of a college d’instruction composed by three judges of investigations for 
each instruction, which will replace the juge d’instruction. So far its entry into force has been postponed several times 
and, at the time of writing is set on 1 January 2015. 
28 Article 206 code de procédure pénale. 
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the president of the Chambre de l’Instruction about the cases he is investigating. 
The Investigating Chamber may order any additional investigatory step it deems 
appropriate, upon the application of the public prosecutor, a third party or on its 
own motion.29
Through the warrant requesting the opening of an investigation the prosecutor 
limits the scope of the investigation to the facts as described therein. Where an 
offence not covered by the prosecution’s warrant is brought to the investigating 
judge’s knowledge, he must communicate the complaints or the official records 
that establish its existence to the district prosecutor without delay.30 The district 
prosecutor may then require the investigating judge to investigate the additional 
facts.31
In addition to the facts mentioned in the prosecutor’s warrant, the investigation 
also focuses on the personality of the suspects as well as “on their financial, family 
or social situation.”32 This inquiry is mandatory in serious offences and optional for 
misdemeanors. The investigating judge may extend the charge to those who, in the 
course of the investigation, appear to be involved in the commission of the criminal 
offences under investigation. The juge d’instruction may investigate those persons 
“against whom there is strong and concordant evidence making it probable that 
they may have participated, as perpetrator or accomplice, in the commission of the 
offences he is investigating” (mise en examen).33
The investigating judge enjoys wide powers to obtain all relevant available evidence 
to include in the dossier. He interrogates the defendant (personne mise en examen)34, 
the civil party and witnesses, he may request expert evidence and he may also issue 
rogatory commission to the police. Furthermore, the investigating judge may issue 
a search warrant35, a subpoena, a summons or an arrest warrant as well as place 
someone on conditional bail.36 The power to remand a suspect in custody belongs 
to the liberty and detention judge (juge des libertés et de la détention), who is not 
involved in the investigation and is also given the power to authorise wire-tapping 
in private houses.37
The public prosecutor, in addition to demanding access to the case files at any time 
during a judicial investigation, can request the juge d’instruction to undertake a 
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29 Article 201 code de procédure pénale.
30 Article 80 code de procédure pénale. 
31 Article 80 code de procédure pénale states that ‘the district prosecutor may then require the investigating judge, by an 
additional submission, to investigate the additional facts, or require him to open a separate investigation, or send the 
case to the trial court, or order an inquiry, or decide to drop the case, or proceed to one of the measures provided for 
in articles 41-1 to 41-3, or to transfer the complaint or the official reports to the district prosecutor who is territorially 
competent. If the district prosecutor requires the opening of a separate investigation, this may be entrusted to the same 
investigating judge, designated under the conditions set out in the first paragraph of article 83”.
32 Article 81 code de procédure pénale. 
33 Article 80-1 code de procédure pénale.
34 The investigation cannot end without the interrogation of the suspect unless he concludes that there is no case to an-
swer. 
35 Article 122 code de procédure pénale.
36 Article 138 code de procédure pénale.
37 The liberty and detention judge was created by Law n. 516 of 15 June 2000. 
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specific investigation that he believes “useful for the discovery of the truth as well 
as any safety measure necessary”.38 The civil party and the defendant may also apply 
to the investigating judge asking him to take any step they consider necessary for 
the discovery of the truth.39  
Once the judicial investigation is completed, the investigating judge transmits the 
dossier to the public prosecutor and informs the parties and their advocates.40 The 
prosecutor and the parties have one month to file their submissions if the person 
under judicial investigation is detained or in other cases three months. The juge 
d’instruction assesses the evidence gathered at the end of the investigation in order 
to determine whether there are elements that constitute an offence of which he 
determines the legal qualification.41 The closing order issued by the investigating 
judge states either that the case should be tried or that there is no case to prosecute.42
Until 2000, the French criminal justice procedure envisaged a “double level” of 
instruction in relation to cases concerning crimes. The investigating judge could 
not unilaterally dispose the referral of a case involving a crime to the Cour d’Assises 
but rather the file would be sent to the prosecutor who in turn would ask the 
Chambre de l’Instruction to scrutinise it and to decide whether or not to transfer it 
to the Assize Court. Currently, this mandatory second level of judicial investigation 
has been abolished due to the establishment of a second level of trial, which allows 
a case tried before the Cour d’Assises to be appealed and tried a second time before 
a different Cour d’Assises.43 In other words, a system characterised by two levels 
of instruction and one trial has been replaced by a criminal system forming one 
mandatory instruction and potentially two levels of trial.44 However, it is still 
possible that the Chambre de l’Instruction, if asked by the prosecutor or by the 
defendant, undertakes a full review of the dossier of the judicial investigation. 
 2.5 The Trial stage at the Cour d’Assises
A case reaches the Cour d’Assises through a committal order issued by the 
investigating judge. The code of criminal procedure envisages a certain number 
of “compulsory preliminary steps” to be taken before the opening of the trial. A 
copy of the official records establishing the existence of the offence, of the written 
statements of witnesses and any expert reports must be delivered to every accused 
person and civil party.45
The dossier must be transferred to the Cour d’Assises in order to allow its president, 
and only him, to study it. The president, at least five days before the beginning of 
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38 Article 82 code de procédure pénale.
39 Article 82-1 code de procédure pénale. 
40 Article 175 code de procédure pénale. 
41 Article 176 code de procédure pénale.
42 Elliott C., Jeanpierre E., Vernon C., French Legal System, 2nd Edition, Pearson Education Limited, 2006, p. 216.  Article 
177 code de procédure pénale states that “if the investigating judge considers that the facts do not constitute a felony, a 
misdemeanor, or a petty offence, or if the perpetrator has remained unidentified, or if there are no sufficient charges 
against the person under judicial examination, he makes an order ruling that there is no cause to prosecute”.
43 Article 380-1 code de procédure pénale.
44 See Vogler and Huber, above n.17 at p. 215. 
45 Article 279 code de procédure pénale.
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the trial, has to meet the defendant to make sure that he has received the documents 
and has appointed a lawyer. Legal representation is in fact mandatory before the 
Cour d’Assises. The public prosecutor and the civil party serve to the accused, and 
vice versa, the list of their witnesses and experts.46 During the preparatory phase, 
which precedes the hearing, the president, if he considers the judicial investigation 
incomplete, can order any further investigative activity he deems useful for the 
discovery of the truth. These activities are carried out by the president, by one of 
his assessors or by an investigating judge who he delegates this task.47
When the “compulsory preliminary steps” have been exhausted, the hearing can 
begin. The principle of the continuité des débats applies and therefore the hearing 
must continue until the case is ended by the assize court judgment.48 The president 
asks for the defendant’s identity, the so-called interrogatoire d’identité49, then the 
jury is appointed through a draw of nine jurors from a list of forty. The prosecutor 
and the defence enjoy the power to challenge four and five jurors respectively. Once 
the jury has been constituted the president orders the bailiff to call the roll of the 
witnesses cited by the public prosecutor, by the accused and the civil party and asks 
them to retire to the room that is prepared for them.50 After the clerk has read the 
committal warrant, the president proceeds explaining the procedural history of 
the case and begins the interrogation of the defendant, followed by the witnesses 
whose audition has been requested by the parties. Since the 2000 reform also 
the prosecutor, the defence lawyer and the lawyer for the civil party (if any) may, 
with the president’s leave, ask the witnesses questions directly. Furthermore, the 
president has the discretionary power to summon and hear any person as well as to 
order the production of any new element that, in the light of the developments at 
the hearing, he believes useful for the discovery of the truth.51
Once all the evidence has been heard, the civil party, the public prosecutor and 
the defendant deliver in turn their final submissions. The defendant must have 
the final word. The president, before retiring the court and the jury to deliberate, 
summarises the questions that must be answered. The court determines the 
sentence where the defendant is found guilty. 
3. The role of the Procureur 
In France, the public prosecutor, the investigating judge and the trial judge belong 
to the same judicial body, namely the magistrature. They are appointed following 
the same competition and the same training at the National School of the Judiciary 
(École nationale de la magistrature). The common selection procedure and training 
allow them to move from one role to another at different stages of their career. It 
is believed that the affiliation to the magistrature instills in its members a “universal 
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46 Article 281 code de procédure pénale. 
47 Article 283 code de procédure pénale. 
48 Article 307 code de procédure pénale also states that “the hearing may be suspended for the time necessary for the judges, 
the civil party and the accused to rest”.
49 Article 294 code de procédure pénale.
50 Articles 324-325 code de procédure pénale.
51 Article 310 code de procédure pénale.
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professional ethos”52 and society entrusts them with the protection of the public interest. 
The Superior Council of the Magistrature (Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature) is 
the governing body for all magistrates. However, within the judiciary, a distinction 
can be made between judges (trial judges and investigative judges) defined as 
the sitting judiciary (magistrats du siège) and the prosecutors, referred to as the 
standing judiciary (magistrats du parquets). Only the judges enjoy constitutional 
independence whereas the prosecutors are hierarchically subordinated to the 
Ministry of Justice. The prosecution service is conceived, in fact, as the means of 
implementation of the government’s criminal policy and is therefore guided in 
the performance of its functions by general instructions and specific directives 
emanating from the Ministry of Justice.53 The failure to comply with these guidelines 
may lead to disciplinary action and in serious cases to dismissal. However, while 
the prosecution is obliged to abide by the Ministry of Justice’s guidance, in relation 
to written submissions it remains “free to make such oral submissions as it believes 
to be in the interest of justice” (la plume est serve mais la parole est libre).54 
The judiciary-executive relationship finds its origin in the French republican 
tradition, based on the idea that the power lies with the people and the state 
administers it on their behalf, guaranteeing the protection of public order. There is 
no room for an independent prosecution service not elected by the people; on the 
contrary, the prosecutor must remain accountable to the government who, even 
if indirectly, is the expression of the popular vote. In addition, the hierarchical 
structure is seen as a way to enforce a uniform and coherent criminal policy at the 
national level. However, several scandals unveiling political pressure in the form of 
informal recommendations not to prosecute specific cases involving high profile 
politicians,55 reinvigorated the argument that it would be desirable that prosecutors 
did not belong to the same professional body as the judges and that their career 
should not be dependent on the executive.56 
The code of criminal procedure states that the prosecutor “exercises the public 
action and formally requests the law to be enforced”.57 The prosecutor enjoys 
considerable discretion in relation to the legal qualification to give to the acts 
investigated as well as in relation to the timing of the transfer of the case to the 
investigating judge (in cases concerning crimes). Considering that only a minority 
of cases (less than 7%)58 are subject to mandatory instruction the prosecutor has a 
broad responsibility in relation to the managing of the majority of criminal cases.
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53 Article 30 code de procédure pénale.
54 Article 33 code de procédure pénale.
55 See Elliot, Jeanpierre, Vernon, above n. 42 at 153–5, describing how, in order to terminate an investigation regarding 
financial affairs of a high ranking politician and his wife, the Minister of Justice sent an helicopter to Katmandu, Nepal, 
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57 Article 31 code de procédure pénale.
58 Hodgson J., Recent Reform in the French Criminal Process, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 52, Octo-
ber 2002. p. 805. 
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In addition, the prosecutor performs an important supervisory function over the 
police investigation and the detention of suspects. Due to the inquisitorial nature 
of this segment of the pre-trial stage and the limited role conferred to the defence 
lawyer the prosecutor is expected, in addition to the enforcement of the law, to 
safeguard the rights of the suspect, especially when he is subject to the garde à 
vue regime. This is a rather ambitious combination of duties to concentrate in 
one subject. Nonetheless, as discussed above, the conception of the prosecutor 
as a magistrat and the hierarchical nature of the French legal process, explains, 
at least ideologically, this concentration of power in the hands of the prosecutor 
who represents only the public interest.59 The ideology behind the magistrat as an 
impartial agent objectively applying the law is a central theoretical feature of the 
supervisory role conferred to the prosecutor in the pre-trial stage.60
However, the functioning of the prosecution service seems to be somewhat 
different from the theoretical and ideological ideas embraced by the French legal 
process.61 First, the uniformity and certainty of the application of the government’s 
criminal policy appears to be strictly dependent on the resources available to each 
prosecutor’s office in different geographical areas which is at odds with the broad 
discretion that prosecutors are called to exercise in relation to each case. 
More importantly, the role conferred to the prosecutor to guarantee the rights of 
due process for the suspect, appears hampered by several factors. The prosecutor’s 
main task is to preserve the effectiveness of the investigation and to ensure that the 
police (when necessary) arrest, detain and interrogate the suspects in the name of 
the overriding goal of the public interest. A crime control oriented approach lies at 
the core of the public interest. It is therefore difficult to reconcile the protection of 
the due process rights of the accused with the duty to guarantee the effectiveness of 
the investigations and the search for the truth. It is worth quoting Hodgson’s report 
of a procureur describing this friction:
“There are two things which do not seem to me to go in the same direction. On the 
one hand, the need to protect the rights of the defence of the accused, his access 
to the dossier. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the police investigation. 
Sometimes, the measures taken [for the defence] can seem to go against this concern 
with effectiveness. For example I am totally hostile to the lawyer being present at the 
start of the garde à vue…”62
The important role of safeguarding the rights of the defence that the prosecutor 
should play, in the absence of a more adversarial involvement of the defence in 
the pre-trial stage, seems limited to ensuring that no procedural irregularities take 
place, in order to avoid the case being challenged.  Another element that contributes 
to this status quo is the close relationship that exists between the prosecutors and 
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Law and Society, Vol. 29, June 2002, p. 235.
60 Ibid. at p. 235. 
61 See Hodgson, above n. 2. 
62 Hodgson, above n. 59 at p. 253.
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the police. The prosecutor is responsible for the investigation and the detention 
of the suspect however, a lack of personnel within the prosecution service and the 
enormous caseload render it impossible to supervise all the investigations and 
detentions of suspects carried out by the police. The prosecutor works with the 
police and together their final goal is to assemble a dossier on which the suspect can 
be successfully prosecuted. Within this framework, the suspect’s rights and their 
protection are probably seen more as a burden than as a fundamental part of the 
prosecutor’s work. 
Interestingly, on 23 November 2010, the ECtHR delivered a judgment in the case of 
Moulin v. France in which it assessed the role of the prosecutor and the guarantees 
of independence that it offered in relation to the provision of article 5(3) of the 
European Convention.63 Article 5(3) grants to the person arrested or detained on 
suspicion of having committed a criminal offence the right to “be brought promptly 
before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power”. In 
Moulin v. France, the applicant had been held in police custody for five days before 
being brought before the investigating judge. She complained that her right to 
be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise 
judicial power had been violated. The Court considered whether the presentation 
before the deputy public prosecutor, which occurred two days after her arrest, could 
be considered as presentation before a competent legal authority for the purpose of 
article 5(3). The Court stated that “the characteristics that a judge or other officer 
must possess in order to satisfy the requirements of Article 5 precluded him or her, 
among other things, from intervening subsequently against the applicant in the 
criminal proceedings, as the prosecution did”. The ECtHR concluded that, due to 
the dependent nature of the relationship between the Minister of Justice and the 
prosecuting authorities in France, the latter did not meet the required impartiality 
which was inherent in the in the notion of “officer authorised by law to exercise 
judicial power” as conceived in article 5(3).64
4. The French Criminal Procedure and the European Court of Human 
Rights
France runs a monist constitutional system, which envisages the direct incorporation 
of duly ratified international treaties or agreements into French law (article 55 of the 
French Constitution). These international instruments are hierarchically placed, 
within the sources of law, below the Constitution and above Parliament’s laws.
Although France was among the most active in drafting the European Convention 
on Human Rights it then resisted its incorporation and application in the domestic 
legal context. France was in principle hesitant to ratify the European Convention, 
as it feared it would interfere with the domestic law in the regulation of sensitive 
areas and would reduce sovereignty. The Convention was finally ratified in 1974. 
The right to an individual petition to the European Court of Human Rights was 
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64 Ibid at paras. 58-62.  
97 98
enforced only in 1981 and gave rise to several condemnations of France in relation 
to a number of features of its criminal procedure.65 
The French inquisitorial model, based on judicial supervision of the investigations, 
was not completely in line with the rights of the defence as envisaged by the 
Convention (articles 5 and 6 in particular), which were perceived as mainly 
accusatorial in nature. This diversity characterised the slow process of adjustment 
of the criminal procedure (particularly in relation to the pre-trial stage) to the new 
Convention, which France has undertaken since its ratification. The jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR has played a relevant role in the reforms of the French criminal 
procedure in 1993 and 2000, which are discussed below. 
Two different approaches, a “virtuous” and a “vicious” one, can be delineated in 
the French approach to the jurisprudence from Strasbourg. The more constructive 
one saw the enactment of legislation in relation to the sensitive part of criminal 
procedure found in violation of the Convention. In addition, the Cour de Cassation 
developed its jurisprudence along the lines of the ECtHR findings. This “virtuous” 
process culminated in the 1993 reform. 
However, after 1993, an attitude developed in both the courts and among lawmakers 
that minimised the impact of the Strasbourg judgments on domestic criminal 
practices. The Court of Cassation stated that Strasbourg’s decisions, which entitled 
appellants to claim reparation for the excessive length of proceedings, had no direct 
effect on French domestic practices.66 Furthermore, in 1999 the ECtHR found 
France in violation of article 3 of the Convention also on the ground of torture, 
making it the only country together with Turkey to have that finding against it.67 
More condemnations followed this hostile approach and led in 2000 to a new 
important reform of the criminal procedural system aimed towards the affirmation 
of the accused’s right to due process. 
In several cases the ECtHR found that France had protracted provisional detention 
beyond what was reasonable68 in accordance with article 5(3) of the European 
Convention, which states that “everyone arrested or detained... shall be entitled to 
trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial”. 
The European Court of Human Rights was also called on to analyse article 583 CPP, 
which stated that “if a person sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than six 
months has not surrendered to custody…his right to appeal on points of law shall be 
forfeited”. The Court held that such a consequence “amounted to a disproportionate 
sanction, having regard to the signal importance of the rights of the defence and 
of the principle of the rule of law in a democratic society”.69 Nonetheless, French 
courts continued to apply this rule leading to further condemnations by the 
ECtHR.70 Only in 2000 was article 583 CPP finally abrogated.71
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In relation to the right to a fair trial, several judgments given by the Strasbourg 
Court had a considerable impact on certain aspects of French criminal procedure. 
It has been in relation to article 6 (2) and (3) that the ECtHR has found on multiple 
occasions France’s criminal procedure to be in violation of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. 
In Reinhardt st Slimane-Kaïd the reporting judge’s report and draft judgment were 
communicated to the advocate-general but not to the defence and was therefore 
found to violate the accused’s right to a fair trial.72 The applicants’ lawyers could 
listen to the first part of the report dealing with facts, procedure and grounds of 
appeal, but the reporting judge’s opinion remained confidential. France responded 
to this judgment extending to the advocate general the prohibition to communicate 
the recommendation over sentencing.73
The European Commission of Human Rights’s judgment in Hakkar v. France, was 
behind the amendment to article 622 CPP regarding the re-examination of cases 
successfully tried before the Strasbourg judicial institutions by domestic courts. 
Initially, France had refused to reopen the Hakkar case after the Strasbourg Court 
found it gravely breached the defence’s rights.74 Following the 2000 reform, article 
626 CPP was amended and it now provides that cases, in the same circumstances 
as the Hakkar case, can be re-opened on request of the parties. 
Most notably in relation to this study, the ECtHR, in Foucher v. France, confronted 
the defendant’s right to access the dossier.75 Mr Foucher and his father had been 
charged with using insulting and threatening words and behaviour towards public 
service employees and were summoned to appear before the Argentan Police Court. 
The offense is a petty offence. Mr. Foucher decided to represent himself and sought 
access to the file through his mother and then personally. On both occasions the 
requests were turned down. The Police Court upheld Mr. Foucher’s claim that there 
had been a violation of the rights of the defence. The Court of Appeal reversed this 
finding and the Court of Cassation confirmed the Appeal Court’s findings. 
Before the ECtHR Mr. Foucher claimed that there had been a violation of article 6(3) 
of the Convention because during these criminal proceedings he was not able to 
access the case file or to obtain a copy of the relevant documents contained within 
it. He stressed that consulting the documents in the case file before the hearing was 
essential in order to properly prepare his defence. Not having access to the dossier 
affected his ability to challenge the only basis for his conviction, which was the 
public employees report. The ECtHR found that “the applicant had been unable to 
prepare a sufficient defence and had not been afforded equality of arms”.76
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Interestingly, in its submission the French government noted how the Court of 
Cassation had reversed its previous case-law concerning the communication of the 
documents from a file where the defendant has already been sent for trial.  It quoted 
the judgment of 12 June 1996 where the Cour de Cassation held that: “everyone 
charged with a criminal offence thus has the right, under Article 6 para. 3 (art. 6-3) 
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, not to the immediate communication of the documents on the file but 
to the release, at his expense and, where appropriate, acting through his lawyer, of 
copies of the documents submitted to the court he has been summoned to appear 
before”.77
In the case of Péllissier et Sassi, the applicant complained that there had been 
a violation of article 6(1) and (3) of the Convention in the domestic criminal 
proceedings against them insofar as they had been convicted of an offence which 
differed from the one they had been charged with (aiding and abetting criminal 
bankruptcy through the concealment of assets instead of bankruptcy).78 The 
applicants submitted that they had not had the opportunity to challenge the 
alternative charge by putting forward their arguments and therefore they had 
not had adequate time and facilities to prepare their defence. The Court pointed 
out that article 6 (3)(a) of the Convention affords the defendant the right to be 
informed not only of the cause of the accusation but also of the legal qualification 
given to those acts. In addition, it stated that “in criminal matters the provision 
of full, detailed information concerning the charges against a defendant, and 
consequently the legal characterization that the court might adopt in the matter, is 
an essential prerequisite for ensuring that the proceedings are fair”.79 It concluded 
that it was within the power of the Appeal Court to re-characterise the facts over 
which it had jurisdiction. However, the Appeals Court should have afforded to 
the defendant the opportunity to exercise his rights of defence in relation to the 
different legal qualification of the offence. Therefore, it held that there had been a 
violation of the accused’s right to be informed in detail of the nature and cause of 
the accusation against them and of the right to have adequate time and facilities for 
the preparation of their defence.80
Finally, in the case of Delta v. France, the applicant submitted that he had been 
convicted of robbery on the sole basis of the testimony of the victim and the 
victim’s friend.81 He complained that he had not had a fair trial because neither he 
nor his lawyer was afforded the opportunity to examine the witness or have them 
examined in the course of the proceedings before the Paris Criminal Court and the 
Court of Appeal. The Court confirmed that the use of witness statements at trial did 
not breach the Convention as long as it did not affect the rights of defence among 
which the right to “adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question 
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a witness against him, either at the time the witness makes his statement or at 
some later stage of the proceedings”.82 The Court concluded that “the rights of the 
defence were subject to such restrictions that Mr Delta did not receive a fair trial”.83
The case law described represents only a part of the condemnations inflicted by the 
Strasbourg Court to France in relation to its criminal procedure. It was argued that 
while the ECtHR raised the level of protection of the basic rights every year, France 
undertook the opposite steps, lowering it each year.84 However, as discussed below, 
several measures have been adopted to bring France more in line with the ECtHR 
jurisprudence.85
5. The 1993 and 2000 reforms of the French Criminal Procedure Code
In 1988, the Minister of Justice established the Criminal Justice and Human Rights 
Commission (the Delmas-Marty Commission) in order to analyse the pre-trial 
stage and to suggest the necessary measures to be adopted to bring the French 
criminal system in line with the European Convention. Particular attention was 
devoted to the development of the rights of suspects. 
The Commission addressed, inter alia, the passive role that the defence was 
assigned in the pre-trial procedure (enquête and instruction) where the suspect was 
considered as the mere object of the search for the truth led by the state. It stressed 
the necessity of embracing and incorporating the principe du contradictoire in the 
criminal system, which did not equate to importing the Anglo-Saxon adversarial 
system, but was intended to guarantee that “each side is entitled to know of 
other’s position and supporting evidence in sufficient detail and with sufficient 
time to give it a proper opportunity to respond”.86 It was understood that a broader 
participation on the part of the suspect rather than representing a shift towards an 
adversarial method would be an essential feature for improved functioning of the 
inquisitorial search for the truth.87 
The Commission recommended that the defence be granted the right to ask for 
further police or judicial investigation, a more encompassing right to access the 
dossier, the right to ask for alternative expert reports, the possibility of attending 
the judicial hearing and to ask questions as well as the right to challenge evidence 
unlawfully obtained.88 These reforms were considered indispensable to ensure a 
more active and participative approach from the defence in the pre-trial stage. In 
January 1993, the majority of the recommendations given by the Delmas-Marty 
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Commission were implemented by Parliament.89 
For the first time a person detained for questioning (also garde à vue) was granted 
the right to speak with a lawyer after twenty hours of police detention. The attempt 
to introduce immediate access to a lawyer encountered major resistance. It was 
contended that it would affect the efficacy of the initial period of investigation 
by the police, who should remain “virtually untrammeled by defense rights”.90 We 
will see in the following subsection how the immediate access to a lawyer was later 
achieved. 
The 1993 reform granted the suspect the right to challenge the validity of the 
investigative acts through an application to the Court of Appeal. This application 
if upheld would lead to the exclusion of the evidence obtained through that act 
from the dossier.91 The January reform did not limit such application to the acts 
performed during the judicial investigation but extended it to the acts undertaken 
during the enquête. This considerable improvement in the defence’s right to 
intervention was subsequently restricted by several amendments.92 Specifically, 
where a violation of the suspect’s rights was established, the Court of Appeal was 
granted discretion as to whether to declare evidence inadmissible instead of the 
automatic mechanism introduced by the 1993 reform. 
As far as the instruction is concerned, the Delmas-Marty Commission highlighted 
a considerable imbalance between the prosecutor and the defence in relation to the 
possibility for the investigating judge carrying out further investigation. In fact, the 
prosecutor’s request could be denied by the juge d’instruction only with a motivated 
decision subject to appeal whereas the defence could only ask the rehearing of a 
specific witness and such request could be denied with no further explanation. 
The reform granted the defence the right to ask the investigating judge to perform 
investigating activities and any denial must now be motivated and is subject to 
appeal. Most notably, the defence lawyer was granted the right to access the dossier 
no later than four working days before the suspect’s first hearing as well as regular 
access thereafter.93
The Commission tried to advocate the necessity of a marked separation between 
the investigation and the judgment. It suggested the abolition of the role of the 
juge d’instruction transforming the prosecutor in the subject responsible for all 
the investigations. This proposal was perceived as an unwelcome shift towards 
the adversarial tradition in which the prosecutor and the defence are (at least 
theoretically) equal parties to the proceedings and consequently it was not 
considered. 
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In January 1997, a Commission de réflexion sur la justice was established by 
President Jacques Chirac. The President of the Cour de Cassation was appointed as 
its chairman. Among other things, the commission was called to tackle the issues 
of the government influence on the justice system and the incapacity of the latter 
to safeguard individual rights such as the presumption of innocence.94 In June 2000 
the main points of the commission’s report were legislated on by Parliament.95  The 
reform introduced a preliminary article affirming that among the main pillars of 
the criminal procedure there are equality of arms, the presumption of innocence, 
the right to a defence and the right to know the nature of the charges against 
someone. In other words, this article states the importance of the implementation 
of the principe du contradictoire in the French criminal procedure.
The rights of a suspect detained by the police for questioning improved. The suspect 
was granted, from the beginning of his detention, access to a lawyer (although 
only for thirty minutes) and the right to be informed by the police about his right 
to remain silent.96 In relation to the instruction, the 2000 reform broadened the 
defence’s right to ask for further investigation extending it to the request to conduct 
searches, to start an investigation in relation to a third person or to intercept post.97
The freedom and detention judge (juge des libertés et de la détention) was established 
and granted the power to decide over the detention of suspects during judicial 
investigations. This part of the reform brought the French criminal procedure in 
line with the ECtHR which requires that pre-trial detention decisions must be made 
by a third judge not involved in the case. The power to hold witnesses in detention 
during the instruction was removed as it had already been done in relation to police 
investigations as a result of the 1993 reform. The reform reaffirmed the idea (which 
had inspired the 1993 legislation) that the principle of the equality of arms and the 
improvement of the defence’s rights were not an antithesis to the effectiveness of 
a criminal investigation but, on the contrary, their affirmation was the right way 
to guarantee the fairness of the procedure. In other words, they would contribute 
“ultimately to legitimate the investigation and trial process”.98
From 2002, a change in governments led to the affirmation of a different approach 
to criminal justice focusing on crime repression. In March 2003, the law for interior 
security (loi pour la sécurité intérieure) was adopted by Parliament.99 Amongst 
other things, it increased police powers and, as mentioned, repealed the police’s 
obligation to inform the suspect of his right to remain silent. 
In March 2004, Parliament passed the law on the adaptation of justice to the evolution 
of crime (loi sur l’adaptation de la justice aux évolutions de la criminalité), which 
focused on the investigation and trial of cases dealing with organised crime.100 It 
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strengthened the regime of garde à vue, increasing its potential length and further 
delaying the access to a lawyer, in cases concerning not only drug trafficking and 
terrorism, as was the case before, but also in cases of extortion, procurement, 
sequestration and human trafficking, overall making the regime far harsher.101 
Although the provision of the more liberal and rights oriented 2000 reform were 
not officially repealed, the 2004 legislation diminished their effectiveness. 
6. Disclosure in the pre-trial stage
 6.1 Introduction
Disclosure of information does not play a predominant role in the above-described 
French inquisitorial pre-trial stage. A distinction must be made between the police 
investigation stage, supervised by the prosecutor, and the instruction, which 
is governed by the juge d’instruction. It is in the former phase, in fact, that the 
defendant’s rights, among which the right to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusations against him, the right to legal assistance and the right to have 
access to the case file, are more restricted.   
The French code of criminal procedure contains no explicit provisions regulating 
access to the case file by the suspect or the release of documents to lawyers in relation 
to the police investigation. In other words, there are no provisions regulating the 
disclosure of information. The judicial supervision is considered the most efficient 
guarantee of the suspect’s rights. This applies also to the delicate phase of the 
formation of the dossier which occurs through a mainly written procedure where the 
evidence which will make up the dossier is considered reliable due to the documented 
procedural regularity of the preliminary investigation. Several questions arise from 
these considerations: does the lack of disclosure affect the suspect’s right to defence? 
What is the role the defence is allowed to play at this stage? And what is the influence, 
if any, of the defence lawyer in the formation of the dossier?
These questions are also much debated in relation to the controversial issue of the 
garde à vue, which, as noted before, allows the police to hold a person in custody 
who is suspected of the commission of a criminal offence but not yet charged and 
needs to be available for the purposes of the investigation. 
The first subsection addresses the defence’s rights during the investigation as well 
as during the garde à vue. The latter is first considered in its regulation before 
the legislative intervention of 2011 and 2014.102 The second subsection provides an 
overview of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the garde 
à vue followed by an account of the reform of the garde à vue regime given in the 
third subsection. This iter allows the changes that occurred regarding the defence’s 
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right to be informed while in custody and the contributions from the Strasbourg 
Court and the European Union to this development to be appreciated. Finally an 
analysis of the disclosure of information during the instruction is provided in the 
last subsection to conclude the description of the disclosure of information in the 
pre-trial stage.
 6.2 Disclosure during police investigation and the garde à vue regime 
French criminal procedure does not envisage an active participation by the defence 
lawyer in the ongoing investigation and in the formation of the dossier. The 
defence lawyer’s observations are inserted into the case file but their effectiveness 
is rather limited. The lack of access to the dossier and the scarce information 
disclosed on the nature of the offences prevents the lawyer from creating a more 
responsive defence strategy from the first meeting with his client. He must rely on 
the information provided by the suspect without any knowledge of the material 
gathered by the police. 
As far as early legal representation of the suspect is concerned, it is worth mentioning 
the 2003 EU Commission green paper on “Procedural Safeguards for Suspect and 
Defendants in Criminal Proceedings throughout the European Union”.103 In this 
paper, the European Commission concluded that while all the rights that make up 
the concept of “fair trial rights” were important, some rights were so fundamental 
that they should be given priority. First among these was the right to legal advice 
and assistance. If the accused has no lawyer, they are less likely to be aware of 
their other rights and therefore to have those rights respected. The Commission 
sees this right as the foundation of all other rights. Furthermore, it stated that the 
right to legal representation arises immediately on arrest and that the suspect has 
the right to have his counsel present at the questioning and interview during the 
proceedings.
The Cour de Cassation established a working group to respond to the questions 
posed by the green paper. The working group recommended allowing counsel 
intervention as soon as a person is informed of being suspected of the commission 
of a criminal offence. It also stressed that the defence counsel should be granted 
access to the case file at every stage of the proceedings. The working group specified 
that “the right to genuine assistance from a lawyer should not be reduced to just 
an interview as currently established under French custody law, particularly at the 
start of the measure. This interview, which is limited to thirty minutes, mainly 
aims to protect individual freedoms and provide psychological support to the 
person held in custody. It in no way enables them to exercise genuine ‘rights to 
defence’, which, in order to be effective, are required by the European Court not 
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only at the beginning when the indictment is notified but also to be part of an 
organized strategy and to be implemented each time that the person is questioned, 
confronted with witnesses or when a court decision is made that he could appeal 
against”.104
Despite these important recommendations, the garde à vue remained a grey area 
in which the suspect was not adequately informed, had little due process rights 
as envisaged by the European Convention and could not benefit from effective 
supervision by the prosecutor who is supposed to safeguard the defence’s rights. 
The police discretion is predominant at this stage. The idea of the dossier built up 
“on the basis of a real dialogue between the prosecutor and defence with the latter 
using a reading of the dossier and client interview to prompt the prosecutor to 
order further investigations was a long way from reality”.105
The police can hold any person against whom there is one or more plausible reasons 
to suspect that they have committed or attempted to commit an offence. The Procureur 
de la République must be informed of the beginning of the garde à vue.106 While the 
person in custody may not be held for more than twenty-four hours, the detention 
may be extended for a further period of up to twenty-four hours through written 
and justified authorisation by the procureur de la République.107 Furthermore, in case 
of exceptionally serious offences such as offences related to organised crime, police 
detention can last up to ninety six hours. The law of 23 February 2006 authorised, in 
cases concerning terrorism, the gard à vue to last up to six days.
As far as the disclosure of information to the suspect is concerned, the regulation 
of the garde à vue raised several concerns which were mostly related to the poor 
quality of the information received by the suspect and the rather limited and 
ineffective legal assistance he was allowed to have.
For instance, Article 63-1 CPP stated that a person placed in police custody must be 
informed of the nature of the offence being investigated. This provision, although 
rather generic in its formulation, marked the first, albeit limited, disclosure 
of information towards the suspect during the proceedings. In addition, the 
suspect has the right to inform somebody of his detention and to ask for medical 
examination.108 The suspect was not informed of his right to remain silent. 
In relation to access to legal representation, Article 63-4 stipulated that at the 
beginning of his detention the suspect could ask to talk to a lawyer. However, 
the meeting could not last longer than thirty minutes and the counsel, although 
informed about the nature and the presumed date of the offence, had no right of 
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access to the case file.109 Therefore, while the defence lawyer has enjoyed the right 
to study the content of the dossier during the instruction since 1897, he is still 
precluded from accessing it during the police investigation.110 
In cases related to organised crime, a suspect is only allowed access to a lawyer 
after forty-eight hours and in cases concerning terrorism and drug trafficking (also 
where the suspect is a minor) after seventy-two hours. This provision seems to be in 
conflict with Strasbourg case law affirming that the refusal of access to a lawyer for 
forty-eight hours for a person arrested for terrorist offences constitutes a violation of 
the European Convention.111 However, in 2004, the Constitutional Council did not 
quash the provisions regulating the delayed access to a lawyer in cases concerning 
grave offences.112 In this framework, the duty of the police to inform the suspect 
about his right to remain silent was repealed. The right still exists but the suspect 
must know of it himself or be informed by his counsel once he has intervened. 
Another much debated aspect of these provisions is that the lawyer was not 
entitled to assist at the questioning of his client. This is in line with the idea that 
the lawyer discharges his function by providing the suspect with moral support 
and general legal advice about his rights and assessing whether they have been 
respected or not. The lawyer performs a check on the legality of the investigation 
and detention. Anything that goes beyond this conception is perceived as an undue 
imbalance in favour of the suspect. In 2007, an amendment to the code of criminal 
procedure introduced article 64-1, which regulated the audiovisual recording of the 
questioning only in relation to cases concerning crimes.113 The registration cannot 
be consulted unless there are challenges on the content of the written statement 
related to the interrogation. In this case, it is the juge d’instruction who decides on 
the application of the parties. 
On 30 July 2010 the Conseil d’État found several provisions of the code of criminal 
procedure regulating the garde à vue to be in violation of the Constitution.114 
Specifically, it found the application of the police detention, and its extension after 
the first twenty-four hours unconstitutional, regardless of the seriousness of the 
offenses as regulated under article 63 and 77 of the CPP. 
Moreover, the judgment targeted the restricted legal assistance available to the 
suspect stating that it “does not allow the person undergoing questioning, and held 
against his will, to have the benefit of effective assistance from a lawyer”.115 This 
restriction on the rights of the defence was imposed in a general manner, without 
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any consideration of particular circumstances in order to collect or conserve 
evidence or ensure the protection of persons. “The person remanded in police 
custody is moreover not informed of his right to remain silent”.116
The Conseil d’État went on stating that in such conditions, the provisions regulating 
the garde à vue do not offer suitable guarantees as to the use made of remands in 
police custody.117 It found that the reconciliation of the need to prevent disruption of 
public order and to pursue the offenders and the need to guarantee the effectiveness 
and exercise of the constitutional freedoms could not be considered balanced (ne 
peut plus être regardée comme équilibrée). “Hence these provisions fail to comply 
with Articles 9 and 16 of the Declaration of 1789 and must therefore be held to be 
unconstitutional.”118
Following this judgment, also the Court of Cassation on 19 October 2010 stated 
the non-compliance of the garde à vue regime with the European Convention on 
Human Rights. However, like the Conseil d’État, it agreed that the consequences of 
its findings should be suspended until July 2011 to give time for Parliament to make 
the necessary changes to the code of criminal procedure.  
  6.2.1 The ECtHR and the garde à vue
On 14 October 2010, the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment 
in the case of Brusco v. France, in which it analysed the garde à vue regime and 
its compatibility with the provisions of Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.119 It concluded that the garde à vue regime violated article 6(1) and 
(3) of the Convention. 
The case concerned an individual, named B.M., who was attacked by two hooded 
men in an underground car park in Paris in December 1998. Mr. Brusco was 
questioned by the police in relation to the assault as the victim had reported the 
assault claiming that his wife and Mr. Brusco (who, according to him, were having 
an affair) had hired the aggressors to attack him.  
Mr. Brusco was suspected of being the mastermind of the aggression and 
consequently, on 7 June 1999 at around 6 p.m., Mr. Brusco was stopped and taken 
into police custody where he was made to swear “to tell the truth and nothing 
but the truth”. Witnesses could be asked to do so according to article 153 of the 
code of criminal procedure.120 Mr. Brusco confessed his involvement in the assault 
admitting to have paid the two aggressors €15,000 in order to scare B.M. with the 
aim of making him leave his wife. He denied having asked them to physically attack 
B.M. 
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Mr. Brusco was allowed to see his lawyer only at the end of his interrogation on 
8 June 1999 at around 2 p.m. He was then placed under investigation for aiding 
and abetting attempted murder, and remanded in custody. His application to have 
the records of his interrogation repealed were all dismissed on the ground that it 
was legitimate to question him as a witness and making him swear on oath. Mr. 
Brusco was sentenced to five years imprisonment. The Appeal Court and the Court 
of Cassation upheld the judgment. 
Before the ECtHR, the applicant claimed that he had been compelled to take 
an oath before being questioned and that his right to remain silent and not to 
incriminate himself had been violated by the procedure followed during the garde 
à vue. The Court first recalled the importance of the right to remain silent and 
of the right against self-incrimination which are generally accepted international 
legal principles and fundamental elements of the right to a fair trial. The Court 
noted that the government’s argument that Mr. Brusco was merely a witness at the 
time of his interrogation (this being the reason why he had been asked to swear 
on oath) was not grounded. It stressed that having being indicated by one of the 
aggressors as the mastermind of the operation, he was considered by the authorities 
as a suspect and not a mere witness. When he was taken into custody and asked to 
swear on oath, there were already criminal charges against him (in the autonomous 
meaning of the Convention), therefore Mr. Brusco had the right to remain silent 
and not to incriminate himself pursuant to article 6(1) and (3). 
Mr. Brusco’s conviction had been based mainly on the admissions he made when 
questioned by the police under oath and without the presence of his lawyer. The 
Strasbourg Court acknowledged that the situation and the threat of criminal 
proceedings for perjury had put the applicant under pressure. He had not been 
informed of his rights at the beginning of the interrogation and he had been allowed 
the legal assistance only after twenty hours in police custody. Consequently, his 
lawyer could not remedy this lack of information on the part of the authorities. 
The Court concluded that under these circumstances an infringement of the 
applicant’s rights to remain silent and not to incriminate himself had occurred in 
violation of article 6(1) and (3) of the European Convention. France did not appeal 
the judgment that became final. 
  6.2.2 The Parliament’s response
On 14 April 2011, Parliament passed law n. 391/2011, which adopted significant 
changes in the garde à vue regime in accordance with the findings of the judgments 
of the ECtHR, the Conseil d’État and the Court of Cassation. 
Interestingly, law n. 391/2011, should have entered into force no later than 1 July 
2011. However, the Court of Cassation, sitting as a full court, ruled on 15 April 2011 
that the findings of the ECtHR in the case of Brusco v. France should be relied 
upon immediately. Consequently, suspects should be granted the presence of a 
lawyer during the entire duration of the garde à vue. The Court of Cassation stated 
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that waiting for legislation to enter into force would leave France in breach of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Following this judgment, the Government 
announced that the provisions of the law n. 391/2011 would have been applied 
immediately. As a direct consequence of these developments, a suspect gained the 
right to be assisted by counsel throughout his garde à vue. 
In addition, law n. 391/2011 provides that a person placed in custody shall be 
informed forthwith that he enjoys the right to make statements, to answer 
the questions asked or to remain silent. Moreover, it significantly changed the 
conditions of intervention by the lawyer during custody, the lawyer being able to 
attend the hearings and crossexaminations of the person in custody.121 Finally, it 
stipulated that a suspect cannot be convicted solely on the basis of the statements 
he has made while in police custody if not assisted by a lawyer. 
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which monitors the 
execution of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, assessed the 
provisions introduced through law n. 391/2011 in the garde à vue regime in relation 
to the Brusco judgment and it considered such measures sufficient for preventing 
a similar violation of the Convention from occurring.122
In addition to this, on 28 May 2014 law n. 535 was published in the official journal of 
the French Republic. This instrument held the necessary provisions for complying 
with the EU directive on the right to information in criminal proceedings of May 
2012.123
The EU directive highlights the importance of procedural rights for suspects and 
accused persons deprived of their liberty (within the meaning of Article 5(1)(c) of 
the European Convention of Human Rights) in order to safeguard the fairness of 
the proceedings. Among these rights, the right to be informed of the criminal act 
they are suspected or accused of having committed is crucial.
The directive states that information on applicable procedural rights should be given 
promptly by means of a written letter of rights drafted in an easily comprehensible 
manner so as to assist the persons held in custody in understanding their rights. 
The document should include basic information concerning any possibility of 
challenging the lawfulness of the arrest, obtaining a review of the detention or 
requesting provisional release where such a right exists in national law. Access to 
material evidence should be granted to the suspects or accused persons but it can 
be refused, in accordance with national law, where such access may lead to the 
endangerment of another person or where the refusal is necessary to safeguard 
ongoing investigation.
By the adoption of law 535 the French Parliament created a statute of rights for 
suspects during investigations also envisaging the possibility of questioning them 
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without placing them in garde à vue. 
Persons heard freely cannot be questioned before they are specifically informed 
of the date, qualification and place of the offense they are suspected of having 
committed, of their right to leave the premises or to remain silent as well as to 
have an interpreter. If the crime is punishable by imprisonment, they will also be 
informed of their right of access to a lawyer.124 They will receive a written document 
outlining their rights and have the same access to the dossier as is granted to their 
lawyer.125
This law also improves the rights of persons held in garde à vue. Specifically, the 
person held in custody must be informed immediately, by the police officer, in 
a language that he understands, of the duration of the measure and its possible 
extensions, of the offence he is suspected of having committed (including the date 
and the place), of the right to be examined by a doctor at the beginning and at the 
end of the custody as well as of the right to inform a relative and his employer and, 
in case of foreign nationals, the consular authorities of the State of which he is a 
national. Moreover, at the beginning of the procedure, the suspect is informed of 
his right to be assisted by a lawyer of his choice or by duty counsel, to be assisted 
by an interpreter, to remain silent during the hearings and to make representations 
to the judge who decides on the extension of his custody, in order to put an end 
to the measure. A document outlining these rights is given to the person upon 
notification of the garde à vue.
In relation to the access to the dossier during the garde à vue, we have seen how the 
framework did not contemplate such a possibility. It is interesting to underline how 
in the context of the intervened reform, during the first reading in the National 
Assembly, an amendment was adopted to allow the person in garde à vue and his 
lawyer access to the file. However, this amendment was not accepted and the access 
to the file remains possible only after the indictment.
 6.3 Disclosure during the instruction 
French criminal procedure is more prone to grant defence rights once a suspect 
is mise en examen by an investigating judge rather than from his arrest. This 
moment marks a turning point at which the defence can play a more active role. 
During the instruction the defence lawyer is granted access to the dossier putting 
him in the position to elaborate with his client a more comprehensive strategy for 
defence in response to the evidence gathered against him. Article 114 CPP states 
that the interrogation of the accused person can take place only in the presence 
of a lawyer who is summoned to appear at least five days before the scheduled 
date and importantly, the case file is put at his disposal at least four working days 
before each interrogation of the person under judicial examination. From this 
moment onwards, the defence counsel is able to evaluate the content of the case file 
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comparing his client’s account of events with the statements and material gathered 
in the dossier. The case file remains at the disposal of the counsel after the first 
appearance of his client compatibly with the exigencies of the magistrate office. 
Article 114 CPP further provides that the defence lawyer has the right to obtain a 
copy at his own expense of any or all of the documents and instruments contained in 
the case file. The suspect’s effective and direct knowledge of the evidence gathered 
in the case file is subject to a judicial filter. The code of criminal procedure in fact, 
states that the defence lawyer must apply to the investigating judge indicating 
the documents he intends to transmit to his client in order to be authorised to 
do so. The juge d’instruction has five days to dismiss the application based on a 
specially reasoned order in respect of the risks of pressure on the victims or on 
other parties to the proceedings. The decision is open to appeal within two days 
from its notification to the president of the investigating chamber.126 
Article 116 of the CPP regulates the first appearance (première comparution) and 
the interrogation of the person under investigation. Usually the first appearance 
takes place shortly after the end of the garde à vue and once the suspect has 
been presented to the prosecutor. The interrogation must take place before any 
decision to charge is taken by the magistrat. At the first appearance of the suspect, 
the juge d’instruction informs him of each of the charges laid against him and for 
which placement under judicial examination is contemplated, specifying their 
legal qualification. Furthermore, the suspect is informed of his right to remain 
silent, to make a statement, or to be interrogated. The consent to be interrogated 
at the first appearance can be given only in the presence of the defence counsel 
who can present his observations to the investigating judge. When the suspect is 
still without the assistance of a lawyer the juge d’instruction informs him of his 
right to appoint one or to have a duty counsel. The advocate may consult the case 
file and communicate freely with his client.127 The investigating judge is in charge 
of interrogation, confrontations and hearings. The district prosecutor and the 
advocates acting for the parties may ask questions or make brief observations.128
In many cases during police custody the duty counsel will most likely be replaced 
before or shortly after the première comparution. This means that the lawyer, 
whose access to the dossier takes place weeks after his client is arrested, may have 
to face substantial admissions made by him during police custody. This changes 
the approach to the case file, which was formed without any the defence counsel’s 
involvement. The latter in fact will have no other option than look for potential 
discrepancies among the statements in the dossier in order to undermine its 
credibility at trial. The defence lawyer will present the best possible reading of the 
evidence gathered in the dossier at the trial rather than adding new favourable 
evidence. In other words, the defence counsel and his client “are primarily 
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reacting to a dossier the basic lines of which have already been established”.129 The 
developments in the regulation of the garde à vue regime, as described above, can 
contribute to improving the defence’s position insofar as it limits the possibility of 
having incriminating statements given by the suspects in the absence of his lawyer.
7. Disclosure at the Assize Court
When the decision to indict the defendant has become final, the accused, if 
detained, is transferred to the prison where the competent Assize Court sits.130 
There the President of the Court interrogates him as soon as possible following 
his arrival at the prison. The dossier and the documents are transferred to the 
court office.131 The President checks that the accused has received a copy of the 
indictment. The accused can communicate freely with his lawyer who enjoys full 
access to the dossier having the right to examine any part of it as long provided it 
does not delay the proceedings.132
Article 279 CPP states that the accused must be given a copy of the records 
establishing the offence, the written statements of witnesses as well as the expert 
reports. In addition, the accused and the civil party or their advocates may take a 
copy or have a copy taken of all the procedural documents at their own expense.133 
The jurisprudence has adopted a restrictive reading of these provisions stating that 
their violation does not cause the nullity of the procedure but only the right of the 
accused to ask for an adjournment of the hearing if his defence has been affected.134
The parties are bound to disclose to one another the list of the witnesses they intend 
to call to testify as soon as possible and in any case no later than twenty-four hours 
before the hearing.135 The same rule applies to the names of the experts called upon 
to report on the tasks entrusted to them in the course of the investigation.136 Each 
party can oppose the admission of a witness’ testimony not mentioned in the list. 
The Court disposes of the application. However, the President of the Court may 
order that a witness is heard as a source of information although not mentioned in 
the witness list.137
The analysis of these provisions regulating disclosure during the trial shows that 
when the proceedings reach the trial stage a more adversarial approach, based on 
the principe du contradictoire, permeates the procedure. 
Chapter 3
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129 Field and West, above n. 86 at p. 295. 
130 Article 269 code de procédure pénale. 
131 Article 272 code de procédure pénale.
132 Article 278 code de procédure pénale. 
133 Article 280 code de procédure pénale. 
134 Crim., 24 mars 1971, B.C., n. 106; 29 juin 1983, B.C., n 206, in Pradel J., Procédure Pénale, 13th Edition 2006/2007, Editions 
Cujas, 2006 p. 821. 
135 Article 281 code de procédure pénale.
136 Article 281 code de procédure pénale. 
137 Article 330 code de procédure pénale. 
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8. Concluding remarks 
Disclosure, intended as the suspect’s right to be informed of the accusations and 
the evidence gathered against him, is a concept that seems to conflict with the 
inquisitorial nature of the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings. The same 
observation applies to the defence’s constructive role in the formation of the dossier. 
The latter assumes a crucial importance in the further stages of the proceedings 
where it is relied upon almost completely. 
The French criminal law system experienced difficulties in finding the balance between 
the fair trial rights granted by the European Convention and its inquisitorial pre-trial 
stage. The current solution lies with the judicial supervision of the prosecutor, which 
is conceived as an adequate guarantee of the suspect’s rights. Proposed steps towards 
a more incisive participation for the defence lawyer are perceived as threatening the 
effectiveness of this delicate phase due to its adversarial character. 
To a third party, it may appear that although the instruction stage marks an 
improvement in the defence’s involvement, the lapse of time between the arrest of 
the suspect and the moment when his lawyer can have access to the dossier affects 
the effectiveness of his counsel. In this context, an improvement in the quality 
of information given to the suspect during his custody as well as the right to be 
assisted by counsel during the interrogation are welcome steps.
The research conducted shows that the trial stage presents a more “adversarial” take on 
the rights of the accused. Full disclosure of the case file and the exchange of the witness 
lists allow each party to have a clear picture of the material gathered and of the other 
side’s strategy. The question is to what extent this openness can be effective when it takes 
place in the final stage of the proceedings where the dossier has already been formed. 
A more active role for the defence, possibly based on its involvement in the formation 
of the case file as well as on an earlier access to the dossier, could assist in bringing 
the system more in line with the standards of the European Convention. Steps in 
this direction are also important considering the increasing number of cases that are 
disposed of through procedures used as an alternative to the instruction (especially by 
comparution immédiate). This trend can, in fact, jeopardise the defence’s rights during 
police investigation as a result of the difficulty faced by the prosecutor in effectively 
supervising each case. 
These changes, which imply a substantial reform of criminal procedure, would 
provide more legitimacy to the inquisitorial pre-trial stage in the public’s eyes. The 
reforms that have been implemented so far have brought the procedure in line with 
the ECtHR jurisprudence. However, the implementation of more significant and 
radical “cultural and material changes”138 have been resisted by the professional 
culture amongst the figures involved in the criminal procedure.
Disclosure of information in the French Criminal law System
_______________________
138 Field S. and West A., Dialogue and the Inquisitorial Tradition: French Defence Lawyers in the Pre-Trial Criminal Process, 
Criminal Law Forum, 2003, Vol. 14, p. 314. 
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IV. Article 6 of the European Convention of Human rights: 
The Right to a Fair Trial
Introduction
Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Individual Freedom, also known as the right to a fair trial, occupies a predominant 
position within the Convention. It is the most frequently invoked right1 in the 
applications filed to the European Court of Human Rights and formerly to the 
European Commission of Human Rights (hereafter Commission).2
The right to a fair trial is also an essential element of every other substantial 
international instrument devoted to the protection of human rights. It is embodied, 
inter alia, in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (ICCPR), Article 8 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights (ACHR) and article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR).
This chapter analyses the provisions of Article 6 of the European Convention in 
light of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, which has provided a substantial contribution 
to their interpretation and evolution. This scrutiny, in line with the focus of this 
book, will be limited to the application of Article 6 regarding criminal trials. 
Furthermore, the study focuses on the provisions of Article 6 that have a direct 
or indirect connection with the disclosure of evidence, which is the focus of this 
research. Article 5 of the Convention and the pre-trial stage are briefly touched 
upon in order to understand the implications that the right to a fair trial has at 
this delicate stage of criminal proceedings.  More specifically, an attempt is made 
to underline the applicability of Article 6, in whole or in part, to segments of the 
proceedings prior to the commencement of the trial. 
The application of Article 6 of the European Convention to disclosure will be 
discussed in detail in the following chapter.
1. General outline of the right to a fair trial
Article 6 of the Convention reads as follows:
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced 
publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the 
_______________________
1 Harris D.J., O’Boyle M. & Warbrick C., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 2014, 
p. 417.
2 The European Commission of Human Rights was abolished in 1998 when Protocol 11 entered into force, allowing in-
dividual applications to be lodged directly with the European Court of Human Rights. Until then the Commission 
had functioned as a filter, evaluating the admissibility of individual applications and filing cases that were considered 
grounded to the Court on behalf of the individual. 
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interest of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the 
interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or 
the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where 
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and the facilities for the preparation of his defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he 
has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests 
of justice so require;
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance 
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses 
against him;
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the 
language used in court.
The right to a fair trial originates from Article 10 of the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (“Declaration”), which states that “everyone is 
entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any 
criminal charge against him”.3 The text of Article 6(1) of the Convention resembles 
the definition of the UN Declaration although it goes further and lists a more 
complete set of rights. This results from the success of the British approach during 
the negotiations of the text based on a more detailed definition of the rights of the 
Convention, over the civil law approach, which aimed for a general definition of the 
guarantees whose development would have been delegated to the jurisprudence of 
the Commission and the Court.4
The guarantees in Article 6 of the Convention are of a procedural nature and so 
they are aimed at providing procedural and not substantive justice.5 The main 
purpose of Article 6 of the Convention is to establish a standard of fairness for the 
defendant that must be followed in every criminal trial. 
The ECtHR does not act as a court of fourth instance. The Court does not assess the 
fairness of the outcome of a case as determined by a domestic jurisdiction, but it 
analyses the overall fairness of the procedure followed to reach that outcome (this 
approach is known as the “fourth instance doctrine”). The ECtHR has consistently 
pointed out that it is not its duty “to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly 
_______________________
3 United Nation Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, article 10. 
4 See Jackson John D., The Effect of Human Rights on Criminal Evidentiary Process: Towards Convergence, Divergence or 
Realignment?, The Modern Law Review, 2005, 68 (5), pp. 737-764.
5 For the opposite argument see Loucaides L.G., Questions of Fair Trial Under the European Convention of Human Rights, 
Human Rights Law Review, 3 (2002) 27.
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committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights 
and freedoms protected by the Convention”.6
Article 6 of the Convention can be broadly divided into a general first part (paragraph 
1) concerned, inter alia, with the right to a fair hearing (and its requirements) in 
criminal and civil matters and a second, more specific part which guarantees the 
presumption of innocence (paragraph 2) and the rights of the defence (paragraph 
3) in criminal proceedings. The presumption of innocence granted in paragraph 2 
and the various “minimum rights” listed in paragraph 3 are constituent elements of 
the concept of a fair trial.7 In sum, paragraph 3 of Article 6 “contains an enumeration 
of specific applications of the general principle stated in paragraph 1 of the Article 
(art. 6-1). The relation between paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 6 of the Convention is 
that of the general to the particular”.8 The list in paragraph 3 is non-exhaustive and 
therefore a trial could still not meet the conditions of fairness of Article 6(1) even 
when all the rights of paragraph 3 have been respected.9 The guarantees embodied 
in Article 6(3) exemplify the notion of a fair trial and must be interpreted in the 
light of the function they have in the framework of the whole proceedings.10
The goal of the Court, when deciding on an application concerning article 6 
remains to “determine whether the proceedings considered as a whole were fair as 
required by Article 6 para. 1”.11 However, when a case concerns a specific guarantee 
regulated in Article 6(2) and (3) the Court can assess the circumstances of the case 
under that specific guarantee alone, or in conjunction with Article 6(1), or only in 
relation to Article 6(1) when the applicant complains that the entire proceedings 
were unfair.12 The Court appears to favour the second approach, often declining 
to decide on a case only on the specific guarantees of paragraph 3. The Court in 
fact, tends not to analyse whether or not one or more of the specific minimum 
rights has been violated, “but to combine at the outset the specific guarantees 
with the general right to a fair trial and to deal with them together without proper 
distinction”.13 
The ECtHR has made consistent reference to the principle of the equality of arms 
and to the right to an adversarial trial when defining the right to a fair trial in 
its jurisprudence. Specifically, the Court stated in multiple judgments that “the 
principle of equality of arms is only one feature of the wider concept of a fair trial, 
which also includes the fundamental right that criminal proceedings should 
be adversarial”.14 The principle of equality of arms means that each party to the 
_______________________
6 Garcia Ruiz v. Spain, ECHR, [GC], no. 30544/96, 21 January 1999, para. 28. 
7 Deweer v. Belgium, ECHR, no. 6903/75, 27 February 1980, para. 56. 
8 Jespers v. Belgium, European Commission of Human Rights, no. 8403/78, 14 December 1981, para. 54. 
9 Ibid.
10 Can v. Austria, European Commission of Human Rights, no. 9300/81, 12 July 1984, para. 48.
11 Barbera, Messegue and Jabarado v. Spain, ECHR, no. 10588/83, 6 December 1988, para. 68. 
12 See Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick, above n. 1 at p. 409.  See among others, Isgró v. Italy, ECHR, no. 11339/85, 19 February 1991 para. 31.
13 Trechsel S., Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings, 2006 Published to Oxford Scholarship on line available at http://
www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/law/9780199271207/toc.html, p. 87. See among others, Isgró v. Italy, 
ECHR, no. 11339/85, 19 February 1991, para. 31.
14 Brandstetter v. Austria, ECHR, no. 11170/84, 28 August 1991, para. 66. See also Belziuk v. Poland, ECHR, no. 23103/93, 25 
March 1998, para. 37; Jasper v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, [GC], no. 27052/95, 16 February 2000, para. 51; Rowe and 
Davis v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, [GC], no. 28901/95, 16 February 2000, para. 60; P.G. and J.H. v. The United Kingdom, 
ECHR, no. 44787/98, 25 September 20011, para. 69; GB v. France, ECHR, no. 44069/98, 02 October 2001, para. 56.
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proceedings must “have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case to the 
Court under conditions which do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-
vis his opponent”.15 The right to an adversarial trial in a criminal case means, “that 
both prosecution and defence must be given the opportunity to have knowledge 
of and comment on the observations filed and the evidence adduced by the other 
party”.16
2. Article 6 (1) and (2) of the European Convention of Human Rights
The first paragraph of Article 6 guarantees a person the right to a fair and public 
hearing, in the determination of any criminal charge against him. The hearing 
must take place within reasonable time and it must be held before an impartial 
and independent tribunal established by law.
It goes beyond the scope of this book to undertake a complete analysis of this 
part of Article 6 of the Convention. What is relevant, as regards the disclosure of 
evidence, is the interpretation offered by the Convention organs of the notion of 
“criminal charge”. The “criminal” connotation of a charge relates to the scope of 
the provisions of Article 6 whereas the interpretation of the notion of “charge” 
determines the point at which Article 6 of the Convention can be invoked. 
From reading the preparatory works of the Convention, it emerges that this 
definition did not create substantial discussion, as the drafters understood it to 
be self explanatory. It has been the Court by means of its jurisprudence to give an 
interpretation of this notion. The Court has developed an independent definition 
of the meaning of “criminal charge” that applies autonomously and irrespective of 
each government’s domestic definition. It did so in order to avoid reliance on the 
definition given by the state parties to the Convention, which in turn would have 
conditioned its jurisdiction.
The ECtHR explained the ratio behind the adoption of an autonomous meaning of 
criminal charge stating that “if the Contracting States were able at their discretion 
to classify an offence as disciplinary instead of criminal, or to prosecute the author 
of a “mixed” offence on the disciplinary rather than on the criminal plane, the 
operation of the fundamental clauses of Articles 6….would be subordinated to their 
sovereign will. A latitude extending thus far might lead to results incompatible with 
the purpose and object of the Convention. The Court therefore has jurisdiction, 
under Article 6….to satisfy itself that the disciplinary [offence] does not improperly 
encroach upon the criminal”.17
In relation to the “criminal” aspect of the charge, the Court established three 
criteria to be taken into account to decide whether a person is “charged with a 
_______________________
15 De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, ECHR, no. 19983/92, 24 February 1997. See also Ankerl v. Switzerland, ECHR, no. 17748/91, 
23 October 1996, para. 38; Helle v. Finland, ECHR, no. 20772/92, 19 December 1997, para. 53; Krčmář and Others v. The 
Czech Republic, ECHR, no. 35376/97, 3 March 2000, para 39. 
16 Brandstetter v. Austria, ECHR, no. 11170/84, 28 August 1991.
17 Engel and Others v. The Netherlands, ECHR, no. 5100/71, 8 June 1976, para. 81. 
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criminal offence” for the purposes of Article 6. These are the classification of the 
offence under national law, the nature of the offence and the nature and degree of 
severity of the penalty that the person concerned risked incurring”.18 A charge is 
therefore criminal if the state concerned classifies it as such in its judicial system. 
However, this criterion operates only in one direction as the Court is not bound 
by the national classification of a charge as not being criminal. In other words, 
the ECtHR can find Article 6(1) to be applicable to cases concerning charges that 
are classified as disciplinary or administrative in the domestic jurisdiction of the 
state concerned. In such cases, the other criteria mentioned will guide the Court in 
determining the criminal nature of a charge. 
As far as the interpretation of “charge” is concerned, in Deweer v. Belgium, the Court 
found that it could correspond to “the official notification given to an individual 
by the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal 
offence”.19 This seems to be a rather formal definition, linked to the delivery of an 
official communication to the person concerned. However, in the same case the 
ECtHR held that the applicant could be considered charged, under the specific 
circumstances of that case, from the moment at which the prosecuting authorities, 
in the absence of an official notification from the incumbent prosecution, had 
made him an offer of settlement. This offer had been formulated to the suspect 
in the course of an inspection that “was not performed within the context of the 
repression of crime”.20
The Court further recalled that the Commission had already adopted, in several 
decisions and opinions, a test that seems to be closely related, namely whether “the 
situation of the [suspect] has been substantially affected” (répercussions importantes 
sur la situation du suspect).21 In Foti and Others v. Italy, the Court adopted the same 
definition holding that the existence of a charge is not necessarily always dependent 
on the official notification but “it may in some instances take the form of other 
measures which carry the implication of such an allegation and which likewise 
substantially affect the situation of the suspect”.22 The Court did not always employ 
the word “likewise” in decisions concerning the same legal issue.23The ECtHR 
therefore opted for an interpretation of the term “charge” referred to in Article 6(1) as 
substantive, rather than formal in nature.24 This approach enables the Court to look 
behind appearances and investigate the realities of the procedure in question.25 
The departure of the ECtHR from a formal interpretation of a charge linked to 
the official notification prevents state parties from intentionally delaying the 
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18 AP, MP and TP v. Switzerland, ECHR, no. 19958/92, 29 August 1997, para. 39.
19 Deweer v. Belgium, ECHR, no. 6903/75, 27 February 1980, para. 46. 
20 Ibid. at paras. 42-46. 
21 Ibid. at para 46. The Court quoted the following Commission’s decisions: Neumeister v. Austria, European Commission 
of Human Rights, no. 1936/63, 27 May 1966, p. 81, Huber v. Austria, European Commission of Human Rights, no. 4517/70, 
8 February 1973, Hätti v. Federal Republic of Germany, European Commission of Human Rights, no. 6181/73, 20 May 1976. 
22 Foti and Others v. Italy, ECHR, no. 7604/76, 10 December 1982, para. 52. 
23 See Peçi I., Sounds of Silence, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006, p. 43, footnote 35. See Eckle v. Germany, ECHR, no. 8130/78, 
15 July 1981, para. 73, where the ECtHR stated that the definition of charge given by the Convention also corresponds to 
the test whether “the situation of the [suspect] has been substantially affected”. The word likewise was not employed. 
24 Deweer v. Belgium, ECHR, no. 6903/75, 27 February 1980, para 44.
25 Ibid. 
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official lodging of a criminal charge in order to postpone in time at which the 
reasonable time element of Article 6 begins to run. At the same time, it allows a 
better appreciation of the nature of each case. On the other hand, the advantage 
of the official notification is to have a fixed and precise date, easily to single out in 
each case, from which article 6 operates, whereas the substantive approach to the 
term charge lacks such precision and requires a case by case determination of the 
relevant point in time. 
The “substantially affected” or “likewise substantially affected” test leads to a 
question that needs to be answered: under what circumstances can the situation of 
an individual be considered “substantially affected”? The Court found that that this 
can happen “on a date prior to the case coming before the trial court, such as the 
date of arrest, the date when the person concerned was officially notified that he 
would be prosecuted or the date when preliminary investigations were opened”.26 
The right to a fair trial is a crucial right in the context of a democratic society and 
therefore the Court’s broad interpretation of it makes it applicable to cases in 
which, although the authorities have not notified the charges, the situation of the 
person concerned has been nonetheless affected in a substantial manner by other 
measures addressed to him. 
The above test relates to the point in time from which Article 6 (1) can be invoked 
whereas, as is discussed throughout the course of this chapter, the Court has 
elaborated a different test to determine which of the specific guarantees of Article 
6(3) and to what extent they can be applied to the pre-trial stage. However, it must 
be mentioned that in Lutz v. Germany the ECtHR analysed the case on the basis 
that “in using the terms “criminal charge” (accusation en matière pénale) and 
“charged with a criminal offence” (accusé d’une infraction) the three paragraphs 
of Article 6 referred to identical situations”.27 According to these bases, the 
“substantially affected test” could be applicable to test the applicability of Article 
6 as a whole. Trechsel contends that this definition (the situation of the individual 
has been substantially affected) “was intended to mark not just the beginning of 
the reasonable time period, but also the point at which Article 6 starts to apply”.28 
Other authors in the field simply state that “from this definition it follows that 
article 6 also applies to the pre-trial phase, but only from the moment a charge has 
been brought”.29
In relation to the point in time in which Article 6(1) begins to run, interestingly the 
Court recognised the possibility of a violation of Article 6(1) (with reference to the 
right against self-incrimination) when the prosecutor used material in the trial that 
was obtained by compulsion in a phase of the proceedings where the guarantees 
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26 Eckle v. Germany, ECHR, no. 8130/78, 15 July 1981, para. 73. The Court has considered that a situation that occurs before 
the formal lodge of a charge against an individual can constitute a charge, such as the appointment by a person of a 
lawyer after the opening of a file by the prosecutor following a police report against the person concerned (Angelucci v. 
Italy, ECHR, no. 12666/87, 29 February 1991).
27 Lutz v. Germany, ECHR, no. 9912/82, 25 August 1987, para. 52. 
28 Trechsel, above n. 13 at p. 138. 
29 Van Dijk P., Van Hoof F., Van Rijn A. and Zwaak L., Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
Intersentia, 4th Edition 2006, p.541. 
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of Article 6 did not operate.30 In the case of Saunders v. The United Kingdom, the 
applicant had been the subject of an investigation, carried out by the Department 
of Trade and Industry (DTI) in relation to alleged fraud. The Companies Act 1985 
regulated this investigation, which did not have the characteristics of a criminal 
investigation. This procedure did not allow the suspect to remain silent and forced 
him to answer all the DTI inspectors’ questions, on pain of a fine or imprisonment. 
In several interviews, Mr. Saunders made statements that were later used by 
the prosecutor to prove his case at trial. There was no controversy over the non-
applicability of article 6 to the DTI investigation and the Court was asked whether 
the subsequent use of those statements by the prosecution amounted to a violation 
of Article 6(1).31 The ECtHR answered in the affirmative, holding that the fact that 
the relevant statements had been made by the applicant prior to him being charged 
did not prevent their use at trial from constituting a violation of Article 6(1). It 
is therefore possible that measures taken before the existence of a charge, in the 
autonomous meaning of the Court, will also have negative repercussions in relation 
to the respect for Article 6(1) at a later stage. What was found to have violated Article 
6(1) in the above-described case was not the procedure compelling the applicant to 
answer the inspector’s questions, as that phase was not covered by Article 6(1), but 
the subsequent use of the statements obtained in that manner as evidence against 
him during trial.32 Furthermore, the Court stressed that it was irrelevant whether 
the statements made by the applicant were of an incriminating nature or not and 
concluded that “the transcripts of the applicant’s answers, whether directly self-
incriminating or not, were used in the course of the proceedings in a manner which 
sought to incriminate the applicant”.33 This alone was sufficient to find a violation 
of Article 6(1). 
Interestingly in the case of Zaichenko v. Russia, the ECtHR went even further in 
relation to the moment in which an individual can be considered “substantially 
affected” and therefore charged in accordance with the provision of Article 6 of the 
Convention. In this case, the applicant worked as a driver for a private company.34 
The director of the company asked the authorities to carry out checks on its 
employees following reports of diesel being removed from service vehicles. The 
applicant was stopped at one of these road checks and two jerry cans of diesel were 
found following an inspection of his car. He was not informed of the reasons for 
the check nor of his right to remain silent. Questioned by the police, in the course 
of the road check, Mr. Zaichenko stated that he had removed the diesel from the 
vehicle he used at work. The police officers drafted a record of the inspection. 
Only after these events was he informed of his right to remain silent and criminal 
proceedings were instituted against him. At the trial, the applicant contended 
that he had purchased the fuel at a petrol station and produced an invoice of the 
purchase. He claimed that he did not tell about the purchase to the police as he 
felt intimidated and had no receipt with him. The judges relied on the inspection 
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30 Saunders v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, [GC], no. 19187/91, 17 December 1996. 
31 Ibid. at para. 74. 
32 Ibid. at para. 71.
33 Ibid. at para. 72.
34 Zaichenko v. Russia, ECHR, no. 39660/02, 18 February 2010. 
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records in which Mr. Zaichenko had admitted stealing the fuel and sentenced him 
for theft. 
The ECtHR noted that the admissions made by the applicant during the road 
check led to the imposition of criminal proceedings and were later used for his 
conviction at trial. Consequently, although at the date on which the applicant 
was stopped he was not accused of any criminal offence, “the proceedings on that 
date substantially affected his situation” and therefore article 6 of the Convention 
was applicable to the case.35 In reaching its finding, the Court seems to have given 
weight to the existence of the suspicion of theft against the applicant that already 
existed at the time the road check was carried out because of the context of the 
road check and the the applicant’s inability to produce any proof of the diesel’s 
purchase.36 Consequently, the Court found that the police should have informed 
Mr. Zaichenko of the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to remain 
silent from the beginning of the questioning despite the fact that there were not yet 
criminal proceedings imposed against him. 
The Court acknowledged the possibility that events, which occurred before the 
imposition of criminal proceedings, can also substantially affect the situation of 
the applicant triggering the applicability of Article 6 of the Convention. Therefore, 
according to the evolving case law of the Court it seems arguable that a charge, within 
the autonomous meaning of the Convention, may even come into being before 
the opening of criminal proceedings. The ECtHR however, stated that although 
it accepted the applicability of Article 6(1) and 3(c) to pre-trial proceedings, the 
manner in which such application takes place “depends on the special features of 
those proceedings and the circumstances of the case assessed in relation to the 
entirety of the domestic proceedings conducted in the case”.37
The above-discussed right against self-incrimination is closely linked to the 
presumption of innocence of any individual charged with a criminal offence which 
is regulated in Article 6 paragraph 2 of the Convention.38 The ECtHR stated that 
the presumption of innocence is a constituent element of the general right to a fair 
trial39 and as such “is intended to enshrine the fundamental principle of the rule 
of law”.40
The right to be presumed innocent requires, inter alia, that “when carrying out 
their duties, the members of a court should not start with the preconceived idea 
that the accused has committed the offence charged; the burden of proof is on 
the prosecution, and any doubt should benefit the accused”.41  The environment 
in which the trial takes place must be one that is open to any outcome according 
to the evidence adduced. This attitude must inspire the conscience and behaviour 
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of the members of the court before which the trial unfolds preventing them from 
expressing any opinion or comment unveiling their lean towards the accused’s 
guilt. The Court explained this stating that “the presumption of innocence will be 
violated if, without the accused’s having previously been proved guilty according 
to law and, notably, without his having had the opportunity of exercising his rights 
of defence, a judicial decision concerning him reflects an opinion that he is guilty. 
This may be so even in the absence of any formal finding; it suffices that there is 
some reasoning suggesting that the court regards the accused as guilty”.42
The presumption of innocence also has implications in relation to the role of 
the prosecutor and other government officials. The Court stated clearly that “the 
principle of the presumption of innocence may be infringed not only by a judge 
or court but also by other public authorities including prosecutors”.43 Although 
the prosecutor leads the case against the accused he should remember that the 
defendant has not yet been convicted and until that moment there should still be 
room for his acquittal despite his opinion, which in any case should not be made 
public. In Daktaras v. Lithuania, the defendant had applied for the dismissal of 
the charges and the discontinuation of the proceedings. The prosecutor performed 
a quasi-judicial function as he was in charge of ruling on the application. In his 
decision rejecting it he pointed to the guilt of the applicant. The ECtHR highlighted 
the distinction between statements made by the prosecution in the context of the 
proceedings (“in the course of a reasoned decision at a preliminary stage”) and 
public statements that are made by the authorities outside the framework of the 
criminal proceedings, such as in a press conference. It concluded that only the 
latter constitute a violation of Article 6(2).44
3. Article 6(3) of the European Convention of Human Rights
 3.1 Introduction
The guarantees listed in paragraph 3 of Article 6 of the Convention constitute a 
minimum number of rights that the defence enjoys in a criminal trial. As noted 
before, the list is not exhaustive and these rights are components of the more 
encompassing right to a fair trial described in paragraph 1 of Article 6. As we also 
saw, even when each of the rights listed in paragraph 3 are respected in criminal 
proceedings, its overall fairness is open to questioning and a violation of the right to 
a fair trial might be take place nonetheless. On the other hand, the lack of respect 
for one of the above-mentioned guarantees alone may compromise the fairness of 
the proceedings. However, the violation of one of the guarantees of Article 3 does 
not automatically lead to a violation of the right to a fair trial.45
There is an overlap between the guarantees of paragraph 3 and the principles of 
paragraph 1 of Article 6, which, as mentioned, usually leads the Court to analyse a 
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case against the background of a specific violation claimed by the applicant under 
paragraph 3 in conjunction with the general paragraph 1 of article 6. Authors in the 
field have criticised this approach based on a blurred application of paragraphs 1 
and 3 of article 6 and on the Court’s reluctance to define clearly and autonomously 
the meaning of the defence’s rights in paragraph 3.46
An example of this tendency can be found in Hadjianastassiou v. Greece. The Court 
explained that “as the requirements of paragraph 3 of Article 6 (art. 6-3) constitute 
specific aspects of the right to a fair trial, guaranteed under paragraph 1 (art. 6-1), 
the Court will examine the complaint under both provisions taken together”.47 As 
Trechsel noted with criticism, in this case the Court did not even clarify which of 
the Article 6(3) guarantees it intended to take into account in its analysis.48
In the context of this book, the analysis will be extended to subparagraphs (a), (b), 
(c) and (d) of Article 6(3) which bear more implications than subparagraph (e) in 
relation to the disclosure of information in criminal trials, as will be discussed below.
 3.2 Article 6(3)(a)
Article 6 (3) (a) states that every person charged with a criminal offence has 
the right “to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in 
detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him”. The wording of this 
provision resembles the content of Article 5(2) of the Convention, which applies 
only to persons arrested.49 However, the application of Article 6(3)(a) is broader to 
the extent that it may apply also to individuals who are under investigation but are 
not subjected to a detention measure. 
The purpose of Article 6(3)(a) is to guarantee that the accused knows, promptly 
and in detail, of the accusations against him as this is the only possible way he 
can defend himself effectively. Here lies the main difference with the provision 
of Article 5(2), which instead aims to afford the detained person the necessary 
information to effectively challenge his detention.50
There is a close connection between subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article 6, the 
latter of which regulates an individual’s right to have adequate time and facilities 
for the preparation of his defence. This connection was affirmed by the ECtHR 
which stated “that sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 6 § 3 are connected and 
that the right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation must be 
considered in light of the accused’s right to prepare his defence”.51 This statement 
shows the approach followed by the Court, which is clearly a functional one. The 
right to be informed of the accusations must be read in its connection to the right 
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to have adequate time and facilities to prepare the defence and not as an absolute 
right that stands alone. Consequently, there can be no violation of Article 6(3)(a) 
unless it is proved that the accused’s preparations for defence were affected by the 
lack, inaccuracy or vagueness of the communication of the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him. 
The ECtHR’s jurisprudence seems to elaborate on whether the information received 
affected the defence was insufficient as claimed. In Sadak v. Turkey, the Court 
stated that it was not its duty “to assess the merits of the defences the applicants 
could have relied on if they had had enough time to prepare their defence against 
the accusation of belonging to an illegal armed organization. It merely notes that 
it would be reasonable to argue that the defences would have been different from 
those used”.52
The speculative assessment that the Court is called on to perform in order to 
determine whether the shortcomings in the information received pursuant Article 
6(3)(a) damaged the preparation of the defence has been criticised by authors 
such as Trechsel who are in favour of an absolutist approach. The latter considers 
Article 6(3)(a) as an independent right of the accused whose violation should not 
be linked to the establishment of specific difficulties experienced by the defence.53 
The Court has often given a reading of this provision in connection not only with 
Article 6(3)(b) but also with the general right to a fair trial adopting an “integrated 
approach”.54 It considers “that in criminal matters the provision of full, detailed 
information concerning the charges against a defendant, and consequently the 
legal characterization that the court might adopt in the matter, is an essential 
prerequisite for ensuring that the proceedings are fair”.55
The nature and the cause of the accusation are the subject of the right to be 
informed as regulated by Article 6(3)(a). The cause of the accusation concerns 
the acts the accused is alleged to have committed and on which the accusation is 
based, whereas the nature pertains to the legal qualification given to these material 
facts. The Strasbourg Court examined several applications regarding instances in 
which, during the proceedings, the legal qualification of the accusation had been 
changed.56 It affirmed that “the accused must be duly and fully informed thereof and 
must be provided with adequate time and facilities to react to them [the changes] 
and organize his defence on the basis of any new information or allegation”.57
As we have seen before, in Péllissier and Sassi v. France the accused was charged 
with bankruptcy but sentenced for aiding and abetting bankruptcy. The applicants 
did not contest the right of the court to return an alternative verdict but claimed 
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that, since aiding and abetting changed the legal characterisation of the offence, 
the information they had been given in relation to the charge was not detailed. They 
did not have the opportunity to file arguments on the different characterisation of 
the offence before the sentence as they were not informed of it and therefore they 
could not set up an effective defence. The Court found a violation of Article 6(3)
(a) in combination with paragraph 1 of the same article because the accused “were 
given no opportunity to prepare their defence to the new charge, as it was only 
through the Court of Appeal’s judgment that they learnt of the re-characterisation 
of the facts. Plainly, that was too late”.58
The information must be given “in detail” although the level of specificity might 
be different according to the different stages of the proceedings. However, it must 
always be sufficient for the accused to be able to “understand fully the extent of the 
charges against him with a view to preparing an adequate defence”.59 Furthermore, 
the adequacy of the information must be assessed against both the background of 
subparagraph (b) as well as against the general right to a fair trial. The information 
must clearly state the facts underlying the charge and the circumstances, place, 
time and any accomplices of the accused. It does not have to mention the evidence 
corroborating the charge. Non-specific information can affect the preparation of 
the defence and impair the accused’s right to a fair trial. 
In Mattoccia v. Italy, the applicant submitted that the notification of the accusation 
against him had been vague and imprecise and had adversely affected his right of 
defence to the extent that he was not in the position to choose the best strategy for 
the defence. The ECtHR found that “the information contained in the accusation 
was characterised by vagueness as to essential details concerning time and place, 
was repeatedly contradicted and amended in the course of the trial” and therefore 
the defendant should have been “afforded greater opportunity and facilities to 
defend himself in a practical and effective manner”.60 
Although the wording of subparagraph (a) suggests the existence of an obligation 
upon the authorities to inform the accused, the Court seems to take a different 
approach, focusing on the accused’s right to be informed by any source and means 
rather than the proactive duty of governments.61 Consequently, the ECtHR’s scrutiny 
has not focused on the fulfilment by the authorities of their duty to inform but on 
whether the accused was, or could have been with due diligence, in possession of the 
necessary information for his defence. The difference is subtle but exists nonetheless 
and cannot be underestimated. The duty to inform implies an active obligation upon 
the authorities, which cannot be limited to putting the accused in the position where 
he can infer the relevant information from the surrounding circumstances. 
In more recent decisions, the Court has reinforced the view that authorities have 
an obligation to communicate the information to the accused. In Mattoccia, the 
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Court reiterated that “even though the applicant could have sought access to the 
prosecution file in due time, that did not release the prosecution from its obligation 
to inform the accused promptly and in detail of the full accusation against him. 
That duty rests entirely on the prosecuting authority’s shoulders and cannot be 
complied with passively by making information available without bringing it to the 
attention of the defence”.62 
Article 6(3)(a) also requires the information to be given “promptly” (dans le plus 
court délai) to the accused. Lacking clear jurisprudence about the definition of 
promptly, differences of opinion arise among legal scholars. For instance, Stavros 
supports the Human Rights Committee’s interpretation, which considers that “this 
right must arise when in the course of an investigation a court or an authority of 
the prosecution decides to take procedural steps against a person suspected of a 
crime or publicly names him as such”. This approach is based on the importance of 
the investigative stage and on the need for the defence to be involved, which must 
occur as soon as possible. On the other hand Trechsel, although in favour of the 
rationale behind the previous interpretation, believes that only the indictment is 
the instrument that triggers the obligation of notification of the information ex 
Article 6(3)(a).63 Interestingly, Trechsel submits that since the information must be 
given in detail this is possible only at the closing of the investigation when sufficient 
material has been gathered in order to draft the indictment. However, he concedes 
that this consideration does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the defence 
enjoys no right of information before the notification of the indictment. This right 
pertains to the case file though and not to the charge and belongs to the realm of 
the facilities envisaged in Article 6(3)(b).  
As far as the method of communication of the relevant information is concerned, no 
specific requirements are mentioned in the Convention. In Kamasinski v. Austria, 
the applicant was a US citizen arrested upon his arrival in Austria on suspicion of 
fraud and misappropriation. Mr. Kamasinski did not speak German and claimed 
that since the indictment was served upon him in German his in his right to defend 
himself was prejudiced. The ECtHR noted that from the circumstances of the case 
it emerged that the applicant had been given a full oral explanation, in English, of 
the charges against him. That was considered sufficient for the purposes of Article 
6(3)(a), which does not require written communication.64 The absence of a written 
translation of the indictment did not influence the Court’s findings. This is in line 
with the Human Rights Committee’s interpretation that provided the information 
of subparagraph 3 (a) indicates both the law and the alleged facts it can be conveyed 
either orally or in writing.65
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 3.3 Article 6(3)(b)
Subparagraph (b) of Article 6(3) grants every person charged with a criminal 
offence the right to have adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence. In Can 
v. Austria, the leading case on this issue, the Commission explained the meaning of 
this provision affirming that it requires that the accused must have “the opportunity 
to organize his defence in an appropriate way and without restriction as to the 
possibility to put all relevant defence arguments before the trial court, and thus to 
influence the outcome of the proceedings”.66 The Commission stated that Article 
6(3)(b) implies that the substantive preparation for the defence (on behalf of the 
accused) may include everything that is necessary to prepare for the trial.
Interestingly, there is a difference between the English and the French text of the 
Convention. The former employs the term “adequate” to characterise the time and 
the facilities that the defence must have at its disposal, whereas the French text uses 
the term necessary (disposer du temps et des facilités nécessaires à la préparation de 
sa defence). The different terminology shows that the English “adequate” is broader 
than the French nécessaires insofar as it suggests that the time and facilities 
must be adequate to the needs and characteristics of the specific case and can go 
beyond those which are strictly necessary to the preparation of the defence. The 
Commission acknowledged the existence of different terminology but stated that 
despite such a “slight difference in meaning…it is clear that the facilities which 
must be granted to the accused are restricted to those which assist or may assist 
him in the preparation of his defence”.67
This “slight difference” also has bearings in relation to the issue of the prejudice 
the defence must demonstrate had been suffered in order to claim violation of the 
provision of Article 6(3)(b). A narrower approach (French) means that the defence 
has to show the impossibility of mounting his defence without the time and facilities 
sought whereas by adopting the broader approach (English) for the defence it 
would be sufficient to show that there would have been better opportunities for the 
defence had it had at its disposal the time and facilities requested.68
As far as the time given to a person to prepare his defence (for the first instance trial) 
is concerned, its adequacy can only be assessed once he has been informed of the 
accusations against him. This provision is clearly intertwined with subparagraph 
(a) of Article 6(3). Trechsel notes that it is a “sheer matter of logic” that each time 
there is a violation of Article 6 (3) (a), paragraph 3 (b) has also been infringed.69 We 
have discussed above that also the opposite situation may be applicable. 
Authors in this field such as Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick contend that the 
guarantee to have adequate time begins to operate from the establishment of a 
criminal charge. As we have discussed this also means from the moment an 
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individual is targeted by a measure which “likewise substantially affect” his 
situation.70 Trechsel, on the other hand, commenting on this position, shares the 
opinion that the application of the adequate time guarantee is not restricted to the 
trial or appeal stage but underlines that the charge does not mark the beginning 
of the relevant period in the same manner as it does in relation to Article 6(1) and 
the reasonable time.71 The term “adequate” is a relative term, which has a different 
meaning according to the different phase of the criminal proceedings in relation to 
which its adequacy must be assessed. 
The Court mentions several relevant factors to be taken into account in the 
assessment of the adequacy of the time such as the complexity of the case, the 
accused representing himself, the workload of the appointed lawyer and the stage 
of the proceedings. An assessment of the adequacy of time will necessarily take 
place on a case-by-case basis. There is no general rule applicable to each case. 
However, the tendency in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence is to be reluctant to find 
violations in the absence of proof that actual prejudice has been suffered by the 
accused as a result of inadequate time. 
In relation to the “adequate facilities”, the Commission defined them as including 
(for the accused) “the opportunity to acquaint himself, for the purposes of 
preparing his defence, with the results of investigations carried out throughout the 
proceedings”.72 Disclosure is the most relevant among the “adequate facilities” the 
accused has the right to enjoy in the preparation of his defence. It seems inevitable 
that in order to have the best opportunity to mount an effective defence the accused 
must not only be informed of the accusation against him [Article 6(3)(a)] but also 
have knowledge of the material that forms the basis of the prosecution’s case. This 
issue will be the object of the analysis carried out in the next chapter. 
Although the most relevant, disclosure is not the only facility the accused has 
the right to enjoy to prepare his defence. The access to legal assistance is another 
fundamental facility a person charged with a criminal offence has the right to 
have at his disposal under Article 6(3)(b). There is a significant overlap with the 
guarantee provided for by Article 6(3)(c) under whose umbrella this will be tackled 
in this chapter. 
A preliminary condition for the right to adequate time and facilities is that, 
before claiming its violation, the defence must have tried all available means 
of being granted an extension of time and facilities. In other words, a certain 
degree of action is expected of the defence before it can claim a violation of its 
Convention rights. The principle confirms the subsidiary nature of the Convention 
and its organs.73 However, in Galstyan v. Armenia, where the applicant had been 
sentenced through an expedited procedure, completed within one day, the ECtHR 
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found that the fact that the applicant had not filed any application requesting an 
extension of time, during the extremely short pre-trial stage (consisting of a few 
hours) could not be held against him. In fact, it did not “necessarily imply that no 
further time was needed for him to be able – in adequate conditions – to properly 
assess the charge against him and to consider various avenues to defend himself 
effectively”.74 In the same case, the ECtHR tackled the government’s position in 
relation to the accused’s possibility to have his case adjourned. Specifically, the 
Court found that “the Government have failed to demonstrate convincingly that the 
applicant unequivocally enjoyed, both in law and in practice, the right to have the 
examination of his case adjourned in order to prepare his defence and that such an 
adjournment would have possibly been granted, had the applicant made a relevant 
request”.75 This decision seems to switch the burden of proof from the defendant to 
the government insofar as it requests the authority to clearly show that the accused 
enjoyed the adequate time and facilities (in this case the possibility to have his case 
adjourned). 
We have discussed that the Court performs a speculative analysis to assess whether 
the defence was impaired in the circumstances of the specific case. In Öcalan 
v. Turkey, the ECtHR concluded that it was “reasonable to assume that, had he 
been permitted to study the prosecution evidence directly for a sufficient period, 
the applicant would have been able to identify arguments relevant to his defence 
other than those his lawyers advanced without the benefit of his instructions”.76 In 
Galstyan v. Armenia, the court concluded that it doubted that “the circumstances in 
which the applicant’s trial was conducted were such as to enable him to familiarize 
himself properly with and to assess adequately the charge and evidence against 
him, and to develop a viable legal strategy for his defence”.77
 3.4 Article 6(3)(c)
Subparagraph (c) of Article 6(3) regulates the right of a person charged with a 
criminal offence to defend himself in person, to have legal assistance of his own 
choosing or to be provided with legal aid should he not be able to afford an attorney. 
The main purpose of this provision is to guarantee that in any criminal proceedings 
the accused person will have adequate representation for his case.78 
The ECtHR noted the overlap of this provision with the adequate facilities of Article 
6(3)(b) mentioned above. In Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, the ECtHR 
considered the access to a lawyer as one of the facilities referred to in subparagraph 
(b) and concluded that where the applicant was denied access to a lawyer “the 
“facilities” contemplated by sub-paragraph (b) (art. 6-3-b) were not afforded”.79 
Although the two provisions are clearly connected, the application of Article 6(3)
(c) is broader than article 6(3)(b) as it is not linked to the preparation of the trial 
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but confers to the accused a more general right to be legally assisted during the 
entire proceedings.80
The right to legal assistance is not dependent on the proof of actual prejudice. In 
Artico v. Italy, the Italian government argued that in order to claim a violation of 
Article 6(3)(c) the applicant had to show that the lack of representation had caused 
actual prejudice.81 The ECtHR did not share this argument and stated that by opting 
for such a high threshold of proof the government was asking the impossible.82
Several important principles regarding the interpretation of Article 6(3)(c) were 
reiterated by the ECtHR in two cases concerning Turkey. First of all, the Court stated 
that the right to a defence is not limited to the trial stage. In Őcalan v. Turkey, the 
applicant had been interrogated for seven days upon his forced return to Turkey 
and his lawyers had been prevented from any contact with him.83 In this period, 
he had made self-incriminating statements. The ECtHR held that “to deny access 
to a lawyer for such a long period and in a situation where the rights of the defence 
might well be irretrievably prejudiced is detrimental to the rights of the defence”.84 
The case of Salduz v. Turkey is relevant in relation to the right to legal assistance 
in the pre-trial stage. The Court in fact, underscored the importance of the 
investigation stage, because the evidence gathered will influence the trial and 
because the accused is particularly vulnerable.85 The presence of a lawyer can be 
the best way to compensate for such vulnerability. The ECtHR concluded that 
“access to a lawyer should be provided from the first interrogation of a suspect by 
the police”.86 In this regard, Judge Bratza, in his concurring opinion appended to 
the judgment, regretted that the Court did not go so far as to state that a suspect 
should be granted access to a lawyer from the moment of the beginning of police 
custody or pre-trial detention.87 However, other judges were of the opinion that 
the legal principle to be derived from the judgment is that an accused person is 
indeed entitled to legal assistance from the onset of pre-trial detention or police 
custody in order “to be visited by defence counsel to discuss everything concerning 
his defence and his legitimate needs”.88 
Restrictions on the accused’s access to a lawyer in the pre-trial stage can be justified 
with good reason, provided that they do not affect the fairness of the proceedings 
as a whole. Compelling reasons attached to the nature of each case must be proven 
in order to justify any restriction. However, such restriction must not irretrievably 
prejudice the rights of the defence. This scenario would materialise when a suspect, 
whose right to legal assistance has been restricted, makes self-incriminating 
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statements later used for his conviction.89
Furthermore, in Őcalan v. Turkey the Strasbourg Court underlined that Article 
6(3)(c) entails, as a basic requirement, the accused’s right to communicate with 
his lawyer in private, out of the hearing of third parties.90 “If a lawyer were unable 
to confer with his client and receive confidential instructions from him without 
such surveillance, his assistance would lose much of its usefulness, whereas the 
Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are practical and effective”.91 The 
Court stressed that the mere assignment of a lawyer to an accused it is not per se 
sufficient to ensure the effectiveness of the assistance he may afford to his client.92
In relation to the length and frequency of the communication between the accused 
and his lawyers, the Court held as unacceptable that the interviews Mr. Őcalan had 
with his legal representative had been limited to two one-hour meetings per week. 
In so doing the Court disregarded the government’s justification that the restriction 
was due to logistic problems (the accused was imprisoned on an island). It found 
that “the Government have not explained why the authorities did not permit the 
lawyers to visit their client more often or why they failed to provide more adequate 
means of transport, thereby increasing the length of each individual visit, when 
such measures were called for as part of the ‘diligence’ the Contracting States must 
exercise in order to ensure that the rights guaranteed by Article 6 are enjoyed in an 
effective manner”.93
 3.5 Article 6(3)(d)
Subparagraph (d) of Article 6(3) grants the accused the right to examine or have 
examined the witnesses testifying against him and to obtain the attendance and 
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses 
against him. This provision forms part of the broader right to a fair trial and reflects 
the required adversarial nature of the trial and the principle of the equality of arms, 
which must guide the regulation of the trial. The right to challenge the other side’s 
evidence and to present their own evidence is a fundamental right of the defence. 
It is the concrete expression of the active role entrusted to the defendant in facing 
the accusation against him by presenting evidence able to corroborate his account 
of the events in order to influence the court. 
The ECtHR clarified in Kostovski v. Netherlands that according to the autonomous 
meaning adopted by the Convention, a witness is any person whose statement 
has been put before the court and taken into account by it.94 Therefore, the term 
witness is not limited to individuals who give oral evidence in a courtroom but it is 
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extended to individuals who have given statements before the trial as long as these 
statements are presented at trial.95
Article 6(3)(d) embodies two rights enjoyed by the defendant; the right to cross-
examine the prosecution’s witnesses and the right to obtain the attendance and 
examination of his own witnesses. In relation to the right to cross-examine the 
prosecution’s witnesses, Article 6(3)(d) is generally violated when statements are 
admitted as evidence in the absence of the cross-examination of their authors 
during the trial. “All the evidence must normally be produced at a public hearing, 
in the presence of the accused, with a view to adversarial argument”.96  Exceptions 
apply to this rule “but they must not infringe the rights of the defence”. There are 
competing interests that cannot be ignored and need to be weighed, assessing 
the defence’s right to cross-examine a witness who has given a statement that 
the prosecution is seeking to have admitted as evidence. The need to protect an 
undercover police agent, a victim of sexual violence or a witness exposed to reprisals 
are only a few examples of these competing interests. 
The task of the Court under the Convention “is not to give a ruling as to whether 
statements of witnesses were properly admitted as evidence, but rather to ascertain 
whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which evidence was 
taken, were fair”.97 This approach regarding the admission of evidence is in line 
with the “fourth instance doctrine” adopted by the Court. 
On this issue, the ECtHR has stated that “to use as evidence such statements 
obtained at the pre-trial stage is not in itself inconsistent with paragraphs 3 (d) 
and 1 of Article 6” if the defence’s rights have been respected.98 The latter condition 
requires “that an accused should be given an adequate and proper opportunity to 
challenge and question a witness against him, either at the time the witness was 
making his statement or at some later stage of the proceedings”.99
In Doorson v. the Netherlands, the applicant was convicted of drug trafficking on 
the basis of statements by anonymous witnesses and a witness who attended trial 
but then absconded. The anonymous witnesses were ultimately questioned at the 
appeal stage, in the presence of the applicant’s lawyer, but not the applicant, and 
without the identity of the witnesses being revealed to the applicant’s lawyer. The 
Court found no violation. It was satisfied that it was “established that the handicaps 
under which the defence laboured were sufficiently counterbalanced by the 
procedures followed by the judicial authorities”.100 However, the Court also recalled 
that regardless of the effectiveness of the measures available to the defendant to 
counterbalance the curtailing of his right to cross-examine the prosecution’s 
witnesses, “a conviction should not be based either solely or to a decisive extent 
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upon anonymous statements”.101 This is the so-called “sole or decisive rule”.102 A 
defining difference therefore, is constituted by the presence of other corroborating 
evidence against the accused of the same probative value as the anonymous witness 
statement. 
In Lucà v. Italy the Court made clear that “if the defendant has been given an 
adequate and proper opportunity to challenge the depositions either when made or 
at a later stage, their admission in evidence will not in itself contravene Article 6 §§ 
1 and 3(d). The corollary of that, however, is that where a conviction is based solely 
or to a decisive degree on depositions that have been made by a person whom the 
accused has had no opportunity to examine or to have examined, whether during 
the investigation or at the trial, the rights of the defence are restricted to an extent 
that is incompatible with the guarantees provided by Article 6”.103
More recently the ECtHR, in Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom, stated 
that “where a hearsay statement is the sole or decisive evidence against a defendant, 
its admission as evidence will not automatically result in a breach of Article 6 § 1. 
At the same time where a conviction is based solely or decisively on the evidence 
of absent witnesses, the Court must subject the proceedings to the most searching 
scrutiny. The question in each case is whether there are sufficient counterbalancing 
factors in place, including measures that permit a fair and proper assessment of 
the reliability of that evidence to take place. This would permit a conviction to be 
based on such evidence only if it is sufficiently reliable given its importance in the 
case”.104 Where the final decision was not based solely or to a decisive extent on the 
untested evidence the ECtHR applies a balancing test to assess whether the rights 
of the defence have been respected. The Court assesses the measures undertaken by 
the authorities to regulate the interrogations of the anonymous witnesses in order 
to ascertain whether the handicaps under which the defence is compelled to work 
[due to the anonymity of one or more witnesses] are sufficiently counterbalanced 
by the procedure followed by the judicial authorities.105 In Kok v. The Netherlands, 
in which the untested evidence was relevant but not decisive, the Strasbourg Court 
considered that because the investigating judge had tested the reliability of the 
anonymous witness giving a reasoned opinion and that the defence had had the 
opportunity to question the investigating judge in open court the restrictions on 
the rights of the defence had been sufficiently counterbalanced.106
The ECtHR has particular concern over statements given by police officers who 
remained anonymous when acting as witnesses at trial. In Van Mechelen v. The 
Netherlands the Court stated that the position of anonymous witnesses who are 
police officers is different from the one of other disinterested anonymous witnesses 
due to the link between the police and the state and in turn between the police 
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and the prosecution representing the state at trial. In this case, the police officers 
in question had been interrogated in a separate room by the investigating judge 
without the defendant and his lawyer being present. They could assist through a 
sound link system, which did not allow them to pose direct questions to the agents 
and observe their demeanor in order to test their reliability. The Court noticed that 
the only evidence relied upon in the judgment to identify the applicants as the 
perpetrators were the statements given by the anonymous police officers. Under 
these circumstances, it concluded that the trial had not been fair.107
The second part of the provision of Article 6(3)(b) regulates the accused’s right to 
obtain the attendance and have the witnesses examined on his behalf.  The close 
connection between this guarantee and the principle of equality of arms is explicit 
in the wording of the provision, which states that the attendance and examination 
of witnesses on behalf of the defendant must take place “under the same conditions 
as witnesses against him”.
Also in relation to the right to examine defence witnesses, the ECtHR felt the need 
to reaffirm that it is for the domestic courts to assess the relevance of the evidence 
in the framework of criminal proceedings. However, “there are exceptional 
circumstances which could prompt the Court to conclude that the failure to hear a 
person as a witness was incompatible with Article 6”.108 The ECtHR reiterated in its 
case-law that “it is not the role of the Court to determine, as a matter of principle, 
whether particular types of evidence – for example, unlawfully obtained evidence – 
may be admissible or, indeed, whether the applicant was guilty or not. The question 
which must be answered is whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way 
in which the evidence was obtained, were fair”.109
In Engel v. Netherlands, the Court made clear that Article 6(3)(d) does not grant the 
accused the right to obtain the attendance and the examination of every witness. 
The Convention “leaves it to the competent national authorities to decide upon 
the relevance of proposed evidence insofar as is compatible with the concept of 
a fair trial which dominates the whole of Article 6”.110 In this judgment, the Court 
stated that the essential aim of the provision was the equality of arms over matters 
of evidence. 
This statement was revisited in the case of Vidal v. Belgium, where exceptionally 
the ECtHR found a violation of Article 6(3)(d) in relation to the non-admission 
of defence witnesses. In this case, the Cour de Cassation had remitted the case of 
the applicant to the Court of Appeal, which denied his request to examine four 
witnesses without any explanation for the decision. The Court of Appeal increased 
the sentence from three to four years and did not suspend the sentence. The ECtHR 
noted that, although the principle of equality of arms had been respected, as also 
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the prosecutor had not been admitted any witness, such principle did not exhaust 
the meaning of Article 6(3)(d). It went on to state that the “complete silence” of the 
judgment on the denial of admission of evidence was not consistent with the right 
to a fair trial, which had therefore been violated.111
4. The principle of the equality of arms 
The text of Article 6 of the Convention does not explicitly refer to the principle of 
the equality of arms. As mentioned above, the concept has been entirely developed 
by the case law of the Commission and the ECtHR. The standard definition of the 
principle of equality of arms states that each party must be granted a “reasonable 
opportunity of presenting his case to the Court under conditions which do not 
place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent”.112
The need for procedural equality between the parties in criminal proceedings was 
first affirmed by the Commission in several decisions given in the beginning of 
the 1960s.113 These decisions, although dealing with different procedures, were 
similar to the extent that they examined domestic appeal proceedings where the 
defence had not been afforded the opportunity to be heard. On the other hand, the 
prosecutor had appeared before the Court making the submissions he considered 
fit and recommending an increase of the sentence.114 As a result of the appeal 
proceedings at stake the impugned sentences had been raised. The Commission 
was asked “whether the notion of a ‘fair trial’ embodies any right relating to the 
defence beyond and above the minimum rights laid down in paragraph (3)”.115 In 
other words, the question was whether any rights of the defence could be derived 
from Article 6(1) other than the ones explicitly mentioned therein. The Commission 
answered the question in the affirmative when it explained the angle from which 
it intended to assess the case. In fact, it declined to review the cases under Article 
6(3) as it found that they concerned the procedural equality between the defence 
and the prosecutor. The Commission found that the general and more inclusive 
provision of the right to a fair hearing also implied the notion of equality of arms. 
The latter is therefore an inherent element of Article 6 (1).
The principle of equality of arms does not concern the resources each party has. 
In criminal proceedings, it is accepted that the prosecutor will have resources 
in terms of personnel, funds and investigative techniques at his disposal, which 
would be impossible for the defendent to match. Nonetheless, the respect for the 
notion of the equality of arms guarantees that, despite these significant differences 
in resources, the defence and the prosecutor are granted the same opportunity to 
present their case and to challenge that of their opponent. 
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The idea underlining the principle is that of a fair balance between the parties. 
Therefore, the Court’s perception of the role and functions of the defence and the 
prosecutor is essential. This perception can change in time leading to opposite 
interpretations regarding the same procedure. The ECtHR in Delcourt v. Belgium 
(1970) found that the procedure allowing the Avocat Général to make submissions 
during appeal proceedings and to be present during the deliberation of the judges 
was in line with the principle of equality of arms.116 The Court’s understanding of 
the Avocat Général was the crucial issue and the Court, in accordance with the 
Commission’s findings, stated that he could not be considered as an opponent of 
the defendant as he was an objective figure whose task was to guarantee the respect 
of the law by the judges. 
Twenty years later the same situation, in relation to the same procedure, led the 
ECtHR to depart from and overturn its previous findings. In Borgers v. Belgium 
(1991), the Court held that the principle of equality of arms and the right to a fair 
trial had “undergone a considerable evolution in the Court’s case-law, notably in 
respect of the importance attached to appearances and to the increased sensitivity 
of the public to the fair administration of justice”.117 It concluded that “the opinion 
of the procureur général’s department cannot be regarded as neutral from the 
point of view of the parties to the proceedings before the Supreme Court. By 
recommending that an accused’s appeal be allowed or dismissed, the official of 
the procureur général’s department becomes objectively speaking his ally or his 
opponent. In the latter event, Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) requires that the rights of 
the defence and the principle of equality of arms be respected”.118 In reaching its 
verdict, the Court recalled that the Convention is a living instrument which must be 
interpreted in light of present day conditions. The decision was not unanimous and 
several dissenting opinions were appended to it. Some of the judges could not see 
any difference between this case and the Delcourt case that was able to justify such 
a radical departure from the latter.119 Furthermore, it was argued that the ECtHR 
failed to give a clear and convincing justification for such a departure.120There is 
indeed no difference between the cases and the procedure examined. What has 
changed is the Court’s perception of the role played by the official of the procureur 
général’s department.
The Court’s decision in Borgers seems to illustrate a departure from the interpretation 
of unfairness (due to a violation of the principle of the equality of arms) as linked 
to the actual prejudice for the accused to an idea more attached to the appearance 
of fairness. In the latter, any affiliation with the prosecutor is sufficient to suggest 
partiality and therefore to harm the fairness of the trial, or at least the perception 
of its fairness, if the affiliated party communicates with the judiciary in the absence 
of the defence. The procureur général, although not formally associated with the 
prosecution, when recommending the granting or dismissal of the appeal would 
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take a position consequently being perceived as an associate or an opponent. In 
other words, the Court seems to have embraced, also in this respect, the principle 
that justice not only needs to be done but also needs to be seen to be done.
The principle of the equality of arms seems to find its ideal application in the 
contest between two parties before an impartial judge, which is clearly of an 
adversarial nature. It is more difficult to adjust it to an inquisitorial procedure 
where the prosecutor and the defence are characterised differently. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that the ECtHR decisions targeting longstanding procedures in civil 
law countries, which were found in violation of the principle of equality of arms, 
were harshly criticised. 
5. The right to an adversarial trial
In Barbera, Messegué and Jabarado v. Spain, a case decided in the late 80’s, the 
ECtHR stated that “the object and purpose of Article 6, and the wording of some 
of the sub-paragraphs in paragraph 3, show that a person charged with a criminal 
offence is entitled to take part in the hearing and to have his case heard in his 
presence by a tribunal. The Court infers that all the evidence must in principle 
be produced in the presence of the accused at a public hearing with a view to 
adversarial argument”.121 
The right to an adversarial trial (principe du contradictoire) “means in principle 
the opportunity for the parties to a criminal or civil trial to have knowledge of and 
comment on all evidence adduced or observations filed with a view to influencing 
the court’s decision”.122 State parties to the Convention are given freedom in 
ensuring the application of this principle as long as they guarantee that “the other 
party will be aware that observations have been filed and will get a real opportunity 
to comment thereon”.123 
What lies at the core of an adversarial trial is the right of the person concerned to 
be heard (droit d’être entendu) and to have his submissions to the court taken into 
account.124 The Court gave the right to an adversarial trial the status of an absolute 
right. It applies to civil and criminal matters and it is not dependent on the nature 
of the material filed by the other party, be it concerned with the establishment of 
facts, the merits of the case or a procedural issue. The defendant should always 
be “given an opportunity to comment on evidence obtained in regard to disputed 
facts even if the facts relate to a point of procedure rather than the alleged offence 
as such”.125
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Both the principle of the equality of arms and the right to an adversarial trial seem 
to lack a precise identity and definition and the Court has given the impression 
that it considers them intertwined if not interchangeable in their application in 
certain judgments. In Lamy v. Belgium, for instance, the Court found a violation of 
Article 5(4) insofar as “the procedure did not afford the applicant an opportunity of 
challenging appropriately the reasons relied upon to justify a remand in custody” 
and concluded that “since it failed to ensure equality of arms, the procedure was 
not truly adversarial”.126 
However, a defining difference exists and allows the two concepts to be clearly 
discerned. The principle of the equality of arms is respected when there is a 
procedural balance between the parties whereas the right to an adversarial trial 
is an autonomous concept, which does not depend on the position of the other 
parties. It requires access to all the relevant material whether the opponent has 
access to it or not.127 The ECtHR clarified the difference in a case in which the 
Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic had gathered motu proprio additional 
evidence that later constituted the basis for its judgment.128 The evidence had 
not been communicated to either of the parties and therefore the principle of 
the equality of arms had been respected. There was, in fact, a balance between 
the parties, as they had both been excluded from the relevant material. However, 
because the applicant had not been able to comment on the “existence, contents 
and authenticity [of the additional evidence] in an appropriate form and within 
an appropriate time, if need be, in a written form and in advance”129 there was an 
infringement of the right to an adversarial trial.130
An analysis of the case law concerning the right to an adversarial trial shows that 
the latter is linked to the right of the disclosure of information. The cases dealing 
with the principe du contradictoire mostly regard situations where the defence had 
not been given an opportunity to reply to a submission made by the prosecutor or 
cases where the prosecution had infringed its obligation to disclose evidence to the 
defence. These aspects will be tackled in the next section.
Concluding, the right to an adversarial trial as appears from the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR embodies elements that are strictly linked to the disclosure of 
information such as the right to have knowledge of and challenge the other side’s 
submission and the evidence adduced before the court. As far as these issues are 
concerned, a certain overlap occurs with the provision of Article 6(3), particularly 
with subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c). The right to an adversarial trial seems to create 
a friendly environment for the proliferation of the rights of the defence that are not 
limited to those listed in subparagraph 3 of Article 6.
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6. Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights and the pre-trial stage
 6.1 Introduction
The pre-trial stage of criminal proceedings is a delicate phase, the importance 
of which should not be underestimated when regulating the safeguards of the 
rights of the defence. The findings of the investigations are likely to influence 
the outcome of the trial phase. It is also a phase in which the suspect is in 
an extremely vulnerable position. He can be subjected to measures such as a 
search of his home, seizure of property, provisional detention, not to mention 
personal consequences of these measures such as discredited reputation and 
the stress of being suspected of the commission of a crime. 
The Convention’s lack of explicit regulation of the pre-trial stage leaves 
questions unanswered: what kind of guarantees does the person under 
investigation who is not detained enjoy? What kind of procedural guarantees 
are applicable to proceedings challenging the lawfulness of pre-trial 
detention? Does Article 6 have any bearing on the pre-trial stage? If so, do all 
its provisions apply or only some?
In order to answer these questions I will first analyse the relevant provisions of 
article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the context in which 
they operate. The following scrutiny will focus on Article 5(2) and (4) which bear 
implications in relation to the disclosure of information to the suspect/accused. 
Furthermore, the analysis is limited to cases where the deprivation of liberty has 
occurred under Article 5(1)(c), namely in cases where a person has been arrested 
on suspicion of having committed an offence in order to be brought before the 
competent legal authorities or when it is necessary to do so to prevent him from 
committing an offence or to escape after having done so. Following this, I will 
return to Article 6.
 6.2 Article 5 (2) and (4) of the European Convention of Human Rights
Article 5 of the Convention regulates certain specific guarantees for the persons who 
have been arrested and are detained in the course of the preliminary investigation. 
Article 5(2) reads as follows:
2. Everyone who is arrested should be informed promptly, in a language which he 
understands, of the reasons for his arrest and the charge against him…
The goal of Article 5(2) is to ensure that a person deprived of his liberty is informed of 
the reasons on which such measure is based to protect him against unfair detention. 
The arrestee must be informed of “the essential legal and factual grounds for his 
arrest”131 in order to be able to face them and eventually to challenge the lawfulness 
of his detention according to the procedure envisaged in Article 5(4). However, 
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this is not the only reason for this guarantee. The overlap between subparagraph 
(2) and (4) of article 5 is evident considering that the information given in the 
first provision is essential in order to trigger the second. The ECtHR acknowledged 
the inseparable connection between the provisions of Article 5(2) and 5(4) and 
in Van der Leen v. The Netherlands stated that “any person who is entitled to 
take proceedings to have the lawfulness of his detention decided speedily cannot 
make effective use of that right unless he is promptly and adequately informed 
of the reasons why he has been deprived of his liberty”.132 Trechsel insists on the 
autonomous meaning of this provision that cannot be limited to be of use to the 
habeas corpus proceedings. The right to know about the reasons behind the arrest 
is a “legitimate purpose of the right under paragraph 2”.133
The Convention does not mention a specific manner in which the information 
must be conveyed to the defendant, although the language employed must be 
“simple and non-technical and understandable by him”.134 The Court must assess 
on a case-by-case basis the adequacy of the promptness and the content of the 
relevant information.135 As far as the promptness of the information is concerned, 
the ECtHR seemed to be at ease with a period of a few hours from the arrest.136 
However, there have been cases where even a significant delay of up to two days 
has been considered in compliance with the provision at stake.137 The Court made 
clear that the information required by Article 5(2) does not have to be given in 
its entirety by the arresting officer at the very moment of the arrest”.138 This is 
questionable given that at the moment of arrest the reasons underlying the very 
same act are already known.139 Interestingly, unlike the European Convention, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights under Article 9(2) singles out 
the moment of the arrest as the defining moment on which the arrestee must be 
informed of the reasons for his arrest. 
The wording of Article 5(2) requires the information to be given promptly but not 
in detail. The sufficiency of the content of the information must be assessed in 
relation to the possibility of mounting an effective challenge to the detention. This 
leads to a lower level of detail as compared to the level required by the provision 
of Article 6(3)(a). The ECtHR has considered the information adequate when it is 
a “fairly precise indication of the suspicion” which enables the applicant to gain 
an idea of what he is suspected of.140 It is worth mentioning that at this stage the 
information concerns the suspicion justifying the detention and not the charge.
In Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. UK, the applicants had been arrested under section 
11 of the 1978 Act on suspicion of being a terrorist. The communication of the 
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provision underlying their arrest was the only information they received upon their 
arrest. The Commission found that “given the elementary nature of the safeguard, 
Article 5 para. 2 (Art. 5-2) places a direct burden on the arresting authorities to 
provide a detainee with adequate information as to the reasons for his arrest at the 
time of the arrest or as soon as is practicable thereafter”. The ECtHR also stressed 
that the information given to the suspects upon their arrest had been insufficient 
because it concerned only the legal basis of the arrest. However, in reversing the 
finding of the Commission, the Court noted that from subsequent interrogations 
carried out by the police, the applicants had been put in the position to understand 
why they were arrested and therefore there was no violation of Article 5(2).141
This finding should be criticised as Article 5(2) guarantees the right to be informed, 
meaning the right to receive information from the authorities explaining the 
reasons for the arrest whereas the Court seems to have interpreted it as the right to 
be put in the position to infer the reasons for the arrest. The terminology employed 
in the judgment handed down in Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. UK corroborates this 
impression. The Court in fact stated that these interrogations “enabled the applicant 
to understand why they had been arrested” and this was sufficient to conclude that 
“the reasons why they were suspected of being terrorists were thereby brought to 
their attention during their interrogation”.142 As far as the position of the arrestee 
is concerned, there is a remarkable difference between being in the position where 
they are able to understand the reasons for the arrest, for example inferring them 
from the questions they were asked during the interrogation, and being informed 
by the authorities. The former scenario equates to the right to an educated guess 
whereas the provision of Article 5(2) seems to require something more active on 
the part of the authorities in bringing the relevant information to the arrestee. 
This criticism was also expressed in Murray v. UK, a similar case where the ECtHR 
upheld the possibility of inferring the information required by Article 5(2) from the 
police interrogations.143 In a partly dissenting opinion, the decision was described 
as reducing the meaning of article 5(2) “to such a low level that it is doubtful 
whether in fact it can, if it is adhered to in this form, have any possible concrete 
application in the future”.144
The other provision assessed in the present analysis is Article 5(4), which reads 
as follows:
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a 
court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
Article 5(4) grants a detained person the right to pursue judicial review, which can 
speedily assess the lawfulness of his detention. The procedure does not allow the 
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court called to review the detention “to substitute its own discretion for that of the 
decision making authorities” but it must assess both the procedural and substantive 
elements that “are essential for the lawful detention of a person according to Article 
5(1)”.145 To enjoy the right a detainee does not have to present a prima facie case 
showing that “he stands any particular chance of success in obtaining his release”.146
There is a partial overlap of the provisions of Article 5(4) and 6(1). The ECtHR 
acknowledged the connection between the two provisions but pointed out that 
they pursue different purposes. The first aims to protect against arbitrary detention 
by access to a speedy review of the lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty, whereas 
Article 6(1) aims to guarantee that the determination of the merits of the case 
occur in the context of a fair trial.147 Because of the different scopes pursued by 
the provisions, Article 5(4) “contains more flexible procedural requirements than 
Article 6 while being much more stringent as regards speediness”.148
The review must not only consider the procedural aspects but also enquire as to the 
reasonableness of the suspicion forming the basis of the arrest and the legitimacy 
of the aim pursued through the arrest and the consequent detention.149 The ECtHR 
made clear what the Convention, and specifically Article 5(4) intends with the term 
“court”. The latter does not necessarily have to be a judicial organ belonging to 
the judiciary but it must be impartial, independent of the executive and of the 
parties to the proceedings and possess all the guarantees appropriate to the kind 
of deprivation of liberty at stake. Furthermore, the body in question ought “not 
have merely advisory functions but must have the competence to “decide” the 
“lawfulness” of the detention and to order release if the detention is unlawful”.150 A 
merely advisory organ will not satisfy the requirement of Article 5(4). 
The Court has clearly stated that in cases concerning the deprivation of liberty under 
Article 5(1)(c) the procedure assessing the lawfulness of the detention must include a 
hearing.151 The necessity of a hearing in the procedure does not equate to the right to a 
public hearing. The procedure must be adversarial and the equality of arms between 
the prosecution and the detained person must be ensured.152 In relation to the right to 
be assisted by a lawyer, although Article 5 does not mention it, in Öcalan v. Turkey, the 
ECtHR acknowledged that “the applicant could not reasonably be expected under such 
conditions to be able to challenge the lawfulness and length of his detention without 
the assistance of his lawyer”.153 This finding suggests the applicability of the right to 
legal assistance during the proceedings regulated by Article 5(4).
The other important requirement of the procedure regulated by Article 5(4) is that 
the application must be dealt with “speedily”. The promptness of the procedure 
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under Article 5(4) entails the right to challenge the lawfulness of the detention 
immediately following the deprivation of liberty. The ECtHR has found a violation 
of Article 5(4) in cases where the applicants had not been allowed to file habeas 
corpus proceedings four days after their arrest.154 
 6.3 Applicability of Article 6 to the pre-trial stage
The applicability of Article 6 of the Convention to the pre-trial stage of criminal 
proceedings has been a much debated part of the doctrine and the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence. In relation to the latter, a more straightforward statement would 
have been welcome as it would have provided some clarity to a delicate legal issue, 
which instead has remained the subject of speculation and interpretation. 
State parties have been determined to resist the support for application of article 6 to 
the pre-trial stage. The Commission in its earlier decisions shared the governments’ 
approach to the issue. Article 6(1) refers to the “determination of any criminal charge” 
meaning the decision on the merit of a charge elevated by the authorities (le bien-fondé 
de toute accusation en matière pénale). Therefore, its applicability seems limited to the 
course of a trial with no bearing on the former stage of the proceedings.155 
The Commission, while holding that Article 6(1) was applicable only to the stage of 
the proceedings at which the charge were to be determined, stated that Article 6(2) 
and (3) apply to “everyone charged with a criminal offense” and seemed to identify a 
different period (also before the trial stage), where these provisions operate. There 
appears to be a duplicity of the moments on which the different subparagraphs of 
Article 6 can be first considered applicable to criminal proceedings.156
In Can v. Austria, the Commission stated that the provisions of Article 6(3)(b) and (c) 
“are not necessarily limited in scope to the trial itself” and found their applicability 
to the pre-trial stage in the case concerned.157 The Commission justified its findings 
by underlining the importance of the investigation stage in defining the framework 
in which the decision on the merits of the charge will take place. Consequently, 
it concluded that it is essential that the “basis for its [the suspect or the accused] 
defence activity can be laid already at this stage”.158 In addition, it underlined that 
the access to a lawyer, guaranteed by Article 6(3)(c), is needed even before trial as 
it safeguards “the control of the lawfulness of any measures taken in the course of 
the investigation proceedings, the identification and presentation of any means 
of evidence at an early stage where it is still possible to trace new relevant facts 
and where the witnesses have a fresh memory, further assistance to the accused 
regarding any complaints which he might wish to make in relation to his detention 
concerning its justification, length and conditions”.159
_______________________
154 See ex multis , De Jong, Baljet and Van den Brink v. Netherlands, ECHR, no. 8805/79, 22 May 1984, para. 58. 
155 Adolf v. Austria, European Commission of Human Rights, no. 8269/78, 8 October 1980, para. 64. 
156 X, Y and Z v. Austria, European Commission of Human Rights, no. 5049,71, 5 February 1973. See Stavros, above n. 63 at 
pp. 54-55.
157 Can v. Austria, European Commission of Human Rights, no. 9300/81, 12 July 1984, para. 47. 
158 Ibid. at para. 50. 
159 Ibid. at para. 55.
Article 6 of the European Convention of Human rights: The Right to a Fair Trial
145 146
In Imbrioscia v. Switzerland the ECtHR held that “the primary purpose of Article 
6 (art. 6) as far as criminal matters are concerned is to ensure a fair trial by a 
“tribunal” competent to determine “any criminal charge”, but it does not follow that 
the Article (art. 6) has no application to pre-trial proceedings…other requirements 
of Article 6 (art. 6) - especially of paragraph 3 (art. 6-3) - may also be relevant 
before a case is sent for trial if and in so far as the fairness of the trial is likely 
to be seriously prejudiced by an initial failure to comply with them”.160 The Court 
elaborated a test (“the Imbrioscia test”) to assess when the provisions of article 
6 and particularly the provisions of Article 6(3), are applicable to a stage of the 
proceedings that precedes the trial. The applicability is therefore extended to the 
violations of article 6, occurring in the pre-trial stage, “in so far as the fairness of 
the trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced”.161
In Imbrioscia, the Court held that the reasonable time mentioned in para. 1 of 
Article 6 begins from the moment at which a charge exists within the autonomous 
meaning given to it by the Convention.162 We have seen that the time at which 
a charge comes into being can be narrowed down to the moment at which the 
situation of the suspect is “substantially affected”, which in turn may coincide with 
a “date prior to the case coming before the trial court, such as…. the date when 
preliminary investigations were opened”.163 In an early case before the Commission, 
it was argued that the relevant moment in relation to the charge was not the opening 
of a preliminary investigation but the request by the prosecuting authorities for an 
investigation to be opened.164
The approach followed by the Court in the Imbrioscia case envisages a violation 
of article 6 in the pre-trial stage only when the violation is likely to prejudice 
the fairness of a trial as a whole. For example, where the criminal procedure of 
a state party attached negative inferences to the silence of the suspect at police 
questioning and there had been a restriction of the right to access a lawyer, the 
ECtHR concluded that there had been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention.165 
We have discussed the Öcalan case in which a violation of Article 6 was recognised 
in relation to the deprivation of the accused from legal assistance for a period of 
seven days during which he made self-incriminating statements, which then went 
on to become essential “elements of the indictment and the public prosecutor’s 
submissions and a major contributing factor in his conviction”.166 Unlike these 
cases, the Court found no violation of Article 6 when the right to legal assistance 




160 Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, ECHR, no. 13972/88, 24 November 1993, para. 36.
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid.
163 Eckle v. Germany, ECHR, no. 8130/78, 15 July 1981, para. 73. 
164 Huber v. Austria, European Commission of Human Rights, no. 4517/70, 8 February 1973, Separate Concurring Opinion 
of Judge Opsahl. 
165 See John Murray v. UK, ECHR, [GC], no. 18731/91, 8 February 1996. 
166 See above, paragraph 3.3. Öcalan v. Turkey, ECHR, [GC], no. 46221/99, 12 May 2005, para. 140. 
167 See Brennan v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, no. 39846/98, 16 October 2001. 
145 146
In relation to the defendant’s right to question a witness, regulated by Article 6(3)(d), 
Trechsel contends that the Imbrioscia case “can only be understood as meaning that, 
as a matter of principle, there is a right to be present and to question witnesses from 
the beginning of the proceedings”.168 However, the ECtHR on this issue seems to put 
more emphasis on the right to examine witnesses during trial rather than envisaging 
a temporal extension of such right throughout the entire criminal proceedings.
The Human Rights Handbook Series of the Council of Europe reports that “the 
guarantees provided for in Article 6 apply not only to the court proceedings, but 
also to the stages which both precede and follow them”.169 It goes on to affirm that 
the guarantees cover pre-trial investigations carried out by the police in criminal 
cases. Trechsel recognises the applicability of article 6 to the pre-trial stage in 
relation to all the procedural steps that are directly relevant to the decision on the 
merit of the case and identifies the police inquiry as the moment at which these 
guarantees should begin.170 
It is worth mentioning the different approach followed by the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) in the regulation of the applicability of Article 14 (provision on 
the fair trial correspondent to Article 6 of the Convention) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The HRC, in fact, explicitly states 
the applicability of Article 14 of the Covenant to the criminal proceedings as a 
whole, including the pre-trial stage.171 In the General Comment on Article 14 of 
the ICCPR, the HRC clarified that the right to be informed of the charges begins 
from the moment at which during the preliminary investigation “a court or an 
authority of the prosecution decides to take procedural steps against a person 
suspected of a crime or publicly names him as such”.172 Also in relation to the right 
to legal assistance, the HRC has often found a violation where the suspect had 
been deprived of the assistance of a lawyer while being detained before the formal 
issue of charges against him.173 The difference with the European Convention lies 
in the explicit recognition of the applicability of Article 14 of the ICCPR to the pre-
trial stage. The drafters of the Convention declined to regulate the pre-trial stage 
through specific provisions and preferred to leave it to the interpretation offered by 
the case law of the ECtHR.
 6.4 Applicability of Article 6 to habeas corpus proceedings174
During the preliminary investigations, a suspect may be arrested and detained by 
the police to ensure, inter alia, that the offence is not repeated and that the suspect 
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does not interfere with the investigation. We have seen that Article 5(4) contains 
specific procedural guarantees pertaining to the issue of the deprivation of liberty 
that are distinct from the ones envisaged by Article 6(1). 
In Neumeister v. Austria, the Commission held that Article 6(1) does not apply 
to proceedings challenging the lawfulness of pre-trial detention.175 Recently, the 
ECtHR reiterated that applying the first paragraph of Article 6 to proceedings 
challenging the lawfulness of the pre-trial detention “would be against its wording 
as their subject matter is not the determination of a criminal charge”.176 However, 
the ECtHR has also shown some leeway for this inflexible interpretation. 
In 2001, the Court decided on three cases where Germany was found to be in 
violation of Article 5(4).177 These cases concerned similar situations where the 
lawyer for the defence had been denied access to the prosecutor’s file containing 
material relevant for challenging the pre-trial detention. The Court stated several 
important principles. It held that “a court examining an appeal against detention 
must provide the guarantees of a judicial procedure”.178 The procedure must always 
respect the principle of the equality of arms between the prosecutor and the 
detained person and it must be adversarial.179 Consequently, denying the defence 
counsel access to the prosecutor’s file violates the equality of arms, as it hampers 
the defence’s effectiveness in challenging the detention.180 
In Reinprecht v. Austria, the Court concluded that the public character of the 
hearing granted under Article 6(1) did not apply to habeas corpus proceedings. 
However, it also acknowledged the existence of an overlap between the guarantees 
recognised by Article 5(4), especially in relation to the access granted to the case 
file, the right to legal assistance and the rights provided for in Article 6.181 Therefore, 
it can be argued that provisions of article 6, other than the one referring to the 
public character of the hearing, such as the right to disclosure and the right to legal 
assistance might find application to proceedings challenging the legitimacy of pre-
trial detention. 
For proceedings to be adversarial, in accordance with Article 6 of the Convention, 
disclosure of each party’s observations and evidence must occur and each party 
must have the opportunity to comment on them.182 The Court stressed that “it 
follows from the wording of Article 6 – and particularly from the autonomous 
meaning to be given to the notion of “criminal charge” – that this provision has 
some application to pre-trial proceedings”.183 Finally, the ECtHR held that due to 
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the “dramatic impact of the deprivation of liberty” the proceedings challenging 
the pre-trial detention “should meet to the largest extent possible under the 
circumstances of an on-going investigation, the basic requirements of a fair trial 
such as the right to an adversarial procedure”.184
In Frommelt v. Liechtenstein, the ECtHR held that it is not always necessary that 
the proceedings challenging pre-trial detention are characterised by the respect 
for the guarantees of Article 6(1).185 Nonetheless, it stated that in such proceedings 
the detained person “should have access to a court and the opportunity to be heard 
either in person or, where necessary, through some form of representation”.186
What emerges from these judgments is that the Convention not only guarantees 
the right of the suspect to challenge the lawfulness of his detention but it also 
ensures that these proceedings constitute a thorough, fair and effective review. The 
review is characterised by the defence’s informed participation. Consequently, and 
also in relation to these proceedings, the accused must be granted “to the largest 
extent possible” the basic requirements of a fair trial, which include the guarantees 
of Article 6(3). The tension clearly arises in relation to the competing interests 
of the safeguard of the right of the detained person and the protection of the 
effectiveness of the preliminary investigations. 
Interestingly, in relation to this issue the position of the HRC is again more 
straightforward as it recognises the applicability of the right to a fair trial [Article 
14(1) of ICCPR] to habeas corpus proceedings, which are considered as a part of the 
whole proceedings.187
 6.5 Concluding remarks 
The pre-trial stage of criminal proceedings is not regulated by any specific provision 
of the Convention except Article 5, which is only applicable to instances where the 
liberty of the suspect or the accused has been restricted. This lack of regulation 
creates room for potential abuse of the suspect or the accused’s vulnerable position. 
The pre-trial stage is an essential part of criminal proceedings, which is able to 
influence the outcome of the trial. Therefore, it also seems essential that a person 
who is being investigated in relation to a crime must be granted minimum rights in 
the pre-trial stage, regardless of his liberty or detention. These guarantees are those 
envisaged by Article 6(3) which in turn are crucial elements of the notion of a fair 
trial. The ECtHR, while acknowledging that the need for the efficiency of pre-trial 
investigations may imply the need for non-disclosure of some information, stated 
that it could not be done “at the expenses of substantial restrictions on the right 
of the defence”.188 Information essential for the determination of the lawfulness 
of the pre-trial detention should be disclosed to the defence in an appropriate 
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manner. The authorities cannot support the prosecution’s interest when seeking to 
maximise effectiveness of the investigation if this deprives the essential guarantees 
provided for by Article 5(4) of their meaning. 
It seems feasible that the applicability of the guarantees provided for in Article 6(3) 
is ensured at least in relation to those moments of the preliminary investigations 
that are able to influence and affect the fairness of the following stage. However, 
the “Imbrioscia test” should be interpreted broadly considering that a restriction 
on the defence’s rights in such a delicate stage is per se highly likely to generate 
potentially devastating consequences for the fairness of the trial. 
The ECtHR has expressly recognised the applicability of the guarantees of Article 
6(3)(a)(b) and (c) to the pre-trial stage under the condition that the fairness of the 
trial is likely to be prejudiced by their violation. It follows that a suspect, from the 
moment that his situation is substantially affected, has the right to be informed of 
the charges against him, to have adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence 
and to be assisted by a lawyer if the condition that the denial of such rights might 
produce adverse effects jeopardising the fairness of the trial is met. What these 
rights entail in relation to disclosure will be discussed below.
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V. Disclosure of information in the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights
Introduction
The analysis carried out in the previous chapter showed that in order to be 
fair and compliant with Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, criminal proceedings must grant to the defence and the prosecution 
the opportunity to present their case without being placed at disadvantage 
to one another. At the same time, it must afford the parties the opportunity 
to have knowledge of and comment upon the evidence adduced and the 
observations submitted by the other parties. Moreover, Article 6(3) grants to 
everyone charged with a criminal offense several rights, which also “reflect 
certain of the aspects of the notion of a fair trial in criminal proceedings”.1
It is within this framework and upon this understanding that the disclosure of 
information has been tackled by the European Court of Human Rights. Many 
questions arise in relation to the right to disclosure. In what provision of the 
Convention should disclosure be collocated? What information is the object of 
disclosure? Who should decide upon instances where non-disclosure is sought on 
public interest grounds? How should such a procedure be regulated in order to be 
fair? How should the friction between the right to disclosure and the public interest 
in non-disclosure be handled? What should the court see and not see? The answer 
to some of these questions can be found in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and, 
although reluctant to provide general definitions, it has provided several important 
principles which should guide national jurisdictions in the management of the 
issue of disclosure. 
The European Court of Human Rights acknowledged that the right to disclosure, 
although not explicitly stated in the provision of Article 6 of the Convention, is an 
inherent element of the right to a fair trial. Nevertheless, the right to disclosure 
is not an absolute right and it must be reconciled with competing interests such 
as, inter alia, the protection of witnesses, national security and the integrity of 
the investigations. Such competing interests can justify, where strictly necessary, 
a restriction of the right to disclosure. However, any restriction must be 
counterbalanced in a way that guarantees the overall fairness of the proceedings. 
The ECtHR has dealt with the legal issue of disclosure in relation to applications 
claiming a violation of different provisions and principles embodied in Article 6 
of the Convention. The right to disclosure in fact, can be read as an element of 
the broader right to a fair trial from different perspectives. For example, lack of 
disclosure has been found to have occurred and thereby breaching the principle of 
the equality of arms between the parties or in violation of the right to an adversarial 
_______________________
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trial. In addition, disclosure is the most important of the facilities an accused must 
have at his disposal to prepare his defence in accordance with article 6(3)(b). 
The disclosure of information may be categorised differently in accordance to its 
object. It can refer to the reasons for a suspect’s arrest, the nature and cause of 
the accusations, the evidence gathered by one party, the identity of witnesses, 
an advisory opinion or access to the dossier. In addition, disclosure may be more 
or less extensive in relation to the different stages of the criminal proceedings. 
Therefore, different elements may influence the management of this issue in 
criminal proceedings.  
The conflict between one party’s interests (usually the defence) to have certain 
information disclosed and the protection of the public interests (such as national 
security, safeguard of police investigation, protection of witnesses at risk etc.) is 
another crucial aspect of the regulation of disclosure.  
The first part of this section will attempt to give an account of the way in which 
the European Court of Human Rights has perceived the disclosure of information 
in its case law. Specifically, an attempt is made to show that disclosure has been 
recognised as an element of the right to a fair trial from different angles of the 
provisions and principles of article 6 of the Convention. Paragraphs 1 and 2 illustrate 
how the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has read the legal issue of disclosure through 
the lenses of the different provisions of Article 6 of the Convention.
The second part of this section will examine the case law of the Strasbourg Court in 
relation to several crucial aspects of the issue of disclosure. In the former section, 
we have seen that the Court is reluctant to provide general definitions applicable 
to every case and prefers to proceed on a case-by-case approach. This philosophy 
applies also to the disclosure of information whose regulation, as we have seen in 
the previous chapters, differs, sometimes significantly, from country to country. 
However, through the analysis of the selected jurisprudence, an attempt is made 
to highlight the essential principles that can be inferred from the Court’s rulings in 
relation to several interesting elements of the disclosure of information. Specifically, 
the subject matter of disclosure, the relation between the non-disclosed material 
and the issue of actual prejudice, the managing of the conflict between the right to 
disclosure and the public interest as well as the possibility to remedy in appeal the 
lack of disclosure are tackled in paragraphs 3 to 7. This analysis will be a useful tool 
for assessing the rules regarding the disclosure of information in the national and 
international criminal procedural systems examined in this book.
1. Article 6(1) and the disclosure of information
 1.1 Introduction
On several occasions, the ECtHR has examined and assessed the issue of disclosure 
of information in relation to the overall fairness of criminal proceedings under the 
provision of article 6(1) and its inherent principles. The case law of the Strasbourg 
Court creates a set of guiding principles in relation to the disclosure of information 
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which should inspire the national judicial systems of the states party to its 
regulation. 
The Court affirmed that “it is a requirement of fairness under paragraph 1 of Article 
6… that the prosecution authorities disclose to the defence all material evidence for 
or against the accused and that the failure to do so in the present case gave rise to 
a defect in the trial proceedings”.2 This is an essential rule, which clarifies the solid 
nexus between the fairness of proceedings and the disclosure of information. In 
other words, a criminal trial cannot be fair in the absence of disclosure.
 1.2 The Equality of arms and disclosure 
It has been illustrated that the principle of the equality of arms between the parties 
to criminal proceedings, although not explicitly stated in the provision, is one of 
the fundamental elements of the right to a fair trial. The Strasbourg Court has had 
the opportunity to deal with the correlation between the disclosure of information 
and the equality of arms in several cases. 
In the case of Foucher v. France, as we saw in chapter III, the ECtHR was called to 
scrutinise the defendant’s right of access the dossier.3 On 24 July 1991, Mr. Foucher 
and his father, French nationals, were summoned to appear before the Argentean 
Police Court under the direct committal procedure regulated by Article 531 of the 
French Code of Criminal Procedure. They were charged with a fifth class minor 
offence, namely of having used insulting and threatening words and behaviour 
towards public service employees (two national game and wildlife wardens). Mr. 
Foucher decided to represent himself. On 25 July 1991, his mother went to the 
registry of the police court seeking access to the case file in order to make copies of 
the documents it contained. The prosecutor denied such request stating that copies 
could not be issued to individuals except through a lawyer. Then the applicant and 
his father sought access to the dossier. The prosecutor informed them that copy of 
official reports could not be issued to individuals. 
On 2 October 1991, at the hearing before the Police Court, Mr. Foucher and his 
father complained that the proceedings against them were unlawful. They claimed 
that the denial of access to the case file amounted to a breach of article 6 of the 
European Convention. The Police Court upheld Mr. Foucher’s claim that there had 
been a violation of the rights of the defence. It stated that the defendants should 
have been allowed access to their case file in order to prepare their defence. On 16 
March 1992, the Caen Court of Appeal reversed the Police Court Judgment stating 
that article 6 of the Convention did not grant the accused access to the case file. On 
15 March 1993, the Court of Cassation upheld the Court of Appeal judgment. 
Before the ECtHR, the applicant complained that his rights of defence had been 
infringed as he was denied access to his file and did not obtain copies of the 
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documents contained therein and this amounted to, in his view, a violation of 
article 6(1) taken together with article 6(3). Access to these facilities was essential 
in order to prepare an effective defence able to challenge the warden’s official 
report, which was good evidence in the absence of proof to the contrary and it was 
the sole piece of evidence supporting the case against him. The ECtHR found that 
the applicant should have been afforded access to the dossier as it was necessary 
for setting up an effective defence against the accusations brought against him. 
Specifically, it was necessary in order to challenge the official report concerning 
him. The Court concluded that “as he had not had such access, the applicant had 
been unable to prepare an adequate defence and had not been afforded equality 
of arms, contrary to the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention taken 
together with Article 6 para. 3”.4
The analysis of the above-mentioned case shows that the ECtHR perceives non-
disclosure as affecting the overall fairness of a criminal trial through its inevitable 
impact on the equality of arms. The lack of disclosure, in the form of denying 
the accused access to the case file, can amount to a violation of the principle of 
the equality of arms putting one party at a disadvantage vis à vis the other. If a 
defendant is denied access to the case file, especially in inquisitorial systems in 
which the trial will be based upon its content, he will not be able to present his 
case. The Court reached the same conclusion in applications that concerned the 
non-disclosure of a relevant document to the defence.5
The assessment of the issue of disclosure against the principle of the equality of 
arms is however, only one of the possible ways in which the ECtHR brings the issue 
of disclosure under the broader umbrella of Article 6 of the Convention.
 1.3 Right to an adversarial trial and disclosure
Another inherent element of the right to a fair trial is the adversarial nature that 
must characterise criminal proceedings. We have discussed that the core of this 
principle lies in the right of the parties to criminal proceedings to have knowledge 
of and comment upon all the evidence adduced by the other party in order to 
display an active role in influencing the court’s final decision. The disclosure of 
information lies at the core of this guarantee. The ECtHR, on various occasions, 
recalled the obligations stemming from the right to an adversarial procedure and 
in addition held that article 6(1) requires that “the prosecution authorities should 
disclose to the defence all material evidence in their possession for or against the 
accused”.6
The case law dealing with the right to an adversarial trial and disclosure can be 
roughly divided into two groups each dealing with a different form of disclosure 
Chapter 5
_______________________ 
4 Ibid. at para. 36. 
5 See Walston v. Norway, ECHR, no. 37372/97, 3 June 2003, para 58. In this case the Strasbourg Court held that the omis-
sion to communicate a relevant document to the accused, which in turn made it impossible for him to respond to it, had 
put him at disadvantage vis à vis the other party. 
6 Ex multis, P.G. and J.H. v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, no. 44787/98, 25 September 2001, para. 67.
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obligations.7 The first group covers situations where the prosecution has not met 
its obligation to disclose evidence to the defence.8 In several cases concerning 
the United Kingdom, the Strasbourg Court tackled the prosecutor’s tendency to 
withhold material from disclosure to the defence. The general rule stated by the 
Court affirmed that the fairness of criminal proceedings depends, inter alia, on 
the prosecutor disclosing all the material against or in favour of the accused.9 The 
prosecutor’s duty to disclose is also intertwined with the existence of competing 
interests which might outweigh the right to disclosure. 
The second group of ECtHR case law dealing with the right to an adversarial 
trial and disclosure concerns situations where the defence has not been given an 
opportunity to reply to a submission addressed to the Court by the office of the 
public prosecutor. This lack of disclosure assumes a different connotation. 
The case of J.J. v. The Netherlands is of assistance in showing the path followed by 
the ECtHR when dealing with these situations.10 The applicant had received an 
assessment of supplementary income tax for the year 1984 together with a fine. He 
had lodged an appeal, which had been declared inadmissible because the court 
registration fee had not been paid. The case reached the Dutch Supreme Court 
(Hoge Raad). The ECtHR was called to examine the procedure followed before 
the Hoge Raad by which the advocates-general to the Supreme Court submit 
an advisory opinion to the Court that is not disclosed to the defence. A crucial 
role was played by the function of the advocates-general to the Supreme Court 
which according to the Dutch Judicial Organisation Act (Wet op de rechterlijke 
organisatie), at the time, belonged to the organisation of the Procurator-General’s 
department (openbaar ministerie) and acted as deputies to the Procurator-
General. Their advisory opinion to the Supreme Court “takes the form of a learned 
treatise”, which includes references to relevant case-law, legal literature and a 
recommendation, which is not binding, to uphold or reject points of appeal”.11 In 
J.J. v. The Netherlands, the advisory opinion, although not taking position on the 
defence’s arguments, expressed the view that the judgment impugned was correct 
and “gave extensive reasons why the alternative submission should be rejected.”12 
The applicant did not receive a copy of the advisory opinion 
Before the ECtHR the applicant claimed that article 6(1) had been violated insofar 
as he was not able to have knowledge of the submission of the advocate-general 
and to respond to it. The Court noted the similarities between the procedure under 
examination and the procedure before the Belgian Court of Cassation, which had 
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11 J.J. v. The Netherlands, ECHR, no. 21351/93, 27 March 1998, para.  29.
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already been assessed in previous cases.13 Further to this, it acknowledged that the 
purpose of the advisory opinion is to safeguard the consistency of the case law of 
the Supreme Court and that the Procurator-General’s department has a clear duty 
to act with the strictest impartiality. 
However, the ECtHR attached great importance to the role of the advocates-
general and to the content and effects of his submissions. It considered that the 
latter, although objective and justified in law was aimed at advising (and therefore 
influencing) the Supreme Court. Consequently, the defendant should have been 
in the position to know its content and decide whether or not to respond to it. 
The Court concluded that “the fact that it was impossible for the applicant to reply 
to it before the Supreme Court took its decision infringed his right to adversarial 
proceedings”.14 The right to have knowledge of and comment on all evidence 
adduced or observations filed applied also to submissions filed by an independent 
member of the national legal service.
From this judgment, it is possible to infer the orientation of the Strasbourg Court 
towards this type of non-disclosure. In addition, it makes clear the connection 
between disclosure and the right to an adversarial trial. The Court considers that it 
is only for the defence to decide whether or not a submission deserves a response. 
This principle also applies in cases where the submission in question originates 
from an independent body. By not disclosing the advisory opinion, the procedure 
affects the defence right to have knowledge of it and to assess the opportunity to 
present arguments to the Supreme Court in relation to its content. The influencing 
potential of the recommendation included in the opinion is not counterbalanced 
by the representation to the judges of the defence position on the opinion itself. 
Non-disclosure therefore leads to the infringement of the right to an adversarial 
trial.  
Moreover, in Kerojärvi v. Finland the ECtHR had already stated that the right to a fair 
trial requires “that the applicant himself should have been given the opportunity to 
assess their [of the documents not transmitted to him] relevance and weight and to 
formulate any such comments as he deemed appropriate”.15 The Court stressed the 
importance of the defence’s assessment of non-disclosed submissions as the only 
possibility for the defence to make an informed decision on the strategy to follow 
(to respond to them or not). 
The Strasbourg Court seems to attach no weight to the relevance of the submission 
for the outcome of the proceedings. In F.R. v. Switzerland, the ECtHR made clear 
that “the effect which the observations actually had on the judgment …is of little 
consequence”.16
Also the possibility that the content of the non-disclosed submission had been 
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repeated in a public hearing was considered of no relevance.17 In the case of Lanz v. 
Austria, as with the cases examined above, the defence had not been served with a 
submission that the Procurator General had addressed to the court. The government 
argued that because an oral hearing was held where the Senior Public Prosecutor 
essentially repeated his written submissions, there was no need to provide these 
observations to the applicant. The Court relied on the case of Brandstetter v. 
Austria (judgment of 28 August 1991), where it had found a breach of Article 6 § 1 
on account of the failure of the Court of Appeal to communicate observations to 
the accused that had been filed by the Senior Public Prosecutor. In that particular 
case the Court did not attach any weight to the fact that upon Mr. Brandstetter’s 
appeal hearings were held before the Court of Appeal. The ECtHR found that such 
a procedure violated article 6(1) and stated that “in a system where the filing of 
written observations by the parties before a hearing is not excluded and where a 
court, therefore, when deliberating on a case has at its disposal in addition to oral 
statements made at a hearing written statements filed beforehand, a party which is 
not informed about written submissions of the opposing party and thus deprived 
from reacting thereto is put at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis its opponent”.18
As a concluding remark, in relation to this second group of Strasbourg jurisprudence 
on the right to an adversarial trial and disclosure, it is interesting to stress that 
in cases such as J.J. v. The Netherlands where the submission to the Court “takes 
the form of a learned treatise”, which includes references to relevant case-law, 
legal literature and a recommendation, no competing interest can be invoked to 
corroborate the claim for non-disclosure as the material on which the submission 
is based has already been disclosed. 
In the previous chapter, it was illustrated how the principle of the equality of arms 
and the right to an adversarial trial seem to lack a precise identity and definition in 
the case law of the ECtHR which has given the impression that they are intertwined 
if not interchangeable in their application. This approach is also followed in relation 
to the case law on the disclosure of information.  
For example in Užukauskas v. Lithuania, the ECtHR found that the decision-making 
procedure adopted before the Lithuanian courts had not complied “with the 
requirement of adversarial proceedings or equality of arms and did not incorporate 
adequate safeguards to protect the interests of the applicant” and concluded that 
a violation of article 6(1) had occurred.19 This case, although not a criminal case, 
assists in highlighting the Court’s approach towards the disclosure of information 
in relation to the equality of arms principle and the right to an adversarial trial.  
The applicant had been listed in a database containing information gathered by 
law-enforcement authorities and as a consequence his licence to keep firearms 
had been revoked and he had been ordered to hand in his weapons to the police. 
The applicant’s challenge to the decision before a national court was dismissed 
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on the basis of classified material that the court received from the police that 
the applicant was not allowed to examine. The Court held that “the applicant’s 
listing in the operational records file had been lawful and reasoned, in view of the 
information about the applicant held by the police”.20 The Supreme Administrative 
Court upheld the decision and stated, inter alia, that the evidence in question was 
classified as a state secret and could not be disclosed to the applicant although the 
court had reviewed it. 
The ECtHR noted that in order to assess whether the applicant’s name had been 
listed in an operational records file without proper reason the judges had to 
examine among other things, “the reason for the police operational activities and 
the nature and extent of the applicant’s suspected participation in alleged crime”.21 
The information in the operational file was therefore crucial to the court’s decision. 
The ECtHR highlighted that the applicant had asked several times, in vain, for 
the disclosure of the file. Consequently, he had been precluded from familiarising 
himself with the evidence against him on which the court had based its findings. 
As mentioned above, the ECtHR concluded that the decision-making procedure 
adopted before the Lithuanian courts had not complied “with the requirement 
of adversarial proceedings or equality of arms and did not incorporate adequate 
safeguards to protect the interests of the applicant”.22
The way in which the Court made reference to the two principles in the judgment 
seems to suggest that it does not consider them so fundamental as to confer them an 
independent definition in relation to the disclosure of information. Consequently, 
it is not uncommon that a lack of disclosure of information can be considered by 
the Court to have affected the fairness of criminal proceedings by compromising 
the equality of arms and/or the adversarial nature of the proceedings itself. 
2. Article 6(3) and the disclosure of information
 2.1 Article 6(3)(a)
As far as the guarantee of article 6(3)(a) is concerned, it is evident that the 
knowledge of the accusation against an individual is an essential element for an 
effective defence. This can also be considered as an initial disclosure of the essence 
of the case against the suspect. The previous section illustrated how the cause and 
the nature of the accusation are the subject of the right to be informed regulated by 
article 6(3)(a). The cause of the accusation concerns the acts the accused is alleged 
to have committed on which the accusation is based, whereas the nature pertains 
to the legal qualification given to these material facts. The ECtHR “considers that 
in criminal matters the provision of full, detailed information to the defendant 
concerning the charges against him – and consequently the legal characterisation 
that the court might adopt in the matter – is an essential prerequisite for ensuring 
Chapter 5
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that the proceedings are fair”.23
What is important, particularly in civil law jurisdictions, is the moment from 
which this right operates. The issue is complicated by the friction between the 
individual’s right to know that he is being investigated and the interest in ensuring 
the preliminary investigation is efficient and on occasion, secret. The provision of 
article 6(3)(a) states that a person must be informed of the accusation against him. 
The accusations do not necessarily amount to an official criminal charge, which 
are usually formalised in the indictment. The latter can be drafted at the end of 
the preliminary investigation and therefore if the indictment were assumed to be 
the object of the provision it would imply that the suspect could remain ignorant 
of the investigation until the very last moment. This scenario would jeopardise the 
effectiveness of the individual’s right to adequate time and facilities to prepare his 
defence, especially in systems that attach great value to the results of the pre-trial 
investigation. A possible conclusion is therefore that the provision of article 6(3)
(a) often finds its first application at a moment that precedes the notification of the 
indictment.24
A central element of this guarantee in relation to disclosure is the certainty of the 
legal characterisation of the accusation. If during the proceedings the conduct of 
the alleged perpetrator is characterised differently from a legal point of view, the 
new legal characterisation must be the object of timely information to the accused 
in order to allow him to adjust his defence strategy accordingly. Therefore, an initial 
disclosure of the nature and cause of the accusation is not sufficient. Disclosure 
must be reiterated in any instance where different legal characterisations of the 
accusation occur. 
The Court tackled this issue, inter alia, in the case of Sadak and others v. Turkey 
where the applicant had been charged with the crime of treason against the integrity 
of the state but on the day of the judgment, 8 December 1994, the charge had been 
re-characterised by the prosecutor as belonging to an armed organisation set up for 
the purpose of destroying the integrity of the state.25 The National Security Court 
had asked the defendants to prepare their defence on the spot against this new 
charge, namely belonging to an illegal armed organisation. It had then dismissed 
their application for additional time to prepare their defence against the new 
charge. The applicants submitted that they had not been able to defend themselves 
properly and present their evidence against the new charge.
In assessing the alleged violation of article 6(3)(a) the Court considered “that 
in criminal matters the provision of full, detailed information to the defendant 
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concerning the charges against him – and consequently the legal characterisation 
that the court might adopt in the matter – is an essential prerequisite for ensuring 
that the proceedings are fair”.26 Moreover, the ECtHR stated that “sub-paragraphs 
(a) and (b) of Article 6 § 3 are connected and that the right to be informed of 
the nature and the cause of the accusation must be considered in the light of the 
accused right to prepare his defence”.27 The Court, therefore, ascertained whether 
it was foreseeable for the accused that such change in the legal characterisation 
of the offence might occur. It answered in the negative considering that the two 
crimes were different in both their material and their mental constituent elements. 
It concluded that a violation of the defence’s right to be informed of the nature and 
causes of the accusation against him and to have adequate time and facilities to 
prepare his defence had occurred. However, from the reasoning employed by the 
Court, it seems arguable that if the accused could have foreseen the change in the 
legal characterisation in light of the constituent elements of the crimes the ECtHR 
would have not found a violation.28
 2.2 Article 6 (3)(b)
Article 6(3)(b) grants every person charged with a criminal offence the right to have 
adequate time and facilities at his disposal in order to prepare his defence. The 
disclosure of information is the most relevant among the “adequate facilities” the 
accused has the right to enjoy in the preparation of his defence. It seems inevitable 
that in order to have a concrete opportunity to mount an effective defence the 
accused must not only be informed of the accusation against him (article 6(3)(a)) 
but he must also have knowledge of the material at the basis of the case against him. 
In this regard, the Strasbourg Commission stated that under article 6(3)(b) “the 
accused must have the opportunity to organize his defence in an appropriate way 
and without restrictions as to the possibility to put all relevant defence arguments 
before the trial court, and thus to influence the outcome of the proceedings”.29 It 
appears logical that in order to be able to put all relevant arguments before the court 
the accused must be granted disclosure of the material forming the foundation of 
the case against him. 
In Jesper v. Belgium, the ECtHR discussed the nature of the facilities a defendant 
should enjoy in accordance with article 6(3)(b).30 In this case, the applicant was 
a former examining judge at the court of Ghent who had been found guilty and 
was sentenced to twenty years hard labour for the attempted murder of his wife, 
aggravated theft, forgery, slanderous accusations and the carrying firearms. The 
applicant complained that the prosecutor had not made several reports drawn up 
by the police available in the trial and that a “special folder” containing certain 
documents and letters sent by third parties to the prosecutor had not been inserted 
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in the case file that he did have access to. 
The Commission pointed out that the facilities that the defendant must be granted 
to prepare his defence include “the opportunity to acquaint himself with the results 
of investigations carried out throughout the proceedings”.31 Moreover, it clarified 
that although not explicitly mentioned in the text of the Convention, the right 
for the defendant to have access to the prosecution file can be inferred from the 
provisions of article 6(3)(b).32 In consideration of the diversity of the criminal 
systems of the state parties to the Convention the term “facilities” cannot have 
its scope restricted to acts performed during a particular period of the criminal 
proceedings. The Commission therefore concluded that any investigation carried 
out in connection with criminal proceedings and their results form part of the 
“facilities” envisaged by article 6(3)(b). In sum, “article 6(3)(b) recognizes the right 
of the accused to have at his disposal, for the purposes of exonerating himself or 
obtaining a reduction in his sentence, all relevant elements that have been or could 
be collected by the competent authorities”.33 If the relevant element is a document 
then access to that document is a necessary facility that must be granted to the 
defendant. 
The case of Jesper v. Belgium illustrates what seems to be some sort of overlap between 
the provision of 6(3)(b) and the principle of the equality of arms when disclosure 
of information is at stake. In this case we have seen that the main question the 
Commission had to answer was whether the prosecutor’s non-disclosure of certain 
material had violated the right of the defence under article 6(1) and/or article 6(3)
(b).34 The Commission recalled that the principle of the equality of arms “could 
be based not only on article 6(1) but also on article 6(3), especially sub-paragraph 
(b)”.35 This approach seems to suggest an almost interchangeable application of 
article 6(1) and 6(3)(b) in relation to disclosure. Trechsel, in relation to the Court’s 
approach towards the two paragraphs of article 6 and disclosure, notes that “the 
distinction between ‘lack of fairness by reason of a failure to disclose’ or by a lack of 
‘adequate facilities for the preparation of the defence’ is particularly difficult”. 36 
 2.3 Article 6(3)(c)
The issue of the disclosure of information also has bearings in relation to article 
6(3)(c). Specifically, although the right to legal assistance is usually linked to the 
accused’s right to have adequate facilities to prepare his defence or, more generally, 
to the right to an adversarial hearing, it is contended that the right to legal assistance 
entails, as an implicit element, the right to disclosure of the evidence against the 
accused. 
Several considerations seem to corroborate such an assumption. We have seen that 
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the ECtHR has clarified that the Convention guarantees rights which are practical 
and effective and not theoretical or illusory and this is particularly so in relation to 
the rights of the defence.37 In addition, it is settled jurisprudence of the Strasbourg 
Court that the mere assignment of a lawyer to an accused is not per se sufficient to 
ensure the effectiveness of the assistance he may afford to his client.38
The core elements of the legal assistance for an accused person in a criminal trial 
can be divided into two parts. First, the lawyer plays a supervisory role. He puts 
his skills and knowledge of the procedure at the service of the accused in order to 
guarantee that the authorities respect his rights during the proceedings. This first 
aspect also involves moral and psychological support that a professional can offer 
to his client in a situation of distress. The second and more constructive aspect 
of the legal assistance is to ensure that the accused can play an active role in the 
proceedings influencing its course and outcome.39
Bearing these considerations in mind, several questions arise. Can a defence be 
considered effective if the role played by the lawyer is limited to being the guardian 
of procedural regularity? How can a lawyer influence the course of the proceedings 
in a favourable way to his client? Is the disclosure of the case against the accused, 
both in relation to the charges and the evidence gathered, a condicio sine qua non 
to ensure that the accused can play an active role in the proceedings? 
The accused has the right, both practical and effective, to legal assistance. The 
defence’s effectiveness is not related to the outcome of the proceedings, which 
depends on the circumstances of the case and the ability and the skills of the 
lawyer, but concerns the possibility to influence the course of the proceedings. In 
other words, the appointed lawyer must be put in a position to be effective so to be 
an influencing factor in the development of the proceedings. Therefore, answering 
the first of the above questions, a defence counsel whose only task is to verify that 
the correct procedure is followed by the authorities, cannot be considered effective. 
Assigning that kind of legal assistance and maintaining that it complies with the 
procedural requirements would strip it of any practical meaning. In fact, the 
defence counsel would be playing a passive role with no opportunity to ensure the 
accused person a constructive attitude throughout the proceedings. This scenario 
would contradict the ECtHR jurisprudence that stresses that the legal assistance 
serves the interest of justice and fairness as it enables “the applicant to make an 
effective contribution to the proceedings.”40
In relation to the possibility to influence the proceedings and to the disclosure 
of information, it follows from the above that to make an effective contribution 
to the proceedings the defence lawyer must be able to confer with his client in 
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private and to have access to the case file. It is only through the knowledge of the 
prosecutor’s case and the indication and instructions obtained by the accused 
in relation to the case file that a lawyer can carry out an informed and effective 
defence. Consequently, it is argued that, although not the central element of the 
guarantee of article 6(3)(c), it is possible to consider the disclosure of information 
as an element which contributes to the effectiveness of the right to legal assistance. 
 2.4 Article 6(3)(d)
In order to best prepare for the examination of a witness called before criminal 
proceedings by the opposite party it is necessary to know the identity of the witness 
in question. This is relevant not only to test the reliability of his testimony on the 
events but also to be able to assess his personal credibility through a thorough 
analysis of his background. However, it is not always possible to disclose the 
identity of witnesses because competing interests may suggest otherwise. This 
problem is experienced almost exclusively by the defence with particular reference 
to undercover police officers who were actively engaged in the investigation, 
witnesses at risk of reprisals and victims who need to be afforded special protection. 
The ECtHR accepted the possibility that the information in relation to identity 
and whereabouts etc. of witnesses might not be disclosed to the defence when 
competing interests so require. It also made clear that once such non-disclosure 
takes place the defence is obliged to work in a challenging environment, which 
should not be the defining part of the proceedings. Therefore, appropriate measures 
to counterbalance the restriction of the defence rights should be put in place by the 
competent authorities. This is a general principle that applies to disclosure and 
in the specific issue of anonymous witnesses finds its implementation through 
the adoption of techniques that might accommodate the need to test the witness 
evidence with the necessity to preserve his anonymity. 
In Kostowski v. Netherlands, the ECtHR summarised the problem of non-disclosure 
of the identity of witnesses stating that “if the defence is unaware of the identity of 
the person it seeks to question, it may be deprived of the very particulars enabling 
it to demonstrate that he or she is prejudiced, hostile or unreliable. Testimony or 
other declarations inculpating an accused may well be designedly untruthful or 
simply erroneous and the defence will scarcely be able to bring this to light if it 
lacks the information permitting it to test the author’s reliability or cast doubt on 
his credibility. The dangers inherent in such a situation are obvious”.41
Where the preservation of anonymity is considered reasonable and justified by 
the competent court it remains to be seen whether the defence has been granted 
procedural measures sufficient to counterbalance the difficulties stemming from 
the non-disclosure of the witness’ identity. This was the assessment made by the 
ECtHR in the case of Doorson v. The Netherlands where it found that there were 
sufficient reasons, in the particular circumstances of the case, not to disclose 
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the identity of the witnesses referred to as Y15 and Y16. Furthermore, the Court 
noted that the anonymous witnesses were questioned at the appeals stage by an 
investigating judge in the presence of the counsel for the applicant (who remained 
unaware of their identity). The defence counsel was able to ask any question he 
considered in the interest of the defence except those, which might lead to the 
disclosure of the witnesses’ identity. Consequently, the ECtHR concluded that no 
violations of article 6 had occurred as the measures undertaken were sufficient to 
counterbalance the difficulties caused by the non-disclosure.42
3. What material should be disclosed and when?
As anticipated in the introduction, the second part of the chapter tackles several 
defining characteristics of the issue of disclosure. However, before turning to this 
analysis it seems important to provide the answer to the following question: What 
is the meaning of the general notion of information? Or in other words, what is the 
subject matter of disclosure? The case law of the ECtHR assists in finding an answer 
to this question.
The procedural stage of criminal proceedings is an important element when 
assessing what the object of disclosure is. The subject matter of disclosure differs 
according to the stage of the criminal proceedings in which it occurs. Therefore, 
a (procedural) chronological approach must be followed to single out what the 
Convention and the ECtHR case law have identified as information that must be 
disclosed.
The previous section described how article 5 of the European Convention 
grants specific rights to persons deprived of their liberty because of, inter alia, a 
reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence.43 Among the guarantees 
that a person arrested enjoys is the right to be informed of the reasons for his arrest 
and the charge against him.44 The disclosure obligation in this phase clearly only 
concerns the reasons for a person’s arrest. This is understandable considering that 
the arrest is a measure taken during a preliminary investigation where evidence 
is still being gathered in order to assess the reasonableness of the suspicion upon 
which the suspect is detained. This kind of disclosure concerns the information 
about the “essential legal and factual grounds for his arrest”.45 The ECtHR has 
examined the sufficiency of the information disclosed in relation to the possibility 
of mounting an effective challenge to the detention in the proceedings regulated 
by article 5(4) and aimed at assessing the lawfulness of the detention. Specifically, 
the Strasbourg Court has considered the information adequate when it is a “fairly 
precise indication of the suspicion”, which enables the applicant to gain an idea of 
what he was suspected of.46
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Moving to article 6(3)(a), the Convention envisages the disclosure of the nature 
and cause of the accusation to every person charged with a criminal offence. Once 
again, at this stage the disclosure obligation concerns the accusations against a 
person, which in turn enables an effective defence. In the previous section it was 
noted that the cause of the accusation concerns the acts the accused is alleged to 
have committed and on which the accusation is based, whereas the nature pertains 
to the legal qualification given to these material facts. The ECtHR illustrated that 
the information must be disclosed in detail and it must always be sufficient for the 
accused to be able to “understand fully the extent of the charges against him with a 
view to preparing an adequate defence”.47 Therefore, the information must clearly 
state the facts underlying the charge and the circumstances, place, time and any 
accomplices the accused allegedly has. 
The provisions of article 5(2) and 6(3)(a) envisage a disclosure obligation 
incumbent upon the authorities and aims to provide a framework within which 
further disclosure takes place. The latter, in its more classical notion, includes 
material, documents, witness statements and more general access to the case file. 
Stavros refers to two different kinds of rules of disclosure: those which provide the 
defence with an appraisal of the prosecutor’s case before trial, and those which 
provide the defence with the material in the prosecutor’s possession that is relevant 
for forming the defence.48
Among the facilities contemplated in article 6(3)(b), disclosure is certainly the 
most relevant for the defence. In Jesper v. Belgium, the Commission made clear that 
the facilities include the opportunity for the person charged with a criminal offence 
“to acquaint himself, for the purpose of preparing his defence, with the results 
of investigations carried out throughout the proceedings”.49 The disclosure of 
information, intended as knowledge of the results of the preliminary investigation, 
in principle involves all the material gathered by the authorities. It is difficult 
to draw a complete list of the possible fruits of an investigation and in turn, of 
what the object of disclosure should be. However, a non-exhaustive list includes 
the transcripts of the interrogations that the police, the investigating and the 
prosecuting authorities have carried out with the defendants and the witnesses, 
pictures of the crime scene, reports of searches, experts’ opinions, documents 
seized, maps, transcripts of  recorded conversations etc.
The Commission stated that any investigation “carried out in connection with 
criminal proceedings and the findings thereof…form part of the facilities within the 
meaning of article 6(3)(b) of the Convention”.50  In principle, all material collected 
during the investigation should be the object of disclosure to the defendant as 
long as it is relevant for the preparation of his defence (unless competing interests 
conflict with full disclosure). The Strasbourg Court clarified this principle stating 
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that “if the element in question [collected by the authorities] is a document, access 
to that document is a necessary facility” if it concerns an act of which the defendant 
is accused.51
The relevance of a specific item collected by the authorities can only be evaluated with 
reference to the circumstances of the case in question. The case of Papageorgiou v. 
Greece, provides a good example of the way in which the specific circumstances of a 
case are determinant for assessing the relevance of an item.52 The applicant, a former 
employee of the Bank of Greece, was convicted of fraud for having forged seven 
cheques, which were debited to the account for Greek Railways. Mr. Papageorgiou 
had requested the original seven cheques in all three domestic proceedings. The 
request was never allowed. The ECtHR noted that at no stage of the proceedings 
were the domestic courts able to assess the conformity of the original cheques from 
the copies given. It concluded that in relation to the circumstances of the case at 
stake “the production of the original cheques was vital to the applicant’s defence 
since it would have enabled him…to show that the instructions for the payment in 
issue had been given by employees of the bank other than him, which would have 
compelled the judges to conclude that the accusation of fraud was unfounded”.53
Continuing with the analysis of the subject matter of disclosure, we have already 
discussed that a submission to the Court filed by the opposing party or even an 
advisory opinion originating from an independent member of the national legal 
system can be the object of disclosure.
Interestingly, disclosure may also concern elements and circumstances which, 
although not included in the prosecution’s case might be relevant for the accused’s 
defence. Having said that, there are elements that bear no relevance to the 
prosecution’s case, which will not be used at trial. For example, interviews with 
persons whose position was initially considered suspicious but in the course of the 
investigation transpired to be extraneous to the events. However, what is irrelevant 
from the perspective of the prosecutor can be evaluated differently in the context of 
the defence’s strategy. The inversion of points of view allows a completely different 
evaluation of the same event. While a fruitless search of a house is merely an 
unfortunate step for the prosecutor in the course of the investigation, from the 
defence’s perspective it can be an element able to corroborate its version of events. 
A good example can be found in the case of Edwards v. The United Kingdom, where 
the applicant was convicted, inter alia, on one count of robbery and two counts 
of burglary. The jury reached the verdict by a majority of ten votes to two. One 
more vote in favour of the applicant and he would have been acquitted. The main 
evidence at trial consisted in the oral admission that Mr. Edwards had allegedly 
made to the police officers in three separate interrogations. The applicant had 
not signed such statements and contended that the police had concocted them. 
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The victim of the robbery was an 82 year old woman who gave a statement to the 
police describing the perpetrator and stating that she would be able to recognise 
him again. She was not called as a witness although her statement was read to the 
jury. Following sentencing, the applicant petitioned the Secretary of State for the 
Home Department complaining about the conduct of the police officers who had 
investigated his case and given testimony at trial. During the independent police 
investigation that followed, two issues arose. First, the police officers’ testimony 
that no fingerprints had been found on the crime scene was not correct, in fact 
two fingerprints belonging to the next-door neighbour had been found. Second, 
it appeared that during the investigation the police had shown two volumes of 
pictures of possible burglars to the victim, including Mr. Edwards, and she did 
not pick out the applicant from the photographs. Both facts had been withheld 
from the defence. The report, which ended the independent police investigation, 
recommended disciplinary action for the police officers but was not disclosed to 
the defence on the grounds of public interest immunity. 
The applicant appealed the judgment. The Appeal Court did not hear the police 
officers and did not have at its disposal the independent police investigation’s 
report. However, it was aware of the shortcomings detected by that investigation. 
It rejected the defence arguments that the abovementioned shortcomings in the 
prosecution case had affected the verdict (which the defence considered unsafe 
and unsatisfactory) and consequently dismissed the appeal.
The ECtHR found no violation of article 6(1) of the Convention as in its view the 
defects in the first instance trial were subsequently remedied before the Court 
of Appeal. However, the Court acknowledged that the lack of disclosure of the 
circumstances related to the fingerprints and the failure of the victim to pick the 
applicant when showed photographs constituted shortcomings of the first instance 
trial. In one of the two dissenting opinions appended to the judgment54 it was 
stated that “the failure of the police to disclose these facts to the defence and to the 
jury fundamentally vitiated the fairness of the trial”. 55
Finally, the identity of the witnesses that a party intends to call to give testimony at 
trial should also in principle be told to the other party in order to allow it to prepare 
for cross-examination in accordance with article 6(3)(d). However, as has been 
discussed in this section, there may be exceptions to disclosure when anonymity is 
necessary to protect the witnesses, inter alia, from the risk of possible reprisals. The 
difficulties faced by the defence because of the non-disclosure of the witnesses’ 
identity must be counterbalanced by the procedure followed by the judicial 
authorities. The Court is in charge of assessing the efficacy of such measures.56 
Summing up we can conclude that through the analysis of the ECtHR case law the 
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obligation to disclose, whether they rest on the authorities or on the parties and 
according to different stages of the proceedings, include but are not limited to, the 
following elements:
• The reasons for the arrest of a person due, inter alia, to the suspicion he has 
committed an offence;
• Detailed information of the acts a person charged with a criminal offense is 
alleged to have committed and of the legal qualification given to these material 
facts;
• “Access” to or “discovery” of the relevant material, gathered during the preliminary 
investigations, which may vary according to the specific circumstances of the 
case;
• Submissions to the court by the other party to the proceedings and advisory 
opinions filed by an independent member of the national legal system;
• Facts, events and circumstances that, although not included in the case file, 
might be relevant for the accused’s defence;
• Identity of witnesses called to give testimony at trial, unless their anonymity is 
necessary to protect them from the risk of possible reprisals.
4. The inherent problem of disclosure
There are two main definitions of the verb to disclose in the English vocabulary. 
The first one is “to make something publicly known, especially after it has been 
kept secret”, and the second is “to show something by removing the thing that 
covers it”.57 In both cases, the verb stresses the passage of something from secrecy 
to the knowledge of one or more individuals. It pertains to the action of unveiling 
something in order to making it available to the knowledge of others who were 
not aware of it. To disclose information in criminal proceedings, using its literal 
meaning, implies that the information is not known by the party asking for its 
disclosure. It is in this simple consideration the inherent problem of disclosure in 
criminal proceedings lies and which can be summarised by a question: how can 
somebody request and justify the disclosure of specific material if he is not aware 
of its existence or its content? 
In criminal proceedings, the problem is felt particularly, but not exclusively, by 
the defence. Specifically, considering that all the material gathered during the 
preliminary investigation is in the hands of the authorities, how can the defendant 
know what should be disclosed to him? Two major problems become clear in this 
regard. The first concerns the actual knowledge of the existence of the material in 
question and the second is related to the demonstration of the relevance of such 
material for the defence’s case.
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In relation to the first problem, it will always be necessary to show some trust in the 
righteous conduct of the prosecuting authorities in carrying out their disclosure 
obligations. Specifically, they must be expected and believed “to disclose to the 
defence material evidence, which contains such particulars which could enable the 
accused to exonerate himself or have his sentence reduced”.58 A distinction must be 
made between material which becomes part of the case-file or is used at trial and 
material which is not included in the file and is not used at trial. In relation to the 
second the defence holds a rather weak position as the reliance on the prosecution 
authorities is at its most acute. 
However, asides from the inevitable reliance on the authorities to identify 
the material to be disclosed, the defence can also play a constructive role in 
the individuation of such material which is not included in the case file.  The 
central element for enabling the defence to play such a role effectively seems to 
be the unrestricted access to legal assistance that can follow the investigation. 
By monitoring the unfolding of the preliminary investigations, the defence will 
be aware of the steps taken by the authorities and their potential outcome. For 
example, by knowing of, and possibly participating in a search of a house it will 
be possible to know the material gathered and assess its possible relevance to the 
defence’s case. The unrestricted access to legal assistance is a necessary tool for 
following the investigation’s developments. Moreover, the defendant is the person 
who has the best knowledge of his conduct and often the circumstances of the 
case. Consequently, he can instruct his lawyer as to what could have been found by 
the authorities in relation to acts of the investigation. This is not an exhaustive list 
but it shows that although the role played by the authorities in disclosure is still 
determinant, there is some room for the defence in the categorisation of material 
possibly held by the authorities whose disclosure can be requested. 
In relation to the need to show relevance of the material whose disclosure is 
pursued, the ECtHR has considered that the right to disclosure does not equate to 
an absolute right to ask for an extensive general disclosure of all the material held 
by the authorities.  Therefore, some kind of proof that the material in question is 
necessary for the preparation of the defence must be given. Indeed, it would be 
difficult to conceive of a system of disclosure in which the defence can claim an 
unlimited and unqualified right to inspect the case material as such a system would 
be prone to be abuse by defence lawyers. The difficulties arise when the fairness of 
the threshold required must be assessed. 
In Jespers v. Belgium the applicant had complained, inter alia, that the lack of 
disclosure of the content of a so-called “special folder” internal to the prosecuting 
authorities had violated his rights of defence.59 He contended that the folder 
might contain reports not made available to the defence and letters from third 
parties concerning the trial, which should have been disclosed if such documents 
suggested an exoneration of the accused. 
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The Commission assessed the complaint and noted that the applicant could “not be 
expected to specify from amongst the documents in the special folder concerning 
his case those which were relevant and should have been made available to him 
for inspection since the very cause of his complaint is that he never had access to 
that special folder”. However, it stressed that the defence had not been able, even 
after having been allowed to inspect three other files produced by the prosecutor, 
to give even the “slightest evidence” that the special folder in question included 
a document whose content might have been necessary for the preparation of 
the defence.60 It concluded that, “in the absence of any conclusive evidence” no 
violation of article 6(3)(b) had occurred. 
In Bendenoun v. France, the ECtHR stated that in relation to the request of disclosure 
of certain material in the possession of the prosecutor “it is necessary, at the very 
least, that the person concerned should have given, even if only briefly, specific 
reasons for his request”.61 In the case at stake, the Court noted that the accused had 
already admitted the customs offence in parallel proceedings and in the absence 
of any precise arguments supporting his contention that the undisclosed material 
was necessary to counter the charge of tax evasion, no violation of the applicant’s 
rights of defence was found. In Natunen v. Finland, discussed above, the ECtHR 
reiterated that the accused may be “expected to give specific reasons for his request 
[in relation to disclosure] and the domestic courts are entitled to examine the 
validity of these reasons”.62
These examples show that the Strasbourg Court requires defendants to back up 
their request for disclosure by meeting a prima facie argument as to the relevance 
of such material to their case. In Jespers the Court found that even though the 
applicant had established the existence of a “special folder” in light of the failure to 
prove that the material contained therein could be of exculpatory nature it was not 
sufficient. Stavros questions whether the Court was fair in considering that a prima 
facie case had not been met by establishing the existence of the internal “special 
folder”.63 He argues that in a situation where the competent authorities might have 
relevant material suggesting a violation of the defendant’s rights, the benefit of 
doubt should operate in his favour and consequently the threshold of proof should 
be lowered. It seems reasonable to argue that if the defence succeeds in proving 
a prima facie case as to the existence and relevance of the material object of the 
disclosure request, then it should be up to the prosecutor to prove either that such 
material does not exist or that it is irrelevant for the defence’s case. 
So far, we have discussed the issue from the perspective of the defence. However, 
the case law of the ECtHR shows that it can also have bearings in relation to the 
prosecutor’s position. Specifically, the Court has dealt with the link between the 
privilege against self-incrimination and the compulsion to deliver documents to 
prosecuting authorities in the context of a criminal investigation. This request can 
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be considered as a form of compelled disclosure of material held by the defence 
and, although in a criminal investigation such compulsion does not per se violate 
the defence’s rights, the authorities must meet certain conditions in order to avoid 
an infringement of the defence’s right against self-incrimination. 
In the case of Funke v. France, the ECtHR found a violation of article 6(1) because 
the customs authorities had secured the applicant’s conviction in order to obtain 
certain documents that they believed must exist although they were unsure.64 Using 
the wording of the ECtHR, the customs authorities “being unable or unwilling to 
procure them [the documents] by some other means, they attempted to compel the 
applicant himself to provide the evidence of offences he had allegedly committed”.65 
The Court seems to be influenced by the case law of the American Supreme Court 
according to which a suspect may be compelled by the authorities to deliver 
existing documents only if the authorities know of their existence and of their 
possession by the accused.66 Differently such compulsion would equate to an 
infringement of the right against self-incrimination to the extent that the existence 
of the documents would be admitted by the accused through their delivery.67 In 
other words, a random and baseless request made by the prosecutor means that 
the existence of the documents in question depends on the (compelled) will of the 
accused to produce them. 
In J.B. v. Switzerland, the Swiss tax authorities requested the applicant produce 
all the documents in his possession concerning two companies in which he had 
invested. These investments had not been declared in the relative taxation period 
and tax evasion proceedings had been commenced against the applicant. The latter 
admitted to have invested in these companies and to have not properly declared the 
income in his tax forms but refused to submit the requested documents. When the 
applicant failed to produce the documents, the authorities imposed four penalties 
on him. 
Before the ECtHR, the authorities were not able to prove their knowledge of the 
existence of the documents that the applicant had been required to produce.68 The 
Court considered that the fact that the authorities had asked for the production 
of the documents on eight different occasions proved that they were not aware of 
their existence. The Court concluded that the applicant was compelled to produce 
documents that would lead to his incrimination. What the Court condemns is not 
the obligation to produce documents but the speculative nature of the authorities’ 
request, which leads to its conflict with the right against self-incrimination. What 
remains unclear is whether it is sufficient that the authorities prove their knowledge 
of the existence of the relevant documents and their possession by the accused or 
whether it is necessary to show knowledge of their content.
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5. The issue of prejudice
There is a link between the disclosure of information in criminal proceedings and 
the actual prejudice that the non-disclosure could cause the defence. Specifically, 
it is interesting to investigate whether the ECtHR requires the defence to establish 
that non-disclosure caused actual prejudice to its case or it deems sufficient that 
it demonstrates the relevance of such material to the defence case. In the first 
scenario, the problem arises considering the position of the accused who is called 
to show to have suffered some kind of prejudice in his defence without knowing the 
nature of the evidence withheld.
The two concepts are similar and sometimes difficult to distinguish. If something 
is relevant to the defence’s case it follows that its non-disclosure will have a 
potential prejudicial effect. In other words, relevance implies the possibility of 
prejudice in case of non-disclosure. However, proving that a piece of information 
is relevant to the defence’s case seems to have a lower threshold than proving that 
its non-disclosure caused actual prejudice to the defence. The difference lies in the 
adjectives “potential” and “actual” which characterise the substantive “prejudice”. 
To prove the relevance of an item of material to the defence’s case means that (once 
it has been established) refusing its disclosure could cause prejudice. On the other 
hand, having to prove the actual detrimental effect suffered by the defence as a 
result of non-disclosure means having to show that the defence’s case has suffered 
concrete and real damage. 
In the case of Korellis v. Cyprus, the ECtHR seems to focus on the relevance (of the 
time and facilities) to the preparation of the defence of the accused rather than on 
the actual prejudice. Consequently, it seems to be sufficient for the accused to have 
a prima facie case in relation to the alleged relevance of the material whose precise 
content cannot be known at the time of the complaint, in order to substantiate his 
demand for disclosure.69
The applicant was accused of rape and committed for trial before an Assize Court. 
The defence asked for the disclosure of a number of relevant documents in the 
prosecution’s possession and further requested that a forensic examination of the 
complainant’s knickers be carried out. The Assize Court granted the requests but 
the Supreme Court subsequently quashed the order. During the proceedings at the 
Assize Court, the prosecutor disclosed several documents requested by the defence 
but objected to the defence’s request to carry out forensic tests. Before the ECtHR, 
the applicant complained that he had been deprived of the opportunity to have his 
own scientific experts examine an important piece of evidence (the complainant’s 
knickers) which was in the prosecutor’s possession. The Court noted that “even 
if the applicant does not have to show actual prejudice to the defence due to the 
non-examination of the knickers, he still has to show the relevance of such an 
examination to the case against him”.70 In the case at stake the applicant failed to 
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do so and failed also to substantiate his argument that such an examination was of 
relevance to his defence.71
Furthermore, the ECtHR reaffirmed that “in any event the principle of the equality 
of arms does not depend on further, quantifiable unfairness flowing from a 
procedural inequality”.72 Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick, who consider that “the 
procedural deficiency in itself is a breach of the right to a fair trial”, also subscribe 
to this approach.73 When the lack of disclosure is examined by the ECtHR in the 
context of the principle of the equality of arms and the right to an adversarial 
trial, the Court seems to consider the actual prejudice irrelevant. In the case of 
Walston v. Norway, the ECtHR assessed the consequences of the lack of disclosure 
of a bank statement to the defence.74 The Court found that it “does not need to 
determine whether the omission to communicate the document caused the 
applicants prejudice; the existence of a violation is conceivable even in the absence 
of prejudice. It is for the applicants to judge whether or not a document calls for 
their comments”.75 The Court concluded that “the mere fact that the applicants 
were unable to respond meant that they were placed at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the 
Bank in the High Court proceedings, in a manner at variance with the fair hearing 
guarantee in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention”.76
However, in Kremzow v. Austria, where the issue at hand was the disclosure of 
the name of the judge rapporteur to the Attorney General’s Office and not to the 
defence, the Court concluded that this procedural imbalance was not enough to 
consider the proceedings unfair. It found that the “defence was not in any way 
prejudiced by the difference”.77 Trechsel contends that “some sort of detrimental 
effect” must be shown by the defence in order to reach a conclusion of unfairness.78
There seems to be a way of reconciling these apparently conflicting interpretations 
by focusing on the subject matter of the disclosure in relation to the fairness of 
the proceedings. Different kinds of imbalances may occur during a criminal trial 
leading to different conclusions on the overall fairness of the proceedings. Not every 
imbalance between the prosecutor and the defence will amount to the unfairness 
of the whole proceedings per se, unless it is coupled with a negative effect on the 
defence’s case. The nature of the imbalance must be the focus of the assessment. 
For example, neglecting to communicate the name of the judge rapporteur to the 
defence (as in the Kremzow case), presumably will have a limited effect on the 
fairness of proceedings and a negative effect on the defence should be shown in 
order to conclude otherwise. Nonetheless, a submission made by the prosecutor to 
the court has a different weight in relation to the proceedings’ fairness if the defence 
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is not granted the opportunity to respond. The latter omission can be considered 
in re ipsa violating the principle of the equality of arms insofar as “it is a matter 
for the defence to assess whether a submission deserves a reaction”.79 The inherent 
prejudice of the imbalance lies in the defence being deprived of the opportunity to 
assess the need for a reaction to the prosecutor’s submission.
In relation to the right to adequate time and facilities envisaged in article 6(3)(b) 
Trechsel argues that it seems to be necessary that the defence demonstrate some 
kind of prejudice has taken place.80 Stavros suggests that the Court should first 
assess whether, as a matter of fairness, a specific facility should have been granted 
to the accused. If the answer is prima facie negative then the defence will be asked 
to prove the existence of actual prejudice. On the contrary, when the answer is 
positive it would be for the respondent government to prove the lack of actual 
prejudice.81
6. The competing interests      
According to the ECtHR case law on disclosure, the general rule is that the 
right to a fair criminal trial under Article 6 includes a right to disclosure of all 
material evidence in the possession of the prosecution, both for and against the 
accused.82 However, the Court has also stated that the right to disclosure is not 
an absolute right and has acknowledged the existence of competing interests, 
which might justify a restriction of the defence’s entitlement to disclosure.83 The 
importance of the public interest in crime prevention and punishment cannot 
be underestimated and must be weighed against the rights of the defence when 
there are instances where, because of the public interest, disclosure of certain 
material is denied by the prosecution. The need to protect the identity of an 
undercover agent, to preserve the secrecy of a police method or to shield a 
witness who fears reprisal are just a few examples of a public interest that might 
be invoked to justify the non-disclosure of specific relevant material. 
On the one hand, the need to protect and guarantee the respect of the right of 
every person charged with a criminal offence to a fair trial is fundamental. On 
the other hand, the public interest requires that in every democratic society 
an effective crime control policy is enforced and its effectiveness must be 
safeguarded. The tension between these interests is self-evident. None of them 
can outweigh the other and consequently a fair equilibrium is the goal aimed 
for while assessing their relevance in a specific case. 
The ECtHR case law has singled out several fundamental principles that might 
assist in the attempt to confer the correct relevance to the competing interests at 
stake in cases concerning disclosure. These principles emerged through several 
judgments in which the Strasbourg Court examined the rules of disclosure in the 
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United Kingdom’s criminal procedure. 
In examining these cases the Court made clear what it sees as its role and to 
what extent it was willing to reassess the national courts’ decisions. The ECtHR 
explained that it is not its task to assess whether the non-disclosure was indeed 
strictly necessary. Such examination belongs to the domestic courts, which are in 
charge of assessing the evidence before them. The goal of the Strasbourg Court 
is “to ascertain whether the decision-making procedure applied in each case 
complied, as far as possible, with the requirements of adversarial proceedings and 
equality of arms and incorporated adequate safeguards to protect the interests of 
the accused”.84 
As we have seen in chapter one, on 16 February 2000, the Grand Chamber of the 
ECtHR delivered three judgments in relation to three cases involving the United 
Kingdom, where all the applicants had complained that non-disclosure by the 
prosecution of relevant evidence on the ground of public interest immunity had 
denied them a fair trial. They consequently contended that a violation of Article 
6(1) and 6 (3) (b) and (d) of the European Convention on Human Rights had 
occurred in their criminal proceedings. 
The first of these three judgments was delivered in the case of Rowe and Davis 
v. The United Kingdom, where the applicants were convicted of murder, assault 
and robbery in relation to three different incidents that occurred on the night 
of 15/16 December 1988. The prosecution during their trial at the Crown Court 
had unilaterally withheld, without notifying the court or the defence, evidence in 
relation to the fact that a witness had claimed a reward in order to testify against 
the accused. This information was relevant to the reliability of that specific 
witness. Only during the appeal trial the Court of Appeal had on two different 
occasions considered the relevant material and had ruled that the it should not 
be disclosed. The ECtHR first recalled two important principles established by its 
precedent jurisprudence. First, that there are legitimate circumstances where it 
may be necessary to withhold certain evidence from the defence so as to preserve 
the fundamental rights of another individual or to safeguard an important public 
interest. However, only such measures restricting the rights of the defence, which 
are strictly necessary, are permissible under Article 6 (1).85 Second, that in order 
to guarantee the accused a fair trial, any difficulties caused to the defence by a 
limitation on its rights must be sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures 
followed by the judicial authorities.86
The Court’s main finding in this judgment is that the “procedure, whereby the 
prosecution itself attempts to assess the importance of concealed information to 
the defence and weigh this against the public interest in keeping the information 
secret, cannot comply with the above-mentioned requirements of Article 6 (1)”.87 
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The Court stated that the trial judge is in the best position to decide the fairest weight 
to be attributed to the competing interests and to decide whether non-disclosure 
is strictly necessary in a specific case as he is “versed in all the evidence and issues 
of the case”.88  Consequently, the ECtHR concluded that the prosecution’s failure to 
lay the evidence in question before the trial judge and to permit him to rule on the 
question of disclosure deprived the applicants of a fair trial in violation of article 
6(1) of the Convention. 
In the case of Natunen v. Finland, the ECtHR made clear that this principle, which 
applies to the prosecutors, applies a fortiori to the police and the investigating 
authorities when they assess the relevance to the defence’s case of undisclosed 
material with no involvement of the defence or a third party.89 The applicant 
had been charged, together with two other co-defendants, with aggravated 
drugs offences consisting of importing a large quantity of amphetamine into 
Finland from Estonia. Mr. Natunen’s defence had asked the police whether 
all the phone calls between the codefendants had been included in the pre-
trial investigation. He also asked for a written confirmation that the telephone 
recording of all the conversations recorded between the three defendants could 
not be disclosed based on the confidentiality of such material. The police 
charted that all the phone calls, which pertained to the case, had been included 
in the file and also that they could not disclose the requested material because 
it was confidential. The codefendants were found guilty and sentenced to six 
and a half years’ imprisonment. The Court relied heavily on the recordings of 
telephone conversations to draw the conclusion that there had been a common 
understanding in relation to the plan to obtain drugs. The three codefendants 
appealed the judgment and asked the Appeal Court to order the disclosure of 
all the conversations recorded as, in their opinion, it would have shown that the 
dealing among them was related to other matters and did not concern drugs. 
The partial and selective recording attached to the pre-trial investigation file 
had misrepresented the association among the three. A hearing was held and 
the prosecutor communicated that the residual metering of the phone calls 
could not be disclosed as, according to the law in force at the time, it had been 
destroyed.90 Consequently, the Court of Appeal did not render a decision on 
the issue of disclosure and upheld the impugned sentence. The Supreme Court 
refused leave to appeal the Court of Appeal Judgment. 
The ECtHR made clear that “a procedure whereby the investigating authority itself, 
even when co-operating with the prosecution, attempts to assess what may or may 
not be relevant to the case, cannot comply with the requirements of Article 6 § 1”.91 
Such violation was even graver in the case at stake considering that the prejudice 
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suffered by the defence because of non-disclosure could not be remedied due to 
the destruction of the undisclosed material.
The other two cases decided by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR on 16 February 
2000 were Jasper v. The United Kingdom and Fitt v The United Kingdom.92 In both 
cases, during the trial, the prosecution made ex parte applications to the trial judge 
to withhold material in its possession on the ground of public interest immunity. 
The defences were notified of the application and could argue their cases before the 
trial judge but they had no knowledge about the category of material involved.93 
The trial judges, in both cases, analysed the material and ruled that it should not 
be disclosed. No reasons for this finding were given to the defence. 
The Court found no violation of the right to a fair trial and the principle of the 
equality of arms because, unlike in the case of Rowe and Davis, the ex parte 
applications had been made to the trial judge who “was fully versed in all the 
evidence and issues in the case and in a position to monitor the relevance to the 
defence of the withheld information both before and during the trial.”94 The Court 
was satisfied that the defence were kept informed and were permitted to make 
submissions and participate in the decision-making process as far as it was possible 
without revealing to them the material which the prosecution sought to keep secret 
on public interest grounds.
The Grand Chamber composed of the same seventeen judges delivered very tight 
verdicts in both cases, which were reached by nine votes to eight. The eight judges 
who did not accept the conclusions drawn by the majority appended dissenting 
opinions to the judgment. 
Some of the dissenting judges were not satisfied that the procedure followed by the 
English courts had been considered compliant with the principles of adversarial 
proceedings and equality of arms.95 They argued that the defence had been 
excluded by the decision making process which led to the exclusion of the material 
from disclosure. The fact that the defence could state their cases before the judges 
could not remedy the injustice of the procedure. The defence, in fact, were unaware 
of the nature of the evidence at stake and “it was purely a matter of chance whether 
they made any relevant points”.96 The judges felt that, in order to be able to fulfil his 
function in a fair trial, a judge should be informed by the opinions of both parties, 
not solely the prosecution. 
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Another dissenting opinion appended to these judgments reached the same 
conclusion through different reasoning. Its point of departure was the well-
established principle that “any measures restricting the rights of the defence should 
be strictly necessary. If a less restrictive measure can suffice then that measure 
should be applied.”97 The dissenting judge stressed how in the cases at stake, 
despite the government contending that there were insurmountable difficulties in 
this regard, there was a viable and less restrictive alternative measure able to protect 
both interests involved which ought to be preferred and was not. It referred to the 
appointment of a special counsel acting on behalf of the defence in the context of 
the ex parte application. This matter will be analysed below.98
 6.1 The role of the judge in relation to disclosure 
An interesting aspect of the conflict between the right to disclosure and the 
protection of the public interest is the position of the judge called to assess and 
decide over that conflict. The ECtHR tackled this issue in its case law. The Court 
first focused on the impartiality of the trial judge as a guarantee of the defence 
rights (or as a surrogate to the defence representation). It then went a step further 
analysing whether such impartiality is still an effective guarantee in situations 
where the judge, in the absence of the defence, is called to examine material (whose 
non-disclosure is sought by the prosecution) which he will have to discard when 
called to decide an issue of fact in that same criminal proceedings. 
In the cases of Jasper v. the United Kingdom and Fitt v The United Kingdom, the 
Court, albeit by a narrow majority, stressed the importance of the role of the trial 
judge in the evaluation of the relevant material whose non-disclosure was pursued. 
The fact that the prosecutor had made his ex parte application to the trial judge was 
deemed a determining factor in the assessment of the fairness of the procedure. 
The ECtHR considered that the defence interests were safeguarded by the impartial 
role of the trial judge called to examine the nature and the relevance for the defence 
case of the evidence that the prosecutor intended to withhold. 
However, doubts arise about what the court should or should not see. The full 
knowledge of the case by the trial judge and his impartiality were the essential 
elements that guided the ECtHR (in the cases of Jasper and Fitt) in considering 
him the appropriate organ for deciding on the prosecutor’s application. It is the 
trial judge who is best placed to assess the competing interests involved and decide 
whether the material at stake should be disclosed in the name of fairness. The 
trial judge’s impartiality must be preserved by all possible means.  Rejecting non-
disclosure applications implies the access to confidential material that could not 
be shown to the defence and may influence the opinion of the judge who is then 
called to decide an issue of fact or to deliver a verdict on the entire case where there 
is no jury. This was the concern of the minority of the judges in Jasper and Fitt. This 
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position was illustrated in their dissenting opinion in which the judges stated that 
the trial judge should not be put in the “uncomfortable position of having to see 
material and then having to discount it at a later stage of the proceedings when he 
has to decide an issue of fact.99
Interestingly, in another dissenting opinion appended to the judgment in the case 
of Jasper v. The United Kingdom, Judge Hedigan, while assessing whether domestic 
authorities could have followed a less restrictive approach in the management of 
the conflict of interests, drew the attention to a procedure adopted in Northern 
Ireland. Such a procedure foresees that ex parte applications seeking non-
disclosure on public interest grounds are made to any judge but the trial judge. This 
procedure avoids putting the trial judge “in the uncomfortable position of having 
to see material and then having to discount it at a later stage of the proceedings”.100 
The reference made to an organ which is foreign to the proceedings where the 
prosecutor requests the non-disclosure, is interesting in the management of the 
conflict between disclosure and public interest.
In the case of Edwards and Lewis v. The United Kingdom, the ECtHR returned to 
this issue indicating that the trial judge should not be put in the uncomfortable 
and dangerous position of seeing material, whose non-disclosure is sought by one 
party, when such material can have an impact on an issue of fact that the same judge 
is required to decide upon. In the latter scenario, the impartiality of the trial judge 
would be jeopardised by the potential influence of the material showed to him. 
The defence in the absence of knowledge of the material concerned would have no 
opportunity to submit any argument to counterbalance such an influencing effect 
with evident consequences on the fairness of the proceedings.  
Mr. Edwards had been arrested following a surveillance operation and in the 
company of an undercover police officer in a van in which a briefcase that contained 
heroin was found. He was convicted and sentenced to nine years imprisonment for 
possessing drugs with intent to supply. Before the commencement of the trial, the 
prosecutor informed the defence that an ex parte application had been made to 
withhold evidence on public interests grounds. The judge considered the material 
in the absence of the defence and concluded that there were genuine public interest 
grounds for non-disclosure. The trial judge who reconsidered the issue reached 
the same conclusion. The other applicant, Mr. Lewis, was arrested following an 
undercover operation when he supplied counterfeit notes to two undercover police 
officers. He was later convicted and sentenced to four years imprisonment. The 
defence had applied to the Crown Court seeking, inter alia, further disclosure by 
the prosecutor. Prior to the decision on this application the judge had received 
an ex parte application by which the prosecutor sought permission to withhold 
certain material evidence on public interests grounds. The judge refused to order 
the stay of the proceedings or to order further disclosure and stated that most of 
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the information sought by the defence was subject to public interest immunity. 
Both applicants claimed to be a victim of entrapment by undercover police officers. 
Although under English law entrapment does not provide a defence, the judge has 
discretion over whether to order a stay of the prosecution if it appears that the 
defendant would not have committed the offence were it not for the activity of an 
undercover police officer. Moreover, the court can exclude evidence obtained by an 
undercover police officer. The applicants claimed that the domestic proceedings 
had been unfair because the trial judge given the task of reviewing the material 
whose non-disclosure was sought by the prosecutor also had to decide on the 
question of whether the accused had been a victim of entrapment or not. 
The ECtHR noted that in both cases the judges who had rejected the defence’s 
submissions on entrapment had already seen the prosecution’s evidence which 
might have been relevant to the issue. The ECtHR had no knowledge of the nature 
of such evidence. However, the UK Government in relation to Mr. Edwards had 
revealed that the evidence object of the ex parte application concerned the previous 
involvement of the accused in similar criminal conduct.101 The defence did not have 
the opportunity to counter these allegations and the evidence showed to the trial 
judge might have influenced his decision on the entrapment’s submission. The 
Court concluded that an ex parte procedure before the trial judge was not sufficient 
to secure a fair trial where the undisclosed material related, or may have related, to 
an issue of fact which formed part of the prosecution’ case, which the trial judge, 
not the jury, had to determine and which might have been of decisive importance 
to the outcome of the applicants’ trials. 
The defining difference between the cases discussed lies in the position of the trial 
judge. In the cases of Jasper v. The United Kingdom and Fitt v The United Kingdom 
the judge who rejected the prosecutor’s ex parte application seeking non-disclosure 
was not called to decide on a question of fact and the separation between the 
judge and the jury safeguarded the rights of the defence. In contrast, in the case of 
Edwards and Lewis v. the United Kingdom the judge called to determine whether 
non-disclosure was legitimate was also in charge of deciding on a question of fact, 
which potentially could bring the proceedings to a closure. The knowledge of 
material suggesting the previous involvement of the accused in analogous criminal 
offences might unconsciously affect his assessment of the alleged entrapment. 
Under these circumstances, the nature of the conflict between the defence’s interest 
in disclosure and the public interest in non-disclosure if assessed by the trial judge 
violates the defence’s right to a fair trial.   
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The analysis of these judgments seems to suggest that the trial judge may be in 
charge of assessing the prosecutor’s ex parte application for non-disclosure as long 
as he is not called, in the same case, to decide on an issue of fact. However, one may 
wonder whether this is sufficient to counterbalance the restrictions on the defence’s 
rights and particularly the lack of participation in the proceedings. The question 
is whether the impartiality of the organ called upon to assess the application for 
non-disclosure can compensate for the lack of the defence’s representation in such 
a procedure. The ECtHR seems to answer this question in the negative.
In the recent case of A. and Others v The United Kingdom102 the ECtHR made 
reference to the judgment delivered in 2007 by the Canadian Supreme Court 
in the case of Charkaoui v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration.103 The case, 
although not a criminal case, is noteworthy because it illustrates the way in which 
the Canadian Court assessed the role of the judge in relation to procedures dealing 
with the public interest and disclosure.104 The ECtHR quoted paragraph 64 of the 
judgement (which is also reported in this paragraph below) in which the Canadian 
Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge cannot be considered as a surrogate 
for the defence’s representation.  
The Canadian Supreme Court was called upon to examine the provisions of the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), part of the immigration law of 
Canada. The provisions allow the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and 
the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to issue a certificate 
stating that a non-citizen (permanent resident or foreign national) living in 
Canada, is not admissible to Canada, and therefore can be removed, on grounds of 
security such as, inter alia, connection to terrorist activities. The certificate leads 
to the detention of the person concerned. The reasonableness of the certificate 
and the detention are both subject to the review of a Federal Court judge. The 
review procedure contemplates a hearing but the person named in the certificate 
is denied the opportunity to participate in the proceedings and has no right to be 
disclosed the material upon which the certificate has been issued. The defence 
guarantees are placed entirely on the judge’s shoulders. The judge must provide 
the person with a summary of the case against him in which no mention is made 
of the confidential material that might compromise national security. If the judge 
confirms the reasonableness of the certificate, the procedure envisages no further 
appeal. If the judge finds the certificate reasonable, it automatically becomes a 
removal order. 
The Supreme Court, among other things, had to assess whether the procedure in 
which the reasonableness of the certificate was reviewed (by a judge of the Federal 
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Court of Canada) in the absence of the defense met the basic requirements of 
procedural justice having regard to the government’s purpose and the rights of the 
person affected.105 Central to this analysis was the role of the judge in the procedure 
in question. 
The Supreme Court noted that the fairness of the IRPA procedure depended 
entirely on the designated judge. It is worth quoting the relevant paragraphs of the 
judgment in order to grasp the Supreme Court remarks on the role of the judge in 
the procedure in question:
The fairness of the IRPA procedure rests entirely on the shoulders of the designated 
judge. Those shoulders  cannot by themselves bear the heavy burden of assuring, 
in fact and appearance, that the decision on the reasonableness of the certificate is 
impartial, is based on a full view of the facts and law, and reflects the named person’s 
knowledge of the case to meet. The judge, working under the constraints imposed 
by the IRPA, simply cannot fill the vacuum left by the removal of the traditional 
guarantees of a fair hearing. 
The judge sees only what the ministers put before him or her. The judge, knowing 
nothing else about the case, is not in a position to identify errors, find omissions 
or assess the credibility and truthfulness of the information in the way the named 
person would be. Although the judge may ask questions of the named person when 
the hearing is reopened, the judge is prevented from asking questions that might 
disclose the protected information. Likewise, since the named person does not know 
what has been put against him or her, he or she does not know what the designated 
judge needs to hear. If the judge cannot provide the named person with a summary 
of the information that is sufficient to enable the person to know the case to meet, 
then the judge cannot be satisfied that the information before him or her is sufficient 
or reliable. 
Despite the judge’s best efforts to question the government’s witnesses and scrutinize 
the documentary evidence, he or she is placed in the situation of asking questions 
and ultimately deciding the issues on the basis of incomplete and potentially 
unreliable information. The judge is not helpless; he or she can note contradictions 
between documents, insist that there be at least some evidence on the critical points, 
and make limited inferences on the value and credibility of the information from its 
source. Nevertheless, the judge’s activity on behalf of the named person is confined 
to what is presented by the ministers. 
The judge is therefore not in a position to compensate for the lack of informed 
scrutiny, challenge and counter-evidence that a person familiar with the case could 
bring. Such scrutiny is the whole point of the principle that a person whose liberty 
is in jeopardy must know the case to meet. Here that principle has not merely been 
limited; it has been effectively gutted. How can one meet a case one does not know?106
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The IRPA procedure attempts to meet the requirements of justice through the 
mechanism of the designated judge’s review. However, the secrecy of the scheme denies 
the person concerned the knowledge of the case against him therefore undermining 
the judge’s ability to reach a decision based on all relevant facts and law. Consequently, 
the IRPA procedure did not conform to the principles of fundamental justice. The role 
of an impartial judge cannot be expected to be an effective substitute for the defence 
informed participation. Even less so when his knowledge of the case is affected by 
non-disclosure.  The Supreme Court concluded that the IRPA procedure violated 
the Charter. Consequently in October 2007 the government introduced Bill-C3 in 
the Senate. The Bill amended the IRPA procedure providing for the appointment of 
a special advocate to represent the person named in the certificate. During the filmed 
proceedings the special advocate is able to assess its reasonableness. 
The ECtHR cases107 and the case before the Supreme Court of Canada discussed in 
this paragraph differ, inter alia, in relation to one important aspect which concerns 
the nature of the cases at stake. On the one hand, the ECtHR dealt with cases where 
the tension between the defence‘s interest in disclosure and the public interest in 
confidentiality arose during the trial. On the other hand, the Canadian Supreme 
Court judgment dealt with an ex post facto assessment of a decision, which had 
already been reached through a procedure in which the defendant played no role. 
Furthermore, the designated judge entrusted to assess the need for disclosure of 
confidential material had no previous knowledge of the case and based his decision 
only on the material put to him by one side. 
Moreover, in situations dealing with the alleged involvement in terrorist activity 
of the person concerned, the threshold of the protection of the due process rights, 
including the right to disclosure of information, can be lower than in other cases. 
However, it cannot be eroded to the point of becoming meaningless. 
A second interesting aspect of the Canadian judgment examined concerns the 
illustration made therein of “less intrusive alternatives” which have been adopted, 
in a number of legal contexts, to reconcile the defence’s right to disclosure with 
the public interest in the confidentiality of material or, borrowing the words of 
the court, “to protect sensitive information while treating individuals fairly”.108 The 
existence of such alternatives has also been acknowledged by the ECtHR in its case 
law and it will be examined in the following paragraph. 
 6.2 The ECtHR’s indications for managing the conflicts of interest
The ECtHR, in its case law dealing with the conflict between the right to disclosure 
of information and the public interest, has limited itself to the analysis of the 
fairness of the decision-making procedure followed by domestic authorities in 
managing such a conflict. However, without explicitly recommending the adoption 
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of specific solutions, it referred to alternative procedures employed by specific 
judicial systems as virtuous examples of the way to handle the above-mentioned 
conflict of interest.
In Chahal v. the United Kingdom, the Strasbourg Court acknowledged that the 
use of confidential material might be unavoidable when the national interest is 
at stake. However, it made clear that domestic courts should be able to exercise 
control over the government’s decision to assert that national security and terrorism 
are involved.109 The attention of the ECtHR was drawn, by several humanitarian 
organisations, to the procedure applied in Canada in situations where evidence 
cannot be disclosed on national security grounds.110 The Canadian procedure 
was applied in cases before the Security Intelligence Review Committee (“SIRC”), 
which considered whether a Minister’s decision to remove a foreign national, with 
the status of permanent residence, on national security grounds was well-founded. 
According to the Canadian procedure envisaged by the Canadian Immigration 
Act 1976 (amended by the Immigration Act 1988), a recorded hearing of all the 
evidence is held before a Federal Court judge, in which the suspect is provided 
with a summary, as detailed as possible, of the case against him. The suspect 
can be represented and can call evidence. The confidential material is examined 
in the absence of the suspect and his lawyer. However, at the examination of the 
confidential material a security cleared counsel instructed by the court takes the 
place of the suspect and his lawyer. He “cross-examines the witnesses and assists the 
court to test the strength of the State’s case”.111 The defendant receives a summary of 
the evidence obtained by this procedure with the necessary redactions. Regarding 
the Canadian procedure, the ECtHR commented that “this example illustrates that 
there are techniques which can be employed which both accommodate legitimate 
security concerns about the nature and sources of intelligence information and yet 
accord the individual a substantial measure of procedural justice”.112
Following the Chahal judgment, the UK introduced legislation, similar to that 
of Canada, making provisions for the appointment of a special counsel in cases 
involving national security.  However, as is discussed in greater detail in the section 
concerning the judicial system of the UK, this procedure differed substantially 
from the Canadian one insofar as it did not allow any communication between 
the special counsel, who safeguards the right of the defendant, and the defendant 
himself once the ex parte hearing has begun. The ECtHR, in A. and Others v The 
United Kingdom recognised that the special counsel “could perform an important 
role in counterbalancing the lack of full disclosure”.113 However, it stressed that 
“the special advocate could not perform this function in any useful way unless the 
detainee was provided with sufficient information about the allegations against 
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110 See Chahal v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, [GC], no. 22414/93, 15 November 1996, para. 144.
111 Ibid. at para. 144.
112 Ibid. at para. 131. See ex multis Tinnelly & Sons Ltd and Others v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, no. 20390/92, 10 July 1998 
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him to enable him to give effective instructions to the special advocate”.114
By referring to these examples, the ECtHR acknowledged the existence of different 
solutions to reconcile the defence’s rights, in particular the right of disclosure, 
with the legitimate concerns about confidentiality. None of the above examples is 
per se the solution to all the problems that the unavoidable friction between the 
oppossing interests creates. However, they show that there is room to accommodate 
the essential concerns of the two interests at stake and it must be exploited with 
flexibility and creativity. 
The above mentioned case of Charkaoui v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration 
in the Supreme Court of Canada illustrated several alternative and creative methods 
that reconcile opposing interests such as due process rights and the public interest. 
The Canadian legal system “has gone further than any other legal system in devising 
novel procedures to accommodate these difficulties”.115 We have seen that the ECtHR 
discussed the above described SIRC procedure in the Chahal judgment which was 
followed with the creation of the special counsel in the English legal system. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court referred to the so-called Air India trial where 
the Crown was in possession of the results of the investigation (which had lasted 
seventeen years) over a terrorist bombing of a civil aircraft which occurred in 
Japan.116 The main exigency in that context was managing security and intelligence 
information in a way that did not erode the defence’s rights to an extent that 
compromised the procedural fairness of the trial. The solution reached saw the 
prosecutor and the defence counsel negotiate an agreement in relation to the 
sensitive information. Specifically, the defence counsel, with the express consent 
of his client, signed an undertaking by which he would not be allowed to disclose 
to anyone, including the defendant, the material the prosecutor would allow 
him to review. This is an interesting solution, although it is difficult to apply it 
to procedures where a large number of defendants and lawyers are involved. 
Nonetheless, as noted by the Supreme Court, it suggests “that a search should be 
made for a less intrusive solution”.117 Furthermore, all these examples show that 
despite the extremely delicate ground on which the opposing interests lie, there 
is room for alternative and creative solutions aimed at accommodating them in a 
mutually satisfactory way. 
At the conclusion of this analysis, it seems possible to summarise the main findings 
of the ECtHR in assessing the different solutions designed to handle the conflict 
between the public interest (in national security for example) and the procedural 
rights of the defendant envisaged by article 6 of the Convention. An attempt is 
made here to summarise these different findings:
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• A procedure whereby the police or the investigating authority itself, even when 
co-operating with the prosecution, attempts to assess what may or may not 
be relevant to the case, cannot comply with the requirements of article 6(1) 
(Natunen v. Finland);
• The individual decision of the prosecutor to withhold information, weighing it 
against the defence’s right to disclosure violates the defence due process rights 
(Rowe and Davis v. The United Kingdom);
• Ex parte applications for non-disclosure made by the prosecutor to the trial judge 
who is fully versed in all the evidence and issues in the case and in a position to 
monitor the relevance of the withheld information to the defence in principle do 
not infringe upon the right to a fair trial.  (Jasper v. the United Kingdom and Fitt 
v. the United Kingdom);
• Ex parte applications to the trial judge for non-disclosure of material that is 
related, or may be related, to an issue of fact which the trial judge, not the jury, 
has to determine and which might be of decisive importance to the outcome of 
the applicants’ trials violates the right to a fair trial (Edwards and Lewis v. The 
United Kingdom);
• In proceedings where non-disclosure is invoked on national security grounds, 
the judicial review without any adversarial involvement of the defence in the 
procedure is not sufficient to comply with the defence guarantees envisaged by 
the Convention (Chahal v. The United Kingdom);
• The judge is “not in a position to compensate for the lack of informed scrutiny, 
challenge and counter-evidence that a person familiar with the case could bring. 
Such scrutiny is the whole point of the principle that a person whose liberty is in 
jeopardy must know the case to meet”  (Charkaoui v Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration quoted by the ECtHR in A. and Others v. the United Kingdom);
• The use of a special advocate to safeguard the interests of the accused in a 
recorded hearing can counterbalance procedural unfairness caused by lack of 
full disclosure in national security cases. It is therefore a more effective form of 
judicial control (Chahal v. The United Kingdom); 
• In order for the special advocate to perform his function effectively the defendant 
must be provided with “sufficient information about the allegations against him 
to enable him to give effective instructions to the special advocate” (A. and Others 
v. the United Kingdom).
7. The appeal proceedings as a possible remedy
The ECtHR case law suggests that a defect occuring during the first instance trial 
rendering the proceedings unfair, can be remedied on appeal. The Condicio sine 
qua non for it to happen is that the appeal judicial organ enjoys full jurisdiction. In 
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other words, the reviewing court must guarantee a review of the case from both a 
procedural and a substantive law perspective and it must have the power to quash 
the appealed decision either substituting it with its own or returning the case for a 
new decision. 
In Dallos v. Hungary the applicant complained that in appeal the charges against 
him had been reclassified. The appeal body had convicted him of aggravated 
fraud whereas at trial he had been found guilty of embezzlement according to the 
indictment. The Commission held that had the applicant had the opportunity to 
make submissions to the appeal court in relation to the charge of fraud his defence 
would certainly have been different from the one adopted to face the initial charge 
of embezzlement. Unlike the Commission, the ECtHR attached great value to the 
Supreme Court’s full review of the case and to the hearing in public session in which 
the applicant’s defence had had the opportunity to be heard in relation to the new 
charge. These factors, in the eyes of the Court, could have led to the acquittal of the 
defendant by the Supreme Court. Consequently, it was satisfied that the Supreme 
Court’s proceedings had cured any defects (violation of article 6(3)) detected in the 
previous stage.118
The possibility of remedying an unfairness affecting the first instance proceedings 
at a later stage is also applicable to cases where the lack of disclosure at first instance 
harmed the fairness of the proceedings. Two cases against Finland provide a good 
example of the way in which the ECtHR applies the above-mentioned principle to 
the issue of disclosure. 
In M.S. v. Finland, the applicant had been convicted of aggravated sexual assault 
on his stepdaughter.119 Part of the applicant’s defence at trial was that he had never 
been alone with the victim in the place where the offence had allegedly occurred. 
The applicant’s wife gave evidence to the contrary. M.S. was sentenced to eleven 
months imprisonment and lodged an appeal attaching to it a statement from his 
wife in which she retracted her previous version supporting this time the applicant’s 
version. A month later the Appeal Court received a letter from the then ex-wife of 
M.S. in which she, again, changed her position stating that she had been pressured 
to sign the letter attached to the appeal. The letter was not disclosed to either 
party. The applicant learned about it through the Court of Appeal’s judgment, 
which upheld his conviction and considered it “manifestly unnecessary to request 
[the applicant’s] comments on the statements”. The Supreme Court denied M.S.’ 
application seeking leave to appeal. Before the ECtHR, the applicant complained 
that the Court of Appeal had simply decided to uphold one version of the testimony 
of his wife who was clearly an unreliable witness whereas such testimony should 
have been disregarded entirely. The Strasbourg Court acknowledged the relevance 
of the letter received by the Appeal Court insofar as it affected the credibility of 
an important witness. It went on stating that only the parties could have properly 
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decided on whether or not to comment on that letter. The ECtHR then assessed 
whether the Supreme Court’s proceedings constituted a proper remedy for the 
non-disclosure. It answered the question in the negative because such proceedings 
were limited in their scope to whether or not the leave to appeal should be accorded 
and did not concern a full review, in law and on the merits, of the applicant’s case. 
In V. v. Finland, the applicant had been convicted on drug related charges.120 He 
had claimed entrapment as part of his defence. An individual (referred to as H), 
who was held in custody and had been promised by the police that they would 
drop the charges if he “set up a bigger player”, had contacted the applicant several 
times (from police custody) asking for a kilogram of cannabis and agreeing to 
meet him for the purchase. The applicant did not have the cannabis with him 
but said he could get it from a third person. The police tried to conceal from the 
court, the defendant and the prosecutor that H was held in custody when calling 
the applicant. Subsequently, they also refused to disclose to the applicant the 
telephone recording information that could have shed light on the moment (before 
or after the police involvement) at which the crime was committed. The applicant 
appealed this non-disclosure decision before the County Administrative Board, 
which ordered the police to disclose the telephone metering. However, the decision 
was delivered only after the expiration of the deadline for filing the appeal against 
the first instance judgment.  Furthermore, the disclosure that followed the County 
Administrative Board’s decision was only partial and the full telephone recording 
was never disclosed. The Court noted that the non-disclosed material was related 
to an essential issue of fact in the case that was relevant to the claim of entrapment. 
It also found that the appeal proceedings were not adequate to remedy the lack 
of disclosure since the applicant could not make informed submissions as the 
disclosure occurred only after the deadline for the filing of the appeal. 
These cases, although the Court concluded that the unfairness found during the 
proceedings was not remedied at a further stage, do not contradict the findings 
in Dallos. On the contrary, they corroborate the idea that a violation of Article 6 
occurred at the first instance trial can be remedied through an appeal procedure 
which provides a review of the case. The central element is the procedure that 
should cure the defect that, as mentioned, must consist of a full review in law and 
on the merits of the case. Furthermore, when the unfairness detected concerns 
undisclosed material the “second proceedings” must assess whether the procedure 
followed to opt for non-disclosure was compliant with article 6 of the Convention. In 
the case of M.S. v. Finland, if the proceedings before the Supreme Court had not been 
limited in their scope so as to only provide leave to appeal, most likely no violation 
of article 6 would have been found. In V. v. Finland the Court found that the appeal 
proceedings could not have remedied the unfairness of the trial proceedings as it 
was still impossible for the defendant to make informed submissions to support his 
case on entrapment. In this case, a different body (County Administrative Board) 
had determined that non-disclosure of certain material evidence had affected the 
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defence due to its relevance for the claim to be a victim of entrapment. This finding 
had unfortunately occurred after the time limit for the appeal had elapsed. The 
conclusion can be drawn that in cases where non-disclosure has been found to be 
unfair, a further degree of jurisdiction cannot cure the defect unless the full review 
takes place in light of the disclosed material.
This principle was recently reaffirmed by the Strasbourg Court in the case of 
McKeown v. The United Kingdom, in which it stated that “where the trial judge is 
not able to rule on the disclosure issue, the lack of fairness at first instance can be 
remedied on appeal only where the Court of Appeal orders full, or virtually full, 
disclosure to the defence”.121
In contrast, when the trial judge was not able to rule on the issue of disclosure and 
the Appeal Court did not order full disclosure to the defence the ECtHR did not 
accept that the Appeal Court’s ex parte assessment of the material not disclosed at 
trial could be an effective remedy. 
For instance, in Atlan v. The United Kingdom the prosecution had repeatedly 
denied during the first-instance trial that they had any evidence in their possession 
concerning the man whom the applicants accused of having been an informer 
and had falsely implicated them. Shortly before the hearing of the appeal, the 
prosecution informed the defence that, in contrast to their earlier statements, there 
was some undisclosed material. The Court of Appeal, following an ex parte hearing, 
ruled that this evidence could remain undisclosed on grounds of public interest 
immunity. The Strasbourg Court found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention 
on the grounds that, (as in Rowe and Davis) the trial judge had been better placed 
than the appeal court judges to decide whether or not the non-disclosure of 
material evidence would be prejudicial to the defence and might, moreover, have 
chosen a different form of words in his summing up before the jury had he seen the 
evidence in question.122
The approach followed by the Court in relation to the appeal proceedings as a 
possible redress of disclosure violations is exposed to a criticism in relation to the 
rule of law123 In judicial systems that foresee two stages of full and fair jurisdiction 
over a case, such as Italy to mention one, the application of the approach of the 
ECtHR legitimises the loss of the opportunity to have a fair first instance trial. When 
a violation of Article 6 has been ascertained in relation to the trial proceedings the 
fact that such defect might be remedied upon appeal does not per se cure the loss of 
one of the two instances the accused was entitled to. In Twalib v. Greece Judge van 
Dijk appended a dissenting opinion in which he held that if shortcomings in the 
fairness of the first instance proceedings are ascertained, they cannot be remedied 
simply by the fact that the appeal proceedings are fair. This would equate, in fact, 
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to considering the issue of fairness in the first instance proceedings completely 
irrelevant. He went on affirming that the shortcomings “would only be remedied if 
the appeal court, in view of the shortcomings in fairness, quashed the first-instance 
decision and ordered a retrial”.124 
_______________________ 
124 Twalib. v. Greece, ECHR, no. 24294/94, 9 June 1998, dissenting Opinion of Judge van Dijk. However, in the last paragraph 
of his dissenting opinion, Judge van Dijk seems to suggest that the possibility to remedy the unfairness of the first in-
stance trial simply by a fair appeal can be applicable to minor offences. 
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VI. Disclosure of information in the legal system of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
Introduction
Evidentiary disclosure is the life-blood of the fact-finding process. Given the inevitable 
mismatch of resources between the prosecution and the accused, disclosure is the tool 
by which the defence achieves equality of arms in the adversarial trial process and, 
thereby, a fair trial.1
“The underlying differences between the common law adversarial system and the civil 
law inquisitorial system are nowhere better reflected than in the differing approach 
taken to disclosure”. 2
This chapter analyses the rules of procedure of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (hereafter ICTY or Tribunal) regulating the obligations 
of disclosure upon the Prosecutor (hereafter Prosecution, Prosecutor or OTP) and 
the defence. Disclosure obligations must be considered against the background of 
the procedural system in which they operate. Therefore, an assessment of the main 
features of the criminal procedure of the Tribunal, their origins and developments 
since the adoption of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (hereafter RPE or Rules) 
in 1994 will be carried out. It will be seen how the initial approach to the criminal 
procedure was based on an adversarial model. However, this system soon proved 
to be unfit to enable the Tribunal to honour its main commitment to prosecute 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law in 
the former Yugoslavia through expeditious trials. The adoption of new rules of 
procedure and evidence and several amendments to the existing rules have marked, 
since 1998, a departure from the original adversarial orientation of the RPE. The 
new procedural system is characterised by a more active judicial control over the 
proceedings, described as judicial management of the cases. 
The second part of the chapter considers in more detail the rules governing 
disclosure of information and their interpretation and application by the 
Tribunal’s jurisprudence. Disclosure is an essential element of the right to a fair 
trial enshrined in Article 20 of the ICTY Statute which encompasses the principle 
of the equality of arms. The defendant’s right to have adequate time and facilities 
for the preparation of his defence is regulated by Article 21 of the ICTY Statute 
and includes the right of the accused to the disclosure of evidence. The analysis 
will cover the rules regulating disclosure by the Prosecution and the defence, the 
exceptions to the obligation to disclose, the tension between competing interests 
such as the right of the defendant to a fair trial and the need to protect witnesses 
_______________________
1 Morrissey P., Applied Rights in International Criminal Law: Defence Counsel and the Right to Disclosure, in Boas G., 
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and victims as well as the need to accommodate national security concerns. Finally, 
the possible remedies and sanctions available to respond to violations of rules of 
disclosure will be assessed.
In the final part of the chapter the main problematic aspects of the ICTY disclosure 
regime emerging from the analysis will be discussed, assessing whether the 
obligations to disclose information and the way in which they are discharged in the 
practice of the ICTY are in line with the defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial.
1.  The ICTY judicial system
On 22 February 1993, the United Nation Security Council passed Resolution 808, 
which authorised the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia. The resolution requested the Secretary General to submit, at 
the latest within 60 days, a report on all aspects of this matter including specific 
proposals, taking into account suggestions put forward by member states.3 In other 
words, the Secretary General was requested to draft the Statute of the International 
Tribunal. On 25 May 1993, the Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 
827, which established the Tribunal and approved, without any change, the draft of 
the Statute proposed by the Secretary General. 4
Article 15 of the Statute of the ICTY, headed Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
states as follows: 
The judges of the International Tribunal shall adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and 
appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and 
other appropriate matters.
The first judges of the Tribunal were elected on 15 September 1993 and the 
Prosecution took office almost a year later on 24 May 1994. The first draft of the 
Rules was approved on 11 February 1994.5 One of the reasons why the judges were 
delegated the important function of drafting the RPE was the highly technical 
nature of the rules of criminal procedure and evidence that differ in each legal 
system as well as the expertise and practical experience offered by the judges with 
respect to such rules.6 This is an important factor to bear in mind when studying 
the nature and characterisation of the Tribunal’s judicial system. Specifically, when 
drafting the Rules, the judges brought their own experience from their domestic 
judicial system, inevitably influencing the wording and orientation of the RPE 
and even more their subsequent interpretation through the jurisprudence of the 
_______________________
3 Security Council Resolution 808, 22 February 1993, 48th session, 3175th meeting, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808.
4 Security Council Resolution 827, 25 May 1993, 48th session, 3217th meeting, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827.
5 The Judges commenced their work at the first session held in November 1993 and completed it at the second session 
held from 17 January to 11 February 1994. For a description of the work carried out by the judges see Morris V. and Sharf 
M.P., An insider’s guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: a documentary history and 
analysis, Transnational Publisher, Inc. 1995, p. 180.
6 Morris and Sharf, above n. 5 at p.176.
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Tribunal. The judges of the ICTY had the difficult task of finding a synthesis between 
more adversarial and more inquisitorial models in order to allow the Tribunal 
to run fair and expeditious trials. The system that was created was significantly 
more adversarial in its nature reflecting the common law tradition. Judge Antonio 
Cassese, first President of the ICTY, stated in public that a largely adversarial 
approach to the ICTY procedure had been taken, rather than the inquisitorial 
approach found in continental Europe and elsewhere.7 
In choosing an adversarial model over an inquisitorial one, the influence of 
the US played an important role. The United States more than other countries, 
contributed with concrete proposals to the making of the RPE. These proposals 
were detailed and exhaustive and provided explanations for the decisions made 
therein. Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, future President of the ICTY, brought 
with her a complete set of proposed rules prepared by a special committee of the 
American Bar Association.8 Many of these proposals have found their way to the 
RPE of the ICTY.9 Moreover, the UN Secretary General was assisted by the United 
Nations Office of Legal Affairs in the drafting the Statute of the Tribunal whose 
team members came from the U.S., the UK, Liberia, Israel and Germany, the 
latter being the only civil law country. Furthermore, the judges who drafted the 
complex set of rules of procedure and evidence came mostly from common law 
jurisdictions.10 Therefore, the preference accorded to a mainly adversarial criminal 
procedure came as no surprise. However it must be said that certain provisions of a 
civil law origin found their place in the first drafting of the RPE .11
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence were aimed at guiding the Tribunal to conduct 
very complex, and large scale criminal trials in an expeditious manner guaranteeing, 
simultaneously, their fairness and their adherence to the internationally recognised 
standards of human rights. Therefore, it is understandable that the RPE of the ICTY 
have been characterised by a substantial degree of flexibility, which is reflected 
in the numerous amendments since their first draft in February 1994, “with a 
frequency unknown to any other jurisdiction before it”.12 Such flexibility became 
useful as it allowed the Tribunal to adapt the Rules to the practice emerging in the 
first years of the Tribunal’s existence. Judge Richard May13 of the ICTY stated that 
the amendments to the RPE, drafted by the judges, reflected the experience gained 
by the Tribunal.14
_______________________
7 See First Annual Report of the ICTY, 17 August 1994, UN doc. A/49/342, para. 71.
8 Bassiouni M.C., The law of the International criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Transnational Publisher, Inc. 
1996, p. 863.
9 Morris and Sharf, above n. 5 at p. 177.
10 See Bassiouni, above n. 8 at p. 863.
11 See First Annual Report of the ICTY, 17 August 1994, UN doc. A/49/342, paras. 72-74 in which the President of the ICTY 
mentions three major departures of the established legal system from the adversarial model. Judge Cassese referred 
specifically to: 1) the lack of  technical rules for the admissibility of evidence, 2) the Tribunal may order the production 
of additional or new evidence proprio motu, 3) the granting of immunity and the practice of plea-bargaining found no 
place in the rules. The plea bargaining practice was subsequently imported in the RPE.
12 Boas G., Creating Laws of Evidence for International Criminal Law: The ICTY and the Principle of Flexibility, Criminal 
Law forum, 12 (2001) 41-90, p. 42.
13 Judge Richard May  (1938-2004), served as the presiding judge in the proceedings against Slobodan Milošević.
14 May R. & Wierda M., Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha, 37 Colum-
bia J. of Transnational Law 727 (1999), p. 745.
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Scholars and professionals have offered different characterisations of the legal 
system of the ICTY.15 All these different characterisations appear to agree that a 
significant departure from the mainly adversarial system initially operating at the 
Tribunal occurred and that this departure begun in 1998.16 It is also uncontested 
that the rationale behind this shift was to be found in the need to speed up the 
proceedings and that a more active and informed bench running the cases was 
singled out as the route to follow. 
2. The ICTY initial procedure 
In the original legal system of the ICTY, the Prosecutor initiates investigations ex 
officio or based on information received from any source.17 In deciding whether or 
not to prosecute a suspect he enjoys significant discretion granted to him by the 
Statute.18 At the end of the investigations, if the Prosecutor deems that a prima 
facie case exists against the suspect he drafts an indictment containing the facts 
and the charges.19 The (reviewing) judge of the Trial Chamber who receives the 
proposed indictment from the Prosecutor, in accordance with article 19 of the 
Statute, confirms the indictment if he is satisfied that a prima facie case exists. 
Otherwise he dismisses it.20 Rule 47 enshrines the possibility for the reviewing 
judge to ask the Prosecutor to present additional evidence on one or all counts. 
When an indictment is confirmed a suspect assumes the status of accused and he 
will stand trial before the Tribunal. The reviewing judge in the original draft of Rule 
15 (C) cannot be part of the bench that will try the case. The rule was amended so as 
to allow the reviewing judge to sit on the bench for trial, lifting the disqualification 
of the judge in these circumstances.21 The judge who reviewed the indictment can 
also be a member of the Appeals Chamber that deals with the case as long as he was 
not a member of the Trial Chamber whose judgment is under scrutiny.
_______________________
15 Three are the main characterisations emerged in relation to the legal system of the Tribunal and its evolution. The first 
approach suggests that the system of the ICTY can be defined as sui generis. Thus, a system that is neither adversarial 
nor inquisitorial in nature, nor a combination of the two, but rather a unique system. A contextual approach to the 
system of the ICTY is necessary to understand its essence. Therefore, also when borrowing from domestic jurisdic-
tions, the result must be tested against the unique nature of the Tribunal and its mission. On this point, see Robinson 
P.L., Ensuring Fair and Expeditious Trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 11 European 
Journal of International Law 569, 588-89 (2000). See also, Prosecutor v. Delalić, IT-04-75, Decision on the Motion on 
Presentation of Evidence by the Accused, 1 May 1997, para. 15. The second approach submits that the system originated 
by the amendments of the rules occurred in the past ten years is a “mixed” or “hybrid” system, characterised by a gradual 
adoption of inquisitorial elements within the Rules and practice of the Tribunal. On this point see, inter alia, Cassese A., 
International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 384-387. Finally, the third approach considers the ICTY 
procedure to have developed toward a managerial judging model characteristic of US civil proceedings. This interpre-
tation contends that the changes, which modified the procedure of the Tribunal, have created a new model in which 
the goal of processing cases expeditiously is particularly important. This system embraces procedure as a tool to process 
cases swiftly with the collaboration and coordination of the parties. The parties not only compete as in the adversarial 
system but they do so in a much more coordinated fashion so to serve the main purpose of running a swift proceeding. 
For a detailed analysis of the managerial judging system, see Langer M., The Rise of Managerial Judging in International 
Criminal Law, American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 53, n.4 (2005), pp. 835-909.
16 For a detailed analysis of the nature of the legal system of the ICTY and for a comprehensive understanding of the dif-
ferent theories on this point see, inter alia, Ambos K., International Criminal Procedure: “Adversarial,” “Inquisitorial” or 
Mixed?, 3 International Criminal Law Review, 1 (2003); Cassese, above n. 15; May & Wierda, above n. 14 at p. 745; Tochi-
lovsky V., Rules of Procedure for the International Criminal Court: Problems to Address in Light of the Experience of the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals, 46 Netherlands International Law Review, 343, 359 (1999); Zappala’ S., Human Rights in International 
Criminal Proceedings, Oxford University Press, 22 (2003). Robinson, above n. 15 at 588-89; Jackson J., Finding the Best 
Epistemic Fit for International Criminal Tribunals, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 7 (2009) 17-39; Boas, above 
n. 12 at pp. 41-90.
17 Article 18 of the Statute.
18 Article 16 of the Statute.
19 Article 18 of the Statute.
20 Article 19 of the Statute and Rule 47 (D).
21 See Rule 15 (C).
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The commencement of the trial proceedings can be identified with the initial 
appearance of the accused before the designated Trial Chamber.22  The accused is 
requested to enter a plea of guilty or not guilty. If he refuses to do so the Chamber 
will enter a not guilty plea on behalf of the accused.23 The parties may then file the 
preliminary motions they deem necessary to obtain a ruling or a relief by the Trial 
Chamber. Rule 72 recognises this right of the parties. Hearings are public although 
under certain circumstances the right of the accused to a public trial may be curtailed 
to protect different interests such as “public order or morality, safety, security or non-
disclosure of the identity of a victim or witness or the protection of the interests of 
justice”.24 The reason for holding a closed session must be made public.
The case presentation is regulated by the Rules. The Trial begins with the 
opening statements of the parties; first the Prosecution and then the defence. 
The latter may decide to hold back its opening statement until the beginning of 
the defence’s case. Following the statements, the Prosecutor, who bears the onus 
probandi, will be the first to start his case followed by the defence. Evidence such 
as testimonials, documentary or physical, are adduced before the Trial Chamber. 
Evidence is presented according to a defined practice, regulated by Rule 85, which 
provides for the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, evidence for the 
defence, prosecution evidence in rebuttal, defence evidence in rejoinder and finally 
evidence ordered by the Chamber pursuant to Rule 98. Each witness can be subject 
to the examination in chief, the cross-examination by the opposite side and the 
re-examination by the party who called him.25 The Bench can ask questions to the 
witnesses.26 Finally, the proceedings turn to an end with the closing statements of 
the parties as disciplined by Rule 86.
The deliberation of the judges on the guilt or innocence of the accused takes place 
by a majority vote; therefore the votes of two judges will determine the verdict.27The 
standard of proof that the Prosecutor has to meet on all charges is proof beyond 
reasonable doubt. Reasoned opinion in writing must accompany the judgment.28If 
an accused is found guilty, the Rules provide for a pre-sentencing procedure which 
allows the parties to file sentencing recommendations to the Chamber before 
the sentencing hearing which is a separate moment from the judgment.29 In 
determining the sentence, the Trial Chamber is required to evaluate elements such 
as “the gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances of the convicted 
person” in accordance to article 24 of the Statute.30
_______________________
22 The initial framework of the RPE did not contemplate status conferences or the existence of Pre-trial Chambers Rules 
65 bis and ter were adopted on 25 July 1997 and 10 July 1998 respectively. 
23 Rule 62. This Rule has been amended and a period of thirty days after the initial appearance had been awarded to the 
accused in order to enter the plea.
24 Rule 79.
25 Rule 85 (B). 
26 Rule 85 (B).
27 Article 23 of the Statute and Rules 29 and 87.
28 Article 23 of the Statute.
29 Rules 100-101 as adopted on 11 February 1994.
30 Rule 101 integrates the nonexhaustive list provided by article 24 of the Statute.
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3. The need for a reform of the system
 
Article 20(1) of the Statute provides, inter alia, that the Trial Chamber must 
guarantee that the trial is fair and expeditious. The right of the accused to be 
tried fairly and without undue delay is a recognised human right guaranteed by 
the main human rights instruments.31 The legal system created by the Statute and 
the Rules in their original formulation was based on the conception of the judges 
as impartial arbiters with limited powers of intervention in a dispute between 
the parties. In addition, the Court had no previous knowledge of the case and 
became acquainted with it only when the presentation of the prosecution case 
commenced. 
Soon it became evident that the Tribunal was encountering considerable problems 
in reconciling the goal of fair and expeditious trials with this the adversarial 
inspired procedure in place. The excessive length of the proceedings was perceived 
as an obstacle to the smooth functioning of the Tribunal. The judges, in accordance 
with the adversarial model, had scarce power of influencing the course of events 
in the proceedings, the chambers were unaware of the facts of the case pending 
before them prior to its commencement and the evidence at trial was mainly oral.32
These elements of the system also affected the few provisions granting the judges 
some inquisitorial power. For instance, the possibility for the judges to question a 
witness (envisaged by Rule 85 of the RPE) was rather theoretical because the bench 
had no previous knowledge of the case. This compromises the concrete opportunity 
to intervene in the examination of a witness asking meaningful questions that 
would require a rather detailed knowledge of the case. As Langer points out, 
borrowing a famous quote33, the inquisitorial powers given to the judges by the law 
in the books were, “in the law in action tilted even more toward a conception of 
judges as umpires.”34 
By July 1998, only two trials had been completed. The caseload of the ICTY had 
grown quickly. Judge Antonio Cassese stated that “it became clear fairly soon 
that, to expedite proceedings which, being grounded on the adversarial model, 
were rather lengthy, it was necessary to depart from the system whereby the 
court acts as a referee and has no knowledge of the case before commencement 
of trial, and even during trial only becomes cognizant of the evidence offered 
by the parties”.35 Judge Iain Bonomy concurred stating that “it is a simple fact of 
life that adversarial proceedings can tend to lack focus and can lead to lengthy, 
unproductive and largely irrelevant exchanges between examiner and witness…
In the absence of judicial control….it is plain that the conduct of war crimes trials 
_______________________
31 Article 6(1) of the European Convention conceives the right of an accused to “a fair and public hearing within a rea-
sonable time”; article 14(3)(c) states that the accused should be tried without undue delay; the American Convention 
proclaims, in article 8(1) the right of the accused to a hearing within a “reasonable time” and the African Convention 
through article 7(1)(d) states that the African Charter grants the right to be “tried within a reasonable time”.
32 See Cassese, above n. 15 at p. 385 and Langer, above n. 15.
33 Roscoe Pound’s famous distinction between the law in the books and the law in action.
34 See Langer, above n. 15 at p. 859.
35 Cassese, above n. 15 at p. 385.
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in classical adversarial form results, and inevitably will result, in the proceedings 
in some cases lasting for several years”.36
The excessive length of the proceedings and the poor statistics of the Tribunal were 
also elements of concern for the international community. In 1998, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations requested the Secretary General to conduct a 
review of the functioning of the ICTY. The Secretary General appointed an expert 
group that in 1999 delivered its Expert’s Group Report37 (hereafter Report) which, 
inter alia, confirmed that the judges believed that the prolonged nature of the 
proceedings was caused to a significant extent by the very limited control they 
could exercise on them. The report also acknowledged that the strict allocation of 
responsibilities for each party by the mainly adversarial system had prevented the 
judges from intervening in the presentation of evidence by the parties. “The judges 
may be needlessly sensitive to the potential for criticism if they intervene actively 
to exercise greater control over the proceedings”.38 Finally, the Report stated that 
the Tribunal’s criminal procedure although based on an adversarial model was able 
to adopt elements from a civil law model and in some respect seemed to be already 
doing so.39
4.  The advent of the judicial management of the cases
The RPE of the Tribunal have been amended 49 times between May 1994 and May 
2013. Despite this quite considerable number, a turning point can be detected in 
1998, when important rules were adopted and others were amended.  
In December 1997, the President of the ICTY established the so-called Rules 
Committee and requested the Vice President to investigate possible solutions to 
speed up trials without harming the rights of the accused. Subsequently two trial 
management workshops were organised. Many jurists attended them, from both 
civil law and common law systems, discussing the conduct and speed of complex 
criminal trials. The Rules Committee recommended, inter alia, amendments to the 
RPE aimed at guaranteeing a more robust regulation of the pre-trial proceedings, 
including the establishment of a pre-trial judge.40
Consequently, in July 1997, Rule 65 bis (status conference) was adopted providing 
the possibility of a so-called status conference whose aim was “to organize exchanges 
between the parties so as to ensure expeditious preparation for trial”. This rule has 
been subsequently amended and now it is a routine procedure in each case to hold 
status conferences on a regular basis in order to deal with issues arising between 
_______________________
36 Langer, above n. 15 at p. 349.
37 Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Tribu-
nal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UN Doc A/54/634 of 22 November 
1999. This Report was completed when certain rules, which gave an important impulse toward a more effective judicial 
control of the proceedings, such as rules 65 bis, 73 bis and ter , rule 90 (G) had been already adopted or amended. It is 
nonetheless interesting as some 12 judges of the ICTY were interviewed along with 17 staff members of the Office of the 
Prosecutor, nine members of  the Registry and two members of the Defence Counsel Unit, giving a first-hand testimony 
of the opinions of the professionals working at the Tribunal on its functioning. 
38 Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Tribu-
nal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UN Doc. A/54/634 of 22 November 
1999, para 75
39 Ibid. at para. 82.
40 Fifth Annual Report of the ICTY, 10 August 1998, UN doc. A/53/219; para. 106. 
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the initial appearance of the accused and the commencement of the trial. 
On a plenary meeting held on 11-13 March 1998, the judges adopted some of the 
recommendations of the Rules Committee. Rules 65 ter (pre-trial judge), 73 bis 
(pre-trial conference) and 73 ter (pre-defence conference), and 98 bis (motion for 
judgment of acquittal) were adopted. Rules 86 (closing arguments), 90 (testimony 
of witnesses) and 94 (judicial notice) were amended. On the eighteenth plenary 
session held on 9 and 19 July 1998 the judges adopted new Rules 65 ter, 73 bis, 73 
ter, 74 bis, 94 bis (testimony of expert witnesses) and 98 ter (judgment). 
Rule 65 ter (B) confers a relatively broad ability to manoeuvre to the pre-trial 
judge as it empowers him to adopt any measure necessary to prepare the case 
for a fair and expeditious trial. Interestingly Rule 65 ter (D)(ii) provides for the 
redaction of a work plan containing, albeit in general terms, the obligations 
the parties are required to meet in the pre-trial stage and the corresponding 
deadlines. The Prosecutor is expected to file the pre-trial brief with the Chamber 
giving full account of the evidence that he intends to present in relation to 
each count of the indictment and highlighting the form of responsibility the 
prosecutor will rely on for each alleged crime.41 The defence will also file a pre-
trial brief addressing the factual and legal issues and indicating the nature of the 
accused’s defence.42 In addition, the Prosecutor has to file the list of witnesses 
and the number of witnesses that will testify in relation to each accused on each 
count and an indication of whether the witnesses will testify viva voce or by a 
written statement.43 The Prosecutor is requested to submit the estimated time 
he will need to question each witness and the estimated total amount of time he 
deems necessary for the presentation of his case44 as well as to file a list of the 
exhibits he intends to tender during trial. The defence has the same obligations 
to fulfil. What differs is the timing, as the defence will have to file the above 
documents between the close of the Prosecutor’s case and the commencement 
of his case. Finally, after the parties have complied with their obligations the pre-
trial judge shall submit to the Trial Chamber “a complete file consisting of all the 
filings of the parties, transcripts of status conferences and minutes of meetings 
held in the performance of his or her functions pursuant to this Rule”.45 This file, 
which is reminiscent of the inquisitorial dossier, allows the Trial Chamber to have 
knowledge of the case before its commencement, assisting the judges in playing 
a more incisive role in the conduct of the trial.
An example of the application of this rule can be found in the Milutinović et al. case.46 
Here the presiding judge issued an order establishing a work-plan for the parties, 
containing all the obligations they were required to meet and the corresponding 
dates by which these obligations had to be met. The work-plan was issued in order 
_______________________
41 Rule 65 ter (E)(i).
42 Rule 65 ter (F). 
43 Rule 65 ter (E)(ii).
44 Rule 65 ter (E)(ii).
45 Rule 65 ter (L)(i) e (ii)
46 Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., IT-05-87, Pre-Trial Order and Appended Work Plan, 5 April 2006. The trial com-
menced on 10 July 2006. The Defence case commenced on 6 August 2007. The judgement was delivered on 26 Febru-
ary 2009. See also Prosecutor v. Goran Hadžić, IT-04-75, Order on Pre-Trial Work Plan, 16 December 2011.
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to bring the case “swiftly and fairly” to trial.47 The work plan appended to the order 
is reproduced below:
5 April 2006: With a view to eventually filing a joint submission, which shall indicate 
the matters of fact and law on which the parties agree, as well as the 
matters on which they disagree and why, from now on the parties should 
conduct whatever meetings and exchanges of correspondence are needed 
to file, at a date which will be determined in due course, a comprehensive 
joint submission. Meetings, in terms of Rules 65 ter(I) and (H), will be 
held as and when appropriate in order to facilitate this process.
26 April 2006: Rule 65 ter conference. 
10 May 2006: Deadline for Prosecution to file its pre-trial brief, which shall conform 
to the requirements of Rule 65 ter(E)(i). Deadline for Prosecution to file 
its witness and exhibit lists, which shall conform to the requirements 
of Rules 65 ter(E)(ii) and (iii) and which shall indicate, with respect to 
each witness, the exhibit(s) the witness will offer in evidence. The lists 
shall also indicate, with respect to each exhibit, the witness who will 
offer the exhibit in evidence. With regard to each proposed viva voce 
witness, the Prosecution shall indicate whether the witness will offer 
written evidence pursuant to Rule 89(F). With regard to each proposed 
Rule 92 bis witness, the Prosecution shall indicate whether it believes the 
witness should attend for cross-examination. 
18 May 2006: Rule 65 ter conference. 
26 May 2006: Deadline for Prosecution to file motion(s) to admit written evidence 
pursuant to Rule 92 bis in accordance with the witness and exhibit lists 
filed by 10 May 2006. 
6 June 2006: Deadline for Defence teams to file their pre-trial briefs, which shall 
conform to the requirements of Rule 65 ter(F). 
30 June 2006: Deadline for return of all Accused on provisional release to the United 
Nations Detention Unit in The Hague. 
7 July 2006: Pre-Trial Conference. 
10 July 2006: Commencement of trial. 
The pre-trial stage ends with the pre-trial and pre-defence conferences, regulated by 
Rules 73 bis and 73 ter respectively. In this context, the Trial Chamber may exercise 
considerable power in determining the number of witnesses the parties can call 
as well as the time allocated to complete the presentation of their case. The Trial 
Chamber may shorten the time estimated for the examination in chief of certain 
witnesses. It can request that the Prosecutor reduce the number of counts charged 
in the indictment and may limit the number of crime sites or incidents alleged in 
one or more of the charges in respect of which evidence may be presented by the 
Prosecutor. These decisions can be appealed by the parties. 
_______________________
47 Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., IT-05-87, Pre-Trial Order and Appended Work Plan, 5 April 2006. The trial commenced 
on 10 July 2006. See also Prosecutor v. Karadžić, IT-95-5/18-I, Order following on Status Conference and Appended Work 
Plan, 6 April 2009.
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Several rules related to the trial stage were also amended to confer more control 
over the proceedings to the bench. Rule 90 (F) states that:
The Trial Chamber shall exercise control over the mode and order of interrogating 
witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (i) make the interrogation and 
presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth; and (ii) avoid needless 
consumption of time.
This rule is effective only if read in combination with Rule 65 ter whose correct 
application will allow the Trial Chamber to become familiar with the case 
beforehand. Consequently, the judges will be in a position to exercise a wide degree 
of informed control over the proceedings. 
Rule 90 (A), according to which “witnesses shall, in principle, be heard directly by 
the Chambers”, was replaced by Rule 89 (F) stipulating that “a Chamber may receive 
the evidence of a witness orally or, where the interests of justice allow in written 
form”. The adoption of this approach marked the departure of the procedure from 
the preference accorded to oral evidence.48
Finally, Rule 87(C) merged the judgment and sentencing phase into a single 
unique determination by the judges.49 The determination of the sentence remains 
a separate procedure only when the accused pleads guilty.50
The reform of the criminal procedure of the ICTY was necessary to tackle the 
excessive length of its proceedings. The judges, in the plenary session held in July 
1998 and in the sessions following, marked a significant departure from many 
adversarial features that had proven unfit to run war crimes trials. 
The changes implemented grant the judges a wide range of judicial control over 
the proceedings after the pre-trial stage. The appointment of a pre-trial judge 
allows the Tribunal to ensure, from the onset, that a case is focused on the most 
relevant issues raised in the indictment. The pre-trial judge has a wide range of 
powers that allow him to guide the parties to narrow the issues for trial.51 If the case 
is clear and well defined after its pre-trial stage, it will be simpler for the judges to 
control that the presentation of the evidence is coherent with the charges of the 
indictment. “The tone of court’s proceedings tends to be set in the early stages”.52 
_______________________
48 Rule 89(F) was amended on 1 December 2000. This Rule allowed for the use of witness statements as regulated by Rule 
92 bis which was also adopted in the plenary held on 1 December 2000. Rule 92 bis(A) states that “a Trial Chamber may 
dispense with the attendance of a witness in person, and instead admit, in whole or in part, the evidence of a witness in 
the form of a written statement or a transcript of evidence, which was given by a witness in proceedings before the Tri-
bunal, in lieu of oral testimony which goes to proof of a matter other than the acts and conduct of the accused as charged 
in the indictment”. The purpose of the rule is to facilitate the admission by way of written statement of peripheral or 
background evidence in order to expedite proceedings while protecting the rights of the accused under the Statute. 
Eight Annual Report of the ICTY, 17 September 2001, UN doc. A/56/352.
49 Rule 87(C) states that: If the Trial Chamber finds the accused guilty on one or more of the charges contained in the 
indictment, it shall impose a sentence in respect of each finding of guilt and indicate whether such sentences shall be 
served consecutively or concurrently, unless it decides to exercise its power to impose a single sentence reflecting the 
totality of the criminal conduct of the accused. Rule 87(C) was first amended on 10 July 1998.
50 Rule 100 as amended on 10 July 1998. 
51 Mundis D.A., From “Common Law” to “Civil Law”, Leiden Journal of International Law, 14 (2001), p. 371.
52 Bonomy I., Making War Crimes Trials Work – Balancing Fairness and Expedition, in Boas G., Schabas W.A. and Scharf 
M.A., International Criminal Justice Legitimacy and Coherence, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2012, p. 56.
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Directing a case from its initial stage will render its conduct at trial swifter and save 
precious time. The Trial Chamber through the activity of the pre-trial judge and 
the parties in accordance with Rule 62 ter becomes familiar with the case at a very 
early stage. Therefore, the judges are in a position to make informed decisions on 
important matters concerning the case, such as, inter alia, the allocation of time, 
the reduction of the witnesses each party can call and the request to the Prosecutor 
to reduce the number of counts in the indictment. 
A certain level of knowledge of the case beforehand puts the judges in the position 
to intervene more often in the examination of a witness asking meaningful 
questions where necessary. Finally, it is worth stressing how a “certain familiarity” 
with the case does not equate to the full knowledge of it that can only be gained 
through being part of the trial. In other words, before the commencement of the 
trial the Trial Chamber does not possess the same “full picture” of the case that the 
Prosecutor enjoys.53
The introduction of written evidence at trial is a tool designed to speed up the 
presentation of evidence. Before this change occurred, the criminal procedure and 
the practice of the ICTY had shown heavy reliance on the testimony of witnesses 
which contributed to excessively increasing the length of the proceedings. 
Interestingly, even before the described changes in the Rules occurred, several judges 
had felt the need to interpret the RPE in order to use powers not explicitly spelled 
therein to expedite the trials.54 For example, in November 1997, in the case of the 
Prosecutor v. Dokmanović, the Trial Chamber issued an order that called upon the 
Prosecutor to take the witness statements taken from witnesses she intended to call 
for trial and other material the Prosecutor intended to rely on at trial. In addition, 
the Trial Chamber ordered the Prosecutor to file the pre-trial brief, clarifying the 
allegations in the indictment, setting out in full the details of the Prosecution’s case 
and identifying the points in issue. Finally, the Prosecutor had to file a copy of the 
proposed opening statements to the Chamber and the Defence.The Chamber put 
the same obligations on the Defence.55 Since it was a rather significant departure 
from the adversarial procedure in place and probably not in line with the Rules, 
the judges sought and found the agreement of Prosecutor and Defence in a status 
conference held a week before. The rationale behind this order was the belief that 
the Chamber would benefit from gaining a better understanding of the legal issues 
at stake and “a more effective management of the trial”.56 The judges stressed that 
those documents would not be “regarded as evidence unless and until submitted 
in the course of trial”.57 This order was a forerunner of the following amendments 
to the Rules which granted the judges the possibility of becoming familiar with the 
case before their commencement in order to exercise a more effective and informed 
control over them.
_______________________
53 Prosecutor v. Karadžić, IT-95-5/18-I, Status Conference, 23 July 2009, p. 386.
54 See Cassese, above n. 15 at p. 385.
55 Prosecutor v. Dokmanović, IT-95-13a, Order, 27 November 1997.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
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Even after the numerous amendments adopted, the characterisation of the 
proceedings as a “competition between the parties” did not change, although a degree 
of cooperation and coordination between the Defence and the Prosecutor’s cases was 
introduced.58 The parties are therefore not only expected to fight their own battle but 
also to collaborate in the pursuit of an expeditious and fair trial. The Prosecution and 
the Defence have to hold meetings to discuss issues related to the presentation of the 
case; they have obligations to file time saving information to the pre-trial judge and, 
as will be analysed below, they have broader disclosure obligations. 
The reforms of the criminal procedure seem to have sacrificed certain expectations, 
which in its early stage characterised the work of the ICTY such as contributing 
to the establishment of a detailed historical record of the war, in order to give the 
victims an opportunity to be heard and to restore a long-lasting peace in the region 
through the reconciliation of different ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia. All 
these high expectations have proved difficult to reconcile with the main objective 
of the ICTY, namely the prosecution of the persons responsible for the crimes 
committed in the former Yugoslavia.59
5. Disclosure obligations in the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
For a trial to be fair an accused must be granted adequate time and facilities for the 
preparation of his or her defence. The right is envisaged in Article 21 of the ICTY Statute.
The accused’s right to have adequate time and facilities as discussed in the 
previous chapters includes the right to have access to the material necessary for the 
preparation of his case and therefore calls into play the subject-matter disclosure.
In the context of extremely complex criminal trials such as those before the 
ICTY the right to disclosure assumes an even more stringent importance for the 
accomplishment of a fair trial.
In the following paragraphs the main rules of procedure and evidence regulating 
disclosure at the ICTY will be analysed and discussed.
 5.1 Rule 66: Disclosure by the Prosecutor
Rule 66 reads as follow:
(A) Subject to the provisions of Rules 53 and 69, the Prosecutor shall make available to the 
defence in a language which the accused understands (i) within thirty days of the initial 
appearance of the accused, copies of the supporting material which accompanied the 
indictment when confirmation was sought as well as all prior statements obtained by the 
Prosecutor from the accused; and (ii) within the time-limit prescribed by the Trial Chamber 
or by the pretrial Judge appointed pursuant to Rule 65 ter, copies of the statements of all 
witnesses whom the Prosecutor intends to call to testify at trial, and copies of all transcripts 
and written statements taken in accordance with Rule 92 bis, Rule 92 ter, and Rule 92 quater; 
copies of the statements of additional prosecution witnesses shall be made available to the 
_______________________
58 Langer, above n. 15 at p. 897.
59 Bonomy I., The Reality of Conducting a War Crimes Trial, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 5 (2007), p. 353.
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defence when a decision is made to call those witnesses.
(B) The Prosecutor shall, on request, permit the defence to inspect any books, documents, 
photographs and tangible objects in the Prosecutor’s custody or control, which are material 
to the preparation of the defence, or are intended for use by the Prosecutor as evidence at 
trial or were obtained from or belonged to the accused. 
(C) Where information is in the possession of the Prosecutor, the disclosure of which may 
prejudice further or ongoing investigations, or for any other reasons may be contrary to 
the public interest or affect the security interests of any State, the Prosecutor may apply to 
the Trial Chamber sitting in camera to be relieved from an obligation under the Rules to 
disclose that information. When making such application the Prosecutor shall provide the 
Trial Chamber (but only the Trial Chamber) with the information that is sought to be kept 
confidential. 
Rule 66 regulates the Prosecutor’s disclosure to the Defence from the pre-trial stage 
through to the trial and appeal stage.60 The timely and meticulous implementation 
by the Prosecutor of the obligations envisaged in this rule is crucial for the 
preparation of the Defence’s case. Rule 66 has often been the object of controversy 
despite the ICTY Appeal Chamber’s inclination to interpret it broadly in its “plain 
meaning”.61 The parties have often sought guidance from the Trial Chambers in 
relation to its application.62 It is indeed via the reading of the jurisprudence of 
the Trial Chambers and the Appeals Chamber that it is possible to understand 
the practical implications of this important rule of disclosure. In essence, it 
demands that the Prosecution discloses all supporting material that accompanied 
the indictment at confirmation, all prior statements obtained by the Prosecutor 
from the accused and all prior statements obtained by the prosecution from the 
witnesses whom he intends to call at trial.63
  5.1.1 Rule 66 (A)(i)
The text of Rule 66(A) opens with a reservation clause by which the disclosure 
obligations envisaged by the rule are subject to the provisions of Rule 53 and Rule 
69. Rule 53(A) states that non-disclosure to the public may be ordered, with respect 
to any documents or information, in exceptional circumstances when the interests 
of justice so require. The impact of this non-disclosure provision on the Defence’s 
case is limited if compared to the provision of Rule 69(A) (discussed below) which 
regulates non-disclosure of the identity of victims or witnesses in exceptional 
circumstances.64
Rule 66 (A)(i) requires the Prosecutor “to make available to the defence”, within 
thirty days of the initial appearance of the accused, copies of the supporting 
_______________________
60 Gibson and Lussiaà-Berdou, above n. 2 at p. 315. 
61 See Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95-14, Appeals Judgment, 29 July 2004, paras. 265-266.
62 Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., IT-96-21, Decision on Motion by the Accused Zejnil Delalić for the Disclosure of Evidence, 
26 September 1996, para. 1. 
63 Ibid. at para. 4.
64 See Tochilovsky V., Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Courts and the European Court of Human Rights, Marti-
nus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008, pp. 113-114.
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material which accompanied the request for confirmation of the indictment as well 
as all prior statements obtained by the Prosecutor from the accused.65
The term supporting material has been interpreted to mean “the material upon 
which the charges are based”.66  Other material that may be submitted to the 
confirming judge, such as a brief of argument or statement of facts, is not covered 
by this Sub-rule.67 In cases of multiple accused the Prosecutor, when submitting 
the indictment for confirmation, must specify which supporting material pertains 
to each accused. It follows that only that specific material will be the object of 
disclosure to that particular accused pursuant to Rule 66(A)(i).68
The second category of material subject to Prosecution disclosure under Rule 66 
(A)(i) concerns all the statements of the accused. The Trial Chamber held that 
“all the previous statements of the accused which appear in the Prosecutor’s file, 
whether collected by the Prosecution or originating from any other source, must be 
disclosed to the Defence immediately”.69 No relevance was attributed to the forms 
that these statements may have. The Prosecutor’s suggestion that a distinction 
ought to be made between the official statements taken under oath or signed and 
recognised by the accused and the others was dismissed by the Trial Chamber as 
not in line with the correct interpretation of sub Rule 66 (A).70
However such a broad interpretation of the meaning of “previous statements of 
the accused” was restricted by the same Trial Chamber which, in a later decision, 
clarified that Rule 66(A)(i) concerns only statements made by the accused “during 
questioning in any type of judicial proceedings which may be in the possession of 
the Prosecutor, but only such statements”.71 This interpretation limits the ambit in 
which statements of the accused are subject to disclosure to the context of judicial 
proceedings. Interviews or statements given outside this framework (e.g. to the 
media) are therefore not covered by Rule 66 (A)(i). 
The Trial Chamber further specified that “brief of argument and statements of 
facts”72 as well as “orders issued freely by the accused himself in the course of his 
duties, cannot be considered to be prior statements pursuant to Sub-rule 66(A) 
of the Rules” as “they constitute documents covered by Rule 66 (B)” and therefore 
they can be inspected by the Defence upon request but there is no obligation on 
the Prosecution to disclose them within the thirty days envisaged in Rule 66(A)
(i).73 Interestingly, audio or video recording of interviews of suspects with the 
_______________________
65 ICTY RPE, Rule 66(A)(i).
66 Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, IT-95-14/2, Decision on Motion to Compel Compliance by Prosecution with Rule 66(A) 
and 68, 26 February 1999, p. 3. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Tochilovsky V., Indictment, Disclosure, Admissibility of Evidence: Jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR, Wolf Legal Pub-
lishers, 2004, p. 35.
69 See Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95-14, Decision on the Production of Discovery Material, 27 January 1997, para. 37. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95-14, Decision on the Defence Motion for Sanctions for the Prosecutor’s Failure to Comply 
with Sub-Rule 66(A) of the rules and the Decision of 27 January 1997, Compelling the Production of All Statements 
of the Accused, 15 July 1998. See Schoun C., International Criminal Procedure, A Clash of Legal Cultures, T.M.C. Asser 
Press, 2010, p. 114.
72 Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, IT-95-14/2, Decision on Motion to Compel Compliance by Prosecution with Rule 66(A) 
and 68, 26 February 1999, p. 3. 
73 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95-14, Decision on the Defence Motion for Sanctions for the Prosecutor’s Failure to Comply 
with Sub-Rule 66(A) of the rules and the Decision of 27 January 1997, Compelling the Production of All Statements of 
the Accused, 15 July 1998.
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OTP, which according to the RPE74 must be transcribed if the suspects in question 
become accused, are subject to disclosure according to Rule 66(A)(i).75
These considerations show how the judicial interpretation of the terminology of 
Rule 66(A)(i) may have repercussions on the disclosure strategies adopted by the 
parties. A practical example can be found in Blaškić where the Defence had refused 
to subject itself to reciprocal disclosure in relation to Rule 66(B) material and in 
so doing it had waived use of that rule.76 Indeed, as will be discussed below, until 
2003 the request made by the Defence to inspect books, objects, photographs and 
tangible objects in possession of the Prosecution would trigger the same disclosure 
obligation upon the Defence. It was therefore a matter for consideration by the 
Defence of whether or not to make use of such a possibility. In Blaškić the Defence 
tried to circumvent the obligation stemming from Rule 66(B) by requesting, under 
Rule 66(A), the disclosure of the orders previously issued by the accused during 
the relevant period characterising those documents as “statements of the accused”. 
The Trial Chamber did not allow the Defence’s motion. This decision confirms 
that the boundaries between these two sub rules can be blurred as to the material 
covered by one or the other and that the role played by the Trial Chamber is crucial 
in ensuring the fair interpretation and function of the disclosure duties envisaged 
therein.
The obligation to disclose borne by the Prosecutor is not one that can be exhausted 
in one act. The Prosecutor is under a continuing obligation to disclose all of the 
accused’s statements that it has in its possession and all statements of the witnesses 
he intends to call at trial.77 Disclosure under Rule 66(A)(i) cannot be regarded as 
complete until the Prosecutor provides the Defence with written statements of all 
the accused’s prior interviews with the Office of the Prosecutor.78
  5.1.2 Rule 66 (A)(ii)
According to Rule 66 (A)(ii) the Prosecutor, “within the time-limit prescribed by 
the Trial Chamber or by the Pretrial Judge” must disclose to the Defence copies of 
the statements of all witnesses whom he intends to call to testify at trial as well as 
copies of all the transcripts and written statements taken in accordance with Rule 
92 bis, Rule 92 ter, and Rule 92 quater.79 The term “witness statement” employed 
in Rule 66(A)(ii) is to be interpreted as “the account of a person’s knowledge of a 
crime, which is recorded through due procedure in the course of an investigation 
into the crime”.80 The ICTY jurisprudence has opted for a broad interpretation 
_______________________
74 Rule 43 (vi) of the ICTY RPE. 
75 Prosecutor v. Čermak and Markač, IT-03-73, Decision relating to Prosecutor’s Disclosure Obligations, 26 March 2004.
76 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95-14, Decision on the Defence Motion for Sanctions for the Prosecutor’s Failure to Comply 
with Sub-Rule 66(A) of the rules and the Decision of 27 January 1997, Compelling the Production of All Statements of 
the Accused, 15 July 1998.
77 See Prosecutor v. Mucić  et al., IT-96-21, Decision on the Motion by the accused Zejnil Delalić  for the Disclosure of 
Evidence, 26 September 1996, para. 4.
78 Prosecutor v. Čermak and Markač, IT-03-73, Decision relating to Prosecutor’s Disclosure Obligations, 26 March 2004.
79 ICTY RPE, Rule 66(A)(ii).
80 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95-14, AC, Decision on the Appellant’s Motion for the Production of Material, Suspension or 
Extension of the Briefing Schedule and Additional Filings, 26 September 2000,  para. 15. 
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of the term in line with the initial interpretation of “previous statements of the 
accused” discussed above. 
This orientation was confirmed in Milutinović where the Trial Chamber held 
that the Prosecutor’s obligation to disclose witness statements “is broad enough 
to include statements taken by humanitarian organizations for the purpose 
of recording allegation of human rights abuses when these are passed to the 
Prosecution in order to assist it in identifying potential lines of inquiries which 
then result in the persons who gave the original statements becoming witnesses 
in Tribunal proceedings”.81 In other words, once the Prosecution decides to call a 
witness it is under the obligation82 to disclose all statements given by such witness 
to the Defence whether obtained directly or by another source.83
The Appeals Chamber stated that the testimony given in other proceedings also 
constitutes a witness statement within the meaning of Rule 66 (A)(ii) where a witness 
is intended to be called by the Prosecutor to testify in relation to the subject matter 
of the testimony previously rendered.84 On the contrary, there is no obligation on 
the Prosecutor to disclose statements given in subsequent proceedings by a witness 
already heard at trial as he ceases to be a “witnesses whom the Prosecutor intends 
to call to testify at trial” within the meaning of Sub-rule 66 (A) (ii).85
Rule 66(A)(ii) is important insofar as it allows the Defence to familiarise itself with 
the witnesses the Prosecution will rely on. This disclosure obligation is continuous 
and therefore should the Prosecutor decide to call additional witnesses to testify, 
copies of their statements must be provided to the Defence.86 The rule does not 
dictate a specific time limit for disclosure leaving it to the discretion of the Trial 
Chamber or pre-trial judge to prescribe it. However, in Tribunal practice witness’ 
identities and unredacted witness statements must be made available to the 
Defence at the latest thirty days before the commencement of the trial. Disclosure 
on a “rolling basis”, namely disclosure of a witness identity before the testimony of 
that particular witness, is no longer accepted by the ICTY practice.87 
The disclosure of witness’s identity and unredacted witness statements must 
be balanced against the competing interest to grant protection to witnesses and 
victims as enshrined in Article 22 of the ICTY Statute. The (sometimes complicated) 
interaction between these two competing interests will be discussed below in the 
context of the protection of victims and witnesses regulated by Rule 69 of the ICTY 
RPE. 
_______________________
81 Prosecutor v. Milutinović et el., IT-05-87, Decision on Ojdanić Motion for Disclosure of Witness Statements and for 
Finding of Violation of Rule 66(A)(ii),  29 September 2006, para. 14.
82 Except for material covered by Rule 70 (A).
83 See Tochilovsky, above n. 64 at p. 101.
84 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95-14, AC, Decision on the Appellant’s Motion for the Production of Material, Suspension or 
Extension of the Briefing Schedule and Additional Filings, 26 September 2000, para. 15.
85 Ibid. at para. 16. 
86 Rule 66 (A)(ii) ICTY RPE.
87 Gibson and Lussiaà-Berdou, above n. 2 at pp. 316-317.
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  5.1.3 Rule 66(B)
Pursuant to Rule 66(B) the Prosecutor shall adhere to the defence request to 
inspect books, documents, photographs and tangible objects (hereafter material), 
which are in the Prosecutors possession if they are (1) “material to the preparation 
of the defence, (2) “intended for use by the Prosecutor as evidence at trial” or (3) 
were “obtained from or belonged to the accused”. These conditions are alternative 
and not cumulative.88
The Trial Chamber is best placed to determine both the modalities for disclosure 
and also how much time is deemed sufficient for an accused to prepare his 
defence. However, the Appeals Chamber stated that disclosure at the time of cross-
examination is insufficient where the requested material is intended to assist the 
Defence in its selection of witnesses.89
There is no requirement for the Defence to make independent efforts to obtain 
material prior to receiving requested disclosure under Rule 66(B) which is indeed 
one of the methods available to the Defence for carrying out investigations.90
Rule 66(B) is only triggered by a sufficiently specific request by the Defence.91 
If such request is dismissed or if the Defence considers that the Prosecutor has 
not fulfilled his obligations under Rule 66 (B) it can turn to the Chamber seeking 
an order to make the relevant material available for inspection. The Defence, in 
its application, must identify the documents whose inspection is sought, show 
that they are in the Prosecutor’s custody or control and establish a prima facie 
case demonstrating the materiality of the documents to its case.92 Establishing a 
prima facie case as to the materiality of the relevant documents to its case is a 
difficult task for the Defence.93 The question arises in relation to the reasonable 
standard to be applied. The threshold cannot be too high, as the Defence has no 
specific knowledge of the material held by the Prosecutor. On the other hand, a 
low threshold allowing Defence “fishing expeditions” would lead to an inquisitorial 
type of disclosure which would not be in line with the intention of the drafters of 
the Rules and would “undermine the entire disclosure regime of the Tribunal and 
its aim to strike a just balance between the parties”.94 
The concept of materiality to the preparation of the Defence’s case, which defines 
the first category of material included in Rule 66(B), is a concept that needs a careful 
_______________________
88 Ibid. at p. 322.
89 Prosecutor v. Bagosora, ICTR-98-41-AR73, AC, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Relating to Disclosure Under Rule 
66(B) of the Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 26 September 2006, para. 12. 
90 Ibid. at para. 11.
91 Ibid. at para. 10.
92 Prosecutor v. Popović et al., IT-05-88, Decision on Popović Motion for Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 66(B) and Request to 
File an Addendum to Professor Stojkovic’s Expert Reports, 6 October 2008, para. 10.
93 The prima facie standard characterizes also applications to the Trial Chamber pursuant Rule 68 concerning exculpatory 
material. 
94 Schoun, above n. 71 at p. 113, footnotes 13. See also Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., IT-96-21, Decision on Motion by the Ac-
cused Zejnil Delalić for the Disclosure of Evidence, 26 September 1996, para. 8 where it quoted the following passage of 
the judgment in the case of the United States v. Liquid Sugars, Inc. & Mooney, 158 F.R.D. 466 (U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. Cal 
1994): The phrase “material to the preparation of the defendant’s case is one that causes practical problems on both 
sides of the discovery equation. On the one hand, a defendant’s counsel cannot know in most cases the precise nature 
of all the documents that should be available, but the defence counsel is going to be hard pressed to specifically argue 
materiality of individual documents. On the other hand, it is equally clear that the discovery rules do not require “open 
file” discovery with the defendant being allowed to browse at will through the prosecution files.
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assessment. The Trial Chamber clarified that it is for the Prosecution to make the 
first assessment as to the materiality of the books, documents, photographs and 
tangible objects relevant to the Defence’s case. The Defence can challenge the 
assessment before the Trial Chamber where it considers it not in compliance with 
Rule 66(B).95
In Delalić the Trial Chamber remarked the absence in Rule 66(B) of guidance 
regarding the process of determining the materiality of evidence.96 It further 
stressed that due to the similarity of Rule 66(B) with Rule 16 of the U.S. Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure it was allowed to seek some guidance in the interpretations 
of the United States rule as well as in the review of its application.97 The test of 
materiality was therefore defined as being threefold. The material in question must 
be: “(1) relevant or possibly relevant to an issue in the case; (2) to raise or possibly 
raise a new issue whose existence is not apparent from the evidence the prosecution 
proposes to use; (3) to hold out a real, as opposed to fanciful, prospect of providing 
a lead on evidence which goes to (1) or (2)”.98
The relevance of the documents to the preparation of the Defence’s case is the test 
to be used to assess the materiality of the documents at stake.99 The preparation 
of the case is a broad concept and does not necessarily require that the material 
itself counters the Prosecution evidence.100 The Appeals Chamber, when applying 
this principle, reversed a Trial Chamber’s decision and ordered the Prosecutor to 
disclose documents related to the immigration, refugee and asylum status of certain 
Defence witnesses as it considered that they were relevant for the preparation of the 
Defence’s case insofar as they could assist the Defence in one of the most important 
tasks in the preparation of its case, namely the choice of the witnesses.101 The Trial 
Chamber had considered that the immigration documents were not “material to 
the preparation of the defence case” because they did not counter the Prosecution’s 
evidence presented during its case-in-chief, but rather concerned the credibility 
of defence evidence.102 In addition, the Trial Chamber had stated that the 
immigration documents did not constitute material intended for use by the 
Prosecution at trial because, in its view, this category refers only to evidence 
for use during the Prosecution’s case-in-chief.103  The approach of the Appeals 
Chamber is to be welcomed as it appears more sensible to the right of the 
_______________________
95 Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., IT-96-21, Decision on Motion by the Accused Zejnil Delalić for the Disclosure of Evidence, 
26 September 1996, para. 9. 
96 Ibid. at paras. 6-8. 
97 On the similarity between Rule 66(B) of the ICTY RPE and Rule 16 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure see 
Schoun, above n. 71 at p. 114.
98 Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., IT-96-21, Decision on Motion by the Accused Zejnil Delalić for the Disclosure of Evidence, 
26 September 1996, para. 7. 
99 Prosecutor v. Bagosora, ICTR-98-41-AR73, AC, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Relating to Disclosure Under Rule 
66(B) of the Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 26 September 2006, para. 9.
100 Ibid. at para. 9. In this decision the Appeal Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber decision and ordered the disclosure 
of immigration documents of the Defence potential witness considering that they were material for the preparation of 
the Defence case insofar as they can assist the Defence in one of the most important tasks in the preparation of its case, 
namely the choice of the witnesses. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Prosecutor v. Bagosora, ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on Disclosure of Material Relating to Immigration Statements of De-




accused and to the overall effectiveness of the truth finding function of the 
trial.  
The second category of material envisaged by Rule 66 (B) is material that the 
Prosecutor intends to use as evidence at trial. The Appeals Chamber clarified 
that the phrase “at trial” must be interpreted as meaning throughout the entire 
proceedings.104 The accused’s right to inspection is therefore not limited to material 
related to the Prosecution’s case-in-chief.105 Whereas there is no specific obligation 
for the Prosecution to disclose to the Defence statements made by witnesses he 
does not intend to call at trial,106 this category of material is not per se excluded 
from the content of Rule 66(B). For instance, in Šešelj the Trial Chamber ordered 
the disclosure of the witness statements in which the name of the accused was 
mentioned even if the witnesses were not to be heard at trial by the Prosecutor.107 In 
its submission to the Trial Chamber the Prosecutor had accepted that such material 
could be relevant or possibly relevant to an issue in the proceedings according to 
the meaning of Rule 66(B).108 
Finally, the Prosecutor shall permit the Defence to inspect evidence that he 
obtained from the accused or that belonged to him. From the reading of the text 
it appears that the discerning element is whether the material concerned is in the 
possession of the Prosecution rather than whether he has gathered it himself.109 
In relation to the meaning of “in possession”, material held by third parties cannot 
be considered to be in “custody or possession” of the Prosecution, regardless of its 
relationship with the third parties in question. An exception is applicable where 
proved that the Prosecution “has some ability to direct and control the relevant 
person or organization”.110
Due to their similar raison d’être Rule 66 (C) will be analysed below together with 
Rule 68 (iv) and Rule 70 in the context of the exceptions to disclosure. 
 5.2 Rule 68: Disclosure of Exculpatory and Other Relevant Material
Rule 68 reads as follow:
Subject to the provisions of Rule 70,
(i) the Prosecutor shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the Defence any material which 
in the actual knowledge of the Prosecutor may suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt 
of the accused or affect the credibility of Prosecution evidence;
_______________________
104 Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Appeal Chamber’s Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Relating to Disclosure Under Rule 66(B) of 
the Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 25 September 2006, para. 9. 
105 Ibid. at para. 8.
106 Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Martinovic, IT-98-34, Decision on Joint Motions for Order Allowing Defense Counsel to 
Inspect Documents in the Possession of the Prosecution, 16 September 2002, p. 3. 
107 Prosecutor v. Šešelj, IT-03-67, Decision on Form of Disclosure, 4 July 2006, paras. 16-17. 
108 Ibid. at para. 16.
109 Gibson and Lussiaà-Berdou, above n. 2 at p. 325.
110 Prosecutor v. Popović et al., IT-05-88, Decision on Popović Motion for Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 66(B) and Request to 
File an Addendum to Professor Stojkovic’s Expert Reports, 6 October 2008, para. 11.
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(ii) without prejudice to paragraph (i), the Prosecutor shall make available to the defence, 
in electronic form, collections of relevant material held by the Prosecutor, together 
with appropriate computer software with which the defence can search such collections 
electronically;
(iii) the Prosecutor shall take reasonable steps, if  confidential information is provided to 
the Prosecutor  by a person or entity under Rule 70 (B) and contains material referred to in 
paragraph (i) above, to obtain the consent of the provider to disclosure of that material, or 
the fact of its existence, to the accused;
(iv) the Prosecutor shall apply to the Chamber sitting in camera to be relieved from an 
obligation under paragraph (i) to disclose information in the possession of the Prosecutor, 
if its disclosure may prejudice further or ongoing investigations, or for any other reason 
may be contrary to the public interest or affect the security interests of any State, and when 
making such application, the Prosecutor shall provide the Trial Chamber (but only the Trial 
Chamber) with the information that is sought to be kept confidential;
(v) notwithstanding the completion of the trial and any subsequent appeal, the Prosecutor 
shall disclose to the other party any material referred to in paragraph (i) above.
Rule 68 is an important procedural rule whose primary purpose is to secure the fair 
trial rights of the accused as enshrined in Articles 20 and 21 of the Statute of the 
Tribunal. The final aim of such rule is also “to enable the Trial Chamber to come to 
factual findings that are as close as possible to the truth, taking into account Rules 
66 and 68 in light of the Tribunal’s mandate under chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations.” 111 
The disclosure of evidence that in any way suggests the innocence or could mitigate 
the guilt of the accused is crucial for the Defence112 and it is “the most onerous 
responsibility of the Prosecutor”.113 Rule 68 is also “an important shield in the 
accused possession”114 as it grants the Defence the possibility to have exculpatory 
material disclosed that it otherwise, due to its deficient investigatory apparatus, 
could probably never have been able to gather.115 The obligation is indeed placed on 
the Prosecution due to its “superior and sometimes sole access to this material.”116
The Prosecution’s disclosure obligations are in line with the rationale of disclosure 
in general, namely to participate in the process of administering justice and to 
assist the Tribunal in its finding the truth and to do justice for the international 
community, victims, and the accused.117
Such obligations are directly intertwined with the interpretation of the role of the 
Prosecution in the ICTY legal system and more in general in the administration of 
_______________________
111 Prosecutor v. Blagojević et al., IT-02-60-PT, Joint Decision on Motions Related to Production of Evidence, 12 December 
2002, para. 27.
112 Prosecutor v. Krstić, IT-98-33, AC, Judgement, 19 April 2004, para. 180.
113 Prosecutor v. Brđanin, IT-99-36-T, AC, Decision on appellant’s Motion for Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 68 and Motion 
for an Order to the Registrar to Disclose Certain Materials, 7 December 2004, p.3. 
114 Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, IT-95-14/2, AC, Judgement, 17 December 2004, para. 242.
115 See Gibson and Lussiaà-Berdou, above n. 2 at p. 327.
116 Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, IT-95-14/2, AC, Decision on Appellant’s Notice and Supplemental Notice of Prosecu-
tion’s Non-Compliance with its Disclosure Obligation Under Rule 68 of the Rules, 11 February 2004, para. 17. 
117 Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., ICTR-98-44, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding the Role of the Prosecutor’s 
Electronic Disclosure Suite in Discharging Obligations, 30 June 2006, para. 9. 
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international criminal justice. The Prosecution disclosure’s obligations envisaged 
in Rule 68 are considered as important as the obligation to prosecute.118 
The jurisprudential characterisation of the functions of the Prosecutor and its 
impact on the disclosure regime of the Tribunal will be discussed further in this 
chapter. However it is should be noted that at the ICTY the Prosecutor is under 
the obligation to disclose material of exculpatory nature that it “encounters” 
while carrying out its investigation but it has no explicit obligation to search for 
exculpatory evidence.119 It will be seen in the next chapter that such obligation has 
been codified in article 54 of the Statute of the ICC which explicitly regulates the 
Prosecutor’s obligation “to investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances 
equally”.120 The difference is significant. 
  5.2.1 Rule 68(i)
The application of Rule 68 “depends so significantly on the facts of each case”.121 
The Prosecution’s obligation to disclose exculpatory material should be discharged 
as soon as practicable, “meaning as soon as the Prosecution becomes aware of 
the existence of such material or has the possibility to become aware by regularly 
checking, inter alia, its own database.”122 In Karadžić, the Trial Chamber stated 
that the Prosecutor’s obligations under Rule 68 are not met where the search 
for exculpatory material is carried out on a “rolling basis” namely through a 
witness-specific approach disclosing the material prior to that particular witness 
testimony.123 The Trial Chamber further stated that regardless of what the Defence 
strategy proves to be and even in case of the accused’s failure to identify its defence 
clearly in its pre-trial brief, the Prosecution’s disclosure of exculpatory material 
should be made as early as the initial appearance of the accused.124 
The Prosecutor remains obliged at all times to disclose to the Defence any material 
in its possession or knowledge that might, wholly or in part, be exculpatory.125 
Consequently, the Prosecution’s obligation to disclose exculpatory material is 
continuous. The application of Rule 68 “is not confined to the trial process and 
continues throughout the proceedings on the relevant case before the Tribunal.”126 
_______________________
118 Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, IT-95-14/2, Decision on Motions to Extend Time for Filling Appellant’s Briefs, 11 May 
2001, para. 14. 
119 Gibson and Lussiaà-Berdou, above n. 2 at p. 326. 
120 Article 54 of the Statute of the ICC. 
121 Harmon M. and Karagiannakis M., The disclosure of exculpatory Material by the Prosecution to the Defence under Rule 
68 of the ICTY Rules, in May R. et al., Essays on ICTY Procedure and Evidence in Honour of Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, 
315-328, Kluwer Law International 2001, p. 327.
122 Prosecutor v. Blagojević et al., IT-02-60-PT, Joint Decision on Motions Related to Production of Evidence, 12 December 
2002, para. 29.
123 Prosecutor v. Karadžić, IT-95-5/18-I, Decision on Prosecution’s Request for Reconsideration of Trial Chamber’s 11 No-
vember 2010 Decision, 10 December 2010, para. 11. See Mundis D.A and Gaynor F., Current Developments at the Ad Hoc 
International Criminal Tribunals, Journal of International Criminal Justice 9 (2011), 481-518, p. 499.
124 Prosecutor v. Karadžić, IT-95-5/18-I, Decision on Prosecution’s Request for Reconsideration of Trial Chamber’s 11 No-
vember 2010 Decision, 10 December 2010, para. 13.
125 Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, IT-98-29/1, Decision on Motion seeking Disclosure of Rule 68 Material, 7 September 
2012, para. 6. 
126 Prosecutor v. Bralo, IT-95-17, Decision on Motions for access to ex Parte Portions of the Record on Appeal and for Dis-
closure of Mitigating Material, 30 August 2006, para. 29. See also Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95-14, AC, Decision on the 
Appellant’s Motions for the Production of Material, suspension or Extension of the Briefing Schedule, and Additional 
Filings, 26 September 2000, para. 32 and Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, IT-98-29/1, Decision on Motion seeking 
Disclosure of Rule 68 Material, 7 September 2012, para. 5. 
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The Prosecutor can be found in violation of its disclosure obligations under Rule 
68 even after the pronouncement of the final judgment.127
The text of Rule 68 has been amended substantially since its first adoption. It 
defines exculpatory material as “material which is known to the Prosecutor and 
which is favorable to the accused in the sense that it tends to suggest the innocence 
or mitigate the guilt of the accused or may affect the credibility of prosecution 
evidence”.128 Exculpatory material also includes “material which may put an accused 
on notice that such material exists”.129
In 1995, the phrase “may affect the credibility of the prosecution evidence” was 
added. Such amendment extended the scope of disclosure to material which not 
necessarily goes to the innocence of the accused but it has nonetheless the potential 
to help the defence case by weakening the prosecution evidence. The Appeals 
Chamber specified that material will affect the credibility of the Prosecution’s 
evidence “if it undermines the case presented by the Prosecution at trial”.130 This is 
interesting in the light of the scope of the Defence’s case which is not to prove the 
innocence of the accused but to insinuate a reasonable doubt about the strength of 
the Prosecution’s case.
In this context the Appeals Chamber acknowledged the burden that a broader 
interpretation of its obligation to disclose under Rule 68 puts on the Prosecution’s 
shoulders both in terms of the volume of material to be disclosed and in terms of 
the necessary effort to assess its exculpatory nature. However, it held that it would 
be against the interest of a fair trial to limit the rule’s scope to material exculpatory 
“on its face” as suggested by the Prosecution.131 For instance, a medical certificate 
stating that a Prosecution witness received mental treatment was considered 
exculpatory material under Rule 68 due to the fact that it “clearly had the potential 
to affect the credibility of prosecution evidence” as it concerned the state of mind 
and memory of the Prosecution’s witness.132
In 2003, Rule 68 was amended extensively to the point that some commentators 
have drawn a distinction between an “old” and a “new” Rule 68.133 The word 
“material” replaced the word “evidence”.134 This change in the text reflected 
the jurisprudence of the Tribunal which did not limit the meaning of the word 
evidence to the material admissible at trial but included any information in any 
form which falls within Rule 68(A)’s description.135 A second change concerned the 
_______________________
127 See Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, ICTR-99-54A, Decision on Motion for Disclosure, 4 March 2010, paras. 5, 8, 
45-47. 
128 Prosecutor v. Delalić, IT-96-21, Decision on the Request of the Accused Pursuant to Rule 68 for Exculpatory Informa-
tion, 24 June 1997, para. 12. 
129 Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., IT-04-84, Decision on Joint Defence Motion for Relief from Rule 68 Violations by the 
Prosecution and for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 68 Bis, 12 October 2011, para. 38. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Prosecutor v. Krstić, IT-98-33, AC, Judgement, 19 April 2004, para. 180. 
132 Prosecutor v. Furundžija, IT-95-17/1, Decision, 16 July 1998, para. 16. 
133 Zappala’ S., The Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Materials and the Recent Amendment to Rule 68 ICTY RPE, 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 2 (2004), 620-630.
134 Ibid.
135 Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, IT-95-14/2, Decision on Motions to Extend Time for Filling Appellant’s Briefs, 11 May 
2001, para. 9; Prosecutor v. Brđanin & Talić, IT-99-36, Decision on Motion by Momir Talić  for Disclosure of Evidence, 27 
June 2000, para 8.  See Tochilovsky, above n. 68 at p. 42. 
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phrase “evidence known to the Prosecutor” that was replaced by the expression “in 
the actual knowledge of the Prosecutor” which has been interpreted as concerning 
material which is in the Prosecutor’s actual possession.136
Exculpatory material arising from related cases regardless of the confidential or 
the public character of such evidence is also subject to disclosure under Rule 68.137 
In Blaškić the Appeals Chamber stated that the OTP is under an obligation to 
adopt procedures which aim to ensure that the evidence provided by witnesses 
(who he intends to call to testify) in a different trial is “re-examined in the light of 
Rule 68 to determine whether any material has to be disclosed.”138 However, even 
if testimonies rendered in the context of another trial are usually included in the 
scope of Rule 68 the Prosecution may be exempted from its obligation to disclose 
if the material in question is known and publicly accessible for the Defence.139 The 
Appeals Chamber made a distinction between material of a public character, which 
does not pose problems in relation to the Prosecution’s exemption from disclosure, 
and material reasonably accessible to the Defence. The Prosecutor is not under 
an obligation to disclose the latter if the Defence can gain access to such material 
through the exercise of due diligence.140 Indeed, the purpose of Rule 68 is not to 
replace the Defence with the Prosecutor in conducting investigations or gathering 
material that can assist the defendant.141
Moreover, Rule 68 does not grant the Defence the right to receive all the evidence 
gathered by the Prosecution which could be useful in countering the charges in 
the indictment.142 Material which could be of interest for the Defence, which is not 
exculpatory remains excluded from the application of Rule 68. The exculpatory 
material should be disclosed in its original form and not in the form of a summary. 
When redactions are believed to be necessary by the Prosecutor the redacted 
version of the exculpatory material should however be “sufficiently cohesive, 
understandable and usable and not taken out of context”.143
Interestingly, also material pertaining to favourable agreements (such as the budget 
for payments and benefits paid to witnesses) entered into by Prosecutor’s witnesses 
with the Prosecutor may be object of disclosure under Rule 68.144 The Trial Chamber 
in Halilović ordered the Prosecutor to provide for the Defence “a list identifying 
those proposed witnesses who have entered into favorable arrangements, if any, 
_______________________
136 It is also noted that previously the Rule stated that the Prosecutor was under the obligation to disclose evidence that “in 
any way tends to suggest…” whereas after the amendments the “in any way” was removed somehow narrowing the cate-
gory of material covered by the Rule See Mundis D.A and Gaynor F., Current Developments at the Ad Hoc International 
Criminal Tribunals, Journal of International Criminal Justice 2 (2004), 642-698. 
137 Prosecutor v. Brđanin, IT-99-36-T, AC, Decision on appellant’s Motion for Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 68 and Motion 
for an Order to the Registrar to Disclose Certain Materials, 7 December 2004, p.4. See also Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95-
14, AC, Judgment, 29 July 2004, para. 267.
138 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95-14, AC, Judgment, 29 July 2004, para. 302.
139 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95-14, AC, Decision on the Appellant’s Motion for the Production of Material, Suspension or 
Extension of the Briefing Schedule and Additional Filings, 26 September 2000, para. 38.
140 See Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95-14, AC, Judgment, 29 July 2004, para. 296. 
141 Prosecutor v. Blagojević et al., IT-02-60-PT, Joint Decision on Motions Related to Production of Evidence, 12 December 
2002, para. 26. 
142 Ibid. The Defence of one of the accused had sought the disclosure of, inter alia, a copy of a report of the Netherlands 
Institute for War Documentation on Srebrenica.
143 Ibid. at, para. 24.
144 Tochilovsky, above n. 64 at pp. 131-132. 
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that may go to the credibility of prosecution evidence”.145
The Prosecution has the exclusive responsibility of assessing the exculpatory 
nature of the material in its actual knowledge. Such assessment, which confers 
considerable discretion for the Prosecution, must be done in good faith.146 The 
standard for assessing the exculpatory nature of the Prosecution’s material is 
whether there is any possibility, considering the parties submissions, that the 
information in question could be relevant to the Defence.147 As a general practice 
the Prosecutor should identify in respect of all material disclosed to the Defence, 
the material that had been disclosed pursuant Rule 68(i).148
In the absence of proof that the Prosecutor abused its discretion the Trial Chamber 
will be reluctant to intervene.149 “The general practice of the Tribunal is to respect 
the Prosecution’s function in the administration of justice, and the Prosecution’s 
execution of that function in good faith”.150 However, if the Defence believes that the 
Prosecution has failed to discharge its disclosure obligations it can apply to the Trial 
Chamber for an order for disclosure. The request should satisfy the Chamber that 
the evidence sought is of an exculpatory nature and that it is in the Prosecution’s 
possession. “Such request is not required to be as specific as to precisely identify 
which documents should be disclosed”.151 However, requesting “any exculpatory 
information in the hands of the Prosecutor” is too general as it is limited to re-state 
the Rule 68 obligation.152 The Defence must present a prima facie case that would 
make the exculpatory nature of the material concerned probable.153 
This scheme places both the burden of proof and the need to monitor the 
Prosecution’s conduct on the Defence. As rightly noted by some commentators, 
it is almost impossible for the Defence, in the absence of an indication or partial 
disclosure on the part of the Prosecution, to have knowledge of exculpatory material 
in the Prosecutor’s possession.154 The possibility for the Defence to challenge 
the Prosecution’s assessment of the exculpatory character of the material in its 
possession is therefore of limited effectiveness. Interestingly, as it will be discussed 
in the next chapter, the drafters of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence tried 
to tackle this problem adopting Rule 83 that regulates the possibility of an ex parte 
hearing aimed at assessing the exculpatory character of evidence.155
_______________________
145 Prosecutor v. Halilović, IT-01-48, Decision on Defence Motion for Identification of Suspects and other Categories 
Among its Proposed Witnesses, 14 November 2003. 
146 Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, IT-98-29/1, Decision on Motion seeking Disclosure of Rule 68 Material, 7 September 
2012, para. 5. 
147 Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., IT-04-84, Decision on Joint Defence Motion for Relief from Rule 68 Violations by the 
Prosecution and for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 68 Bis, 12 October 2011, para. 38.
148 Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Simatović, IT-03-69, Order Establishing Work Plan, 19 January 2007, p. 2. Tochilovsky, above 
n. 64 at p. 126. 
149 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95-14, AC, Decision on the Appellant’s Motion for the Production of Material, Suspension or 
Extension of the Briefing Schedule and Additional Filings, 26 September 2000, para. 39.
150 Prosecutor v. Bralo, IT-95-17, Decision on Motions for access to ex Parte Portions of the Record on Appeal and for Dis-
closure of Mitigating Material, 30 August 2006, para. 31.
151 Ibid. at para. 30.
152 See Tochilovsky, above n. 64 at p. 138.
153 Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al., IT-06-90, Decision on Ivan Čermak’s Motion Requesting the Trial Chamber to Order the 
Prosecution to Disclose Rule 68 Material to the Defence, 7 august 2009, para. 9.
154 Gibson and Lussiaà-Berdou, above n. 2 at p. 329.
155 Rule 83 of the ICC Statute. See Gibson and Lussiaà-Berdou, above n. 2 at p. 329.
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Finally one of the major changes that occurred in the provision of Rule 68 concerns 
its being subjected to the provision of Rule 70 which regulates matters not subject 
to disclosure. Before the amendments to the rule, exculpatory material had to be 
disclosed to the defendant without exception. The relationship between the two 
rules will be discussed in the context of the exception to disclosure.
  5.2.2 Rule 68(ii)                
An electronic disclosure system (EDS) was introduced by the 2003 amendments 
to Rule 68. The EDS does not establish a distinct disclosure obligation but rather a 
possible means of conveying exculpatory material to the Defence in an electronic 
format.156 The material disclosed under Rule 68(ii) is the same material covered by 
Rule 68(i) but in searchable electronic form. In other words Rule 68 envisages two 
different ways to disclose the same material. 
The Appeals Chamber clarified that the disclosure obligation regulated by Rule 
68 is not met by simply granting the Defence access to the electronic database 
“containing a large amount of documents only a few of which are potentially 
exculpatory”.157 This method “cannot serve as a surrogate for the Prosecution’s 
individualized consideration of the material in its possession”.158 The electronic 
disclosure system does not per se make documents “reasonably accessible as 
a general matter” and it does not allow the assumption that the Defence has 
knowledge of all material included therein. Consequently, the Prosecution cannot 
be relieved of its obligations pursuant Rule 68 by simply making available the EDS 
to the Defence.159
The Appeals Chamber did not go as far as stating the right procedure to be followed 
in disclosure through the EDS, however it warned the Prosecution that by placing 
a particular piece of material on EDS it had not made that piece of material 
necessarily “reasonably accessible” to any of the accused.160 It further stressed that 
it might be useful if the Prosecutor either created a special file containing Rule 68 
material or gave the Defence written notice of such material keeping the special file 
or the written notice up to date.161 In other words, in order to meet its obligation 
under Rule 68 the Prosecution must guide the Defence to the exculpatory material 
present in the collections of material disclosed electronically. 
_______________________
156 Prosecutor v. Karadžić, IT-95-5/18-I, Decision on Motions for Disclosure of Rule 68 Material and Reconsideration of 
Decision on adequate Facilities, 10 March 2009, para. 14.
157 Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., ICTR-98-44, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding the Role of the Prosecutor’s 
Electronic Disclosure Suite in Discharging Obligations, 30 June 2006, para. 10. See also Prosecutor v. Karadžić, IT-95-
5/18-I, Decision on Motions for Disclosure of Rule 68 Material and Reconsideration of Decision on adequate Facilities, 
10 March 2009, para. 14 and Prosecutor v. Bralo, IT-95-17, Decision on Motions for access to ex Parte Portions of the 
Record on Appeal and for Disclosure of Mitigating Material, 30 August 2006, para. 35.
158 Ibid.
159 Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., ICTR-98-44, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding the Role of the Prosecutor’s 
Electronic Disclosure Suite in Discharging Obligations, 30 June 2006, para. 15.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
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Rule 68(iv) which regulated the Prosecutor’s application to the Chamber sitting in 
camera in order to seek relief from its obligation to disclose exculpatory material 
will be discussed in the paragraph dedicated to the exceptions to disclosure. 
 5.3 Rule 67: Additional disclosure (Defence disclosure) 
Rule 67 reads as follows:
(A) Within the time-limit prescribed by the Trial Chamber, at a time not prior to a ruling 
under Rule 98 bis, but not less than one week prior to the commencement of the Defence 
case, the Defence shall: 
(i) permit the Prosecutor to inspect and copy any books, documents, photographs, and tangible 
objects in the Defence’s custody or control, which are intended for use by the Defence as 
evidence at trial; and (ii) provide to the Prosecutor copies of statements, if any, of all witnesses 
whom the Defence intends to call to testify at trial, and copies of all written statements taken 
in accordance with Rule 92 bis, Rule 92 ter, or Rule 92 quater, which the Defence intends 
to present at trial. Copies of the statements, if any, of additional witnesses shall be made 
available to the Prosecutor prior to a decision being made to call those witnesses.
(B) Within the time-limit prescribed by the Trial Chamber or by the pre-trial Judge 
appointed pursuant to Rule 65 ter: 
(i) the defence shall notify the Prosecutor of its intent to offer:
(a) the defence of alibi; in which case the notification shall specify the place or places at 
which the accused claims to have been present at the time of the alleged crime and the 
names and addresses of witnesses and any other evidence upon which the accused intends 
to rely to establish the alibi;
(b) any special defence, including that of diminished or lack of mental responsibility; in 
which case the notification shall specify the names and addresses of witnesses and any 
other evidence upon which the accused intends to rely to establish the special defence; and
(ii) the Prosecutor shall notify the defence of the names of the witnesses that the Prosecutor 
intends to call in rebuttal of any defence plea of which the Prosecutor has received notice in 
accordance with paragraph (i) above.
(C) Failure of the Defence to provide notice under this Rule shall not limit the right of the 
accused to testify on the above defences.
(D) If either party discovers additional evidence or material which should have been 
disclosed earlier pursuant to the Rules, that party shall immediately disclose that evidence 
or material to the other party and the Trial Chamber.
Defence disclosure obligations have been broadened by several amendments to 
Rule 67 adopted in 2008. Before the adoption of these amendments the Defence 
disclosure duties were limited to the defence of an alibi (or other special defences) 
the accused intended to rely on. This approach reflected the role played by the 
Defence in the proceedings before the Tribunal in which it does not bear the onus 
probandi of the case, which is instead on the Prosecution’s shoulders. After the 
2008 amendments the Defence’s obligations to disclose have been brought closer 
to those of the Prosecution’s bringing an equality that was not in the intentions of 
the drafters of the original RPE.
Rule 67 (A)(i) now stipulates that the Defence must permit the Prosecution to 
inspect and copy books, documents, photographs and tangible objects in its 
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custody or control which it intends to use at trial. The time limit of the obligation 
is set by the Trial Chamber at a time not prior to a 98 bis ruling (judgment of 
acquittal at the end of the Prosecution’s case) and no later than one week before 
the commencement of the Defence’s case. Before 2003, this disclosure obligation 
functioned on a reciprocal basis as the Defence’s obligation to allow the Prosecutor 
to inspect books, documents, photographs and tangible objects would only be 
triggered by a prior request made by the Defence (under Rule 66(B)) to inspect 
the same material in the Prosecutor’s possession. Once the Defence has decided to 
avail itself of the possibility of inspecting the Prosecution’s material it fell under 
the obligation to allow the inspection of the same material in its possession by the 
Prosecution. Unlike the previous obligation, the new disclosure obligation is not 
reciprocal as its application is not dependent on a prior request to the Prosecution 
for the disclosure of similar material.
Moreover, pursuant to the adoption of Rule 67(A)(ii), the Defence, at the latest 
one week before the commencement of its case, must disclose to the Prosecutor 
the statements given by witnesses it intends to call at trial as well as copies of all 
written statements taken from witnesses whose attendance is required by the Trial 
Chamber (Rule 92 bis), who have given testimony in other proceedings before the 
Tribunal (Rule 92 ter) or who are unavailable (Rule 92 quater). This amendment 
marked a major shift from the mechanism in place before where the Defence did 
not have any obligation to disclose the names of its witnesses to the Prosecutor 
before the trial unless it intended to rely upon an alibi or a special Defence.162
The jurisprudential background to the adoption of Rule 67(A)(ii) is of interest. 
Indeed, the issue of whether a Trial Chamber could order the Defence, even in the 
absence of any provision in the Statute or in the RPE, to disclose its witness lists 
or previous statements of its witnesses had been tackled by the ICTY Trial and 
Appeals Chambers. This question called into play, to a certain extent, the principle 
of the equality of arms between the Prosecution and the Defence in relation to 
their disclosure obligations. 
Two different approaches emerged. In Tadić the Trial Chamber rejected a 
Prosecution motion for the disclosure of prior statements of Defence witnesses.163 
In Delalić the Trial Chamber found that the Defence’s pre-trial disclosure of its 
list of witnesses would “not shift the balance of advantage from the Defence, 
rather it will ensure the observance and maintenance of the parity of opportunity 
safeguarded by the statute.”164
The Appeals Chamber in Alekovsky opted for the Delalić approach holding that 
_______________________
162 See Klamberg M., Evidence in International Criminal Trials: Confronting Legal Gaps and the Reconstruction of Disputed 
Events, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013, p. 294.
163 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, IT-94-1, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Production of Defence Witness Statements, 27 
November 1996. In its separate opinion Judge Vohrah stated that the principle of equality of arms in criminal proceed-
ings should be tilted towards the Defence in order to allow it to gain parity with the Prosecutor in the presentation of the 
Defence case. It is interesting to note that in the Appeals judgment of this case the Appeals Chamber stated that “a Trial 
Chamber may, depending on the circumstances of the case at hand, order the disclosure of defence witness statements 
after examination in chief of the witness. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, IT-94-1, AC, Judgement, 15 July 1999, paras. 22 
and 326.
164 Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., IT-96-21, Decision on the Prosecution’s Motion for an Order Requiring Advance Disclosure 
of Witnesses by the Defence, 4 February 1998, para. 46. 
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“it would be difficult to reconcile with the fairness of a trial that the Defence 
could be favored at the expenses of the Prosecution.”165
The adoption of Rule 67(A)(ii) and Rule 65 ter (G) transformed into obligations 
which the Appeals Chamber found was a possibility depending on the 
circumstances of the case and on the will of the Chamber to intervene motu 
proprio.  
Rule 67 (B)(i) stipulates that the Defence is required to disclose to the Prosecutor 
within the time-limit set by the Trial Chamber or the Pre-Trial Judge its intention 
to rely on an alibi and in that case it must describe the details of the alibi as well 
as the witnesses and any other evidence it intends to use to corroborate it.166 
Furthermore, the Defence must disclose to the Prosecutor any special defence it 
intends to offer indicating the witnesses and evidence it intends to rely upon.167 
We saw that these obligations were the only Defence disclosure duties before the 
amendments adopted in 2008. 
Shortly after the above-mentioned amendments to Rule 67 were adopted, a 
Trial Chamber made an application seeking the non-applicability of the newly 
amended rule to an ongoing trial. The Defence sought a declaration that neither 
the Chamber nor the Prosecution could rely on the amendments to the rule to 
oblige the Defence to act or to refrain from action.168 The application was lodged 
pursuant to Rule 6(D) of the RPE which stipulates that an amendment should not 
operate to prejudice the rights of the accused. The applicant claimed, inter alia, 
that the rule was prejudicial insofar as it created additional disclosure obligations 
with no countervailing benefit and restricted the right of the accused to deny the 
Prosecution permission to inspect certain documents or to deny disclosure of 
certain statements. The Trial Chamber recalled the difference existing between 
rights and advantages in its jurisprudence169 and stated that the “simple fact that 
the previous version of the Rules did not impose certain disclosure obligations 
on the Defence does not constitute the right to deny such disclosure”.170 In other 
words, it qualified as an advantage rather than a right the previous absence of the 
particular disclosure obligation in question. It concluded that Rule 67(A) did not 
impinge on the rights of the Defence and it was therefore applicable to the case 
at stake.
Finally, Rule 67(D) stipulates that if the Defence or the Prosecutor discovers 
additional evidence, which should have been disclosed previously according to the 
_______________________
165 Prosecutor v. Aleksovsky, IT-95-14/1-A, AC, Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence, 16 February 
1999, paras. 23 and 25. 
166 Rule 67(B)(i)(a) of the ICTY RPE.
167 Rule 67(B)(i)(b) of the ICTY RPE. 
168 Prosecutor v. Prlić et al., IT-04-74, Decision on Slobodan Praliak’s Motion on the Application of Rule 67 (A) of the Rules, 
4 April 2008.
169 It made reference to Prosecutor v. Meiakić, IT-02-65, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant 
to Rule 11bis, 20 July 2005, para. 123 which reads as follows: The context of the Rule indicates that the “rights” contem-
plated are confined, at least, to those rights to which an accused, or a convicted or acquitted person, in a pending case 
has a legal entitlement, and do not extend to that wide variety of advantages or benefits which are frequently described 
as rights, particularly by those seeking to secure them, but to which there is no legal entitlement.




Rules, they are under the obligation to immediately disclose such material to the 
other party and the Trial Chamber.171
 5.4  Other forms of disclosure
The disclosure of information in proceedings before the ICTY can also occur through 
non-conventional means of disclosure.172 As previously mentioned, the changes to 
the ICTY RPE implemented since their first adoption in 1994 have advanced pre-
trial communication between the Defence and the Prosecutor through the creation 
of pre-trial and pre-defence conferences.173 In this context Rule 65 ter (E) states 
that within a time limit set by a pre-trial judge and no later than six weeks before 
the pre-trial conference the Prosecutor must submit its pre-trial brief. 
The document must contain a summary of the evidence he intends to bring at 
trial in relation to each count and a list of the exhibits the Prosecution intends 
to offer. Moreover, the pre-trial brief must contain a list of all the witnesses 
the Prosecution intends to call to trial. This includes, inter alia, the number of 
witnesses, their names or pseudonyms and a summary of the facts on which they 
will testify.
As far as the Defence is concerned Rule 65ter (F) stipulates that once the Prosecution 
has submitted its pre-trial brief the Defence within a time frame decided by the 
Pre-Trial Judge and no later than three weeks before the Pre-Trial conference the 
Defence must file a pre-trial brief whose purpose is to enable the Chamber and the 
Prosecution to have sufficient notice of the content of the Defence’s case before the 
presentation of evidence at trial begins.174 In its pre-trial brief, the Defence, inter 
alia, must include a written statement describing the nature of its case in general 
terms. After the close of the Prosecution’s case the Defence, pursuant to Rule 65 ter 
(G) is called to file a list of all the witnesses it intends to call at trial including the 
number of witnesses, their names or pseudonyms as well as a summary of the facts 
on which they will testify. 
The scope of Rule 65 ter (G) is to make the Prosecution aware of the main facts 
upon which Defence witnesses are expected to testify in order to allow it to prepare 
its cross-examination.175
Through the pre-trial briefs the Prosecution and the Defence exchange information 
on their respective cases in the pre-trial phase giving rise to some unconventional 
anticipated disclosure, which can assist the expeditiousness of the trial. 
_______________________
171 However, as noticed by Tochilovsky, when such material may suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused 
or may affect the credibility of Prosecution witnesses but at the same time it can be interpreted as supporting the Pros-
ecution’s case, the Prosecutor should consult the Defence before disclosing the material in question to the Chamber. 
The Defence in fact should not be prejudiced by the fact that material which it regards as incriminatory rather than 
exculpatory is made available to the Trial Chamber under Rule 67(D). See Tochilovsky, above n. 64 at p. 126.
172 See Schoun, above n. 71 at p. 121. 
173 See Rules 73 bis and 73 ter of the ICTY RPE. 
174 Prosecutor v. Šešelj, IT-03-67, Reasons for Decision on the Accused’s Request to File a Pre-Trial Brief, 22 November 2006, 
para. 8. 
175 Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Simatović, IT-03-69, Decision on Prosecution Urgent Motion Related to Non-Compliance of 
Stanišić Defence with Rule 65ter (G) and Rule 67 of the Rules, 12 October 2011, para. 22. 
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 5.5 Limitations to disclosure 
  
  5.5.1 Rule 66 (C) and Rule 68 (iv)
Rule 66(C) reads as follows:
Where information is in the possession of the Prosecutor, the disclosure of which may 
prejudice further or ongoing investigations, or for any other reasons may be contrary to 
the public interest or affect the security interests of any State, the Prosecutor may apply to 
the Trial Chamber sitting in camera to be relieved from an obligation under the Rules to 
disclose that information. When making such application the Prosecutor shall provide the 
Trial Chamber (but only the Trial Chamber) with the information that is sought to be kept 
confidential.
Rule 68(iv) reads as follows:
The Prosecutor shall apply to the Chamber sitting in camera to be relieved from an 
obligation under paragraph (i) to disclose information in the possession of the Prosecutor, 
if its disclosure may prejudice further or ongoing investigations, or for any other reason 
may be contrary to the public interest or affect the security interests of any State, and when 
making such application, the Prosecutor shall provide the Trial Chamber (but only the Trial 
Chamber) with the information that is sought to be kept confidential.
When the Prosecutor applies in camera to the Trial Chamber it must submit to it, 
but only to it, the material whose non-disclosure is sought. Through this procedure 
the Trial Chamber is exposed to material which will not necessarily become 
evidence at trial. Thus, the question about what the judges should and should not 
see presents itself. 
The Appeals Chamber dealt with the argument that by reviewing the material the 
judges of the Trial Chamber are put in the position of unfairly considering the merits 
of the case before trial. This argument was raised in the context of an order by the 
Chamber obliging the Prosecution to deliver certain material to the Chamber. Even 
if the context is different from the procedure envisaged in Rules 66(C) and 68 (iv) 
the concern is the same, namely that material which is not necessarily admitted 
into evidence would nonetheless have a weight in the final judgment rendered by 
the Trial Chamber.176 The Appeals Chamber however stated that “to be exposed to 
materials yet to be presented in evidence does not necessarily lead to pre-judgment 
or partiality.” Therefore the presumption of innocence would be guaranteed by the 
professionalism of the judges of the Trial Chamber.177
However, there are still concerns given that it is difficult for a judge to remain 
indifferent when exposed to potential evidence whose nature must be carefully 
assessed by him in order to grant or dismiss an application for non-disclosure. 
Also the Appeals Chamber did not exclude such possibility when stating that 
the exposure to disclosed material does not necessarily lead to pre-judgment or 
_______________________
176 Prosecutor v. Blagojević et al., IT-02-60-AR73, AC, Decision, 8 April 2003, paras. 25-31. 
177 Ibid. at para. 29. 
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partiality. “Not necessarily” does not equate to ruling out such possibility.
  5.5.2 Rule 69: Protection of Victims and Witnesses
The protection of victims and witnesses is enshrined in Article 22 of the ICTY 
Statute and is given remarkable weight in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
whose Rule 69 reads as follows
(A) In exceptional circumstances, either party may apply to a Judge or Trial Chamber to 
order the non-disclosure of the identity of a victim or witness who may be in danger or at 
risk until such person is brought under the protection of the Tribunal. 
(B) In the determination of protective measures for victims and witnesses, the Judge or Trial 
Chamber may consult the Victims and Witnesses Section.
(C) Subject to Rule 75, the identity of the victim or witness shall be disclosed within such 
time as determined by the Trial Chamber to allow adequate time for preparation of the 
Prosecution or Defence. 
Rule 69 allows the Prosecutor, through an order of the Trial Chamber, “to either 
delay or bypass” its disclosure obligations enshrined in Rule 66 in relation to 
witnesses who may be in danger.178 It must be read in combination with Rule 75(A) 
which provides that a Chamber may order appropriate measures for the privacy and 
protection of victims and witnesses as long as these measures are not inconsistent 
with the rights of the accused.
It is common practice for the Prosecution to invoke the protection given by Rule 
69 for its witnesses, who sometimes are also the victims of the crimes allegedly 
committed by the accused, and it is from this angle that Rule 69 will be analysed. 
One Trial Chamber noted “with regret” that granting such protective measures (in 
relation to Prosecution witnesses) had become the rule rather than the exception 
in the Tribunal practice.179 However, the Defence can also request such measures 
in relation to the witnesses it intends to call at the trial.180 Where witnesses have 
been granted protective measures in other proceedings before the Tribunal those 
protective measures should continue when they are called to testify in another 
trial.181
When assessing a Prosecutor’s request for non-disclosure of a witness identity 
brought under Rule 69 a Trial Chamber is confronted with the difficult task 
of striking a “fair and proper balance” between the competing interests of the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial which includes the right to know the identity of 
witnesses the Prosecution intends to call at trial and the necessity of granting 
protection to victims and witnesses. 
_______________________
178 Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., IT-04-84, Decision on Second Haradinaj Motion to Lift Redactions of Protected Witness 
Statements with Confidential Annex, 22 November 2006, para. 2. 
179 Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, IT-02-54, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Provisional Protective Measures Pursu-
ant to Rule 69, 19 February 2002, para. 28. 
180 Klamberg, above n. 162 at p. 303.
181 Rule 75(F) of the ICTY RPE. See Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, IT-02-54, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Provi-
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The elements upon which to strike such a balance are given by the specific case at 
hand and therefore may differ from case to case. However, the jurisprudence of 
the Tribunal shows that even if great importance is attached to the protection of 
victims and witnesses the balance leans towards the right of the accused to know 
the identity of the witnesses on whose testimony the Prosecutor intends to rely in 
order to prove his guilt.182
This approach appears consistent with Article 20(1) of the Statute which states that 
“full respect” must be given to the rights of the accused and “due regard” to the 
protection of victims and witnesses.”183
The term “identity” when referring to witnesses is not limited to the disclosure of 
the names of the witness as such information is not sufficient to identify the person 
whose testimony is used to prove the charges. To know the identity of a witness 
the Defence has to be informed of “further particulars” about them.184 “Identifying 
information would appear to be the sex of each witness, his or her date of birth, 
the names of his or her parents, his or her place of origin and the town or village 
where he or she resided at the time relevant to the charges. Such information 
provides the Defence with adequate notice of who exactly it is that the Prosecution 
deems essential to the proof of its case against the accused so that the Defence can 
adequately conduct its own investigations.”185 The present address of the witness is 
not part of the identifying information.
It is not unusual for a Trial Chamber to issue orders, pursuant to a motion for the 
Prosecution, for non-disclosure or limited disclosure by the accused to the public 
of material received from the Prosecution pursuant to Rule 66(A)(i).186 This kind 
of consideration shows the difference between the concept of disclosure and the 
principle of publicity.187
In its application to the Trial Chamber the Prosecutor must show the importance of 
the particular witness for its case and the existence of “exceptional circumstances” 
in relation to the witness in question. This has been interpreted as “specific 
evidence of an identifiable risk to security and welfare of the particular witness or 
to his or her family.”188 The witness’ fear as well as broad allegations of dangerous 
conditions will not suffice to justify an order for non-disclosure.189 The existence of 
“exceptional circumstances” must be shown in relation to each and every witness 
for whom protective measures are sought.190
_______________________
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However, when the Prosecution proves the importance of the witness to its case 
and the existence of the “special circumstances” the Trial Chamber will not grant 
a non-disclosure order where it would infringe upon the accused’s right to a fair 
trial. Elements to be taken into account in this regard are the nature and quantity 
of the material already disclosed, in non-redacted form, to the accused compared 
with that for which non-disclosure is sought and the approaching start date 
of trial.191“The nearing start of the trial proceedings certainly has an impact on 
balancing the right of the accused to a fair trial against the measures in place for 
the protection of victims and witnesses.”192
Even when protective measures are granted, the identity of the witness or victim 
shall be disclosed within a time limit decided by the Trial Chamber in order to 
allow adequate time for the Prosecution’s and Defence’s preparations. In fact, there 
is no opportunity for the Defence to examine the witnesses for the Prosecution in 
any real sense without a proper appreciation of those witnesses. The basic right 
of the accused to examine witnesses, read in conjunction with the right to have 
adequate time for the preparation of his defence, therefore envisages more than 
a blind confrontation in the courtroom. A proper in-court examination depends 
upon a prior out of court investigation. Sub-rule 69(C) reflects this by referring to a 
“sufficient time prior to the trial”.193 However, the non-disclosure measures adopted 
can be maintained vis à vis the public when the circumstances, as assessed by the 
Trial Chamber, so demand. 
Rule 69 (C) does not envisage a time frame for the disclosure of the identity of 
witnesses to the accused. Rather, to “allow adequate time for the preparation of the 
Prosecutor or Defence”.
The time allowed for the preparation of the case has been interpreted in combination 
with Rule 75194 as the time before the trial commences rather than time before the 
witness testifies.195 It is Tribunal practice to order disclosure at the latest thirty days 
before the commencement of the trial.196 In Šešelj, the Appeals Chamber held that 
the delayed disclosure of the identity of eight witnesses (of one hundred) after the 
commencement of the trial but thirty days before the scheduled testimony did not 
affect the defendant’s right to adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence.197 
The Defence can apply to the Chamber seeking change in the measures previously 
issued. However, it must prove that, notwithstanding the continued existence of 
the “exceptional circumstances” its right to adequately investigate and prepare its 
_______________________
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case ensures the immediate removal of such measures as opposed to merely thirty 
days prior to the commencement of the trial.198
In Milošević, the Prosecutor had first redacted the statements of the witnesses and 
then sought protective measures under Rule 69. The Trial Chamber remarked that 
protective measures under Rule 69 must be sought at the time disclosure under 
Rule 66(A)(i) is envisaged, namely within thirty days of the initial appearance of the 
accused. The Prosecutor cannot unilaterally decide to disclose the redacted version 
of identifying information and then apply for particular protective measures at an 
unspecified later moment.199 The Prosecutor cannot redact identifying information 
from the supporting material without prior authorisation from a Chamber.200 
However the Prosecution’s unauthorised redactions of information capable of 
indentifying victims and witnesses from the material it disclosed pursuant to Rule 
66(A)(i) of the Rules were accepted when they aimed to ensure the continued 
protection of potential witnesses in the case, pending the outcome of its motions on 
protective measures, while enabling the accused to have the supporting materials 
within the time specified by Rule 66(A)(i) of the Rules.201
  5.5.3 Rule 70: Matters not subject to disclosure
Rule 70 reads as follows:
(A) Notwithstanding the provisions of Rules 66 and 67, reports, memoranda, or other 
internal documents prepared by a party, its assistants or representatives in connection with 
the investigation or preparation of the case, are not subject to disclosure or notification 
under those Rules. 
(B) If the Prosecutor is in possession of information which has been provided to the 
Prosecutor on a confidential basis and which has been used solely for the purpose of 
generating new evidence, that initial information and its origin shall not be disclosed by 
the Prosecutor without the consent of the person or entity providing the initial information 
and shall in any event not be given in evidence without prior disclosure to the accused. 
(C) If, after obtaining the consent of the person or entity providing information under 
this Rule, the Prosecutor elects to present as evidence any testimony, document or other 
material so provided, the Trial Chamber, notwithstanding Rule 98, may not order either 
party to produce additional evidence received from the person or entity providing the 
initial information, nor may the Trial Chamber for the purpose of obtaining such additional 
evidence itself summon that person or a representative of that entity as a witness or order 
their attendance. A Trial Chamber may not use its power to order the attendance of witnesses 
or to require production of documents in order to compel the production of such additional 
evidence.
(D) If the Prosecutor calls a witness to introduce in evidence any information provided 
under this Rule, the Trial Chamber may not compel that witness to answer any question 
_______________________
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relating to the information or its origin, if the witness declines to answer on grounds of 
confidentiality. 
(E) The right of the accused to challenge the evidence presented by the Prosecution shall 
remain unaffected subject only to the limitations contained in paragraphs (C) and (D). 
(F) The Trial Chamber may order upon an application by the accused or defence counsel 
that, in the interests of justice, the provisions of this Rule shall apply mutatis mutandis to 
specific information in the possession of the accused.
(G) Nothing in paragraph (C) or (D) above shall affect a Trial Chamber’s power under Rule 
89 (D) to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to 
ensure a fair trial.
The Tribunal, unlike a domestic judicial system, cannot count on its own law 
enforcement agency and must rely on the cooperation of states and organisations 
to gather useful information in the course of the investigation of a specific case. 
It is therefore of paramount importance for the functioning of the Tribunal that 
its Prosecution (but also the Defence) is put in a position where they can gather 
information from third entities on a confidential basis entering into an obligation 
of non-disclosure. The structure of the rule, which impacts the Prosecution almost 
entirely seems to indirectly reflect the structural differences that exist in the 
Prosecution’s and Defence’s functions and means of investigations.
Rule 70 (A) stipulates that reports, memoranda or other internal documents 
prepared by a party or its collaborators which are connected with the investigation 
or preparation of a case do not fall within the material subject to disclosure as 
envisaged in Rules 66 and 67. This paragraph, which appears separate from the 
others was adopted in February 1994 and initially stood alone in the Rules.202
Rule 70 is an essential tool which aims to encourage states, organisations and 
individuals to co-operate by sharing sensitive information with the Tribunal (the 
Prosecution or the Defence) on a confidential basis. Information providers are 
assured protection of the information they offer and its sources.203 “The exceptions 
to disclosure in Sub-rules 70(B) to (E) were introduced into the Rules to permit 
the use, as and when appropriate, of certain information which, in the absence of 
explicit provisions, would either not have been provided to the Prosecutor or have 
been unusable on account of its confidential nature or its origin.”204 Without such 
guarantees of confidentiality, it is “almost impossible to envisage this Tribunal, of 
which the Prosecution is an integral organ, being able to fulfill its functions”.205
Paragraph (B) of Rule 70 prevents the disclosure of information, without the 
provider’s consent, which was obtained by the Prosecution on a confidential basis 
_______________________
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and where such information has been used solely for the purpose of generating 
new evidence. 
Information, testimony and documents referred to in paragraphs (C) and (D) of 
Rule 70 are intended to relate back to the “information” referred to in paragraph 
(B).206 The Appeals Chamber clarified that this information is the information 
provided to the Prosecution on a confidential basis and not the information which 
was so provided and which has been used solely for the purpose of finding further 
evidence. It added that even if there is no doubt that the purpose of providing 
confidential information will in many cases include the aim of finding further 
evidence, “the limitations imposed by Rule 70 (B) are not based upon the existence 
of such state of mind on the part of the provider.”207 
Therefore, for purposes of paragraph (B) the information must be provided on a 
confidential basis and it must be used solely for the purpose of generating new 
evidence, “but for paragraph (C) and (D) that requirement necessarily drops out, 
for once the information is introduced as evidence at trial, it by definition is no 
longer used solely for the purpose of generating new evidence.” 208
The “information” or “initial information” covered by Rule 70 can be provided also 
in the form of testimony. The Appeals Chamber held that in such a case it is not only 
the informant’s identity and the general subject of his knowledge that constitute 
the information envisaged in Rule 70 but also the substance of the information 
shared by the person in question. 
Before its substantial amendments in 2003, Rule 68 disclosure was not subject 
to Rule 70 and therefore exculpatory material in the Prosecutor’s possession 
had to be disclosed to the defendant.209 The exceptions to disclosure envisaged 
in Rule 70 did not relieve the Prosecutor of his obligation to disclose exculpatory 
evidence to the defendant.210 The new Rule 68 is expressly subject to the exception 
to disclosure regulated by Rule 70 and should the Prosecution be provided with 
exculpatory information as envisaged in Rule 68(i) on confidential basis, he must 
take “reasonable steps” to obtain the consent of the provider to disclosure of such 
material or to inform the defendant of its existence.211 This is how the balance has 
been struck between the interest of the accused in the disclosure of exculpatory 
material and the interest of the provider in confidentiality.212 As will be discussed, 
the absence of any judicial supervision or control over the Prosecution’s “reasonable 
steps” to obtain consent to disclosure of exculpatory material to the defendant is 
regrettable.213 According to this mechanism the Trial Chamber and the accused 
_______________________
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may remain unaware of the existence of exculpatory material obtained by the 
Prosecution pursuant to Rule 70 if the consent of the provider is not given. It appears 
that the balance between competing interests at this important junction of the ICTY 
procedure has drifted away from the protection of the accused’s right to a fair trial 
and is in stark contrast with the Tribunal’s proclaimed focus on that interest. 
The Appeals Chamber has interpreted Rule 70(F) as “enabling the Defence to 
request a Trial Chamber that it be permitted to give the same undertaking as the 
Prosecutor to a prospective provider of confidential material that the material will 
be protected if disclosed to the Defence”. It further held that the purpose of Rule 
70 is to encourage third parties to provide confidential information to the Defence 
in the same way that Rule 70(B) encourages parties to do this for the Prosecutor.”214 
However, the Defence, unlike the Prosecutor, has to apply to the Chamber to 
benefit from the application of the rule whose text states that the material object 
of the application must already be in the Defence’s possession. The Trial Chamber 
assessed this disparity stating that it did not amount to an infringement of the 
equality of arms principle as “it corresponds to the different roles of the Prosecution 
and the Defence and their respective duties to disclose material to the opposing 
party.”215 Interestingly, in reaching this conclusion the Trial Chamber emphasised 
that the Defence did not (at the time) have the same duty to disclose material to 
the Prosecution.216 Finally, the requirement that the Defence applies to the Trial 
Chamber does not place it at a “distinct disadvantage” as such application can be 
made confidentially and ex parte to ensure that no prejudice occurs to the Defence. 
Furthermore, also the requirement that the material concerned must already be in 
the Defence’s possession should not be interpreted literally but should allow the 
Defence to make an application in advance in relation to material whose provision 
they are seeking on a confidential basis.217
Paragraph (G) of Rule 70 is a safeguard that was intended to guarantee that 
restrictions on disclosure do not affect the accused’s right to a fair trial by granting 
the Trial Chambers the power to exclude evidence when its probative value is 
outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial. The authority “to police” the application 
of Rule 70 also allows the Trial Chamber a limited enquiry on the confidentiality nature 
of the information provided. In doing so it performs an objective test consisting of a 
simple analysis of the information or be limited to “mere assertion” of the Prosecution. 
The Trial Chamber may turn to the provider of the information for confirmation of 
its confidential nature.218 Where doubts still remain on the applicability of Rule 70 to 
particular information the Trial Chamber may invite the provider and the Prosecution 
to submit their observation on the issue before ruling on it.219
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 5.6 Remedies - Rule 68 bis: Failure to Comply with Disclosure Obligations
Rule 68 bis, which was adopted in December 2001, reads as follows:
The pre-trial Judge or the Trial Chamber may decide proprio motu, or at the request of either 
party, on sanctions to be imposed on a party which fails to perform its disclosure obligations 
pursuant to the Rules.
Rule 68 bis does not indicate what kind of sanctions can be inflicted nor the specific 
circumstances which should trigger their adoption.220 Moreover, the rule does not 
go into detail of the nature, procedural or disciplinary or both, of the sanctions it 
envisages. It is therefore left to the judges’ discretion to single out the remedies 
they consider appropriate for a particular disclosure violation. 
This approach was taken on board by the Appeals Chamber which stressed that 
rules regarding sanctions are not mandatory but discretionary and it is therefore 
for the Trial Chamber to assess the opportunity to adopt any remedies following 
a disclosure violation.221 It further noted that a Trial Chamber could not be 
considered as having abused its discretion when it did not impose any sanctions on 
the Prosecutor for its disclosure violations.222 
When assessing the appropriate response to the Prosecution’s non-compliance 
with disclosure obligations the Trial Chamber will consider whether the Defence 
has suffered prejudice as a consequence. However, the Defence must not show 
malice towards the Prosecutor as a precondition for the imposition of sanctions.223
The practice of the Tribunal shows that the “sanction approach” is not the primary 
option.224 The possible violations of Rule 68 are governed less by a system of 
sanctions than by the judges’ definitive evaluation of the evidence presented by 
either party and the possibility which the opposing party has to contest it.225 It is 
worth noting that in a decision delivered almost a year after the adoption of Rule 
68 bis the Tribunal reaffirmed such a lenient approach towards the Prosecution’s 
disclosure violations.226 In common practice the Trial Chambers have felt more 
at ease in granting the Defence some sort of relief in the form of additional time 
to study the newly disclosed material or the possibility to re-call the prosecutor’s 
witnesses, as opposed to imposing sanctions to the Prosecutor or ordering a stay of 
the proceedings. In other words, the application of Rule 68 bis has focused more 
on remedy than on sanctions. 
_______________________
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The Appeals Chamber regarded a trial as fair when following a Prosecutor’s breach 
of his disclosure obligations the Defence had been granted the possibility to present 
additional evidence in appeal.227 The same conclusion was reached in Furundžija 
where, at the end of the hearings, the Prosecutor disclosed documents related 
to the medical and psychological condition of an important prosecution witness 
(who was also a victim). The Trial Chamber acknowledged the serious misconduct 
of the Prosecutor and the prejudice suffered by the Defence. It therefore ordered 
the re-opening of the proceedings considering that it was the only available means 
of remedying the prejudice suffered by the Defence, which was then allowed to call 
additional witnesses and to re-call the prosecution witnesses in order to integrate 
their cross-examination in the light of the newly disclosed material.228
The Defence had requested that either the witness’ testimony was struck out or, 
in case of a conviction, to order a re-trial. The Trial Chamber also considered the 
position of the witness/victim concerned concluding that she should have not have 
had her evidence struck out as a consequence of the Prosecution’s misconduct. 
It therefore opted for the re-opening and integration of the case rather than to 
strike out part of it.229 One may wonder whether the conclusion would have been 
different if the particular witness had not been a victim.
In Karadžić the Trial Chamber, at the time of writing, has been confronted with 
over eighty motions claiming improper or untimely disclosure of evidence by the 
Prosecution. In one of these motions the accused sought an order for a new trial 
emphasising the “cumulative effect” of the Prosecution’s disclosure violations and 
the prejudice they caused to the preparation of his defence.230 The Trial Chamber 
denied the request pointing out that it had taken the cumulative effect of the 
Prosecution’s disclosure violations into account and that the remedies adopted 
throughout the trial had avoided prejudice to the Defence. 
The Trial Chamber recalled having ordered the suspension of the proceedings 
on multiple occasions to allow the accused additional time to review the newly 
disclosed material.231 Moreover, it stressed that the testimony of some witnesses 
had been postponed or delayed when the Prosecutor had disclosed specific material 
related to that testimony far too late.232 
Still in Karadžić the Trial Chamber found that the Prosecutor had violated 
his disclosure obligations in relation to Rule 68, but since no prejudice for the 
Defence had been proved it declined to adopt a remedy or sanction. The presiding 
judge dissented stressing how in the absence of any prejudice resulting from the 
Prosecution’s violation of Rule 68 “it is unnecessary, moot or even frivolous” to 
issue a declaratory finding that the Prosecution has violated Rule 68 of the Rules 
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as it serves no purpose.233
In Haradinaj the Trial Chamber acknowledged the Prosecutor’s multiple disclosure 
violations and it reprimanded the Prosecution’s Senior Trial Lawyer.234 However, 
this decision was reconsidered and abandoned by the same trial Chamber (pursuant 
a Prosecution motion) concluding that Rule 68bis does not envisage personal 
reprimand which could have only been administered pursuant Rule 46 which 
regulates misconduct of counsel.235 The decision was not unanimous and the 
dissenting judge emphasised that this reading of Rule 68 bis ”may foster a climate of 
impunity by sending attorneys the message that they cannot be held accountable for 
misconduct unless a Chamber takes the extraordinary step of applying Rule 46.”236
In Krnojelac the Prosecutor was ordered to file a signed report by a member of its 
trial team certifying among other things that “a full research had been conducted 
throughout the materials in the possession of the prosecution or otherwise within its 
knowledge for the existence of such evidence”.237 In Orić the Prosecutor was ordered 
to research Rule 68 material providing the Trial Chamber with a declaration stating 
that such search had been made, where it had been made and its results.238 In the 
same case, which was plagued by multiple disclosure violations on the part of the 
Prosecutor, the Trial Chamber reserved (until the passing down of the judgment) 
its right to draw reasonable inferences in favour of the accused with reference to 
the specific evidence object of the disclosure violations. It finally concluded that 
despite the Prosecution’s “less than diligent” approach to its disclosure obligation 
the accused had not been prejudiced “to the extent of being denied a fair trial”.239 
The Trial Chamber also reached that conclusion in the light of its final judgment 
of the case in which the accused was finally sentenced to two years and released 
immediately having being in custody for three years.
Statements such as “disclosure practice of the Prosecutor had not been 
satisfactory”240 or “the numerous disclosure violations reflected badly on the 
Prosecution”241 are not unusual in the Trial Chambers’ assessment of the way in 
which the Prosecution discharges its disclosure obligations. However, despite the 
Appeals Chamber’s statement that it “will not tolerate anything short of strict 
compliance with disclosure obligations” it appears to be common practice that the 
Trial Chamber reacts timidly to the Prosecution’s disclosure violations. 
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6. Critical aspects of the ICTY Disclosure process 
 6.1 Preliminary remarks
When defining the right to a fair trial the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY found 
no reason to depart from the notion developed by the European Convention on 
Human Rights.242 It further held that the principle of the equality of arms, which 
falls within the fair trial guarantee under the Statute, “goes to the heart of the 
fair trial guarantee” and “obligates a judicial body to ensure that neither party is 
put at disadvantage when presenting its case.”243 The application of the principle 
does not encompass financial equality as in criminal proceedings it is accepted 
that the Prosecutor will have at his disposal resources in terms of personnel, 
funds and investigative techniques, which will be impossible for a defendant to 
match. Nonetheless, the respect for the notion of the equality of arms guarantees 
that, despite these significant differences, the Defence and the Prosecutor are 
granted the same possibility to present their case and to challenge the case of their 
opponent. In this regard the Trial Chamber “shall provide every practicable facility 
it is capable of granting under the Rules and Statute when faced with a request by 
a party for assistance in presenting its case”.244
However when discussing the scope of the application of the principle the Appeals 
Chamber emphasised the different context in which the Tribunal operates when 
compared to domestic courts which have “the capacity, if not directly, at least 
through the extensive enforcement powers of the State, to control matters that 
could materially affect the fairness of a trial”.245 The Tribunal must rely heavily on 
the cooperation of states which in most cases are the sole holders of evidence. It 
concluded that under the ICTY Statute the principle of the equality of arms must 
be given a “more liberal interpretation than that normally upheld with regard to 
proceedings before domestic courts”.246
It is noted that although the language used in describing the equality of arms 
principle covers both the Prosecution and the Defence, in practice where violations 
of this principle have been found, it is because the Defence was somehow unfairly 
affected in preparing or presenting its case.247
In the context of the ICTY the imbalance between the Defence and the Prosecution 
appears to be structural. The latter is an organ of the Tribunal envisaged by the 
Statute, which can rely on resources not even remotely comparable with the 
limited ones enjoyed by the Defence teams. Furthermore, the Prosecution begins 
the investigations years before the issuance of an indictment whereas the Defence 
_______________________
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will come into play much later and in any case after the indictment has been issued. 
It is inevitable that, particularly in the context of international criminal trials, the 
Prosecutor will be in possession of information that the Defence will not be able to 
gather itself. The defendant will consequently rely on the Prosecution’s disclosure 
of material relevant to both the Prosecution’s and the Defence’s case. That 
makes the Prosecution a source of valuable information for the Defence’s case.248 
Disclosure can be considered as one of the practical expressions of the principle of 
the equality of arms as it can operate to reduce the structural imbalance between 
the Prosecution and the Defence in the preparation of their respective cases. It 
is indeed the most relevant among the “adequate facilities” that the accused is 
entitled to in the preparation of his defence.
The role of the Prosecution in the disclosure procedure is of paramount importance 
particularly in the light of the characterisation of his functions offered by the 
Tribunal’s jurisprudence. The Prosecutor in fact is considered not only a party 
to adversarial proceedings but also an organ of the Tribunal and more in general 
an organ of international criminal justice. He has been defined as a “Minister of 
Justice with an overriding obligation of ensuring fairness in the proceedings”.249 
While the prosecution must be conducted vigorously the prosecuting counsel 
“ought to bear themselves rather in the character of ministers of justice assisting 
in the administration of justice.”250 The goal of the Prosecutor is not only to 
obtain a conviction but also to present the case for the Prosecution assisting the 
Chamber in discovering the truth in a judicial setting. Therefore, the presentation 
of the Prosecution’s case must include not only inculpatory but also exculpatory 
evidence.251 The Prosecutor is a party to the proceedings and therefore is not 
required to be neutral but he is “not a partisan” and this is the ratio behind its 
disclosure obligations particularly in relation to exculpatory material. The 
obligation to disclose is therefore part of the Prosecution’s duty as a minister of 
justice to assist the administration of justice and the accused.252 
Assessed against this background, the analysis of the ICTY disclosure rules and of 
the practice of the Tribunal carried out in this chapter highlighted several critical 
aspects in relation to their compliance with the defendant’s rights, which will be 
discussed below.  
  6.2 Disclosure by the Prosecutor
The Prosecutor is sui generis as he encompasses characteristics which belong to 
different legal models. He is indeed expected to prosecute as in an adversarial 
_______________________
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context and at the same time to act as a super partes entity of inquisitorial origin. 
The Prosecution seems to struggle “to establish the equilibrium between these two 
characteristics assumed to be achievable”253 and the disclosure of information is 
one of the ambits in which such difficulties appear more evident. The Prosecution’s 
determination to seek a narrow interpretation of its disclosure obligations 
reinforces such impression.254 It has been remarked how the Prosecutor’s inability 
“to adopt this double character imposed on it suggests that the expectations that 
the prosecution can function consistently under both hats in criminal proceedings 
of the nature heard at the Tribunal may be an unrealistic one”.255
It is worth recalling Damaška’s warning that mixing procedures as opposed to 
following either an inquisitorial or an adversarial one can endanger the effectiveness 
of the fact finding.256 The research conducted seems to suggest the relevance of 
such a warning to the nature of the Prosecutorial role in the ICTY legal system as 
well.
The friction between the competing functions of acting super partes as well as 
a party whose aim is to prove the guilt of the defendant affect the disclosure of 
information with particular reference to exculpatory material. The disclosure of 
exculpatory material has a considerable impact on the fairness of the proceedings 
as it touches upon a type of evidence the importance of which is self-evident. 
Scholars have noted that both the operation and the application by the Chambers 
of Rule 68 “have the potential to greatly limit its scope and undermine its utility”.257 
It is indeed in relation to the disclosure of exculpatory material that controversies 
arise as opposed to incriminating material which the prosecution tends to disclose 
in a rather timely and comprehensive fashion.258
In this regard (1) the absence of a codification of the obligation to investigate 
incriminating as well as exculpatory circumstances equally, (2) the unsupervised 
discretion granted to the Prosecution in the assessment of the exculpatory nature 
of the material in its possession and (3) the unmonitored responsibility to take 
“reasonable steps” to obtain the consent (to disclose) of the provider of (Rule 70) 
confidential exculpatory material appear to be critical points of the procedure. 
First, the expectations placed on the Prosecutor are not adequately reflected 
and codified in the Statute and RPE where the absence of, inter alia, an explicit 
obligation to investigate inculpatory as well as exculpatory circumstances equally 
in equal measure is regrettable. In fact, the absence of such provision seems to 
affect the super partes role of the Prosecutor who is under no obligation to 
search for the exculpatory material, which he would be then obliged to disclose. 
To encounter something along the way is different than searching for it and the 
_______________________
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difference is significant when it comes to exculpatory material. In the absence of an 
explicit obligation it appears somewhat unrealistic to expect that, while carrying 
out investigations with the intention of building a strong case against the accused, 
the Prosecutor may actively search for exculpatory circumstances which would 
weaken his case at trial. In other words, the Prosecution finds itself in the somewhat 
awkward position of being expected to go against its adversarial character in the 
attempt to fulfil its inquisitorial task.
Second, the Prosecutor enjoys a great deal of discretion in relation to the assessment 
of the exculpatory nature of the material in its possession. He is presumed to 
fulfil his disclosure obligations in good faith and the Tribunal will be reluctant to 
interfere with the Prosecution’s assessment.259 However, there are multiple factors 
that can lead to non-disclosure of exculpatory material. For instance, the mass of 
the material in the possession of the Prosecutor, his imperfect familiarity with it, 
his lack of knowledge of the Defence’s strategy or simply non-disclosure can occur 
because the Prosecutor does not grasp the exculpatory nature of particular material 
relevant to the Defence’s case.260 As discussed above, the concepts of exculpatory 
and potentially exculpatory are rather broad and their actual meaning depends 
significantly on the nature of the specific case at stake. This is a crucial point of 
the procedure in which the above-mentioned struggle between the Prosecutor’s 
“two souls” can lead, even involuntarily, to disclosure violations. The Prosecutor 
is, in fact, put in the position of having to adopt the Defence’s perspective in the 
assessment of the material in his possession while bearing in mind that he has to 
build a case to prove the accused guilty. The possibility that the latter may influence 
the Prosecutor’s assessment cannot be excluded and it is against this background 
that the lack of any judicial control over the correct use of the Prosecutor’s wide 
degree of discretion appears unsatisfactory. 
Finally, on the impact of the Prosecution’s role on the disclosure of exculpatory 
material we have seen how Rule 68 is subject to the provision of Rule 70 that regulates 
non-disclosure on confidential grounds. Rule 68(iii) stipulates that should the 
Prosecution be provided with exculpatory information as envisaged in Rule 68(i) 
on a confidential basis, he must take “reasonable steps” to obtain the consent of 
the provider to disclose such material or to inform the defendant of its existence.261 
This is the balance struck between the interest of the accused in disclosure of 
exculpatory material and the interest of the provider in confidentiality.262 In this 
ambit the absence of any judicial supervision or control over the Prosecution’s 
“reasonable steps” to obtain consent to disclosure of exculpatory material to 
the defendant appears questionable.263 According to this mechanism, the Trial 
Chamber and the accused may remain unaware of the existence of exculpatory 
material obtained by the Prosecution pursuant to Rule 70 if the consent of the 
_______________________
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provider is not given. The balance between the competing interests at this section 
of the disclosure procedure seems to have moved away from the protection of the 
accused’s right to a fair trial and is in stark contrast with the Tribunal proclaimed 
focus on this interest. 
On this point it is also noted that the operation of the safeguard enshrined in Rule 
70(G) which refers to the Trial Chamber’s power to exclude evidence under Rule 89 
(D) if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair 
trial is indeed limited to the provision of Rule 70 (C) and (D) regarding material 
presented as evidence and therefore material for which the consent of the provider 
has been already secured, but it cannot avoid that exculpatory material remains 
unknown to the Chamber and the Defence if the Rule 70 provider does not consent 
to its disclosure.
An example of the effectiveness of this safeguard can be found in Milutinović 
in relation to the Prosecution’s request to add General Wesley Clark to the list of 
its witnesses.264 The Chamber, confronted with the restrictions to the General’s 
testimony requested by the U.S. Government, the Rule 70 provider, refused to hear 
the witness. It considered that the restriction of the cross examination of the witness 
to the content of a summary provided by the Prosecutor (requested by the provider) 
would be unfair to the Defence. It further remarked that to require the Defence “to 
seek permission from the Rule 70 provider in advance for examination on a particular 
subject would oblige them to make disclosure not required by the Rules.”265
It is clear that the effectiveness of Rule 70(G) is limited to the case in which the 
Trial Chamber is in the position to assess the weight of the evidence against the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial which implies that the Chamber is presented with 
that material. This will not happen in the absence of the consent of the Rule 70 
provider. 
It is somewhat ironic to recall that in 2001 Human Rights Watch issued a report in 
which it compared the ICTY RPE with President Bush’s order establishing a military 
commission for detainees and praised the ICTY disclosure procedure insofar as it 
imposed on the Prosecutor a clear obligation to disclose all exculpatory material in 
its possession.266 The situation has changed substantially since the adoption of the 
“new” Rule 68. 
Moving away from considerations linked to the role of the Prosecutor, but 
remaining in the ambit of Rule 68, it is noteworthy that if the Defence believes that 
the Prosecution has not complied with its Rule 68 obligations in order to trigger the 
Trial Chambers intervention it must identify the particular material in question. 
_______________________
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Moreover, it must show a prima facie case indicating that the Prosecution is in 
possession of such material as well as in relation to its exculpatory or potentially 
exculpatory character. Rule 68 therefore calls upon the Defence to bear the burden 
of proof concerning prosecutorial non-compliance. This part of the procedure 
is problematic insofar as it does not grant an effective tool to the Defence for 
questioning the Prosecutorial assessment. This is so considering that in the absence 
of an “indication or partial disclosure” by the Prosecution the Defence will have no 
knowledge of the existence of exculpatory material and consequently it will not be 
in the position to make a prima facie case as to the necessity of its disclosure under 
Rule 68.267 In other words without at least a hint from the Prosecutor the Defence, 
as well as the Trial Chambers, will not be aware of potentially exculpatory material 
in the Prosecutor’s possession. 
Rules 66 and 68 both envisage the possibility for the Prosecutor to apply to the 
Chamber in camera to be relieved from his disclosure obligation if disclosure may 
prejudice further or ongoing investigations or for any other reason may be contrary 
to the public interest or affect the security interests of any state. In this case the 
Chamber will be provided with the material whose non-disclosure is sought. In this 
context the Defence appears to be in a disadvantaged position.
In Blaškić the Trial Chamber remarked that although it is true that Rule 66 (C) 
does provide for ex parte disclosure by the Prosecutor to the Trial Chamber of the 
information for which confidentiality is sought, it in no way authorises the holding 
of ex parte hearings on all the measures to be taken to ensure the protection of 
the witnesses as part of proceedings before the Tribunal.268 However the Defence 
will have to argue for disclosure without knowing the material in question, which 
clearly affects its ability to put forward valid arguments.
Moreover, in camera applications lead to the question of whether the Trial judges 
should or should not see, outside of the trial framework, material whose non-
disclosure is being sought (considering that the Prosecution must provide such 
material to the Chamber, and the Chamber only).  The Chamber might therefore 
see material which will not necessarily be admitted at trial and tested by the 
Defence. This scenario raises some concerns. In Kirstic a memorable intercept in 
which the accused was shouting “to kill them all” was produced by the Prosecution 
during cross-examination without prior disclosure. Even if it was not admitted into 
evidence one may wonder what the impact of such powerful material was on the 
judges’ minds. Although this episode occurred in a different context the concern is 
the same, namely the potential influence of material submitted by the Prosecutor 
(seeking its non-disclosure) on the judges and not tested by the Defence. 
On this point it is worth recalling the findings of the European Court of Human 
Rights in the case of Edwards and Lewis v. The United Kingdom in which it tackled 
_______________________
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this issue indicating that the trial judge should not be put in the uncomfortable 
and dangerous position of seeing material, whose non-disclosure is sought by one 
party, when such material can have an impact on an issue of fact that the same judge 
is called upon to decide. In the latter scenario, the trial judge’s judgment could be 
affected by the potential influence of the material showed to him. In the absence 
of knowing of the material concerned the Defence would have no opportunity to 
submit any argument to counterbalance such a powerful piece of evidence with 
clear consequences on the fairness of the proceedings. The Court concluded that 
an ex parte procedure before the trial judge was not sufficient to secure a fair trial 
where the undisclosed material was related to, or may have been related to, an issue 
of fact which formed part of the Prosecution’s case and which the trial judge, rather 
than the jury, had to determine and that might have been of decisive importance to 
the outcome of the applicants’ trials.
The considerations presented above seem to call for the creation of an impartial 
figure, outside the Trial proceedings, which can supervise the disclosure procedure 
without running the risk of being prejudiced against the accused at a later stage of 
the proceedings.
This suggestion is not alien to the ICTY context. In Blaškić, the Defence, while 
filing a motion for disclosure of exculpatory material, suggested the appointment 
of an ombudsman capable of examining the Prosecution’s files in order to assess the 
exculpatory character of the material in its possession.269 The Chamber declined 
the proposal despite it appearing valid and convincing even sixteen years after its 
first suggestion.
 6.3 Defence disclosure
 
The rules of disclosure and the burden they place on the Prosecution and the 
Defence should reflect and be proportionate to the different roles and functions 
played by them in the criminal proceedings before the Tribunal. While the 
Prosecutor is called upon to build a case to prove the guilt of the accused beyond 
reasonable doubt the Defence can, if it considers it an effective strategy, rely on the 
presumption of innocence and limit its case to poking holes in the Prosecution’s 
case. 
In this context the broadening of the Defence disclosure obligations occurred 
in 2008 has been defined as “a dramatic shift in evidentiary practice at the 
tribunals.”270  While the Prosecutor’s disclosure duties remain broader than 
those of the Defence the 2008 amendments appear to bring the Defence closer 
to the Prosecution in terms of its disclosure commitments therefore diluting 
the previously marked reflection in the rules of disclosure of the different roles 
played by the parties at trial. 
_______________________
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In this context the separate opinion that Judge Vhorah appended to a decision in the 
Tadić case concerning the Prosecutor’s request for disclosure of the Defence’s witness 
list (before the intervened amendments of Rule 67) is of interest. He stated that: 
“The application of the equality of arms principle especially in criminal proceedings 
should be inclined in favour of the Defence acquiring parity with the Prosecution in the 
presentation of the Defence case before the Court to preclude any injustice against the 
accused. To compel the Defence to make available to the Prosecution the prior statement of 
a witness would afford the Prosecution the opportunity to peep into the Defence Brief for 
any incriminating material in breach of the doctrine of privilege which undoubtedly forbids 
the Prosecution access to the work product of Defence Counsel.”271 
The changes in the Defence disclosure obligations seem to infringe the recognised 
difference in function and scope of the Defence and the Prosecution in the 
presentation of their case. Moreover they appear to contradict the principle that 
in adversarial trials the accused has no obligation to assist the Prosecution in the 
presentation of its case.272 Interestingly, it has been argued that the principle of the 
equality of arms in practice has been deprived of its meaning and diminished to “a 
melodious yet vacuous slogan, a consoling though ineffectual mantra” if assessed 
against the numerous obstacles that the adversarial structure developed at the 
ICTY creates to the achievement of real equality between the Prosecution and the 
Defence.273 It is noted that while broadened Defence disclosure obligations allow 
the Prosecutor to become aware of the Defence’s case earlier in time and in turn can 
help achieve more expeditious trials274, this legitimate goal should not be pursued 
at the expenses of the rights of the defendant. 
 6.4 The lack of an effective remedy
Another controversial aspect of the ICTY disclosure regime emerged from the 
analysis of the application of Rule 68 bis which deals with failure to comply with 
disclosure obligations and envisages a possibility for the Trial Chamber to impose 
sanctions on a party responsible for disclosure violations. 
The lack of specific indications in the Rules as to the sanctions that can be 
imposed, their nature and the circumstances under which they can be imposed 
left it to the judges’ discretion to single out the remedies they consider appropriate 
for a particular disclosure violation. We have seen how the Trial Chambers do not 
sanction the Prosecution for its disclosure violations preferring to grant some sort 
of relief to the damaged party. This approach is maintained even when multiple 
disclosure violations occur.  The analysis carried out suggests that a more incisive 
use of the power granted to the judges by Rule 68bis could constitute an effective 
deterrent to misconceived disclosure practice which not only damages the Defence 
_______________________
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in the preparation and presentation of its case but also causes undue delay in the 
trial.
Another issue raised by the application of Rule 68bis is the necessity for the Defence 
to prove prejudice following a disclosure violation by the Prosecution in order to 
trigger the adoption of some form of remedy on the part of the Trial Chamber. Even 
if the Trial Chamber stated that “the burden (to prove prejudice) on the alleging 
party cannot serve to isolate violations of Rule 68 to the detriment of a fair trial”,275 
the practice shows that in the absence of proven prejudice the Chamber will not act 
upon a disclosure violation.
The Tribunal underlined the importance of a timely and comprehensive system 
of disclosure (in relation to the names of the Prosecution’s witnesses) in order to 
allow the Defence to have “a clear and cohesive view of the Prosecution’s strategy 
and to make the appropriate preparations.”276 Moreover, it acknowledged that the 
potential cumulative effects of multiple disclosure violations by the Prosecution 
is likely to place a strain on the resources of the accused in the preparation of his 
defence.277
It is submitted that recurrent disclosure violations negatively impact the “clear 
and cohesive view” of the Prosecution’s case that the Defence can have and on 
its resources regardless of the specific prejudice suffered in relation to any single 
episode of non-disclosure or late disclosure. The cumulative effect of multiple 
disclosure violations occurred throughout proceedings cannot be overlooked. 
Disclosure should be timely in order to be effective and allow the Defence to 
prepare and present its case. 
While a single disclosure violation can be cured by a remedial approach, a 
consolidated pattern of non-disclosure or late disclosure, which plagues the 
entire proceedings, needs a more robust solution. When confronted with multiple 
disclosure violations the prejudice to the Defence’s case should be presumed and 
the Defence exonerated from what it proves. This would switch the burden of proof 
from the Defence to the Prosecution. However, such an approach would leave us 
with the problem of what sanctions could be applied.
I also submit that the absence of prejudice does not per se exclude the possibility 
that the Prosecutor may benefit from non-disclosure or delayed disclosure and that 
the advantage gained in the presentation of his case would indirectly detriment the 
Defence.
In light of the above it appears sensible to advocate, as some commentators already 
have, the necessity of procedural sanctions such as the exclusion of the material 
disclosed too late as an effective remedy to the Prosecution’s disclosure violations.278  
_______________________
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As things stand, the Prosecution is aware that should he fail to disclose material 
most likely the Trial Chamber will grant additional time to the Defence or will 
order the re-call of one or more witnesses. These consequences have little if any 
deterrent effect. 
Concluding, it must be specified that the Rules as they stand would allow in 
principle the adoption of such measures, it is the practice of the Tribunal which, 
so far, has not made use of them. I submit that a more explicit codification of the 
procedural sanctions referred to in this paragraph and of the circumstance which 
would trigger their imposition could constitute an effective step towards the 
effectiveness of Rule 68 whereas its timid application seems to defeat its scope 
and purpose considerably limiting its remedial and deterrent effects.
7. Summary and concluding remarks 
The Statute and the RPE of the ICTY established a somewhat adversarial system 
reflecting the common law tradition. The Tribunal encountered considerable 
problems in reconciling the goal of fair and expeditious trials with the adversarial 
system in place. By July 1998, only two trials had been completed and the caseload 
of the ICTY had grown quickly. 
In 1998 several elements of the inquisitorial tradition were imported in the 
RPE granting the judges a wide range of judicial control over the proceedings 
since their pre-trial stage in order to improve their expeditiousness. However, 
the approach to the proceedings as a “competition between the parties” did not 
change even if a degree of cooperation and coordination between the Defence 
and the Prosecutor’s cases was introduced.279
The ICTY system codified the right to a fair trial and the Tribunal’s practice 
acknowledged the principle of the equality of arms between the Prosecutor and 
the defendant in criminal trials as going “to the heart of the fair trial guarantee.”280 
The Tribunal however, highlighted the importance of a more liberal interpretation 
of the equality of arms principle in the light of the particular nature of its trials 
and of the context in which it is called to operate. 
The ICTY adopts a procedural equality between the parties and accepts the duty 
to assist them providing the necessary facilities in the presentation of their cases.
In this framework, the disclosure of information is an essential feature of the 
principle of the equality of arms as it can play a crucial role in reducing the 
existing structural gap, in terms of resources and capacity to investigate, between 
the Prosecution and the Defence, assisting the latter in obtaining material which 
_______________________
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it otherwise would never have been able to gather. 
At the same time disclosure is the ambit in which the frictions between the “two 
souls” of the Prosecution’s composition reveal themselves more clearly. 
 
The assessment of the Tribunal’s disclosure regime carried out in this chapter 
showed that the duality of the Prosecution’s functions envisaged by the Tribunal’s 
jurisprudence appears to have negative repercussions on the disclosure regime. 
The fact that the Rules do not reflect the Prosecution’s role as a Minister of 
Justice in its relationship with the Defence, the absence of judicial supervision 
over the Prosecution’s discretion and the possibility that exculpatory material 
in possession of the OTP may remain unknown to the Defence and the Trial 
Chamber impact on the fairness and effectiveness of the disclosure system. 
The analysis carried out illustrated other critical aspects of the ICTY’s disclosure 
procedure which are not strictly related to the role of the Prosecution. This 
includes the broadened Defence disclosure marking a departure from the former 
limited duties on the Defence that better reflected the difference in the scope of 
the cases of the Defence and Prosecution; the Prosecution’s in camera applications 
for non-disclosure which do not grant a real opportunity to the Defence to make 
its case for disclosure; the issue of prejudice in relation to Article 68bis sanctions; 
the Tribunal’s practice of not imposing procedural sanctions for disclosure 
violations and the limited effectiveness of the safeguards envisaged by the RPE in 
relation to confidential material ex Rule 70. 
In the light of the above one may wonder whether a more inquisitorial 
investigation system envisaging the judicial supervision of a pre-trial judge, 
with the creation of an open dossier accessible to the Defence coupled with a 
clear codified obligation on the Prosecutor to investigate both inculpatory and 
exculpatory circumstances, could be a more suitable and effective option in the 
context of complex international criminal trials.281 
The system could envisage the creation of an impartial figure, outside of the trial 
proceedings but operating parallel to it, in charge of dealing with all the disclosure 
motions without having to decide issues to which this material is relevant at trial. 
Finally, an adequate sanctioning regime that included specific procedural 
sanctions in cases of disclosure violations, less dependent on the issue of 
prejudice and from the discretion of the judges, could guarantee an effective 
deterrent action. 
The ICTY will soon close its doors and any change in its procedure regarding 
disclosure could have only a limited impact for the future. However, the analysis 
of the critical points emerged in its disclosure regime can be of benefit for current 
and future international, ad hoc or mixed Tribunals. The ICTY experience can 
_______________________
281 On this point see Schoun, above n. 71 at p. 134.
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be of assistance in the search for a workable disclosure regime which, taking 
into account the differences in resources and roles between the Prosecution and 
the Defence, could accommodate competing interests without infringing the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial which should eventually prevail to guarantee the 
legitimacy of the judgments it delivers.
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VII. Disclosure of information in the legal system of the 
International Criminal Court
Introduction
“At present, the International Criminal Court embodies the most representative attempt to 
harmoniously blend different traditions, in the field of criminal justice”.1
“The International Criminal Court, governed by the Rome Statute, is the first 
permanent, treaty based, international criminal court established to help 
end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community.”2
This is how the website of the International Criminal Court (hereafter ICC or Court) 
begins its presentation and these few lines already highlight several differences 
with the ICTY which for the purpose of this work is used as a term of comparison.
The ICC was created by a treaty and not by the United Nations (hereafter UN) 
through a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It is a self-
standing independent international organisation. It is a permanent institution 
without an expiry date and it was not established to prosecute perpetrators of 
crimes committed within a specific conflict and time frame. These are significant 
differences which had repercussions in the negotiation of the Statute and on 
the drafting of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Court (hereafter 
RPE or Rules). Both instruments present several peculiarities unknown to their 
predecessors that will be discussed in this chapter. 
The drafters had to reconcile principles of law belonging to different judicial 
systems such as common and civil law. The compromise appears more balanced 
than the first ICTY structure arising from the first draft of its Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, which, as discussed in the previous chapter, was ostensibly based on 
the common law tradition. 
As in the previous chapter, it is useful, before turning to the scrutiny of the 
provisions regulating the disclosure of information before the ICC, to dwell briefly 
on the description of the procedure before the Court. This effort does not intend 
to lead to a detailed analytical picture of the proceedings or to analyse each aspect 
of them in depth. On the contrary, it aims to provide the reader with an idea of 
the structure of the pre-trial and trial stage of the proceedings to allow a better 
understanding of the context in which the disclosure obligations are discharged. 
Then the disclosure process will be tackled. With the intent of avoiding repetitions 
the scope of the scrutiny will be limited to the major differences emerging between 
the ICC and the ICTY disclosure rules. The existing similarities between the two 
_______________________
1 Caianiello M., Disclosure before the ICC: The Emergence of a New Form of Policies Implementation System in Interna-
tional Criminal Justice?, International Criminal Law Review 10 (2010) 23-42, p. 24.
2 http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/Pages/about%20the%20court.aspx 
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systems will be acknowledged without elaborating on them as they have been 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
The scrutiny will first deal with the Prosecution’s disclosure obligations and then 
with the Defence’s disclosure duties. The role of the Pre-Trial Chamber (hereafter 
PTC) will be discussed before moving to the analysis of the exceptions to disclosure 
and to the friction between confidential agreements between the Prosecution and 
a third party and the rights of the accused with some reference to the Lubanga case. 
The remedy and sanction for disclosure violations will be touched upon before 
formulating some critical remarks on the main issues discussed in the chapter. 
1. The ICC judicial system
 1.1 The ICC instruments 
For the purposes of this work this brief introductory analysis will be limited to 
some features of the Statute, the RPE and the Regulations of the Court, which are 
the three main instruments that establish the structure of the ICC and regulate the 
procedure to be followed in its proceedings. The Statute was adopted by the United 
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries held in Rome on 17 July 19983 
and it is the primary source of the ICC judicial system.4  It holds a higher status 
insofar as in case of conflict with other instruments its provisions will prevail.5
The ICC Statute covers certain procedural areas that in other Tribunals such as 
the ICTY are entirely left to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Disclosure is 
one of these. In fact, several articles of the ICC Statute make direct or indirect 
reference to the disclosure of information, inter alia, in relation to the rights of the 
accused (Article 67), the confirmation of the charges before trial (Article 61) and 
the functions and powers of the Trial Chambers (Article 64) as well as the duties 
and powers of the Prosecutor (Article 54). 
Part 4 of the Statute sets out the composition of the Court foreseeing the Presidency, 
the Chambers (Pre-Trial Division, the Trial Division and Appeal Division), the 
Office of the Prosecutor (hereafter OTP) and the Registry.6 
Unlike with the ad hoc Tribunals, in the ICC proceedings the victims are granted a 
participating position if the Chamber considers it appropriate and not in contrast 
with the rights of the accused and with the conduct of a fair and expeditious trial.7 
According to Article 75 of the Statute victims are also entitled to seek reparation, 
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.8
Chapter 7
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3 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9. 
4 See Article 51(4) and (5). 
5 ICC Statute, Articles 9 and 51.
6 ICC Statute, Article 34.
7 Article 415 bis CPP 
8 The position of the victims vis à vis the disclosure of information remains outside the scope of this work.
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The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC were drafted by the Preparatory 
Commission and were then adopted by the assembly of the States Parties in 
September 2000.9 A first significant difference with the ad hoc Tribunals can be 
seen in that the ICC RPE were not drafted and adopted by the judges of the Court. 
In addition, the procedure to amend the Rules passes through the approval of the 
Assembly of States Parties.10 However, the Statute contemplates the possibility that 
in case of urgency, amendments may be adopted by the judges and subsequently 
accepted or rejected by States Parties. A separation appears to have been drawn 
between the legislative and the judicial power which was unknown to the ad hoc 
Tribunals where the judges were empowered by the Statute with the drafting of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
The ICC approach is the outcome of the negotiation of the Rome Statute in which 
states showed the will to maintain a certain degree of control over the newly born 
Court. However, this approach, which is unsurprising given the reluctance with 
which states delegate their sovereignty to international institutions, comes at 
some costs in terms of flexibility and adaptability of the judicial system to needs or 
problems that may arise only through the practice of the Court. 
We have discussed in the previous chapter how the ICTY was able to adjust its 
procedure to the complexity of the proceedings through constant amendments to 
the RPE. These amendments were drafted by the judges of the Tribunal, who are 
in the best position to appreciate what may be needed to run fair and expeditious 
trials. In other words, the power to amend the Rules was granted to the ICTY 
judges, which allowed the system to respond and adapt to challenges which could 
not be foreseen at the time of the drafting of the RPE.  The different course of 
action chosen by the drafters of the ICC Statute could prove detrimental as it may 
affect the ability of the system to respond to any needs that arise.
A counter argument, as Guariglia noted, is that Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
enhanced by judges enjoy less legitimacy than RPE which are the outcome 
of extensive negotiations among a remarkable numbers of states.11 However, 
the capacity of the RPE to accommodate unpredicted needs arising from the 
proceedings will depend on the approach, whether rigid or responsive, that the 
States Parties will be inclined to follow when confronted with suggestions or urgent 
amendments from the ICC judges.12
The third ICC instrument discussed here is established by Article 52 of the 
Rome Statute which allows the judges to adopt the Regulations of the Court.13 
The Regulations are necessary for the routine functioning of the Court.14 They 
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9 The Preparatory Commission completed its work on 30 June 2000. 
10 ICC Statute, Article 51(3). 
11 Guariglia F., The Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Court, in Cassese A., Gaeta P. and John 
R.W.J., The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 1133.
12 Ibid. at pp. 1119-1120.
13 The Regulations of the Court were adopted, by absolute majority, after consultation with the Prosecutor and the Registry on 
26 May 2004. See Schabas W., An Introduction to the International Cirminal Court, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 199.
14 Article 468 CPP 
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established two Offices of Public Counsel (one for defence counsel and one for 
victims counsel) with the Registry.15 This third instrument (apparently less state 
controlled) must be circulated for comments to States Parties and is considered 
adopted only after six months in the absence of comments or objections.16 There 
were no objections or comments to the Regulations of the Court as proposed by 
the ICC judges. The Regulations are relevant to the disclosure procedures before 
the Court.17
 1.2 The investigations and the pre-trial stage
The ICC jurisdiction can be triggered by the UN Security Council, the State Parties 
and the Prosecutor.18 When the Prosecutor receives information concerning a 
particular situation or once such situation has been referred to the ICC by a State 
party or by the UN Security Council, the Prosecutor carries out a preliminary 
examination in order to decide whether or not to initiate an investigation.19 When 
the Prosecutor is acting motu proprio his discretion, unlike the discretion given to 
his colleagues operating in the ad hoc Tribunals, is not absolute as it is subject to 
the scrutiny of the Pre-Trial Chamber (hereafter PTC) which is self-standing and 
independent from the Trial Chambers (hereafter TC). The PTC constitutes one of 
the most significant features of the procedural system envisaged by the Statute.20  
When deciding whether to investigate, the Prosecutor must consider if the 
information provided constitutes a reasonable basis to believe that a crime covered 
by the ICC jurisdiction has been or is being committed; if the case would be 
admissible; and if taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests 
of the victims there are nonetheless reasons to believe that the beginning of an 
investigation would be against the interest of justice. 
Once the Prosecution has decided to initiate an investigation the Pre-Trial Chamber 
begins work as it is required to supervise the Prosecutor’s decision assessing 
whether or not, in the light of the Prosecutor’s request and the supporting material, 
there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation.21 If the Prosecution 
has decided not to initiate an investigation the State making the referral or the 
Security Council may demand judicial intervention from the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
review the decision. If the Prosecutor has declined to proceed with an investigation 
because the “interest of justice” so demand, pursuant Article 53 (2)(c), the Pre-Trial 
Chamber can review the decision of its own motion even in the absence of a third 
party demand. The Pre-Trial Chamber authorisation to investigate is not requested 
when a situation is referred to the ICC by the Security Council or a State Party. The 
Prosecution’s discretion may also be limited by the Security Council of the United 
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15 Regulations 77 and 81. 
16 ICC Statute, Article 52(3). 
17 See Regulation 54 of the Regulation of the Court.
18 ICC Statute, Article 13. 
19 Article 53 ICC Statute.
20 Ex multis, see Orie A., Accusatorial v. Inquisitorial Approach in International Criminal Proceedings, in Cassese A., Gaeta 
P. and John R.W.J., The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2002, 
p. 1485.  
21 ICC Statute, Article 15(4). 
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Nations which can, acting under the umbrella of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
prevent the start or stop the continuation of an investigation (or prosecution) for a 
(renewable) period of twelve months.22
Unlike the ICTY’s judicial system the ICC Prosecutor is statute bound, in order 
to establish the truth, to “extend the investigation to cover all facts and evidence 
relevant to an assessment of whether there is a criminal responsibility under this 
Statute and, in doing so, investigates incriminating and exonerating circumstances 
equally”.23 One commentator described this provision as an attempt “to build a 
bridge between the adversarial common law approach to the role of the Prosecutor 
and the role of the investigating judge in certain civil law systems”.24 It will be 
discussed below in greater detail how this provision has positive implications in 
relation to exculpatory material (and its disclosure) which becomes part of the 
focus of the Prosecutor’s investigation. Looking at the characterisation of the 
role of the Prosecution through the lenses of this provision a more inquisitorially 
fashioned figure emerges.
The interaction between the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber characterises 
the issuance of an arrest warrant of a person (or a summons to appear) which can 
be issued by the PTC after the beginning of an investigation upon an application by 
the Prosecutor.25 It is noteworthy that once a person has been arrested he can apply 
to the competent authority in the custodial State for provisional release pending 
trial.26 In deciding on the application the competent domestic authority must give 
full consideration to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s recommendations on the issue.27
The Pre-Trial Chamber plays an active role during the investigation as it has the 
authority, among other things, to issue orders and warrants, to provide for the 
protection of victims and witnesses and to authorise the Prosecutor to take specific 
investigative steps within the territory of a State Party without having previously 
obtained the cooperation of that State.28 Moreover, if the Prosecutor deems that 
an investigation presents a “unique investigative opportunity” to gather evidence 
which might not be available at a later date he must turn to the Pre-Trial Chamber 
which can provide the permission.29 This approach applies to both incriminating 
and exculpatory evidence which may become unavailable at a further stage. 
Interestingly enough the PTC can, if convinced that the Prosecutor failed to secure 
a unique investigative opportunity to gather evidence favourable to the Defence, 
take the necessary measures on its own initiative.30 This decision can be appealed 
by the Prosecutor. This provision was one of the most controversial and was 
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22 ICC Statute, Article 16. 
23 ICC Statute, Article 54. 
24 Bergsmo M. and Kruger P., Article 54, in Triffterer O., Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, C.H. Beck – Hart – Nomos, 2nd Edition, 2008, p. 1078.
25 ICC Statute, Article  58. 
26 ICC Statute, Article 59(3).
27 ICC Statute, Article 59(5).
28 ICC statute, Article 57(3). 
29 ICC Statute, Article 56. 
30 ICC Statute, Article 56(3).
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vigorously debated between common and civil law lawyers in the negotiations of 
the Statute.31
In light of the above, it emerges that the Pre-Trial Chamber monitors and supervises 
the Prosecution’s performance during the investigation in line with an inquisitorial 
judicial tradition. As noted by Boas, the role of the Pre-Trial Chamber can be 
compared to the function of the judge for the preliminary investigation (giudice 
per le indagini preliminari) envisaged by the Italian Criminal Code discussed in 
chapter two.32
As far as the confirmation of the charges is concerned the ICC procedure 
envisages a hearing before the Pre-Trial Chamber to confirm the charges on which 
the Prosecutor intends to proceed at trial.33 The confirmation hearing can be 
considered as the line separating the investigation phase from the pre-trial stage.34 
The Statute specifies that it should be held within a reasonable time after the 
surrender or voluntary appearance before the Court. The presence of the suspect 
at the hearing allows him to object to the charges, challenge the Prosecution’s 
evidence and produce his own evidence. However, his presence is not a sine qua 
non condition for the confirmation of the charges as the Pre-Trial Chamber may 
on its own motion or, upon the Prosecutor’s request, proceed in the absence of the 
person charged if it is found that he waived his right to be present by fleeing or he 
cannot be found and all reasonable steps have been taken to contact him and to 
inform him about the charges and the date of the confirmation hearing.35 In order 
to confirm the charges the Pre-Trial Chamber must be presented with “sufficient 
evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed 
each of the crimes charged.”36 Before the commencement of the trial and after the 
confirmation of the charges the Prosecutor can, with the permission of the Pre-
trial Chamber and after notice to the accused, amend the charges. However if new 
charges are added another confirming hearing must be held to allow the accused 
to challenge the new charges.37
At the end of the confirmation hearing the Pre-Trial Chamber may confirm the 
charges, decline to confirm them or adjourn the hearing requesting that the 
Prosecution provide further evidence, to conduct further investigation in relation 
to a particular charge or to amend a charge because the Pre-Trial Chamber considers 
that the evidence presented would appear to establish a different crime under the 
ICC jurisdiction.38 In Bemba for instance the Pre-Trial Chamber was not satisfied by 
the Prosecutor’s failure to specify, in the document containing the charges, whether 
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31 See Orie, above n. 20 at p. 1475, footnote 148.
32 Boas G., Comparing the ICTY and the ICC: Some Procedural and Substantive Issues, Netherlands International Law 
Review, Volume 47, December 2000, p. 283. 
33 ICC Statute, Article 61. 
34 See Ambos K., International Criminal Procedure: “Adversarial”, “Inquisitorial”or Mixed?, International Criminal Law 
Review 3, 2003, p. 10. 
35 Article 61(2)(b). In the struggle to find a compromise between different legal traditions, the drafters chose to adopt the 
more neutral formulation of  “person charged” rather than suspect.  The same approach can be detected in relation to 
the absence of the term indictment which is substituted by the expression “document containing the charges”. 
36 ICC Statute, Article 61. 
37 ICC Statute, Article 61.
38 ICC Statute, Article 61(7). 
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the alleged crimes had been committed in the context of an international or a non-
international armed conflict and therefore it ordered the Prosecutor to provide 
such clarification.39 When the Pre-Trial Chamber declines to confirm the charges 
the Office of the Prosecutor is not precluded from requesting their confirmation 
a second time if new evidence is produced.40 A decision shall be rendered within 
sixty days from the end of the confirmation hearing.41 The records of the Pre-Trial 
proceedings are transmitted to and kept by the Registrar.
 1.3 The trial proceedings
 
Following the confirmation of the charges the Presidency of the Court will set up a 
Trial Chamber for the conduct of the upcoming proceedings. There are no trials in 
absentia.42 The Trial Chamber will hold a status conference with the parties to set 
the starting date of the trial.43
The Trial Chamber must conduct the trial and ensure that it is fair and expeditious.44 
The judges have been granted significant active powers in order to run the trial 
smoothly. To this aim the Trial Chamber, inter alia, provides for the disclosure of 
documents or information, not previously disclosed, in sufficient advance of the 
commencement of the trial to enable adequate preparation for trial.45 Moreover, 
the Trial Chamber is empowered to provide for the protection of confidential 
information and order the production of additional evidence.46
In addition, Regulation 54 of the Regulations of the Court stipulates that at a 
status conference the TC may, inter alia, “order the production and disclosure of 
the statements of the witnesses on which the participants propose to rely”.47 This 
includes the Defence on whose disclosure the Trial Chamber can have influence 
through the provision of Rule 79(4) which restates the Chamber’s power to order 
the disclosure of any other evidence to the Defence.48
The Trial begins with the reading of the charges which have been confirmed.49 The 
Trial Chamber must be satisfied that the accused understands the nature of the 
charges against him before affording him the opportunity to make an admission of 
guilt or to plead not guilty.50 Article 65 of the ICC Statute envisages the possibility 
of a guilty plea which is referred to as an admission of guilt and the procedure to 
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39 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-323, Request for Clarification on Document Containing the 
Charges, 4 November 2008.
40 ICC Statute, Article 61(8).
41 Regulations of the Court, Regulation n. 53.
42 ICC Statute, Article 63. 
43 ICC RPE, Rule 132. Other status conferences are held on different issues such as, inter alia, the length of the evidence 
to be relied on, the production and disclosure of the statements of the witness to be called at trial and the disclosure of 
evidence.
44 ICC Statute, Article 61(11) and Article 64(2). 
45 ICC Statute, Article 64(3)(c). 
46 ICC Statute, Article 64(6) (c) and (d).
47 Regulation 54 of the Regulations of the Court.
48 ICC RPE, Rule 79(4). 
49 See Articles 326-328 CPP.
50 Cordero F, Procedura Penale (8th Edition), 2008. Cordero states that if the prosecutor disregards [evidence favourable 
to the suspect], ICC Statute, Article 64(8)(a).
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be followed in such case.51 The Trial Chamber is not bound by a guilty plea and can 
order the continuation of the trial according to the ordinary procedure if it is not 
satisfied that the admission of guilt is supported by the facts of the case or where 
the interest of justice and victims so demand.52 
If the accused enters a not guilty plea the trial begins. Even if the RPE only foresees 
closing statements by the parties after the submission of evidence, the accused has 
the right to make unsworn written or oral statements in his defence. The statement 
may take place at any time including the opening stage of the proceedings.53 
Interestingly enough, according to the RPE the parties can decide the order in 
which the evidence is presented.54 When an agreement cannot be reached the 
Presiding judge gives directions to the parties in relation to the presentation of 
evidence.55 However it is usually the Prosecution, which bears the onus probandi, 
that presents its case first. Also the Trial Chamber can play an active role in the 
submission of evidence by requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses 
and the production of documents when it considers it necessary in order to unveil 
the truth in relation to the crimes the accused is charged with.56
As far as the questioning of witnesses is concerned, the party that calls a witness 
will be the first to question him, followed by the other party.The Trial Chamber 
can ask its questions before and after the witness has been questioned by the 
parties.57 The Defence will always be the last to address a witness.58 Witnesses 
can be questioned on any relevant matter including credibility and reliability.59 
The evidence is submitted through the testimony of witnesses, both during the 
examination in chief and during the cross-examination.
Questions of admissibility or relevance of evidence should be raised by the parties, 
or by the Chamber of its own motion at the moment at which the evidence is 
submitted to the Chamber and dealt with accordingly.60 An untimely objection will 
be precluded unless the party raising it was not aware of the issue at the time the 
evidence was produced and is able to prove so.61  Leave to appeal is necessary to 
appeal, inter alia, decisions issued by the Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber when they 
involve issues which “would significantly affect the fair and expeditious conduct of 
the proceedings or the outcome of the trial”.62   
When the submission of evidence is declared as closed by the Presiding judge, the 
parties are invited to make their closing statements.63 
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51 ICC Statute, Article 65. 
52 Ibid.
53 Sluiter G., Friman H., Linton S., Vasiliev S. and Zappala’ S., International Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules, 
Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 550.
54 ICC RPE, Rule 140
55 ICC Statute, Article 64(8) and ICC RPE, Rule 140.
56 ICC Statute, Article 64(6) (b) and (d). 
57 ICC RPE, Rule 140(2).
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 ICC RPE, Rule 64. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Article 468 CPP.
63 ICC RPE, Rule 141. 
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The Trial Chamber will then begin its deliberation to reach a verdict which is 
referred to in the Statute as a “decision” and not as a “judgment”. 
If the attempt to reach a unanimous verdict is not successful it will be given by a 
majority of judges.64 
The decision must be given in writing and it must be justified. 
In case of a majority verdict the decision must give account of the position of the 
minority. Interestingly, according to Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court, 
the Trial Chamber may characterise the facts differently to accord with the crimes 
under Article 6, 7 and 8, of the Statute. In addition, the Trial Chamber can change 
the form of participation.65 In the decision on the guilt of the accused the Trial 
Chamber “shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, 
victims including compensation, restitution and rehabilitation.”66 
To this aim the Court may make an order directly against the convicted person.67 
If the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt 
it delivers a guilty verdict and it proceeds to assess the appropriate sentence to be 
imposed.68 Unlike the ICTY (after the amendments of the RPE on this issue) the 
sentencing procedure at the ICC is separated by the decision on the guilt of the 
accused. 
A specific hearing to hear submissions and receive evidence on the sentence shall 
be held at the request of one of the parties.69 Even when there is no such request 
the Trial Chamber can decide to hold the hearing. The person who has been found 
guilty can submit evidence seeking a mitigation of the sentence such as evidence 
showing his effort to reduce the suffering of the victims.70 
The Prosecution can also adduce evidence to prove the bad character of the person 
found guilty.
It is noteworthy that Article 85 and Rules 173-175 regulate the right to compensation 
of a person unlawfully arrested or detained and the procedure to follow when 
seeking such compensation. The ICTY statutory framework does not envisage a 
similar provision.71
2. Disclosure obligations in the ICC Statute and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence
 2.1 Introduction
In the statutory and procedural framework of the ICC the Prosecutor’s and 
Defence’s disclosure obligations differ significantly thanks to their respective roles 
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65 Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court. 
66 ICC Statute, Article 75.
67 Ibid.
68 ICC Statute, Article 76.
69 ICC Statute, Article 76 and ICC RPE, Rule 143. 
70 Schabas, above n. 13 at p. 305.
71 See Zappala’ S., Compensation to an Arrested or Convicted Person, in in Cassese A., Gaeta P. and John R.W.J., The Rome 
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in the proceedings.72 While the Prosecutor bears the onus probandi of the case 
as well as the duty to investigate incriminating and exculpatory circumstances 
equally, the Defence’s role is “largely reactive” to the presentation of evidence by 
the Prosecutor.73
We have discussed that the issue of disclosure is inevitably intertwined with 
the principle of the equality of arms. The ICC procedural framework makes no 
exception to this. In Banda and Jerbo the Appeals Chamber of the ICC (hereafter 
AC) restated that the disclosure process is essential in ensuring the fairness of 
the proceedings and in ensuring that the rights of the defence are respected, with 
particular reference to the principle of the equality of arms.74 In Lubanga the Trial 
Chamber stated that the fundamental right to a fair trial includes an entitlement to 
disclosure of exculpatory material.75 
The issue of disclosure gave rise to confrontation in the negotiations of the Statute 
and the RPE.76 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence regulating the disclosure 
regime at the International Criminal Court are very similar to the ICTY Rules.77 
During the negotiation of the Rome Statute two different approaches to disclosure 
were promoted by the Australian delegation and the French delegation. The former 
was in favour of a two stage disclosure separating disclosure for the purpose of the 
confirmation hearing from disclosure before trial, whereas the French delegation 
favoured one single disclosure stage to take place at a very early stage of the 
proceedings.78 The two-stage approach eventually prevailed.
In light of the structure of the procedure at the ICC the disclosure of evidence can 
be divided into disclosure before the confirmation hearing and the disclosure before 
trial.79 These two stages are characterised by a different scope of the material disclosed 
insofar as at the confirmation hearing stage the Prosecutor will submit evidence 
sufficient to convince the Pre-Trial Chamber of the existence of “sufficient grounds to 
believe that the person committed each of the crimes charged”, whereas the second 
stage of disclosure concerns evidence used by the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the 
accused “beyond reasonable doubt”.80 However, as is discussed below, what material 
should be disclosed to the Defence and communicated to the Pre-Trial Chamber 
remains a question which is answered differently by the Chambers of the ICC.
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80 See Sluiter et al., above n. 53 at p. 1089. 
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The ICC criminal procedure in relation to disclosure draws a distinction between 
the procedure of inter partes disclosure stricto sensu and the obligation to allow 
the other party to inspect books, photographs, maps and tangible objects.81 While 
disclosure between the parties in its more traditional meaning requires a more 
active role for the parties who are obliged to hand in material to their counterpart, 
inspections entail a more “passively open” attitude on the part of the parties who 
must let their opponent have access to certain material in their possession. An 
example of inter partes disclosure is given by the Prosecutor’s delivery of exculpatory 
material to the Defence; an example of material subject to inspection can be found 
in Lubanga where material relating to the general use of child soldiers in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo was considered as belonging to this category.82  
A further distinction exists between “disclosure” which takes place between the 
Defence and the Prosecution and the following “communication” of the disclosed 
material to the Pre-Trial Chamber.83 The communication of the material to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber allows it to carry out, inter alia, its duty to ensure that disclosure 
takes place under satisfactory conditions.84 This issue is closely linked to the issue 
of the creation of a record of the pre-trial proceedings as well as to the complex 
issue of how much of the trial the TC should be allowed to see, discussed below. 
The provisions of Article 61(3) of the Rome Statute and Rule 121(3) and (6) regulate 
the obligations to disclose which refer only to the pre-confirmation hearing stage. 
Another set of provisions applies to disclosure throughout the entire proceedings 
and they can be found in section II of Chapter IV of the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence. Specifically, Article 67(2) and Rules 76, 77 and 83 regulate the 
Prosecutor’s disclosure obligations while Rules 78, 79 and 80 are devoted to the 
Defence’s disclosure duties.85 Furthermore, Rules 81 and 83 concern the restrictions 
to disclosure and Rule 84 regulates the production of additional evidence for trial. 
Moreover, the issue of disclosure is touched upon through the regulation of the 
function of two of the ICC organs (OTP and Chambers), in several articles of the 
Rome Statute. But it is not regulated in great detail therein. As with the ICTY, at the 
International Criminal Court the role played by the Prosecutor and the Chambers 
(Pre-Trial and Trial) according to their statutory powers as well as the jurisprudential 
interpretation of such roles have significant implications on the functioning of the 
disclosure procedure. Article 54 (Duties and powers of the Prosecutor with respect 
to investigations), Article 57 (Functions and powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber), 
Article 61 (Confirmation of the charges before trial) and Article 64 (Functions and 
powers of the Trial Chamber) are the relevant articles in this context.
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Another type of disclosure which concerns the material used by the Prosecutor 
in support of his request for the issuance of an arrest warrant is recognised in the 
ICC procedure and will be briefly tackled in the next subsection which opens the 
analysis of the Prosecution’s disclosure obligations. 
 2.2 Prosecution disclosure duties during the investigations
Under the ICC procedure the Prosecutor can apply to the Pre-Trial Chamber seeking 
an arrest warrant for a suspect. He must submit supporting material showing that 
there are sufficient grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime 
under the jurisdiction of the Court.86 A question arises in relation to the person’s 
entitlement to the disclosure of this supporting material. This subsection discusses 
the answer given to this question by the ICC Chambers.
Neither the Statute nor the Rules explicitly regulate the disclosure of documents to a 
person subject to an arrest warrant before he surrenders to the Court. Nonetheless, 
even in the absence of explicit statutory provisions disclosure may take place during 
the investigation and its details have been further developed by the jurisprudence 
of the Court.
In the Mbarushimana case the Defence requested the Prosecutor disclose material 
related to the arrest of Mr. Mbarushimana with the aim of (i) challenging the 
validity of the arrest warrant as envisaged by Rule 117 (3) of the ICC RPE, (ii) 
applying for interim release and (iii) challenging the admissibility of the case.87 
The OTP responded that it would consider such request at the appropriate time. 
The Defence then turned to the Pre-Trial Chamber with a request for disclosure. 
The Prosecutor maintained that such request was untimely and emphasised, inter 
alia, the absence of any statutory basis for “pre-surrender disclosure”. 
The Pre-Trial Chamber acknowledged that the right to the disclosure of documents 
for the three purposes identified by the Defence is not explicitly set forth in the 
Statute or in the Rules.88 However, it stressed that the Appeals Chamber had 
confirmed the existence of the right to disclosure for the purposes of seeking interim 
release.89 Furthermore, in relation to the purpose of challenging the validity of 
the arrest warrant the PTC noted that “the grounds on which such challenge can 
be made are similar to the grounds for seeking interim release” and consequently 
access to the same documents is necessary.90
Dealing with the third purpose for seeking disclosure, namely to challenge the 
admissibility of the case, the Pre-Trial Chamber highlighted that Article 19(2) of 
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the Rome Statute explicitly provides for a challenge by a person for whom a warrant 
of arrest has been issued and therefore it concluded that to exercise the right access 
to relevant documents is necessary.91
The ICC Appeals Chamber in Bemba made reference to the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR on the right of an arrested person to have access to proceedings (adversarial 
and in which the equality of arms is ensured) to assess “the compliance with the 
procedural requirements, the reasonableness of the suspicion grounding the arrest 
and the legitimacy of the purpose pursued by the arrest and the legitimacy of the 
ensued detention”92 and to have access to the relevant documents “in order to 
challenge the lawfulness of the arrest warrant effectively”.93
The Appeals Chamber stated that “in order to ensure both equality of arms and an 
adversarial procedure, the defence must, to the largest extent possible, be granted 
access to documents that are essential in order effectively to challenge the lawfulness 
of detention, bearing in mind the circumstances of the case.”94 At the same time the 
ICC judges acknowledged the necessity of accommodating the competing interests 
of the protection of witnesses and victims and the need to safeguard the ongoing 
investigation.95 
In this particular case the AC noted that the applicant had not had at his disposal 
all the documents and evidence relating to the grounds for his detention when the 
PTC had rendered its decision on the application for interim release. However, it 
concluded that the Pre-Trial Chamber had not erred in issuing its decision at that 
point considering its effort to ensure disclosure of information, the need to protect 
witnesses and victims and the duty to render a decision without undue delay.96 
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber emphasised that the arrested person might 
have an interest to a prompt decision even in the absence of full disclosure and 
that following the latter he can apply again for interim release, in a more informed 
fashion, if his previous application was not successful.97
In the light of the above it can be concluded that even in the absence of an explicit 
statutory provision regulating the disclosure of the material used by the Prosecutor 
to support his application for an arrest warrant, the ICC appears to allow this 
possibility for the purposes of applying for interim release, challenging the legality 
of the supporting material and challenging the admissibility of the case. However, 
the mere absence of full disclosure before a decision on interim release is issued 
will not per se lead to its reversal on appeal.  
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 2.3 Prosecution disclosure duties prior to the confirmation hearing
  2.3.1 Preliminary remarks
The hearing to confirm the charges against the suspect was an unknown feature 
in international criminal procedure prior to its adoption by the ICC Statute.98 The 
nature of the confirmation hearing and its impact on the disclosure of evidence 
were hotly debated during the negotiation of the Statute.99 Common law lawyers 
conceived it as a rather straightforward procedure whose aim would be to prevent 
proceedings in which the Prosecutor was unable to gather sufficient evidence to 
establish substantial grounds that a crime under the Court’s jurisdiction had been 
committed. Civil lawyers on the other hand, interpreted it as a more articulated 
procedure. The two different understandings had repercussions on the obligations 
regarding disclosure of evidence at this stage as common lawyers advocated limited 
disclosure obligations whereas civil lawyers supported more extensive ones.100
The result is a compromise where the hearing’s purpose is to filter the cases which 
should be sent to trial on the basis of the result of the Prosecutor’s investigation 
but at the same time the suspect has the possibility of participating in the hearing 
challenging the charges and the evidence presented by the OTP. 101
 
The Rome Statute stipulates that the Pre-Trial Chamber must assess whether the Prosecutor 
gathered and presented sufficient evidence “to establish substantial grounds to believe that 
the person committed each of the crimes charged”.102 It is not a hearing which intentends 
to determine the innocence or guilt of the suspect and therefore the scope of the evidence 
produced is also different to a certain extent from the evidence presented at trial.
We have seen that at the ICTY the indictment is confirmed by a single judge (the 
so-called reviewing judge) through a swift ex parte hearing that does not involve 
the Defence and the Prosecutor will produce evidence supporting the indictment 
without any counter argument or counter evidence from the other side. In the 
procedural structure of the International Criminal Court the charges on which the 
Prosecutor intends to seek trial must be confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber at the 
confirmation hearing. This procedure, which is more articulated and complex than 
the one envisaged by the ICTY RPE, involves both parties and entails significant 
disclosure obligations for the Prosecutor. The ICC clarified that the confirmation 
hearing should not be seen as a “mini trial” or a “trial before trial” but rather as 
a step to ensure that no case goes to trial unless there is sufficient evidence to 
establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed the crimes with 
which he has been charged.103 In relation to the Prosecutor’s disclosure the Pre-
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Trial Chamber stressed that the focus of Prosecution’s disclosure must be not on 
the amount and volume of the evidence disclosed but on the true relevance of the 
evidence to the case.104
In preparation for the confirmation hearing, status conferences are held by the 
Pre-trial Chamber “to ensure that disclosure takes place under satisfactory 
conditions”.105 Decisions regarding disclosure in preparation for the hearing to 
confirm the charges are usually taken by a single judge of the Pre-Trial Chamber.106
  2.3.2 Article 61(3): Confirmation of the charges before trial   
  Rule 121(3): Proceedings before the confirmation hearing
In preparation for the confirmation hearing the Statute and the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence of the ICC regulate a disclosure process which, depending on the 
Defence’s strategy, can be almost unilateral and concern only the Prosecutor. The 
ratio behind these disclosure duties is to allow the suspect to become familiar with 
the charges against him and the evidence the Prosecutor intends to use during 
the hearing to confirm them. These provisions are briefly touched upon in this 
subsection.
Article 61(3), in the relevant part, reads as follows:
Within a reasonable time before the hearing, the person shall:
(a) Be provided with a copy of the document containing the charges on which the Prosecutor 
intends to bring the person to trial; and
(b) Be informed of the evidence on which the Prosecutor intends to rely at the hearing.
Rule 121(3) reads as follows:
…The Prosecutor shall provide to the Pre-Trial Chamber and the person, no later than 30 
days before the date of the confirmation hearing, a detailed description of the charges 
together with a list of the evidence which he or she intends to present at the hearing.
Article 61(3) states that the Prosecutor must, within a reasonable time before the 
confirmation hearing, provide to the person a copy of the document containing the 
charges on which the Prosecutor intends to bring the person to trial.107 Moreover, 
within the same time frame, the person must be informed of the evidence the 
Prosecutor intends to rely on at the confirmation hearing.108
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Rule 121(3) underpins Article 61(3) in relation to the relevant time frame for disclosure 
stating that within thirty days before the confirmation hearing the Prosecutor must 
provide the Pre-Trial Chamber and the suspect with a detailed description of the 
charges as well as with a description of the evidence the Prosecutor will rely on at 
the hearing. The time frame set by Rule 121(3) (and 6 in relation to the Defence) 
appears to be binding if read in combination with Rule 121(8) which states that “the 
Pre-Trial Chamber shall not take into consideration charges and evidence presented 
after the time limit, or any extension thereof, has expired”.109 It appears therefore 
that the exclusion of the evidence in question follows from a delay in presenting 
the Pre-Trial Chamber with the description of evidence that each party intends 
to rely upon in the hearing. In addition to this, the Prosecutor is statute bound to 
disclose the exculpatory evidence in his possession as soon as practicable.110 This is 
a continuous obligation to which the Prosecutor is subject throughout the entire 
proceedings. 
  2.3.3 Rule 121(2)(c): Proceedings before the confirmation hearing
The material that has been disclosed between the parties in preparation of 
the confirmation hearing must be communicated to the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
This communication enables the PTC to perform its function in relation to the 
confirmation hearing among which is an obligation to ensure that disclosure 
occurred satisfactorily. This subsection analyses the relevant provisions regulating 
this issue as well as the different approaches developed by the PTC jurisprudence 
in relation to their operation.111 
Rule 121(2)(c) reads as follows: 
2. In accordance with article 61, paragraph 3, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall take the necessary 
decisions regarding disclosure between the Prosecutor and the person in respect of whom a 
warrant of arrest or a summons to appear has been issued. During disclosure:
…
All evidence disclosed between the Prosecutor and the person for the purposes of the 
confirmation hearing shall be communicated to the Pre-Trial Chamber.
Rule 121(2)(c) states that all evidence that the Prosecutor and the suspect have 
exchanged for the purposes of the confirmation hearing has to be communicated 
to the Pre-Trial Chamber.112
The jurisprudence of the ICC on the pre-confirmation hearing’s disclosure and 
communication appears to have developed two different interpretations of the 
term “all evidence”. 
The first interpretation follows the so called “bulk rule” according to which only the 
evidence which will be used at the confirmation hearing should be disclosed to the 
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Defence and communicated to the PTC. 
The second interpretation adopts what has been referred to as the “totality rule” 
which requires the Prosecutor to disclose the evidence that is of true relevance 
to the case (exculpatory and incriminating), and extends the scope of the 
communication to the PTC to all the material exchanged between the parties 
regardless of their intention to use it at this hearing.113 This dichotomy, which 
finds its origin not only in a different interpretation of the relevant provisions but 
also in a different understanding of the role of the Pre-Trial Chamber,114 is still 
present in the absence of a ruling by the Appeals Chamber. Questions arise as to 
the preferable interpretation as well as on whether inculpatory and exculpatory 
evidence should be treated the same way for the purposes of disclosure at this 
stage of the proceedings. I will return to this issue in the subsection devoted to the 
critical remarks at the end of the chapter.
The first approach (“bulk rule”) was followed by the Pre-Trial Chambers in the 
Lubanga and Katanga cases. The judges recalled that the Prosecutor’s disclosure 
obligations for the purposes of the confirmation hearing concern the “bulk of 
the potentially exculpatory evidence or evidence which could be material to the 
preparation of the Defence” and not all the evidence in the Prosecutor’s possession.115 
In Lubanga the Prosecutor argued that the bulk of the disclosure of the exculpatory 
material to the Defence should take place between the confirmation hearing and 
the trial. The single Judge disagreed stating that disclosure should occur before 
the confirmation hearing.116 In the same case the Defence had sought access to the 
Prosecutor’s entire file arguing that this kind of full disclosure was indispensable in 
order to challenge the charges and present evidence at the confirmation hearing.117 
The Single Judge concluded that the Statute and the RPE do not grant the Defence 
the entitlement to disclosure or inspection of any material which the Prosecutor 
does not intend to use at the confirmation hearing and which is neither potentially 
exculpatory nor relevant to the Defence’s preparation for such a hearing.118 These 
provisions “are based on the premise that the criminal procedure before the 
International Criminal Court does not provide for full access by the Defence to the 
entire Prosecution file”.119 Moreover, “all evidence” which must be communicated 
to the Pre-Trial Chamber is only the evidence which the Prosecution intends to rely 
on at the confirmation hearing.120 
Disclosure of information in the legal system of the International Criminal Court
_______________________ 
113 Fairness at the International Criminal Court, An International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute Report Sup-
ported by the John D and Catherine T MacArthur Foundation, August 2011.
114 See Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09, Second Decision on issues relating to disclosure, 15 July 2009, 
Partly dissenting Opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser, para. 1. Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision estab-
lishing a disclosure system and a calendar for Disclosure, 24 January 2012, para. 11. See also Heinze, above n. 872.
115 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007, 
para. 154; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Final System of Disclosure and the 
Establishment of a Timetable, 15 May 2006, para. 124; Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-
01/04-01/07, Decision on Article 54(3)(e) Documents Identified as Potentially Exculpatory or Otherwise Material to the 
Defence’s Preparation for the Confirmation Hearing, 20 June 2008, para. 8.
116 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Final System of Disclosure and the Establish-
ment of a Timetable, 15 May 2006, paras. 121 and 124. 
117 Ibid. at para. 8. 
118 Ibid. at para. 11.
119 Ibid. at para. 12. 
120 Ibid. at para. 41. 
259 260
The opposite approach (or “totality rule”) can be detected in Bemba where the PTC 
required the Prosecutor to disclose all the material of true relevance to the case 
regardless of its exculpatory or incriminating nature.121 Moreover, it stated that in 
order to conduct an independent assessment of the case the Chamber “should not 
be confined to the evidence which the parties intend to rely on for the purpose of 
the confirmation hearing”.122 The Pre-Trial Chamber emphasised the importance of 
having access to the evidence exchanged between the Prosecutor and the Defence 
with particular reference to exculpatory evidence in order to ensure that the 
Prosecutor has properly disclosed the evidence to the Defence and that the latter 
had adequate time and facilities to prepare for the confirmation hearing.123
In more recent cases divergent interpretations can also be observed. In Ruto and 
Sang the Single Judge of Pre-Trial Chamber II stated that ensuring an effective 
disclosure process “requires that all evidence disclosed between the parties, shall 
be communicated to the Chamber, regardless of whether the parties intend to rely 
on or present the said evidence at the confirmation hearing”.124
The Prosecutor applied to the Pre-Trial Chamber seeking leave to appeal this 
decision. He emphasised, inter alia, that the departure from the “bulk rule” 
adopted in the Lubanga and Katanga cases affected the fairness of the proceedings 
vis-à-vis the Prosecutor.125 On this issue the Single Judge of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
pointed out that the so-called “bulk rule” was not a term or a concept enshrined in 
the Court’s statutory documents but rather a notion developed in some pre-trial 
proceedings.126 Therefore considering the rejection of the stare decisis doctrine by 
the ICC procedural system the Pre-Trial Chamber was allowed to depart from the 
“bulk rule” notion.127
Furthermore, the Prosecutor sought leave to appeal the decision on the issue of 
whether the Chamber may order the Prosecution to provide the Chamber with all the 
material made available to the Defence which will not be used at the confirmation 
hearing.128 The Prosecutor argued that by requiring the communication of all 
evidence the Pre-Trial Chamber was assuming control over the presentation of 
both parties’ case intruding in their role to decide what evidence to offer at the 
confirmation hearing. 
On this issue the Single Judge recalled that the Pre-Trial Chamber may “request the 
submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for its specific determination 
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at the end of the pre-trial stage, in addition to other evidence which has been 
presented by the parties” in fulfilling its role to contribute to the establishment 
of the truth in the framework of the confirmation of charges.129 Against this 
background the Single Judge dismissed the Prosecutor’s argument.130
Two other recent decisions in the Abu Garda case and in the Gbagbo case restated 
that only the evidence which the parties intend to rely on at the confirmation 
hearing should be communicated to the Pre-Trial Chamber and even exculpatory 
evidence disclosed to the Defence should not be communicated if the Defence does 
not intend to rely on it at the confirmation hearing.131 At the same time another Pre-
Trial Chamber continues to advocate the duty to inform the Pre-Trial Chamber of 
all the evidence disclosed between the parties regardless of the parties’ intention 
to use that evidence at the confirmation hearing, including exculpatory evidence 
disclosed pursuant Article 67(2).132
 2.4 Prosecution disclosure obligations throughout the entire proceeding
  2.4.1 Rule 76: Pre-trial disclosure relating to prosecution witnesses
As a general rule in the ICC procedure the Prosecutor is required to disclose to 
the Defence the names of the witnesses he intends to call to testify as well as their 
prior statements in the original language and in a language that the suspect fully 
understands.133 The same obligation arises in relation to any additional witnesses 
the Prosecutor may decide to call.134 This subsection describes the characteristics 
of these obligations incumbent on the Prosecutor giving account of the relevant 
contribution the ICC jurisprudence has made to their development.
Rule 76 reads as follows:
1. The Prosecutor shall provide the defence with the names of witnesses whom the Prosecutor 
intends to call to testify and copies of any prior statements made by those witnesses. This 
shall be done sufficiently in advance to enable the adequate preparation of the defence. 
2. The Prosecutor shall subsequently advise the defence of the names of any additional 
prosecution witnesses and provide copies of their statements when the decision is made to 
call those witnesses. 
3. The statements of prosecution witnesses shall be made available in original and in a 
language which the accused fully understands and speaks.
4. This rule is subject to the protection and privacy of victims and witnesses and the 
protection of confidential information as provided for in the Statute and rules 81 and 82.
At the confirmation hearing the Prosecutor is not obliged to call witnesses who are 
expected to testify at trial when he considers it sufficient to rely on documents or 
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summary evidence.135 However, even if the Prosecutor decides to rely on redacted 
versions of the prior statements of any witnesses without calling the witness to 
testify at the confirmation hearing he is still obliged to provide the Defence with 
the unredacted version of such statements.136 In other words, even if Rule 76 
makes reference only to “witnesses whom the Prosecutor intends to call to testify” 
the provision must be interpreted as covering any witness whose written or oral 
testimony the Prosecution intends to rely upon at the confirmation hearing.137
In relation to Rule 76 it is noteworthy that in the Lubanga case the Pre-Trial Chamber 
stated that the term “any prior statements” of the witnesses the Prosecutor intends 
to call to testify must be interpreted as including statements taken by entities other 
than the Prosecutor and which are not in his possession or control and consequently 
the Prosecutor “is under the obligation to make its utmost effort to obtain the prior 
statements” (taken by other entities) of those witnesses on whom he intends to rely 
at the confirmation hearing.138
As far as the timing of Rule 76 disclosure is concerned the text uses the expression 
“sufficiently in advance to enable the adequate preparation of the defence”. Given 
that the Prosecution is allowed to continue his investigations until the beginning 
of the confirmation hearing the Pre-Trial Chamber stated that the mandatory time 
limit for the Prosecution to decide which evidence he intends to rely on at the 
hearing is no later than thirty days before the date of the hearing and fifteen days 
before the hearing in case of new evidence.139
Rule 76 allows restrictions to disclosure in order to safeguard the protection and 
privacy of witnesses and victims as well as the protection of confidential material 
under Rules 81 and 82. This exception will be analysed in a specific section dedicated 
to the restrictions on disclosure.
  2.4.2 Rule 77: Inspection of material in possession or control 
  of the  Prosecutor
The Prosecutor has an obligation to allow the Defence to inspect certain categories 
of material in his possession. This subsection examines Rule 77, which regulates 
this type of “passive disclosure” by the Prosecutor, highlighting certain aspects of it 
as touched upon by the ICC Chambers’ jurisprudence. 
Rule 77 reads as follows:
The Prosecutor shall, subject to the restrictions on disclosure as provided for in the Statute 
and in rules 81 and 82, permit the defence to inspect any books, documents, photographs 
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and other tangible objects in the possession or control of the Prosecutor, which are material 
to the preparation of the defence or are intended for use by the Prosecutor as evidence for 
the purposes of the confirmation hearing or at trial, as the case may be, or were obtained 
from or belonged to the person.
The terminology and content of Rule 76 and 77 of the ICC RPE resemble ICTY Rules 
66(a)(ii) and 66(B). The difference between Rule 77 and its counterpart at the ICTY 
is that Rule 77 does not need a request by the Defence to trigger the inspection. 140 
The Prosecutor has to allow the Defence to inspect the originals of the books, 
documents, photographs and tangible objects in his possession or control on 
the OTP premises as described by the rule.141 During or immediately after the 
inspection, upon request of the Defence, the Prosecutor must provide it with an 
electronic copy of any material subject to inspection.142 Finally, once this procedure 
has been completed the Prosecutor must file in the records of the proceedings 
the originals and an electronic copy of those items he intends to produce at the 
confirmation hearing.143
The Prosecutor must allow the Defence to inspect books, documents, photographs 
and other tangible objects in his possession or control which are (i) material to the 
preparation of the Defence (ii) intended to be used by the Prosecutor as evidence at the 
confirmation hearing or at trial or (iii) were obtained from or belonged to the suspect.
In relation to the first category, the Appeals Chamber stated that Rule 77 has two 
stages. First, it must be determined whether the books, documents, photographs and 
other tangible objects in question are “material to the preparation of the defence”. 
If they are, the second stage envisages their disclosure to the Defence subject to the 
restrictions on disclosure as provided for in the Statute and the Rules.144 Therefore 
only once it is first determined that information is material to the preparation of 
the Defence can consideration be given to whether any restrictions on the right of 
disclosure should be imposed.145
The Appeals Chamber considered that “material to the preparation of the defense” 
ought to be interpreted as referring to all objects relevant for the preparation of 
the defence.146 Even objects which are not directly connected to exonerating 
or incriminating evidence cannot be excluded as they might be useful for the 
preparation of the defence.147 The Appeals Chamber cited an ICTY decision which 
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when tackling the same issue relied on the case law of U.S. federal jurisdictions stating 
that the “requested evidence must be significantly helpful to an understanding of 
important inculpatory or exculpatory evidence”.148
Furthermore, the Trial Chamber in Lubanga stated that “the prosecution is to 
communicate to the defence any material in its possession that may significantly 
assist the accused in understanding the incriminating and exculpatory evidence, 
and the issues, in the case”.149 Information that undermines or supports the evidence, 
or the credibility, of the Defence’s proposed witnesses falls within the scope of Rule 
77 of the Rules.150 In Bemba the Trial Chamber stated that “items obtained from a 
prosecution witness will presumptively be material to the defence’s preparation for 
that witness’ testimony and possibly for other purposes as well”.151
The assessment of whether information is material to the preparation of the defence 
pursuant to Rule 77 should indeed be made on a prima facie basis.152 Information 
that is material to the preparation of the defence may ultimately not be used as 
evidence at the trial or may not turn out to be relevant to it and yet the Defence is 
still entitled to this information based on a prima facie assessment.153  In reaching 
this conclusion the Appeals Chamber noted that this standard is also used at the 
ICTY and ICTR in relation to Rule 66 (B) of their Rules of Procedure and Evidence.154
  2.4.3 Article 67(2): Disclosure of exculpatory evidence
The disclosure duties discussed so far concern inculpatory evidence or evidence 
material to the Defence which reveal to the Defence the nature of the Prosecutor’s 
case against the accused. However the Prosecutor’s most important disclosure 
obligation concerns the exculpatory evidence in his possession. The scope of 
exculpatory material is different insofar as it can directly assist the Defence 
in the preparation of its case and consequently its disclosure is of the utmost 
importance. Article 67(2) of the Rome Statute regulates this type of disclosure 
which constitutes a continuous obligation on the Prosecutor operating throughout 
the entire proceedings. This subsection assesses the main features of this duty and 
its development through the jurisprudence of the ICC.  
Article 67(2) reads as follows:
…In addition to any other disclosure provided for in this Statute, the Prosecutor shall, as soon 
as practicable, disclose to the defence evidence in the Prosecutor’s possession or control 
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which he or she believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate 
the guilt of the accused, or which may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence. In case 
of doubt as to the application of this paragraph, the Court shall decide.
In Lubanga the Trial Chamber defined the notion of exculpatory evidence in the 
same way as it is defined in the ICTY’s Rule 68 namely as material (and not only 
evidence) that shows the innocence of the accused; which mitigates the guilt of the 
accused; and which may affect the credibility of the Prosecution’s evidence.155 In 
doing so it cleared the way from any restrictive interpretation possibly arising from 
the different terminology used. Article 67(2) of the ICC Statute, in fact, uses the 
word “evidence” whereas Rule 68 of the ICTY RPE employs the word “material”. The 
disclosure of exculpatory material must take place as soon as practicable. When 
compared to the ICTY obligation the disclosure of exculpatory material at the ICC 
appears more meaningful when read in combination to Article 54 (1)(a) which 
imposes a duty on the Prosecutor to investigate “incriminating and exonerating 
circumstances equally”. 
The rule is that once the Prosecution believes that the evidence “shows or tends 
to show the innocence of the accused” (Article 67(2) of the Statute), it is to be 
disclosed to the Defence, or in case of doubt put before the Court.156 However this 
conclusion was found not necessarily applicable to the confirmation hearing stage 
due to the different (from the trial) purpose of such hearing.157 
For instance, the Pre-Trial Chamber stated that the disclosure of information 
analogous to those covered by confidentiality pursuant to Article 54(3)(e)158 enables 
the Defence, for the purposes of the confirmation hearing, to have a “proper overview” 
of the information identified as potentially exculpatory or otherwise relevant to 
the Defence’s preparation for the hearing and to make an informed decision on 
whether to object to the charges or not.159 However, the PTC acknowledged that 
serving analogous information still prevented the Defence for gaining access to the 
potentially exculpatory material covered by confidentiality and therefore even if it 
minimises the prejudice caused by non-disclosure it does not fully eliminate it.160
The last sentence of Article 67(2) states that in case of doubt about the exculpatory 
nature of the material in possession of the Prosecutor it is for the Court to 
decide. Article 67(2) must be read in combination with Rule 83, which regulates 
the possibility for the Prosecutor to request on an ex parte basis a hearing to the 
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Trial Chamber for the purpose of obtaining a ruling on the exculpatory nature of 
the material in his possession.161 In other words, Rule 83 underpins Article 67(2) 
providing for the possible intervention of the Chamber in the assessment of 
exculpatory material for disclosure to the Defence. However, it must be noted that 
this provision which states that the “Prosecutor may request” a hearing makes room 
for a possibility rather than establishing an obligation on the part of the Prosecutor.
The rationale behind the ex parte nature of the hearing regulated by Rule 83 is the 
focus of the hearing itself, which is to determine whether certain material should 
be disclosed to the Defence. The presence of the Defence at such hearing would 
defeat its purpose as it would prevent the Prosecutor from going into details in 
relation to the material at stake and at the same time the Defence would not be 
in the position to present any meaningful argument given its lack of knowledge 
of the material.162 The Appeals Chamber made it clear, also citing the relevant 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, that the Chamber must receive the material in order 
to deliver such a ruling.163 In Lubanga the Single Judge remarked the importance 
of assessing the potential exculpatory value of the material by also placing it in 
context with other material gathered during investigation.164
The Defence also can request the Pre-Trial Chamber to order disclosure of 
exculpatory material for the purposes of the confirmation hearing.165 The same 
request can be addressed to the Trial Chamber in preparation for the trial.166 
Restrictions on the disclosure of exculpatory material are acceptable in case of (i) 
an agreement between the Prosecution and the Defence on those facts affected 
by the relevant material; or (ii) when the Prosecutor withdraws the factual 
allegations and/or charges affected by the relevant material.167 For the purposes 
of the confirmation hearing the Appeals Chamber acknowledged that preventing 
the Defence from having access to certain information that has been identified as 
potentially exculpatory in application of Rules 81(2) and (4) does not necessarily 
make the confirmation hearing as a whole unfair.168 
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The Appeals Chamber stressed that there is no relationship between the entitlement 
of the accused to the disclosure of exculpatory material and the Defence’s disclosure. 
It stated that the lack of any correlation between the right to disclosure from the 
Prosecution and any disclosure obligations on the Defence is evident in that the 
Prosecutor is duty-bound to provide full disclosure even if an accused elects to 
remain silent or does not raise a defence.169 The OTP must set up search criteria 
able to allow it to research constantly for potentially exculpatory material within 
the material in its possession regardless of the position of the Defence which plays 
no role in the search.170
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber made clear that even material which is gathered 
through confidential agreements is subject to disclosure if it is of an exculpatory 
nature. It noted that to hold the contrary would allow the Prosecutor to withhold a 
potentially large amount of information without any monitoring by the Chamber 
and that would be incompatible with the requirements of a fair trial which is the 
guiding principle in the interpretation of the Statute.171
In relation to exculpatory evidence, a suggestion made by Schabas appears workable. 
He, while commenting on Article 67 and possible remedies for its breach, argued 
that Article 67 should be given a “hierarchically superior status within the Statute” 
so that when appropriate the Court may have the authority to declare provisions 
that conflict with Article 67 inoperative.172 
 2.5 The Defence’s obligations to disclose
The Defence’s disclosure obligations are limited when compared to those of the 
Prosecutor. This subsection discusses these obligations and assesses the provisions 
of Rules 78 and 79 which regulates the process for the Defence’s disclosure. It 
further describes their implications for the purpose of the confirmation hearing 
and the trial as well as their development through the ICC’s jurisprudence.
Rule 78 reads as follows:
The defence shall permit the Prosecutor to inspect any books, documents, photographs and 
other tangible objects in the possession or control of the defence, which are intended for use 
by the defence as evidence for the purposes of the confirmation hearing or at trial.
Rule 79 reads as follows:
1. The defence shall notify the Prosecutor of its intent to: 
(a) Raise the existence of an alibi, in which case the notification shall specify the place or 
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places at which the accused claims to have been present at the time of the alleged crime and 
the names of witnesses and any other evidence upon which the accused intends to rely to 
establish the alibi; or (b) Raise a ground for excluding criminal responsibility provided for 
in article 31, paragraph 1, in which case the notification shall specify the names of witnesses 
and any other evidence upon which the accused intends to rely to establish the ground. 
2. With due regard to time limits set forth in other rules, notification under sub-rule 1 
shall be given sufficiently in advance to enable the Prosecutor to prepare adequately and to 
respond. The Chamber dealing with the matter may grant the Prosecutor an adjournment 
to address the issue raised by the defence. 
3. Failure of the defence to provide notice under this rule shall not limit its right to raise 
matters dealt with in sub-rule 1 and to present evidence. 
4. This rule does not prevent a Chamber from ordering disclosure of any other evidence.
As far as the preparation for the confirmation hearing is concerned the Defence 
has no disclosure obligations unless it decides to present evidence. Indeed the 
provisions, which allow the suspect to challenge the charges, present evidence and 
challenge the Prosecution’s evidence are “permissive rather than mandatory”.173 
However, should the suspect wish to present evidence at the confirmation hearing 
he must provide a description of the evidence for the Pre-Trial Chamber within 
fifteen days from the date set for the confirmation hearing.174 The Pre-Trial Chamber 
will then transmit this description to the Prosecutor. If the Defence intends to 
produce new evidence in response to any amended charges it must submit a new 
description of such evidence.
The ICC judicial framework does not consider that the timing and nature of Defence’s 
disclosure may alter the scope of Prosecution’s disclosure.175 However, the Appeals 
Chamber allowed for the hypothetical situation where following an unjustifiable 
delayed disclosure of a line of defence the Prosecutor failing to disclose certain 
material would not per se affect the fairness of the trial.176 In other words, while 
there is no direct correlation between Defence’s disclosure and the entitlement 
of the accused/suspect to disclosure of exculpatory material the delayed or non-
disclosure of a line of defence may affect the Prosecutor’s understanding of what 
exculpatory material is in his possession and therefore lead to delayed or non-
disclosure to the Defence. This scenario would not necessarily compromise the 
fairness of the proceedings. 
According to Rule 78, the Defence is under the obligation to allow the Prosecutor 
to inspect any books, material, photographs or tangible objects in its possession or 
control which it intends to use for the purposes of the confirmation hearing or at 
trial. The provision of Rule 78 establishes an obligation that applies to both stages 
(pre-confirmation and pre-trial) of the proceedings. The Defence’s obligation to 
permit the Prosecutor’s inspection is limited to the material it intends to use for 
the purposes of the confirmation hearing or at trial. The Prosecutor’s obligation 
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to allow the Defence to inspect his material is broader as it extends to material 
obtained from or which belonged to the suspect as well as to books, objects etc. 
which are relevant to the preparation of the Defence.177
The Rules are silent on the timing of the inspection. However, in Katanga and Chui 
the Trial Chamber found that the Defence must permit the Prosecutions to inspect 
“all the material in its possession or control which it intends to use at trial no less 
than two weeks prior to the scheduled commencement of the Defence case”.178 
The same time frame was adopted in Bemba.179 In that case the Trial Chamber 
also considered the scenario where in exceptional circumstances the need to use a 
specific item may arise after the two week deadline. The Trial Chamber stated that 
in that case the Defence may still disclose or permit the inspection of the item in 
question provided that (i) it takes place no later than seven days before its intended 
use; (ii) the Defence explains through a written submission the reasons why the 
item was disclosed later than the deadline and why it believes it should be allowed 
to use it; and (iii) after hearing the Prosecutor the Chamber agrees that the Defence 
should be allowed to use that particular item.180
If the Defence deems that disclosure of material covered by Rule 78 should be 
restricted it must address the Trial Chamber seeking authorisation no later than 
four weeks before the Defence commences the presentation of its evidence.181
Rule 79 obliges the Defence to disclose to the Prosecutor the existence of an alibi 
corroborated by the indication of the place the person claims to have been as well 
as by the names of the witnesses and any other evidence it intends to use to confirm 
the alibi. The Defence must also disclose, together with the names of witnesses and 
evidence, its intention to raise a ground for excluding criminal responsibility such 
as, inter alia, mental capacity, state of intoxication or duress.182 According to Rule 79 
(2) and Rule 80 notice of a particular defence should be given to the Prosecutor in 
sufficient advance of the commencement of the trial in order to enable the Prosecutor 
to adequately prepare for trial.183 However, Rule 79(3) states that the failure of the 
Defence to provide notice of an alibi or grounds for excluding criminal responsibility 
shall not limit its right to raise such matters and to present evidence later.184
In Lubanga the TC stated that there are obligations found in the framework of the 
Rome Statute which can be imposed on the Defence in relation to disclosure which 
do not infringe its privilege against self-incrimination.185 The TC emphasised, 
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among other things, its power to order “disclosure of any other evidence” pursuant 
Rule 79(4)186 as well as its authority, under Regulation 54 of the Court, to make 
orders during a status conference on the production and disclosure of statements 
given by witnesses the accused intends to call and in general on the disclosure 
of evidence.187 The term “any other evidence” must not be interpreted as limited 
to evidence related to an alibi or a ground to exclude criminal responsibility but 
as any other evidence the Chamber considers necessary.188 This interpretation is 
supported by Regulation 54 of the Regulations of the Court.
It was against this background that the Trial Chamber considered the imposition 
put upon the accused of the obligation to reveal in advance details of the defence 
that will be adopted and the evidence to be presented does not necessarily infringe 
on his right to a fair trial.189 The Trial Chamber must, at all times, ensure that any 
discretionary order it makes regarding Defence’s disclosure does not affect the 
accused’s right to a fair and impartial trial.190
In Katanga and Chui the TC stated that the Chamber’s power to order the Defence’s 
disclosure of “a document outlining the defences, as well as any information 
regarding the identification of Defence witnesses, their statements or summaries 
thereof” cannot be inferred from the provision of Rule 79.191 The Trial Chamber 
derived its power to require the Defence to communicate the statements given 
by witnesses it intended to call at trial to the parties and to the Chamber from 
Regulation 54 of the Regulations of the Court rather than from Rule 79(4). 
Rule 79 finds application predominantly before trial.192 The Single Judge in Lubanga 
seemed to share this view as she stated that “under Rules 79 and 80 the Defence 
has the right not to reveal before the confirmation hearing any of the defences on 
which it intends to rely at trial.”193
The Trial Chamber touched upon Defence’s disclosure on more than one occasion. 
As far as the confirmation hearing is concerned it is noteworthy that in Lubanga the 
Single Judge ordered the Defence to file the statements of the witnesses it intends to 
rely on at the confirmation hearing in the records of the case as soon as practicable 
after the Defence’s description of evidence has been filed.194 In Abu Garda the 
Defence was ordered by the Single Judge to submit to the PTC “information as 
to the proposed subject matter and scope of the prospective questioning of the 
witness”.195 The ratio behind it is that a failure to disclose such information prevents 
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the Chamber from properly exercising its power in relation to the relevance and 
admissibility of the evidence.196
Regarding the trial stage, if the Defence decides to rely on documents for questioning 
a (defence) witness it must make a list of those documents available to the Trial 
Chamber, the Prosecutor and the legal representatives, at least seven working 
days before the witness gives testimony.197 In Katanga and Chui the TC remarked 
that the Defence’s decision to challenge the testimony of a Prosecution witness by 
using evidence in the form of documents triggers an obligation to disclose those 
documents to the Prosecution in sufficient advance of the witness’ testimony.198
In relation to the necessity for the Defence to submit a list of its witnesses and 
an estimation of the length of their questioning it is important to note that two 
different approaches were adopted by Trial Chamber I and II. While the former 
only requested the communication of the identity of the Defence’s prospective 
witnesses after the Prosecutor has finished presenting his evidence199, the latter 
and more strict of the two requested that the Defence provide the identity of 
its witnesses, their anticipated order of appearance as well as the length of their 
questioning no later than two weeks before the start of the Defence’s case.200 In 
Bemba Trial Chamber III adopted the stricter approach.201
Concerning the issue of the disclosure of the Defence’s witness statements Trial 
Chamber I and II also adopted a (slightly) different approach. The TC I denied 
the Prosecutor’s request of disclosure of formal (defense) witness statements and 
limited its request to the disclosure of summaries of the witness statements.202 The 
TC II required the Defence to provide the statements given by witnesses it intended 
to call or a summary of the key elements of the testimony no later than two weeks 
before the beginning of the Defence’s case.203 In other words, the disclosure of 
full witness statements by the Defence was denied by Trial Chamber I and made 
possible but not mandatory by Trial Chamber II. In Bemba the Trial Chamber III 
adopted the TC II approach.204 In this case the Trial Chamber also specified that 
if the Defence chose to opt for the disclosure of summaries (instead of the full 
witness statements) such summaries should contain, inter alia, basic identifying 
information such as the witness’ name, date and place of birth and aliases as well 
as the issues upon which he or she is expected to testify and the relation of those 
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issues with the charges.205
No differences among the three Trial Chambers arise in relation to the request that 
the Defence submit, no later than two weeks before it starts the presentation of 
its evidence, a document outlining the factual and legal issues it intends to raise 
in the presentation of its evidence.206 This request aims to, among other things, 
provide the Prosecutor “with the context in which to prepare its questioning of the 
Defence’s witnesses increasing the efficiency of the procedures as a whole”.207
It can be concluded that, regardless of the limited disclosure obligations placed 
on the Defence’ shoulders by the ICC legal instruments, the proactive role played 
by the judicial organs may broaden their scope. However, in the light of the above 
it stands to reason to advocate an intervention by the Appeals Chamber in order 
to harmonise the different practices emerging from the jurisprudence of the Trial 
Chambers in relation to the disclosure of the list of the Defence’s witnesses as well 
as disclosure of their statements.
 2.6 The Role of the Pre-Trial and Trial Chamber in the disclosure process 
The Pre-Trial Chamber plays an active role in regulating and monitoring the 
disclosure process for the purpose of preparing the confirmation hearing.208 The 
Trial Chamber enjoys the same powers and authority in relation to the trial stage.209 
This subsection tries to describe the main implications of the Chambers’ powers in 
the ICC proceedings’ system of disclosure.
It is noteworthy that the PTC may also play an active role during the investigations 
and this action may have effects on the disclosure of evidence which will follow at 
a later stage of the proceedings. For instance, we have seen how the entitlement 
to disclosure of the material submitted to support a request for an arrest warrant 
was developed through the jurisprudence of the Pre-Trial Chamber. Moreover, 
in the course of the investigations the PTC may adopt the necessary measures to 
“preserve evidence that it deems would be essential for the Defence at trial” when 
it believes that the Prosecutor failed to do so.210
The Pre-Trial Chamber may issue orders regarding the disclosure of information 
for the purposes of the confirmation hearing.211 Furthermore, the Rome Statute 
envisages the Trial Chamber as having the authority to request the production of any 
evidence it considers necessary for the finding of the truth.212 It is noteworthy that 
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the submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the determination of 
the truth” applies to different stages of the proceedings including the confirmation 
hearing.213 It further clarified that the application of such power is restricted by the 
scope of the confirmation hearing.214 
Once the case has been committed to trial and a Trial Chamber has been 
assigned the case it shall, according to Article 64(3)(c), provide for the disclosure 
of documents or information not previously disclosed, in sufficient advance of 
the commencement of the trial to enable adequate preparation for trial.215 This 
provision is subject to any other provision of the Statute (e.g. restriction on 
disclosure). Moreover, pursuant to Article 64(6)(d) the Trial Chamber may order 
the production of evidence in addition to that already collected prior to the trial or 
presented during the trial by the parties.216
Regulation 54 of the Regulations of the Court states that in preparation for 
trial (at a status conference) the Trial Chamber may issue orders on, inter alia, 
“the production and disclosure of the statements of the witnesses on which the 
participants propose to rely” and “the disclosure of evidence”.217 Pursuant to this 
regulation, the Trial Chamber in Katanga and Chui ordered the Defence to provide 
the Prosecutor, the co-accused, the Legal Representatives of the Victims and the 
Chamber with, inter alia, “the statements of the witnesses whom it intends to call 
to testify, or a summary of the key elements that each witness will address during 
his or her testimony”.218
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence further clarify the Chambers’ involvement in 
the disclosure procedures, both prior to the confirmation hearing and before the 
trial, in different ways.
Rule 84 which is headed “disclosure of additional evidence for trial” confers the 
power to make any orders necessary for the disclosure of documents or information 
not previously disclosed and for the production of additional evidence to the Trial 
Chamber which it does with the aim of assisting the parties in their preparation for 
the trial and in order to facilitate the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings. 
Strict deadlines should characterise such orders in order to avoid delay.219 
Some of the ICC judges have interpreted their powers as encompassing a certain 
degree of freedom to intervene in the managing of the disclosure procedure 
with the greater aim of the fairness and expeditiousness of the proceedings 
in mind. For instance, for the purposes of the confirmation hearing the Pre-
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Trial Chamber instructed the Prosecutor to file the so-called “disclosure notes” 
(referring to exchanges under Article 67(2)) and “inspection reports” (referring to 
material inspected by the Defence under Rule 77) in the record of the inter partes 
exchange.220 The aim of this filing is to assist the Registry in creating and keeping 
a record of the pre-trial proceedings ensuring legal certainty as to which materials 
have been exchanged between the parties.221 In order to facilitate the assessment 
of the exculpatory material disclosed by the Defence the Prosecutor was ordered 
to include a concise summary of the content of each item and an explanation of 
the relevance (as potentially exculpatory) of such item in the “disclosure note”.222 
In the same decision, establishing a disclosure system and a disclosure calendar, 
specific deadlines were issued by the Single Judge for the Prosecutor to comply with 
his disclosure obligations for the purposes of the confirmation hearing even if at 
the time the decision was issued the date for the confirmation hearing had not yet 
been set.223
Moreover in Bemba, noting that Mr. Bemba was believed to be a national of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) and that the Prosecutor had conducted 
investigation into the DRC situation since June 2004, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
ordered the Prosecutor to inform the PTC and the Defence within five days on 
whether his ongoing search for potentially exculpatory materials that could fall 
under Article 67(2) of the Statute encompasses the DRC documents already in his 
possession and control.224
Another concrete application of the Pre-trial Chamber’s important role in 
safeguarding the suspect’s rights as well as ensuring that disclosure takes place 
under satisfactory conditions could be seen in the Bemba case where the Pre-
Trial Chamber postponed the date of the confirmation hearing noting “with 
astonishment” that the Prosecutor had not discharged his disclosure obligations 
“correctly, fully and diligently”.225 Specifically, the Prosecutor’s shortcomings 
concerned the inclusion of some additional witnesses in the description of evidence 
he intended to rely on at the confirmation hearing whose identity had not been 
disclosed to the Defence.226 
 2.7 The record of the proceedings 
A peculiarity of the ICC criminal procedure is the Registry’s duty to create and 
maintain a full and accurate record of all proceedings before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber. The record includes all documents and material disclosed between the 
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parties and communicated to the Chamber. We have previously discussed the 
different interpretations which have been given to the term “all evidence” and 
the consequent implications for the communication to the PTC of the material 
exchanged between the parties. This subsection scrutinises the relevant provisions 
concerning the creation of a record of the pre-trial proceedings dwelling on the 
ambiguous formulation adopted by the Rules which do not clarify whether the 
Trial Chambers should have access to the pre-trial records.   
Rule 121(10) – Proceedings before the confirmation hearing:
 
The Registry shall create and maintain a full and accurate record of all proceedings before 
the Pre-Trial Chamber, including all documents transmitted to the Chamber pursuant 
to this rule. Subject to any restrictions concerning confidentiality and the protection of 
national security information, the record may be consulted by the Prosecutor, the person 
and victims or their legal representatives…
Rule 130 – Constitution of the Trial Chamber:
When the Presidency constitutes a Trial Chamber and refers the case to it, the Presidency 
shall transmit the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber and the record of the proceedings to 
the Trial Chamber. The Presidency may also refer the case to a previously constituted Trial 
Chamber.
Rule 131(2) – Record of the Proceedings transmitted by the Pre-Trial Chamber:
Subject to any restrictions concerning confidentiality and the protection of national 
security information, the record may be consulted by the Prosecutor, the defence, the 
representatives of States when they participate in the proceedings, and the victims or their 
legal representatives participating in the proceedings…
Granting the Pre-Trial Chamber access to the records of the pre-trial proceedings 
did not give rise to heated discussions during the negotiations of the Rome Statute 
and all the delegations agreed that evidence disclosed inter partes should be 
disclosed to the PTC.227 Also the common law lawyers felt at ease with this system 
in the light of the fact that the Pre-Trial Chamber is not called upon to decide on 
the merits of the case.228 The purpose of the PTC’s access to the records is to enable 
it to make informed decisions and to issue the necessary orders for disclosure and 
for the production of additional evidence.229
The Trial Chamber’s access to the Pre-Trial records was a more problematic issue. 
Also controversial was whether evidence disclosed inter partes following the 
confirmation hearing should also be communicated to the Trial Chamber and 
therefore whether the pre-trial record should be updated following disclosure. On 
these issues a civil law – common law contrast became clear.230 This is unsurprising 
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considering the opposite view the two legal traditions hold on these matters. The 
inquisitorial systems consider the Trial Chamber being informed of the case before 
the beginning of the trial normal. This is so in the light of the powers granted to the 
judges to run the trial and it would defeat their purposes if the bench had no prior 
knowledge of the case. On the contrary, the adversarial systems envisage the judge 
as an impartial umpire in a party-led trial. Such a construction would be affected if 
the judge would have to know details of the case before its commencement. 
The contrast led to a “constructively ambiguous” result in the sense that no clear 
answer was given to the question.  This becomes evident through the combined 
reading of Rules 130 and 131(2). While the former rule stipulates that the Presidency 
must transmit the record of the pre-trial proceedings to the Trial Chamber, Rule 
131(2) states that the record (subject to the restriction concerning confidentiality 
and the protection of national security information) may be consulted by the 
Prosecutor, the Defence, the representative of States and the victims or their legal 
representatives (when they participate in the proceedings). It does not mention 
the Trial Chamber among the subjects entitled to have access to the record of the 
case. While this might be superfluous from a civil law perspective it is not so from 
common law.
In Lubanga the Trial Chamber considered that evidence cannot be introduced 
automatically into the trial process simply by virtue of having been included in 
the list of evidence admitted by the Pre-Trial Chamber, but instead it must be 
introduced, if necessary, de novo.231 It further stated that as a consequence the 
record of the pre-trial proceedings (and all the evidence admitted for that purpose) 
transmitted to the Trial Chamber by virtue of Rule 130 is available mainly to be used 
as a “tool” to help with preparation and the progress of the case. No disagreement 
on this position had been expressed by the parties in their submissions. In Katanga 
and Chui the Trial Chamber had access to the record of the pre-trial proceedings 
including all the evidence that was submitted during these proceedings.232
In the light of the above the Trial Chambers appear inclined to claim access to the 
records of the pre-trial proceedings in order to have some knowledge of the case to 
make full use of the powers that the Statute and the RPE grant to it in the managing 
of the trial. On the other hand, it is clear that the evidence must be submitted at 
trial de novo and the records can be useful for this purpose.
 2.8 Limitations on disclosure
This subsection discusses the provisions of the ICC Statute and RPE regulating the 
restrictions on the disclosure of information as well as the main features of their 
practical application by the ICC Chambers with particular attention paid to the tension 
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that exists between the interest in confidentiality and the accused’s right to disclosure. 
The ICC procedural framework allows restrictions on disclosure on grounds similar to 
the ones envisaged by the ICTY procedure, such as safeguarding ongoing investigation, 
ensuring the confidentiality of information and protecting the safety of witnesses.
Restrictions may be applicable to disclosure which occurs before the confirmation 
hearing as well as to disclosure which takes place in preparation for the trial.233 The 
Chambers must fully justify their decision to authorise restrictions on disclosure 
giving full explanation of the overall reasons underlying their decision.234
  2.8.1 Rule 81: Restrictions on disclosure
Rule 81 sets the general process for the restrictions on disclosure and covers different 
cases in which such restrictions may be requested. Rule 81 makes reference to 
several provisions of the Statute which, for the sake of brevity, will not be addressed 
in depth. As for the provisions analysed so far, the ICC’s jurisprudence has made 
a significant contribution in developing the application of the restrictions on 
disclosure. An account of the main principles elaborated by this jurisprudence is 
given in this subsection.
Rule 81 reads as follows: 
1. Reports, memoranda or other internal documents prepared by a party, its assistants or 
representatives in connection with the investigation or preparation of the case are not 
subject to disclosure. 
2. Where material or information is in the possession or control of the Prosecutor which 
must be disclosed in accordance with the Statute, but disclosure may prejudice further or 
ongoing investigations, the Prosecutor may apply to the Chamber dealing with the matter 
for a ruling as to whether the material or information must be disclosed to the defence. The 
matter shall be heard on an ex parte basis by the Chamber. However, the Prosecutor may 
not introduce such material or information into evidence during the confirmation hearing 
or the trial without adequate prior disclosure to the accused. 
3. Where steps have been taken to ensure the confidentiality of information, in accordance 
with articles 54, 57, 64, 72 and 93, and, in accordance with article 68, to protect the safety 
of witnesses and victims and members of their families, such information shall not be 
disclosed, except in accordance with those articles. When the disclosure of such information 
may create a risk to the safety of the witness, the Court shall take measures to inform the 
witness in advance. 
4. The Chamber dealing with the matter shall, on its own motion or at the request of the 
Prosecutor, the accused or any State, take the necessary steps to ensure the confidentiality 
of information, in accordance with articles 54, 72 and 93, and, in accordance with article 
68, to protect the safety of witnesses and victims and members of their families, including 
by authorizing the non-disclosure of their identity prior to the commencement of the trial. 
5. Where material or information is in the possession or control of the Prosecutor which 
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is withheld under article 68, paragraph 5, such material and information may not be 
subsequently introduced into evidence during the confirmation hearing or the trial without 
adequate prior disclosure to the accused. 
6. Where material or information is in the possession or control of the defence which is 
subject to disclosure, it may be withheld in circumstances similar to those which would allow 
the Prosecutor to rely on article 68, paragraph 5, and a summary thereof submitted instead. 
Such material and information may not be subsequently introduced into evidence during 
the confirmation hearing or the trial without adequate prior disclosure to the Prosecutor.
Rule 81(1) resembles Rule 70(A) of the ICTY RPE as it states that memoranda or 
internal documents prepared by the parties are not subject to disclosure.
Rule 81(2) which is based on Rule 66(C) of the ICTY Rules of procedure and 
evidence, regulates the situation where the Prosecutor is in possession of evidence 
which should be disclosed to the Defence but whose disclosure could compromise 
the effectiveness of the ongoing investigation. Where this is the case the Prosecutor 
may apply, on an ex parte basis, to the Chamber for a ruling on whether the material 
should be disclosed to the Defence.235 The safeguard for the defendant is that the 
material or information not disclosed cannot be introduced as evidence without 
prior disclosure to the Defence.236 Furthermore, the Chamber’s assessment of the 
material whose non-disclosure is sought monitors the Prosecutor’s discretion 
which therefore does not remain unchecked.237
Rule 81 (3) and (4) deals with the situations where pursuant to several Articles 
of the Statute (Article 54, 68, 72 and 93) steps have been taken to ensure the 
confidentiality of information and to protect (pursuant to Article 68) the safety 
of witnesses and victims. In these cases the particular information must not be 
disclosed if it is not in accordance with the procedure envisaged in the Statute. 
As far as the protection of witnesses is concerned Article 68 of the Rome Statute 
stipulates that where the disclosure of evidence or information may lead to the grave 
endangerment of the security of a witness or his family the Prosecutor may disclose 
summaries of such evidence or information. However, this measure should not be 
exercised to the detriment of the accused’s rights and the fairness and impartiality 
of the trial.238 Rule 81(5) stipulates that material or information withheld pursuant 
Article 68(5) cannot be turned into evidence by the Prosecutor without prior 
disclosure to the Defence. Rule 81(6) envisages the same for the Defence, which can 
submit a summary of the relevant information when its disclosure may endanger 
the security of the witnesses or their family. The same limitation applies to the 
Defence as the information withheld cannot be introduced as evidence without 
prior disclosure to the Prosecution.239
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When the disclosure of confidential information may create a risk to the safety 
of the witness the Court must take steps to inform the witness in advance of the 
upcoming disclosure. The introduction of this safeguard will grant the witness the 
possibility to apply to the Chamber seeking to maintain confidentiality. Moreover, 
it will put the witnesses in the position to adopt additional security measures.240
The Appeals Chamber in the Katanga case241 underlined that, when seeking 
redactions pursuant to Rule 81(4), the Prosecutor may only redact information 
from material and evidence that it must disclose to the Defence after obtaining 
authorisation from the competent Chamber.242 It further noted that when 
the redaction sought would involve withholding exculpatory information, or 
would result in “a manifest inequality of arms, with little, if any prospect for fair 
proceedings” the Chamber would, no doubt, reject the application.  However, the 
Appeals Chamber noted that this is a question of assessing the facts of an individual 
case rather than ruling out the possibility of redactions to protect people at risk 
being granted, in principle, in carefully defined circumstances”.243
Interestingly enough, the ICC Appeals Chamber adopted a broad interpretation of 
the provision in question insofar as it ordered the non-disclosure of the identities 
of “third innocent parties” who may be endangered by the disclosure of such 
information. The aim of Rule 81(4) is “to secure protection of individuals at risk” 
and therefore the provision must be interpreted as also granting protection to 
persons other than the witnesses, victims and their families (explicitly mentioned 
in the Rule).244 Rule 81(4) “should be read to include the words “persons at risk 
on account of the activities of the Court”.245 This finding was circumscribed to the 
confirmation hearing stage and the Appeals Chamber conceded that it might have 
reached a different conclusion at the trial stage. It stated that “it may be permissible 
to withhold the disclosure of certain information from the Defence prior to the 
hearing to confirm the charges that could not be withheld prior to trial”.246 However, 
in Lubanga the Trial Chamber cited the Appeals Chamber Judgement and stated 
that the principles which were set therein are of high value also to proceedings 
before the Trial Chamber.247
The different stages of the proceedings can indeed confer differing weights 
to the competing interests (right to disclosure v. confidentiality, safeguard of 
ongoing investigation or witness and victims protection) in the eyes of the 
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judges. In other words, restrictions which may be acceptable at an early stage of 
the proceedings may be denied at the trial where the right of the accused to have 
knowledge of the relevant evidence or information is reinforced. For instance 
in Abu Garda while granting the non-disclosure to the suspect of the names 
of the OTP investigators the Single Judge confined the restriction to the stage 
of the proceedings where investigations were still underway “in regions that 
are facing ongoing armed conflicts”.248  At that stage the interest in controlling 
crime appears to have a high priority when assessing the necessity of granting 
restrictions on disclosure. 249
In Lubanga the Appeals Chamber accepted that for the purposes of the 
confirmation hearing the Prosecutor may use unredacted witness statements and 
other documents even when the Defence has only had the redacted version of the 
material disclosed to it pursuant to Rule 81(2).250 However it clarified that “non-
disclosure to the person in respect of whom a confirmation hearing is held of the 
identity of the witnesses on whom the Prosecutor intends to rely at the confirmation 
hearing or portions of prior statements made by these witnesses is an exception to 
the general rule that the identity of such witnesses and their prior statements are 
to be disclosed”.251
In assessing a request for non-disclosure of the identity of witnesses a Chamber 
must address several factors such as the danger that the disclosure of the identity of 
that person may cause; the necessity of the protective measure, including whether 
it is the least intrusive measure necessary to protect the person concerned; and the 
fact that any protective measures taken must not prejudice or be inconsistent with 
the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.252 In Abu Garda the Single 
Judge authorised the non-disclosure of the name of the OTP investigators during 
the investigations considering, inter alia, that at that stage of the proceedings, it is 
“the less intrusive protective measure available, and that it does not collide with the 
rights of the suspect to a fair trial”.253
  2.8.2 Article 54(3)(e) and Rule 82
Article 54(3)(e) and Rule 82 must be read together as they deal specifically with 
a complex and controversial issue; namely the restriction on the disclosure of 
exculpatory material gathered by the Prosecutor through confidential agreements 
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with a third party. This scenario puts the Prosecutor in a difficult position where 
he faces the tension between the duty to preserve the confidentiality of the 
material obtained and the obligation to disclose exculpatory material to the 
Defence. This subsection assesses the relevant provisions and discusses their 
judicial interpretation in cases where this tension jeopardises the fairness of the 
proceedings with particular reference to the Lubanga case.
Article 54(3)(e) – The Prosecutor’s duties and powers with respect to investigations 
– reads as follows:
The Prosecutor may: (e) Agree not to disclose, at any stage of the proceedings, 
documents or information that the Prosecutor obtains on the condition of 
confidentiality and solely for the purpose of generating new evidence, unless the 
provider of the information consents;
Rule 82 – Restrictions on the disclosure of material and information protected 
under article 54(3)(e) – reads as follows:
1. Where material or information is in the possession or control of the Prosecutor which is 
protected under article 54, paragraph 3 (e), the Prosecutor may not subsequently introduce 
such material or information into evidence without the prior consent of the provider of the 
material or information and adequate prior disclosure to the accused. 
2. If the Prosecutor introduces material or information protected under article 54, paragraph 
3 (e), into evidence, a Chamber may not order the production of additional evidence received 
from the provider of the initial material or information, nor may a Chamber for the purpose 
of obtaining such additional evidence itself summon the provider or a representative of the 
provider as a witness or order their attendance. 
3. If the Prosecutor calls a witness to introduce in evidence any material or information 
which has been protected under article 54, paragraph 3 (e), a Chamber may not compel that 
witness to answer any question relating to the material or information or its origin, if the 
witness declines to answer on grounds of confidentiality. 
4. The right of the accused to challenge evidence which has been protected under article 
54, paragraph 3 (e), shall remain unaffected subject only to the limitations contained in 
sub-rules 2 and 3. 
5. A Chamber dealing with the matter may order, upon application by the defence, that, in 
the interests of justice, material or information in the possession of the accused, which has 
been provided to the accused under the same conditions as set forth in article 54, paragraph 
3 (e), and which is to be introduced into evidence, shall be subject mutatis mutandis to sub-
rules 1, 2 and 3.
Article 54(3)(e) regulates the possibility “in highly restricted circumstances”254 for 
the Prosecutor to enter into non-disclosure agreements with third parties willing 
to provide documents or information on a confidential basis throughout the 
investigation. The material must be received for the sole purpose of leading to other 
evidence. This provision is strikingly similar to Rule 70 (B)-(F) of the ICTY RPE.255 
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Also the ratio underling this provision is the same of that in ICTY Rule 70, namely 
that the effectiveness of the Prosecutor’s investigations is highly dependent on the 
cooperation of States who will be more inclined to assist when the information 
they provide remains confidential.  
 
Rule 82 underpins Article 54(3)(e) insofar as it establishes several safeguards for 
the Defence and the provider of confidential material or information in relation 
to the use that the Prosecutor is allowed to make of such material as well as 
regarding the Chamber’s authority vis à vis the provider and the witnesses linked 
to the material in question. Specifically, material or information gathered by the 
Prosecutor through a confidentiality agreement under Article 54(3)(e) of the 
Statute cannot be introduced into evidence without the previous consent of the 
provider and adequate disclosure to the Defence.256 Once the confidential material 
or information has been introduced into evidence the Trial Chamber cannot order 
the production of additional evidence obtained from the provider nor summon 
the latter for the purpose of obtaining such additional evidence.257 Furthermore, 
when Article 54(3)(e) material is turned into evidence through the testimony of a 
witness the Chamber cannot compel the witness to answer a question related to the 
confidential material or its origin if the witness declines to answer on grounds of 
confidentiality.258 In other words, the provider remains the owner of the evidence 
given to the Prosecutor and its consent is a condicio sine qua non for its disclosure. 
The Chamber cannot order the production of evidence other than that for which 
consent to disclosure has been given.  
The accused’s right to challenge the evidence protected under Article 54(3)(e) 
remains “unaffected”.259 The provisions of Rule 82 are applicable mutatis mutandis 
to the Defence. However, this application must be ordered by the Chamber upon a 
request by the Defence.260 
Gathering material under an Article 54(3)(e) agreement can provide the Prosecutor 
with material or information whose exculpatory nature triggers his duty to disclose 
to the Defence. However, at that point it is not for the Prosecutor to make such a 
decision as it is the provider who has the last word in relation to disclosure. The 
tension between the confidentiality agreements and the Prosecutor’s obligation 
to disclose exculpatory material in his possession is striking. The Prosecution 
indeed faces uncertainty as to whether the provider will give the requested consent 
whenever it has a document pursuant to article 54(3)(e) of the Statute.261
In sum, “by accepting material on the condition of confidentiality, the Prosecutor 
potentially puts himself in a position where he either does not disclose material 
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that he normally would have to disclose or breaches a confidentiality agreement 
entered into with the provider of the material in question”.262 Moreover, an 
agreement concluded under Article 54(3)(e) with a provider of information can 
put the Prosecutor in a difficult position vis à vis the Chamber when the provider 
declines to give its consent to the disclosure of relevant material to the Chamber 
intending assess the exculpatory nature of such material. 
In Lubanga, the Prosecutor made extensive use of confidential agreements to 
gather evidence during the investigation. As a result, the Prosecution had a 
significant number of documents of an exculpatory nature (or material to the 
Defence preparation) in its possession, which it was unable to disclose to either 
the Defence or the Chamber. The Trial Chamber found that the Prosecutor had 
routintely utilised the provision of Article 54(3)(e) in order to obtain a “wide range of 
material under the cloak of confidentiality” for the purpose of identifying evidence 
that could be used at trial after having secured the provider’s consent.263 The TC 
remarked that this was the “exact opposite of the proper use of the provision” and 
amounted to a “wholesale and serious abuse”. 264
Article 18(3) of the agreement concluded by the Prosecutor with the United Nations 
(one of the providers) stipulated that the Prosecutor was prevented from disclosing 
material or information obtained under Article 54(3)(e) to the Defence as well as 
to “other organs of the Court or to third parties, at any stage of the proceedings or 
thereafter without the consent of the United Nations”.265
The TC remarked that if the Prosecutor is unable to disclose exculpatory evidence 
covered by a confidentiality agreement the issue should always be raised with the 
Chamber.266 It is indeed for the Chamber and not for the Prosecutor to decide upon 
the impact of potentially exculpatory evidence on the Chamber’s determination 
of the guilt or innocence of the accused.267 The Trial Chamber concluded that the 
trial process had been “ruptured to such a degree” that it was “impossible to piece 
together the constituent elements of a fair trial”.268 It therefore ordered, with great 
reluctance, a stay in the proceedings which was later confirmed by the Appeals 
Chamber.269 The stay was eventually lifted by the TC on 18 November 2008 after 
it had been afforded unrestricted access to the documentation covered by Article 
54(3)(e).270 The trial commenced on 26 January 2009.
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Similarly, albeit in relation to pre-confirmation hearing disclosure, the Single Judge 
in Katanga was highly perturbed by, inter alia, “the Prosecution’s underestimation 
of the serious problems posed by its reckless practice of extensively gathering 
documents pursuant to article 54(3)(e) of the Statute during the first two years of 
the investigation” as well as by the Prosecutor’s disregard of the deadlines for the 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence under Article 67(2) of the Statute.271 However, 
the Single Judge considered that the prejudice caused by the Prosecutor’s late 
disclosure had been cured by granting the Defence sufficient time to review the 
newly disclosed documents and to decide whether or not they wished to rely on 
them for the purposes of the confirmation hearing.272
In relation to material obtained by the Prosecutor through Article 54(3)(e) 
agreements the Chamber’s authority is limited as it cannot order the production 
of such material without the provider’s consent. If the consent is not given the 
Chamber must ask itself the question of whether the accused’s rights and the 
fairness of the trial can be preserved through the adoption of a counter-balancing 
measure and in that case it must identify the appropriate one. In Lubanga, the TC 
answered the question in the negative whereas in Katanga and Chui the PTC found 
that additional time was able to remedy the prejudice caused to the Defence by the 
Prosecutor’s untimely disclosure. The Appeals Chamber stated that, especially in 
circumstances where only a small number of documents are concerned, appropriate 
counter-balancing measures may include identifying new similar exculpatory 
material, providing the material in summarised form, stipulating the relevant 
facts, or amending or withdrawing the charges.273
At the basis of these two cases there was the Prosecutor’s extensive and distorted 
use of the confidentiality agreement regulated by Article 54(3)(e) for the purpose 
of gathering direct evidence rather than lead evidence. This is certainly true. 
However, even when the provision in question is interpreted and used correctly 
by the Prosecutor frictions between the rights of the Defence to disclosure of 
potentially exculpatory material and the interest of the provider in confidentiality 
may arise as also lead evidence can be exculpatory in nature and therefore subject 
to disclosure to the Defence.  
 2.9 Remedies and sanctions for disclosure violations
This subsection attempts to assess the possible responses to violations of disclosure 
obligations envisaged by the ICC criminal procedure. It shows how the adoption 
of such responses rather than being codified has been left to the discretion of the 
Chambers whose role is crucial in relation to this issue. Particular attention is 
Chapter 7
_______________________ 
271 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the 19 June 2008 Prosecution 
Information and other Matters concerning Articles 54 (3)(e) and 67 (2) of the Statute and rule 77 of the Rules, 25 June 
2008, para. 21. 
272 Ibid. at p. 15. 
273 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, AC, Judgement on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the 
decision of Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered 
by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other 
issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008”, 21 October 2008, paragraphs 28 and 44.
283 284
devoted to a stay of in proceedings as a possible remedy and its operation in the 
jurisprudence of the Court.
Article 21(3) of the Statute stipulates that the law applicable under the Statute must 
be interpreted as well as applied in accordance with internationally recognised 
human rights.274 The Appeals Chamber stated that every aspect of human rights 
underpins the Statute. It stands to reason that disclosure as part of the right to a 
fair trial, which is one of the most prominent human rights, must be respected in 
the interpretation and application of the Statute of the ICC. When the fairness of 
the trial is affected a remedy must be taken. The appropriateness of the remedy 
depends on the level to which the right to a fair trial is affected. 
The ICC’s judicial system does not explicitly provide for remedies or sanctions for 
non-disclosure. Only Rule 122(8), in relation to disclosure in preparation for the 
confirmation hearing, stipulates  that the Pre-Trial Chamber does not take charges 
and evidence presented after the time limit has expired into consideration.275 Article 
69(7)(b) of the Rome Statute provides the Court with the power to exclude evidence 
obtained in violation of internationally recognised human rights standards. 
According to Article 71 of the ICC Statute, the Court may sanction persons acting 
before it who commit misconduct, including disruption of its proceedings or 
deliberate refusal to comply with its directions.276 However, such provisions may 
not be sufficient or appropriate to tackle all kinds of infringements of, inter alia, the 
obligation to disclose exculpatory material under Article 67 of the Statute or more 
in general of the rights of the accused found therein.277
As discussed the necessity of a remedy or a counter-balancing measure may arise as 
a consequence of the Prosecutor being unable to disclose documents or information 
to the Defence, obtained on a confidential basis under Article 54(3)(e), which are 
potentially exculpatory or relevant to the Defence’s preparations. In this context it is 
noted that neither the Rome Statute nor the Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides 
for a “stay of proceedings” before the Court. However, the ICC derived this possibility 
from its inherent powers. The Appeals Chamber stressed that “where fair trial becomes 
impossible because of breaches of the fundamental rights of the suspect or the accused 
by his/her accusers, it would be a contradiction in terms to put the person on trial. 
Justice could not be done. A fair trial is the only means to do justice. If no fair trial can 
be held, the object of the judicial process is frustrated and must be stopped”.278
Moreover, “where the breaches of the rights of the accused are such as to make it 
impossible for him/her to make his/her defence within the framework of his rights, 
no fair trial can take place and the proceedings can be stayed. Unfairness in the 
treatment of the suspect or the accused may rupture the process to an extent making 
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it impossible to piece together the constituent elements of a fair trial. In those 
circumstances, the interest of the world community to put persons accused of the 
most heinous crimes against humanity on trial, great as it is, is outweighed by the 
need to sustain the efficacy of the judicial process as the potent agent of justice”.279 
However, before resorting to the drastic remedy of a stay in proceedings a Trial 
Chamber must first use tools within the trial process itself, to cure underlying 
obstacles to a fair trial and to allow the trial to proceed speedily to a conclusion 
on its merits.280 Only when the Chamber considers that a fair trial has become 
irreparably impossible is the resort to a stay in proceedings appropriate. In reaching 
this conclusion the Chamber enjoys a certain margin of appreciation based on 
its “intimate understanding of the process”.281 The Appeals Chamber noted that 
the stay of the proceedings is the necessary remedy only if (i) the “essential 
preconditions of a fair trial are missing” and (ii) there is “no sufficient indication 
that this will be resolved during the trial process”.282 When the unfairness of a trial 
is of such a nature that the trial will become impossible to conduct fairly at a later 
stage (because of a change in the situation that led to the stay in proceedings) a 
conditional stay in the proceedings may be imposed as it can be lifted should the 
reasons for its imposition cease to exist.283
In the Lubanga case the Prosecutor had admitted in open court that confidential 
agreements with third parties had been used to gather the majority of the evidence 
to back up his case rather than using these agreements for the sole purpose of 
generating new evidence. He was therefore in the problematic position of being 
unable to disclose potentially exculpatory material to the Defence nor to the 
Chamber. The Trial Chamber concluded that there was no prospect of a fair trial 
and ordered a stay in the proceedings. 
Upon appeal the Appeals Chamber noted that the TC, before ordering a stay in the 
proceedings, had explored options, which had not been successful such as ordering 
the submission of summaries or providing an undertaking that it would not disclose 
the material without the consent of the providers.284 The Appeals Chamber, which 
confirmed the stay in proceedings, noted that if the trial had taken place despite 
the Prosecution’s non-disclosure “there would always have been a lurking doubt as 
to whether the disclosure of the documents in question would have changed the 
course of the trial”.285
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Another remedy was considered in Banda and Jerbo where the Trial Chamber 
was provided with documents and information obtained by the Prosecution 
pursuant to Article 54(3)(e) which were potentially exculpatory and relevant to the 
Defence’s preparations. In relation to confidential documents which the Chamber 
found relevant for the Defence’s preparation it considered that the Prosecutor’s 
admissions of fact, together with the summaries and the alternative evidence 
were sufficient counter-balancing measures in the sense that they ensured that 
the rights of the accused persons were protected at this stage of the proceedings. 
The Trial Chamber stated that after reviewing these documents it believed that, 
taken together, they captured the essence of the original documents and offered a 
sufficient counterbalance to non-disclosure.286
The Trial Chamber also assessed two undisclosed and potentially exculpatory 
documents (whose content was not made public) and found that the admission of 
facts proposed by the Prosecutor along with the alternative evidence represented 
a sufficient counterbalance. The concession was sufficiently broad in scope and, 
together with the alternative evidence, covered the essential elements contained 
in the confidential documents. The Trial Chamber emphasised that the Defence 
should be able to rely on this admission from the Prosecution rather than having 
to seek to establish the facts through the unavailable material.287 In this case the 
Defence is put in a more favourable position regarding evidence than it otherwise 
would have been even though the admission is not binding on the Chamber. 
3. Critical aspects of the ICC disclosure process
 3.1 The role of the Prosecutor and his disclosure obligations 
We have discussed in the previous chapter that the ICTY Prosecutor is a sui generis 
figure expected to prosecute in an adversarial context as well as acting as a super 
partes entity of inquisitorial origin at the same time. We have also seen that the 
Prosecutor appears to struggle to reconcile these two characteristics “assumed to 
be achievable”288 and that the disclosure of information is one of the ambits in 
which such difficulties appear more evident.
The analysis of the role of the Prosecutor in the ICC legal system showed certain 
differences with his ICTY counterpart. The most relevant and welcome of these 
differences is that pursuant to Article 54(1)(a) of the Rome Statute the Prosecutor is 
statute bound to investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally. 
This provision marks a significant change in the characterisation of the role of the 
Prosecutor and brings it closer to the inquisitorial legal tradition of an investigating 
judge. Moreover, this provision reinforces and grants authority to the concept of a 
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super partes Prosecutor acting as a Minister of Justice in the investigation stage. 
The ICTY’s jurisprudence developed this understanding of the Prosecutor making 
the role more inquisitorial than its adversarial beginnings. This course of action 
made it difficult for the Prosecutor to find the right balance. 
The ICC Prosecutor knew from the beginning that his role in the investigation 
was conceived as impartial and that he is required to assess a particular situation 
with the goal of discovering the truth rather than building up his case. This duty 
has implications in relation to the disclosure to the Defence. As noted by one 
commentator, the ICC Prosecutor is under the double obligation to investigate 
exculpatory material and to disclose it as soon as possible whereas at the ICTY he 
is subject only to the second.289
The Defence will benefit from the Prosecutor’s obligation to investigate exculpatory 
circumstances as it reinforces the meaning of Article 67(2) according to which 
the Prosecutor has to discover exculpatory material in his possession as soon as 
possible. There is a difference indeed between coming across exculpatory material 
during investigations whose aim is to mount a case against the suspect and being 
compelled to investigate these circumstances with the aim of discovering the truth. 
As far as the Prosecutor’s disclosure obligations are concerned they appear to be 
similar to those envisaged by the ICTY system. The major difference is given by the 
existence of two stages of disclosure in the ICC framework. The two stage structure 
originates from the establishment of a hearing to confirm the charges in which the 
Defence is allowed to participate and introduce evidence. 
We have discussed that the provisions regulating the disclosure process prior to 
the confirmation hearing have been interpreted differently by different Pre-Trial 
Chambers (bulk rule v. totality rule) and that such difference originates not only 
from a different reading of the provision but more profoundly from a different 
conception of the role of the PTC. This dichotomy calls for an intervention of the 
Appeals Chamber which should indicate the correct interpretation to be applied 
in all cases. 
On this point it is suggested that a difference should be drawn between inculpatory 
and exculpatory evidence for the purpose of disclosure and communication 
before the confirmation hearing. From the research conducted it appears that the 
difference in scope of the hearing to confirm the charges and the trial is clear as 
the former prevents unmeritorious cases from going to trial and the latter assesses 
the guilt or innocence of the accused. Consequently, it stands to reason to accept 
that there may also be a difference in the scope of the disclosure that takes place 
for the purposes of these two phases. It is also reasonable to limit the disclosure 
of inculpatory information as well as their communication to the PTC to those 
materials which the parties intend to rely on at the confirmation hearing. The 
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alternative option (full disclosure and communication) would transform the 
hearing into a “mini trial” which was not the drafters’ intention.
However, the conclusion is different in relation to the disclosure of exculpatory 
material. That is a continuous obligation that should take place “as soon as possible” 
regardless of the stage of the proceedings. The reading of Article 121(1) confirms 
this interpretation as it stipulates that a person subject to an arrest warrant or a 
summons to appear enjoys the rights envisaged by Article 67. Moreover, it is submitted 
that for the purposes of the confirmation hearing exculpatory material should be 
communicated to the Pre-Trial Chamber regardless of the parties’ intention to use 
it at the hearing. This approach would not go against the scope of the hearing as 
exculpatory material can only assist in the filtering function of this stage. 
Given these considerations it appears questionable to exclude this form of 
evidence from that which needs to be communicated to the PTC unless the parties 
intend to use it at the hearing.290 In Gbagbo the Single Judge considered that this 
approach is consistent with the limited scope of the confirmation hearing which 
is to assess whether there is sufficient evidence establishing substantial grounds 
to believe that the person committed each of the crimes charged. However, it is 
noted that exculpatory evidence can affect the strength of the Prosecutor’s charges 
and therefore its disclosure and communication remains within the limit of the 
confirmation hearing as it can counter the evidence produced by the Prosecutor to 
establish the “sufficient grounds”.
On this issue, the alternative view advocating the communication of all 
exculpatory evidence to the PTC prior to the confirmation hearing appears more 
convincing. Depriving the Pre-Trial Chamber of the possibility to see a piece of 
crucial exculpatory material could result in sending (and imprisoning) an innocent 
individual to trial.291
Even if exculpatory evidence is communicated to the PTC the latter must base its 
decision on the material presented at the hearing. Therefore, the communication 
would put the Chamber in the position of assessing the material and order its 
production pursuant to Article 69 (3) only when it considers it necessary.  In other 
words, it would allow the PTC to fully exercise its role as an arbiter of the exculpatory 
or incriminating nature of a piece of evidence as well as its function of filtering the 
Prosecutor’s cases and safeguarding the rights of the suspects. 
Summing up, it can be concluded that limiting the disclosure of incriminating 
material to the Defence and its communication to the PTC to the material which 
the Prosecutor intends to use at the confirmation hearing appears consistent with 
the particular purpose of that hearing. The same conclusion cannot be reached in 
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relation to exculpatory material whose disclosure prior the confirmation hearing 
appears to be in line with the scope of such a hearing and necessary to safeguard the 
rights of the suspect as well as to allow the PTC to effectively carry out its function. 
 3.2 Non-disclosure of exculpatory material obtained under Article 54(3)(e)
The combined reading of Article 67(2) and Rule 83 establishes a clear rule according 
to which the first assessment of the nature of the material in his possession is the 
responsibility of the Prosecutor who in case of doubt may turn to the Chambers 
for a ruling. It is noteworthy that this rule also applies to exculpatory material 
protected by confidentiality agreements under Article 54(3)(e). Even in relation to 
such material it is for the Chamber rather than the Prosecutor to assess whether the 
accused’s rights and the fairness of the trial can be preserved through the adoption 
of a counter-balancing measure where there has not been disclosure. 
Confidential agreements are essential for the effectiveness of the investigations. It 
is also self-evident that without the Prosecutor’s commitment to non-disclosure to 
the Defence the purpose of the provision of Article 54(3)(e) would be defeated. In 
Lubanga, asides from the misuse of this provision, the problem was caused by the 
Prosecution undertaking not to disclose the confidential material to “other organs 
of the Court” as well. While an agreement under Article 54(3)(e) not to disclose 
material obtained by a third party provider to the Defence is understandable as it 
lays at the basis of the provision itself, accepting the obligation to not disclose that 
material to the Chambers is problematic.
Given that the Prosecutor may not be in the position to know the exact nature of 
the material which the provider will serve on him in advance292, when negotiating 
an agreement under Article 54(3)(e) he should make sure that it contemplates 
the possibility for the Prosecutor to provide exculpatory material to the Chamber 
for its assessment under Rule 83. This clause would not defeat the purpose of 
the agreement as the providers’ interest in non-disclosure would be met by the 
Chamber’s inability293 to force the disclosure of the confidential material which 
would, therefore, remain unaffected. Moreover, the professionalism and discretion 
of the ICC judges, who would be bound not to reveal any information about the 
material received, should in itself a sufficient guarantee as to the maintenance of 
confidentiality of the material in question.294 
The ICC Appeals Chamber stated that whenever the Prosecutor relies on article 
54(3)(e) of the Statute he must bear in mind his obligations under the Statute and 
apply that provision in a manner that will allow the Court to resolve the potential 
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the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008”, 21 
October 2008, para. 44.
293 Envisaged by Rule 82.
294 However it is noted that in Lubanga the UN did not change their position after the TC gave an undertaking that it would 
not disclose the material without the consent of the providers.
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tension between the confidentiality to which the Prosecutor has agreed and the 
requirements of a fair trial.295 Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber was concerned 
that the Prosecutor agreed that he would not disclose the material even to the 
Chambers of the Court without the consent of those who provide the information.296 
It mentioned the possibility of other arrangements between the Prosecutor and 
the UN although it did not give any example.297 When material is offered to the 
Prosecutor on a confidential basis he must consider its expected content and nature 
and its relevance for the Defence. Against this background he will have to assess 
under what exact conditions he may accept the material in question particularly 
bearing in mind his obligation to disclose potentially exculpatory material under 
Article 67(2).298 
Interestingly, in Banda and Jerbo the Trial Chamber was presented with the 
documents obtained by the Prosecutor pursuant to Article 54(3)(e) and was able 
assess them and identify the appropriate counter balancing measures to be adopted 
in order to safeguard the accused’s right to a fair trial.299 Here the Chamber’s access 
to the confidential documents ensured the possibility of finding appropriate 
solutions to guarantee the accused’s right to a fair trial even when confronted 
with non-disclosure of potentially exculpatory material. The Trial Chamber kept 
monitoring the situation and was able to single out the counter-balancing measures 
that enabled the trial to continue. The absence of such judicial supervision might 
have led to the imposition of a stay in proceedings, which was indeed the measure 
sought by the Defence.
These cases seem to go in the direction proposed, namely towards the necessity of 
the involvement of the Chambers in the assessment of Article 54(3)(e) material. 
This result can only be achieved if the Prosecution’s obligation of non-disclosure 
(as a result of an agreement of confidence between the OTP and a provider of 
information) is not extended to the Chambers.
 3.3 Defence’s disclosure
The analysis carried out showed some improvements (in comparison to the ICTY) 
in the Defence’s position in relation to disclosure. For instance, in relation to 
the timing of the disclosure that the Defence receives from the Prosecution, the 
Defence whilst not having any disclosure obligations itself (unless it intends to 
present evidence) benefits from extensive disclosure from the Prosecutor as a result 
_______________________ 
295 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, AC, Judgement on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the 
decision of Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered 
by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other 
issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008”, 21 October 2008, para. 44.
296 Ibid. at para. 45.
297 The Appeals Chamber noted that the wording of the relevant part of the OTP-UN agreement stated that the Prosecutor 
“may agree” that the documents provided shall not be disclosed to other organs of the Court and therefore it left room 
for other arrangements between the Prosecutor and the UN. See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, 
AC, Judgement on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the conse-
quences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay 
the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008”, 21 
October 2008, para. 51.
298 Ibid. at para. 51.
299 Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, ICC-02/05-03/09, Decision on the 
defence request for a temporary stay of the proceedings, 26 October 2012.
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of the creation of the confirmation hearing. This in turn allows the Defence to 
have a clearer picture of the Prosecutor’s case at an earlier stage. Moreover, we have 
discussed the Pre-Trial Chamber’s monitoring function and specifically its power 
to step in should the Prosecutor miss a unique investigative opportunity capable of 
providing evidence relevant to the Defence’s case.
However, due to the similar nature of the provisions regulating the Defence’s 
disclosure in the ICC and in ICTY proceedings some of the concerns voiced in 
the former chapter also find application in relation to the ICC. For instance, in 
relation to the high threshold that the Defence appears to have to meet in order 
to be granted the disclosure of additional evidence by the Chambers. The reader is 
therefore redirected to the previous chapter for discussion on this issue. 
It is noteworthy that in the ICC’s judicial system the scope of the Defence’s disclosure 
both prior to the confirmation hearing and prior to the trial can be significantly 
broadened by intervention from the Chambers. We have seen that the Chambers 
have been willing to intervene in the Defence’s disclosure even beyond the limited 
obligations envisaged in order to facilitate the disclosure process and therefore 
expedite the trial. In decisions concerning Defence disclosure it is common for 
the TC to make reference to Rule 79(4) granting the Chambers the power to order 
the Defence to disclose any other evidence as well as to Regulation 54 of the Court 
empowering the Chambers to order the Defence to, amongst other things disclose 
the statements of the witnesses the accused intends to call. 
The crucial issue is finding the right balance between the interest in the expeditious 
management of the case and the Defence’s rights. We have seen that the Appeals 
Chamber, whilst acknowledging the accused’s privilege against self-incrimination 
and right to remain silent, explained that there are disclosure obligations that can 
be imposed on the Defence without infringing the accused’s rights to a fair trial. At 
all times the Chamber has an absolute duty to ensure that any discretionary order 
it makes regarding the Defence’s disclosure does not derogate from the accused’s 
right to a fair and impartial hearing in which his rights are fully safeguarded. 
While the imposition of further disclosure obligations may not infringe the suspect/
accused’s right to a fair trial it is contended that the Chambers should use their power 
carefully. For instance, when anticipated disclosure of the Defence’s strategy is likely to 
assist the Prosecutor in disclosing further exculpatory evidence. Other considerations 
such as the expeditiousness of the trial should not outweigh the suspect/accused’s rights. 
A different approach to the issue would risk reducing the difference in scope between 
the Prosecutor and the Defence’s disclosure which was intentionally established by the 
drafters as a tool to enhance the principle of the equality of arms otherwise affected by 
the structural imbalance existing between them. 
 3.4 The role of the Pre-Trial Chamber in the disclosure process 
The creation of the Pre-Trial Chambers is an interesting feature of the ICC legal 
system which has significant implications for the disclosure process. The ICC 
Chapter 7
291 292
seems to have learned from the ICTY insofar as its legal framework envisages a 
more active and earlier involvement from the judiciary in the organisation of the 
disclosure process. We have seen that the judicial management of the trial was 
found to be a necessary part of the procedure at the ICTY following its first few 
years of activity and it was achieved through significant amendments of the RPE. In 
this context we have discussed, inter alia, the pre-trial judge’s authority to adopt a 
“work plan” stating the obligations the parties are required to meet in the pre-trial 
stage and their respective deadlines.
In the ICC’s judicial system it is the responsibility of the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
ensure that disclosure takes place under satisfactory conditions.300 To this aim the 
PTC has the power to establish a system that regulates the disclosure of evidence 
between the parties (and its communication to the Chamber) and a calendar for 
disclosure for the purposes of the confirmation hearing. The resemblance to the 
ICTY’s Single Judge “work plan” is evident.
Furthermore, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s involvement in the investigation stage 
appears to be a positive development for the safeguarding of the suspect’s rights and 
for disclosure to the Defence. The supervisory function regarding the Prosecutor’s 
discretion in assessing the exculpatory nature of the material in his possession is 
also welcome. However, the fact that the Chambers can exercise their powers only 
upon the initiative of the parties which therefore limits the effectiveness of their 
powers cannot be overlooked. Indeed, it is for the Prosecutor to request the hearing 
under Rule 83 and have a Chamber ruling on the exculpatory nature of particular 
material and his function appears immune from scrutiny.301 
Moreover, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s ability to intervene in the investigation in order 
to safeguard the rights of the suspect is also welcome. The possibility to take its own 
investigative initiative when the Pre-Trial Chamber considers that the Prosecutor 
has failed to secure a unique investigative opportunity to gather evidence favourable 
to the Defence provides an additional safeguard for the suspect.302 However, in 
order to appreciate the uniqueness of an investigative opportunity the Chamber 
must be involved and aware of the development of the investigation.
 3.5 The lack of a system of procedural sanctions 
Neither the Rome Statute nor the RPE foresee any sanction in case of violations 
of the disclosure obligations by one of the parties. An exception is made for the 
exclusion of evidence disclosed too late to prepare for the confirmation hearing 
pursuant to Rule 121(8). The same issues expressed on this topic in relation to the 
ICTY are therefore applicable to the ICC insofar as the lack of a statutory provision 
giving certainty for the sanctions which can follow to non-disclosure or delayed 
disclosure appears to be questionable.303 
_______________________ 
300 ICC RPE, Rule 121(2).
301 Caianiello, above n. 1 at p. 30.
302 ICC Statute, Article 56, para. 3.
303 See chapter six.
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As for the ICTY, the ICC legal framework also leaves the choice of appropriate 
sanctions with regard to the specific violation to the judges on a case-by-case basis. 
Nevertheless a difference with the ICTY seems to emerge concerning the approach 
followed by the judges towards the imposition of sanctions, when considering the 
response of the Chamber in Lubanga to the Prosecutor’s decision not to disclose 
large numbers of exculpatory material gathered through confidential agreements. 
On that occasion the Trial Chamber was not afraid to take recourse to the drastic 
measure of ordering a stay in the proceedings when it reached the conclusion that 
the trial process had been “ruptured to such a degree” that it was “impossible to 
piece together the constituent elements of a fair trial”.304 While this is a major 
step, the difference with the ICTY is not so clear when we consider that the TC 
imposed a provisional stay in the proceedings that was lifted once the Prosecutor 
had complied with his disclosure obligations.305 The Trial Chamber did not order 
the  proceedings to be discontinued. The measure adopted therefore seems to aim 
towards offering the Prosecutor the possibility of ensuring the trial is fair again 
rather than sanction the Prosecutor for his grave misconduct.306 This approach 
resembles the ICTY’s preference for a remedial rather than a sanctioning approach. 
On the one hand, it is understandable that the judges decided to leave room for 
redressing the situation with the aim of reaching a verdict and the Trial Chamber’s 
approach was brave considering the interests at stake. However, it is noted that the 
imposition of a provisional stay came at the cost of legal certainty throughout the 
procedure and (paradoxically) for the rights of the accused. In relation to the former 
the provisional stay rather than the unconditional discontinuance did not send out 
the message that there can be disclosure violations capable of affecting the fairness 
of the trial so seriously as to render its continuation impossible. As for the rights of 
the accused, the problem with a provisional stay without a deadline for its possible 
lifting can be better explained through a question: what if in Lubanga the Prosecutor 
had disclosed the exculpatory material after two or three years rather than two or 
three weeks from the imposition of the stay of the proceedings? A deadline for the 
Prosecutor could have been a more convincing solution for the matter.
4. Concluding remarks 
The analysis carried out shows that the ICC legal system established through 
the adoption of the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence has 
been given significant inquisitorial elements. However, these elements operate 
in a context that maintains the features of the common law tradition such as the 
trial hearing where the parties present their cases and, more importantly, the 
disclosure of information that is regulated by an articulated set of technical rules. 
The interaction between comprehensive regulation of the disclosure process and 
_______________________ 
304 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpato-
ry Materials covered by article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together 
with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008, 13 June 2008, para. 93.
305 Ibid. at para. 94. 
306 Caianiello, above n. 1 at 23-42.
Chapter 7
293 294
the more inquisitorial role played by the actors who operate in the a process is an 
interesting one.
The ICC legal framework grants a position of control to the judiciary and enables 
intervention in the proceedings at both the pre-trial and trial stage. The creation 
of Pre-Trial Chambers, which are reminiscent of an Italian giudice per le indagini 
preliminari, is an interesting feature. The PTC’s monitoring function over the 
Prosecutor as well as its power to ensure that disclosure takes place under satisfactory 
conditions in preparation for the confirmation hearing reveals an inquisitorial 
flavour. Emblematic of this direction is the emphasis placed on the Chamber as the 
organ designated as having the final word on the exculpatory nature of the material 
in the Prosecutor’s possession. The codified super partes role the Prosecutor plays 
during the investigation is welcome when contrasted with the developments of his 
ICTY counterpart. 
These characteristics may question the necessity of a complex and articulated set 
of rules regulating disclosure. One may wonder whether several of the ICC features 
could not be developed so as to lead to a more efficient and simplified disclosure 
process. For instance, the idea of disclosure taking place to a greater extent before 
a Chamber which is not involved in the determination of the guilt or innocence of 
the accused (as well as at an earlier stage) in addition to the judicial supervision 
over the investigation process and the disclosure of the material gathered deserves 
praise and could be developed further. In this sense, the confirmation hearing 
is an intriguing novelty with significant potential in relation to the disclosure of 
information. Moreover, the creation of the record of the pre-trial proceedings is 
another noteworthy innovation, which seems to be moving in the direction of a 
more open and simplified disclosure process. 
These considerations call for further discussion that will be developed in the 
context of the final chapter of this book. 
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VIII. Conclusion
1. What are the goals of criminal proceedings?
Any society, national or international, needs to guarantee the security and well 
being of its constituency. Each member must be deterred from and punished for 
perpetrating acts which may negatively affect others and ultimately threaten the 
social order. Criminal justice and criminal proceedings are the instruments used 
to address these needs.
What are the goals of criminal proceedings? In my view, going beyond the 
terminology employed by different legal traditions, the common purpose of 
criminal proceedings is to ascertain the guilt or innocence of an individual accused 
of a crime ensuring that he receives a fair and impartial evaluation of the situation. 
However, the comparative analysis carried out shows that this common goal is 
pursued in different manners by different criminal systems. For instance, at the 
national level the English criminal procedure embraces an adversarial approach 
where the guilt or innocence of the accused emerges from a contest between the 
prosecutor and the defence before a passive judge. On the other hand, the French 
procedural system presents an inquisitorial approach to the discovery of the truth 
that is a prerogative of the institutions and cannot be left entirely in the hands of 
the parties.
A democratic society must act firmly against those who have committed a crime but 
it is equally important that it shows that its criminal law system guarantees their 
fundamental rights. Indeed “society wins not only when the guilty are convicted 
but when criminal trials are fair”.1 Therefore criminal proceedings must defend the 
rights of the accused against possible abuses.
This consideration leads to the primary role in criminal proceedings being played 
by human rights norms regarding the fair trial. Domestic criminal systems must 
abide by a set of norms, envisaged by different international legal instruments, 
which grant the suspect and the defendant several rights in criminal proceedings. 
The domestic criminal procedures of England, Italy and France must be in line with 
the standards set out by the European Convention on Human Rights as applied 
and developed by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. The 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court contributes to the harmonisation of the 
criminal procedures of the Member States of the Council of Europe, promoting and 
defending a set of core fair trial rights that cannot be disregarded in any criminal 
system. The international procedural systems of the ICTY and the ICC, although 
not directly subject to international human rights instruments, envisage in their 
Statutes the right to a fair trial.2
_______________________
1 US Supreme Court, Brady v. Maryland 373 US 83 (1963), para. 87.
2 See Article 20(1) of the ICTY Statute and Article 64(2) of the ICC Statute.
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Another important feature of criminal proceedings is that they must be conducted 
and concluded in reasonable time in order to be effective. The right to be tried 
expeditiously is enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
excessive length of criminal proceedings generates uncertainty and frustration for 
those who are being prosecuted and reveals problems, some of which are structural, 
in the administration of justice. 
It can be concluded that the assessment of the effectiveness of a criminal law 
system’s response to crime cannot be limited to the numbers of convictions reached 
but it must extend to the fairness and expeditiousness of the proceedings that led 
to such convictions. 
Fair trial rights and criminal procedure are intertwined. Criminal procedure sets 
the rules to be followed, weighing the rights of suspects and defendants. It is 
through criminal procedure that crime control and human rights are reconciled 
in order to find a fair balance. Crime control and human rights should not conflict 
as their interaction benefits the entire system showing its capacity to bring those 
who violated its criminal law to justice yet ensuring them a fair assessment of their 
conduct. 
2. How does disclosure relate to these goals?
“He who knows only his side of the case knows little of that”.3 This quote encapsulates 
the meaning and importance of disclosure in criminal proceedings. Disclosure is 
the act or process of revealing or uncovering; it brings to light what could not be 
seen before. 
The disclosure process in criminal proceedings is a fundamental tool for the 
defendant as it assists him in gaining knowledge of the case against him. 
The European Court of Human Rights made it clear that “it is a requirement of 
fairness…that the prosecution authorities disclose to the defence all material 
evidence for or against the accused”.4 This is an essential rule, which clarifies the 
solid nexus between the fairness of proceedings and the disclosure of information. 
Disclosure goes to the heart of the fairness of criminal proceedings which cannot 
be achieved in its absence. 
Disclosure is also the practical manifestation of the principle of the equality of arms. 
The prosecutor, who enjoys more investigative resources, is compelled to disclose 
information and material relevant to the defence case. Without the prosecutor’s 
disclosure the defence would have no access to certain material. Disclosure 
obligations reduce the structural gap that exists between the two parties. 
Disclosure is now considered an essential feature of criminal proceedings. However 
_______________________
3 Notable quotation from John Stuart Mill.
4 Edwards v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, no. 13071/87, 16 December 1992, para. 36. 
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the comparative analysis reveals that this is the outcome of a development which in 
certain cases started from the opposite perspective. 
For instance, in England in the late sixteenth and throughout the seventeenth 
century the main function of the trial was to grant an opportunity to the accused to 
confront the prosecution’s case and the evidence gathered against him. In order to 
preserve the spontaneity and truthfulness of his account of the events, the accused 
had to remain ignorant of the prosecution’s case and the evidence collected 
against him until confronted with it at trial. Disclosure was foreign to the criminal 
procedure as it threatened the strength of its foundations. 
Once disclosure permeated the English legal system, its development was 
influenced by the response of the system to severe miscarriages of justice. We 
have discussed the 1974 Judith Ward case which marked a turning point in the 
regulation of the prosecution’s obligation to disclose material to the accused in 
criminal proceedings. In that case the withholding of essential expert evidence 
changed the course of the trial leading to the unjust conviction of the accused. 
In France prior to the 1789 revolution the criminal law system was characterised 
by cruelty and arbitrariness. The detention of the suspect in order to obtain 
information through torture was common practice and no disclosure occurred in 
such proceedings. 
The 1789 Revolution intended to eradicate the inequality and discrimination upon 
which the system was built through the affirmation of, inter alia, the defence’s 
rights. The Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen envisaged a single 
legal system applicable to all and based on the presumption of innocence, the 
abolishment of cruel and inhuman punishment as well as the abolition of arbitrary 
arrest and detention. Guarantees to the accused in jury trials became part of the 
system.
Disclosure in these criminal systems was part of the response to situations which 
had become unacceptable, unfair and arbitrary and had led to the questioning of 
the functioning of the entire system. 
However, disclosure also relates to another feature of criminal proceedings, namely 
their expeditiousness. Criminal proceedings must be carried out efficiently and 
expeditiously in order to be considered as having taken place in a ‘reasonable time’. 
Smooth and prompt disclosure of the relevant material to the defendent became 
an inseparable feature for the effective operation of criminal proceedings.
Disclosure is a complex legal issue which involves several subjects as it is not limited 
to disclosure between the prosecutor and the defence but it can encompasses 
disclosure to the judges, disclosure from the police to the prosecutor or even 
disclosure from a third entity to the parties to criminal proceedings. 
For instance in England, the prosecution presents a tripartite scheme which involves 
the police, the prosecutors and the barristers. This has implications in relation to the 
disclosure process insofar as it fragments its operation. The split structure of the English 
system of prosecution makes the effectiveness of the disclosure scheme dependent on 
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the activity of more than one subject increasing the risks of gaps in the process.
We have seen that at the ICTY and at the ICC disclosure matters are litigated 
extensively with consequent delays in the proceedings. The ICC Lubanga case 
shows that complications in the disclosure process may arise due to the interaction 
between the prosecutor and a provider of confidential information. The case was 
halted by the Chamber due to the incapacity of the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory 
material to the defence and the judges because of a confidential agreement with 
the UN. The Lubanga example is also of interest because it presents a scenario 
in which the safeguarding of the defendant’s right to the disclosure of potentially 
exculpatory material conflicts with the interest in confidentiality of a third party 
and ultimately with the advancement of the trial. 
These examples show that smooth disclosure of information in criminal proceedings 
plays a crucial role in facilitating their efficiency and expeditiousness. In contrast, 
poor disclosure may affect the proceedings leading in, extreme cases, to harm the 
prospect of reaching a verdict.  
3. Against this background, what material should be disclosed?
 3.1 Introduction
Providing an answer to this question is a rather complicated exercise. The material 
one party should disclose to the other may depend on several factors such as the 
peculiarities of each criminal system, the procedural structure and the different 
stages of proceedings. In addition to this, the particular nature of a case may require 
the disclosure of items of material that in other cases would be irrelevant.     
  
Material and information may be the object of disclosure before they are turned 
into evidence and even material which ultimately will not become evidence may 
be important to disclose. The English legal system struggled with the issue of the 
disclosure of the prosecutor’s unused material. On the other hand, in systems of 
an inquisitorial tradition, such as the French, the existence of a dossier or case file 
bypasses the issue of unused material.
The ICC procedural system is of assistance in showing how the subject matter of 
disclosure can change according to the different phases of the proceedings. The 
establishment of an adversarial hearing to confirm the charges brings disclosure 
to the spotlight at a moment at which it is not even sure that the case will reach 
the trial stage. Material that can be withheld by the prosecutor in preparation 
for the confirmation hearing may be subject to disclosure at a later stage. In the 
Katanga case, before the confirmation hearing, the Appeals Chamber granted 
non-disclosure of the identities of persons, other than the witnesses, who could 
be equally endangered if disclosure was ordered. However, it stated that while 
non-disclosure of certain information may be permissible prior to the hearing to 
confirm the charges the conclusion might be different in the preparation for trial.5
Conclusion
_______________________
5 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, AC, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of 
Pre-Trial Chamber Entitled “First Decision on the Prosecutor Request for Authorization to Redact Witness Statements”, 
13 May 2008, para. 68.
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Another factor relevant to the determination of the subject matter of disclosure 
is who is going to be the recipient of such disclosure. This consideration calls into 
play the interesting issue, addressed in this section, of the role played by the judges 
in criminal proceedings. Should the judges see all the material disclosed between 
the parties at all times? 
Interestingly enough, this question is answered differently by the ICC Pre-Trial 
Chambers. 
We have discussed the two different judicial approaches to material that should 
be communicated to the Pre-Trial Chamber prior to the confirmation hearing. 
According to the first approach, only the evidence which will be used at the 
confirmation hearing should be communicated to the PTC. According to the 
second, the scope of the communication to the PTC includes all the material 
exchanged between the parties regardless of their intention to use it at the hearing.
These are but a few examples useful for appreciating the impossibility of drawing 
up a definitive list of the material which should be disclosed at all times to the 
defendant and to the judges in any criminal proceedings. 
However, it seems possible to single out several core items of material whose non-
disclosure would hamper the fairness of the proceedings. 
 3.2 Subject matter of disclosure
Broadly speaking disclosure should put the defendant in the position where he has 
knowledge of the charges against him, the incriminating material which will be used 
at trial as well as knowledge of all the exculpatory or potentially exculpatory material 
gathered and/or known by the prosecutor regardless of his intention to use it at trial. 
This can be considered the core of the prosecution’s disclosure in criminal trials. 
Once a defendant is acquainted with these elements, he has adequate knowledge to 
prepare his defence. Disclosure of such elements takes place differently in systems of 
adversarial tradition and systems of more inquisitorial nature.  
The starting point of this analysis is the disclosure to the accused of the charges 
against him. The ECtHR illustrated that the information must be disclosed in detail 
and it must always be sufficient for the accused to be able to “understand fully the 
extent of the charges against him with a view to preparing an adequate defence”.6 
The information must state the facts underlying the charge clearly and the crime’s 
circumstances, place, time and any accomplices the accused may have had.
The comparative analysis of the criminal systems investigated highlights the 
different ways in which they regulate disclosure of the charges.
In England the police must ensure that adequate information is given to the suspect 
immediately following his arrest. In cases involving less serious offences (which 
Chapter 8
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6 Mattoccia v. Italy, ECHR, no. 23969/94, 25 July 2000, para. 60. 
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constitute the majority of cases) it is indeed the police who charge the suspects. 
In cases that concern more serious offences such as, for instance, murder or rape 
the police need the authorisation of the crown prosecution service before charging 
a suspect. When a suspect is not arrested a summons is issued by the police and 
delivered to the suspect.
In Italy, unless he decides to drop the case the prosecutor must give the defendant 
notice of the conclusion of the preliminary investigations. The information 
contains, inter alia, a summary description of the facts underlying the proceedings, 
the rules of law allegedly violated and the locus commissi delicti.7 Following this 
communication the defendant is entitled to inspect and make a copy of the material 
gathered during the investigations.
In France, the opening of an instruction marks the moment at which the accused, 
through his lawyer, is granted access to the dossier. However if he is placed in 
gard à vue he must be immediately informed of the nature of the crimes being 
investigated.8 This provision, although rather generic in its formulation, marks 
the first, although limited, disclosure of information to the suspect during the 
proceedings. The official accusation against a suspect is notified to him when the 
case is committed for trial.
The ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence state that the indictment is served on 
the accused at the time he is taken into custody or as soon as reasonably practicable 
thereafter.9 Moreover, within thirty days of his initial appearance he must be 
provided with a copy of the supporting material that accompanied the request 
for confirmation of the indictment as well as all prior statements obtained by the 
Prosecutor from the accused.10
Finally, the ICC Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence stipulate that the 
suspect is entitled to the disclosure of a detailed description of the charges together 
with a description of the evidence which the Prosecutor intends to present at the 
confirmation hearing.11  
Once the charges (and the supporting material) are known to the defendant 
the disclosure of the material gathered during the investigations comes into 
play. A person charged with a criminal offense has the right, according to the 
ECtHR,  “to acquaint himself, for the purpose of preparing his defence with 
the results of the investigations carried out throughout the proceedings”.12 In 
principle, all material collected during the investigation should be the object 
of disclosure to the defendant as long as it is relevant for the preparation 
of his defence (unless competing interests conf lict with full disclosure). 
Conclusion
_______________________
7 Code of criminal procedure, Article 415 bis.
8 Article 63-1 Code de procedure penale. 
9 ICTY RPE, Rule 53 bis.
10 ICTY RPE, Rule 66(A)(i).
11 ICC Statute, Article 61(3) and ICC RPE, Rule 121(3).
12 Jespers v. Belgium, European Commission of Human Rights, no. 8403/78, 14 December 1981, para. 56. 
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The Strasbourg Court clarified this principle stating that “if the element in 
question [collected by the authorities] is a document, access to that document 
is a necessary facility” if it concerns an act of which the defendant is accused.13 
This kind of material includes the transcripts of the interrogations that the 
police, the investigating and the prosecuting authorities have carried out 
with the defendants and the witnesses, pictures of the crime scene, reports of 
searches, experts’ opinions, confiscated documents, maps as well as recordings 
of wire taped conversations.
The material gathered during the investigations by the prosecution can be divided 
into material that will be used at trial and material that will not be part of the 
prosecutor’s case. 
The incriminating material that the prosecutor intends to use must be disclosed to 
the defence. This category includes the details and statements given by witnesses 
who will testify as well as the identity of experts and their reports. 
The Italian criminal procedure stipulates that, at the latest seven days before the 
date set for the beginning of the trial, both parties must submit a list to the registry 
of the court with the names of the witnesses, experts and technical counsel they 
intend to call to testify indicating the circumstances on which their testimony will 
be given.14 The disclosure of evidence takes place at trial when the parties tender 
the documents asking the judge their admission. The French criminal procedure 
ensures that once the accused has been mise en accusation and will therefore stand 
trial (before the Assize Court) he is provided with, inter alia, the written statements 
of witnesses as well as the experts’ reports.15
The ICTY RPE require the Prosecutor to disclose to the Defence within the time 
limit prescribed by the Trial Chamber (or by the pretrial Judge) copies of the 
statements of all witnesses whom the Prosecutor intends to call to testify at trial. 
Likewise, copies of the statements of additional Prosecution witnesses shall be 
made available to the Defence when a decision is made to call those witnesses. The 
ICC legal instruments have similar provisions.
Furthermore, disclosure may also cover the written submissions filed with the 
court by the parties as well as the advisory opinions from an independent member 
of the national legal system. An example of this type of disclosure can be found 
in the ICC’s procedure where Rule 121(9) explicitly provides the parties with the 
possibility of filing written submissions in preparation for the confirmation 
hearing. It further states that a copy of these submissions must be transmitted to 
the other party immediately.
Chapter 8
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13 Ibid. at para. 58. 
14 Code of criminal procedure, Article 468.
15 Code de procédure criminelle, Article 279. 
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 3.3 Disclosure of unused material 
Not all the material collected from an investigation will be used by the Prosecutor 
to corroborate his case. There will be material that remains in his possession unless 
the criminal procedure requires its disclosure. However, what is irrelevant from 
the Prosecutor’s perspective may be quite different from the Defence’s perspective. 
The inversion of points of view may lead to a different assessment of the same item. 
For instance, while a fruitless search of a house is simply a waste of time for the 
Prosecutor in the course of the investigations, in the eyes of the Defence it can be 
an element capable of corroborating its strategy. 
The disclosure of unused material is a thought-provoking issue insofar as it is the 
prosecutor who assesses the material in his possession in order to determine what could 
be of assistance to the defence. The comparative analysis reveals that, in systems that 
embrace an adversarial tradition, the liklihood of the defence obtaining evidence relevant 
for its defence depends on the evaluation of its usefulness by the police or Prosecutor. 
In England for example, while no controversies arise over the disclosure of 
material the prosecutor will use at trial, one of the major challenges faced by the 
disclosure regime was the management of the prosecutor’s unused material. In 
relation to exculpatory material the disclosure test entails an evaluation of what 
might undermine the prosecution’s case and assist that of the defence. This is a 
very difficult test to carry out especially when it is not performed by the defence. 
Moreover, “while items of material viewed in isolation may not be reasonably 
considered to be capable of undermining the prosecution case or assisting the 
accused, several items together can have that effect”.16 
The ICTY and the ICC employ an identical test in relation to the inspection of 
material in the prosecutor’s possession that will be not relied upon at trial. 
Specifically, the defence is allowed to inspect books, documents, photographs and 
other tangible objects only if the prosecutor determines that they are relevant to 
the defence’s preparations.17 The ICTY jurisprudence provides guidance as to the 
test that the prosecutor must carry out in order to evaluate items of material in 
relation to the defence’s case. The material in question must be: “(1) relevant or 
possibly relevant to an issue in the case; (2) able to raise or possibly raise a new issue 
whose existence is not apparent from the evidence the prosecution proposes to use; 
(3) hold out a real, as opposed to fanciful, prospect of providing a lead on evidence 
which goes to (1) or (2)”.18
 3.4 Disclosure of exculpatory material
Of the utmost importance for the defence among the material that will not form 
part of the prosecutor case is exculpatory or potentially exculpatory material. 
Conclusion
_______________________
16 Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure, 2013, para. 7.
17 ICTY RPE, Rule 66(B) and ICC RPE, Rule 77. 
18 Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., IT-96-21, Decision on Motion by the Accused Zejnil Delalić for the Disclosure of Evidence, 26 
September 1996, para. 7. 
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This kind of material has the potential to significantly influence the fairness and 
outcome of the proceedings and as such should always be made available to the 
defence. 
In France and Italy, disclosure of the results of the investigations in preparation for 
trial takes the shape of access to the case file containing all the material collected in 
the investigation. Therefore the problem of unused material is lessened since the 
dossier also contains that kind of material. 
In England, the current practice envisages the prosecutor’s obligation to disclose any 
unused material “which might reasonably be considered capable of undermining 
the prosecution case or of assisting the case for the accused”.19 The House of Lords 
clarified that “fairness ordinarily requires that any material held by the prosecution 
which weakens its case or strengthens that of the defendant, if not relied on as part 
of its formal case against the defendant, should be disclosed to the defence…The 
golden rule is that full disclosure of such material should be made.”20
The ICTY RPE states that material which is known to the Prosecutor and is favourable 
to the accused in the sense that it suggests the innocence or might mitigate the guilt 
of the accused or may affect the credibility of the prosecution’s evidence must be 
disclosed to the defence as soon as practicable.21 Exculpatory material also includes 
“material which may put an accused on notice that such material exists”.22 Moreover, 
the jurisprudence of the Tribunal sheds light on the Prosecutor’s assessment of the 
material in his possession affirming that the standard for assessing the exculpatory 
nature of the Prosecution’s material is whether there is any possibility, considering 
the parties submissions, that the information in question could be relevant to the 
Defence.23
The ICC Statute envisages the same disclosure obligation and adopts an almost 
identical definition in which the term evidence replaces the term material.24 
However, in Lubanga the Trial Chamber defined the notion of exculpatory evidence 
in the same way as it is defined by the ICTY namely as material (and not only 
evidence) that shows the innocence of the accused; which mitigates the guilt of 
the accused; and which may affect the credibility of Prosecution’s evidence.25 Both 
systems envisage the disclosure of such material to take place as soon as practicable 
and characterise it as a continuous obligation on the prosecutor. The ICC criminal 
procedure, unlike the ICTY, codified the prosecution’s obligation to investigate 
incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally.
Chapter 8
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19 Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 3(1)(a).
20 R v H and C, [2004] UKHL 3, at 147.
21 ICTY RPE, Rule 68. See also Prosecutor v. Delalić, IT-96-21, Decision on the Request of the Accused Pursuant to Rule 68 
for Exculpatory Information, 24 June 1997, para. 12. 
22 Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., IT-04-84, Decision on Joint Defence Motion for Relief from Rule 68 Violations by the 
Prosecution and for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 68 Bis, 12 October 2011, para. 38. 
23 Ibid.
24 ICC Statute, Article 67. 
25 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory 
Materials covered by article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together 
with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008, 13 June 2008, para. 59. See ICTY Rule 68. 
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Ultimately the material that will be disclosed may be dependent more on the 
assessment of that material than on the category to which it belongs. This is 
unsatisfactory particularly in relation to exculpatory and potentially exculpatory 
material in possession of the prosecutor. This issue will be dealt with in greater 
detail when discussing the prosecutor’s role.
4. How can disclosure be achieved?
 4.1 Two different approaches 
The criminal procedures which have been investigated reveal two different ways 
of achieving disclosure in criminal proceedings. On the one hand, disclosure 
can be accomplished through the adoption of a set of technical procedural rules 
or provisions laying out clear obligations to disclose. This model is typical of 
common law systems. On the other hand, disclosure can be achieved mainly by the 
defendant consulting the case file or dossier. These are the two main approaches 
to the regulation of disclosure in criminal proceedings. Interestingly, the research 
conducted seems to reveal, particularly in international criminal procedure, an 
ongoing tendency to introduce elements of an inquisitorial model of disclosure 
into systems which regulate disclosure through procedural rules.
 4.2 The procedural rules/provisions approach
Systems that adopt detailed procedural rules or provisions to regulate the 
disclosure of information in criminal proceedings are characterised by a disclosure 
scheme or process which is made up of different stages. In order to function, this 
model requires the full engagement of the prosecutor and the defence and its 
effectiveness is ultimately dependent on their conduct. The introduction of the 
defence’s obligations to disclose in an adversarial criminal system represents a 
radical change that stands in stark contrast to the Anglo-Saxon tradition where 
no such obligations can be found. Moreover, as mentioned, these procedural 
systems require the prosecutor to assess the material in his possession from the 
perspective of the defence, which creates significant difficulties for process as a 
whole. The prosecution’s disclosure can be divided into two stages. The first stage is 
autonomous and regards the first assessment of the material gathered through the 
investigation. In the second stage disclosure is reactive. This segment still requires 
the prosecutor to appraise the material through the lense of the defence’s case. 
However, the assessment is guided by the defence’s disclosure of information about 
its case and strategy. 
The procedural systems of England and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia provide good examples of this model of disclosure. In these 
systems disclosure is achieved through the adoption of specific legal provisions 
(England) or procedural rules (ICTY). Both systems are strongly influenced by the 
adversarial legal tradition where no case file, in its civil law meaning, is created 




Interestingly, the English criminal system is characterised by the absence of one 
consolidated text on disclosure. There are a multiplicity of sources from which 
guidance as to the operation of the disclosure process can be found. The plurality 
and combination of protocols, manuals, guidelines and statutory law on disclosure 
however, generates confusion. 
It suffices to recall that the operation of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations 
Act, as amended by the Criminal Justice Act, is guided by several tools among 
which are the Criminal Procedure Rules (2014) and the Code of practice which is 
issued in part 2 of the CPIA.26 
Furthermore, the judiciary issued a disclosure Protocol for the Crown and the 
Magistrate’s Courts (2006)27 as well as a Judicial Protocol on the disclosure of 
unused material in criminal cases (2013)28. The Attorney General issued Guidelines 
in 2000 in order to assist the operation of the statutory regime on disclosure. In 
April 2005, the Attorney General issued new Guidelines on the disclosure of unused 
material in criminal proceedings. In July 2011 the Supplementary Attorney General 
Guidelines on Disclosure, Digitally Stored Material were issued. In December 2013 
new Attorney General Guidelines on Disclosure were issued which replaced the 
previous ones.
Furthermore, in 2005a disclosure manual for the police and the Crown Prosecution 
Service was created.29 Finally, operational instructions for investigators and 
prosecutors can be found in the disclosure manual issued by the Association of 
Chief police officers and the CPS.
These provisions regulate what in essence is a disclosure process articulated in 
three different stages: the primary prosecutor’s disclosure; the defence disclosure 
and the secondary prosecutor’s disclosure. 
Similarly, the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, under the heading 
“production of evidence”, regulate the prosecutor’s and defence’s disclosure as well 
as disclosure of exculpatory material, failure to comply with disclosure obligations 
and restrictions on disclosure. The regulation of disclosure through these Rules 
was influenced by two major factors: the numerous amendments to the RPE, which 
at the time of writing amount to 49, and the contribution made by the Tribunal’s 




26 The Criminal Procedure Rules regulate the way a criminal case is managed. They apply in all magistrates’ courts, the 
Crown Court and the Court of Appeal. The latest edition entered into force on 6 October 2014. The Code of Practice, as 
recorded in its Preamble, sets out “the manner in which police officers are to record, retain and reveal to the prosecutor 
material obtained in a criminal investigation and which may be relevant to the investigation, and related matters”.
27 The protocol’s title is: Disclosure: A Protocol For The Control And Management Of Unused Material In the Crown Court 
(the Disclosure Protocol). It was issued by the Courts service in February 2006. 
28 As stated in its foreword, the Protocol (which is applicable to all criminal Courts in England and Wales) was prepared 
following the recommendations of Lord Justice Gross in his September 2011 ‘Review of Disclosure in Criminal Pro-
ceedings’. It also takes account of Lord Justice Gross and Lord Justice Treacy’s ‘Further review of disclosure in criminal 
proceedings: sanctions for disclosure failure’, published in November 2012.
29 The combined efforts of the CPS and the association of Chief Police Officers gave birth to the Disclosure Manual that 
provided operational instructions in the implementation of disclosure principles and procedures. The Manual reflected 
the Prosecution approach to disclosure obligations and was the authoritative guidance on practice and procedure for all 
police investigations and CPS prosecutors.
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 4.3 The dossier approach
At the opposite end of the spectrum there are criminal law systems where the 
creation of a case file is an essential characteristic of the proceedings. In these 
procedures disclosure is not regulated by a set of procedural rules but rather it 
coincides with the moment at which a defendant or his lawyer is granted access 
to the so-called dossier. The case file contains the material collected during the 
preliminary investigation by the police under the supervision of the prosecutor. 
The analysis carried out reveals the tendency to keep the dossier’s content from 
the defence during the investigation and postponing the defendant’s access to it to 
upon its completion. From that moment on the defence may influence the content 
of the dossier through the result of its own investigation as well as by demanding 
the prosecuting authority carry out a specific investigation considered necessary 
for the accused’s case. 
Italian criminal procedure, despite its recent reform moving it in the direction of 
a more adversarial procedure, still provides an interesting example in this regard. 
Italy uses the so-called “double-dossier system”.  The procedure is based on an 
initial dossier where the material collected during the preliminary investigations is 
gathered and a second dossier to be used at trial. The structure is interesting. The 
investigations are carried out by the police under the direction and supervision 
of the prosecutor. The suspect may remain unaware that he is being investigated. 
All the material collected goes into the preliminary investigation dossier. Once 
the investigations are concluded the suspect is informed and granted access to 
the content of the dossier. Disclosure of the results of the investigation is carried 
out at this stage. Moreover, within twenty days of notification, the suspect can file 
submissions, exhibits and documents as well as present the material gathered by 
the defence’s investigations that may have been carried out. He can also ask the 
prosecutor to undertake further investigation on his behalf and can request he 
be interrogated. The notice given to the suspect pursuant to article 415 bis is an 
instrument that triggers an informed and adequate response from the defence.30
Once the results of the defence’s activity have been incorporated in the dossier a 
preliminary hearing is held to decide whether or not the case should be committed 
to trial. 
The judge for the preliminary hearing and the parties form the trial dossier 
immediately after the case is referred for trial.31 In theory, the trial dossier should 
be empty when it reaches the trial judge but in practice the code allows for certain 
exceptions. Consequently, it is essential that the parties to the trial and the judge 
who supervises the preliminary hearing are involved in the formation of the 
dossier whose content will be used at trial in order to safeguard the fairness of 
the trial. The trial dossier may take from the investigative dossier, inter alia, the 
Conclusion
_______________________
30 Bonzano C., Avviso di conclusione delle Indagini: L’Effettività della Discovery Garantisce il Sistema, Diritto Penale e Pro-
cesso, 2009, 10, 1281. 
31 Article 431 CPP.
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charging documents, the records of investigation which are objectively impossible 
to reproduce in court, the evidence admitted during the investigations from the 
parties being confronted before a judge, the records concerning the corpus delicti 
and the records of the accused’s prior convictions, if applicable. If the parties 
agree further documents collected during the investigations (both defence and 
prosecution documents) can be inserted in the trial dossier. 
 4.4 Procedural fluctuations in the achievement of disclosure
The study conducted reveals trends or “procedural fluctuations” in the regulation 
of disclosure. Specifically it shows the appearance of inquisitorial features in the 
disclosure process adopted by the ICC as well as the preservation of a dossier 
approach to disclosure in the Italian system despite its attempt to move towards 
an adversarial model of criminal proceedings. I will try to elaborate on this point.
A peculiarity of the ICC criminal procedure is the Registry’s duty to create and 
maintain a full and accurate record of the whole proceedings before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber. The record includes all documents and material disclosed between the 
parties and communicated to the Pre-Trial Chamber. The record may be consulted 
by the Prosecutor, the Defence and the victims or their legal representatives. Once 
the charges are confirmed and the case is ready for trial the record is sent to the 
Trial Chamber. 
The creation of the record relates to disclosure insofar as the record is made 
available to the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers. This kind of disclosure involves the 
judiciary and its powers in the context of criminal proceedings. 
During the negotiations for the Rome Statute the access to the records of the pre-
trial proceedings that the Pre-Trial Chamber would enjoy was not fiercely debated 
and all the delegations agreed that evidence disclosed inter partes should be 
disclosed to the PTC.32 Even the common law lawyers felt at ease with this setup 
in the light of the fact that the Pre-Trial Chamber does not decide on the merits of 
the case.33 
The Trial Chamber’s access to the Pre-Trial record was a more problematic issue. 
Also controversial was whether evidence disclosed inter partes following the 
confirmation hearing should be communicated to the Trial Chamber and therefore 
whether the pre-trial record should be updated in this sense. On these issues a civil 
law/common law contrast became clear in the light of the opposite view that these 
two legal traditions hold on these matters.34 The inquisitorial systems consider it 
normal that the Trial Chamber be informed of the case before the beginning of 
the trial. This is because in order to effectively run the trial judges must have prior 
Chapter 8
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32 Brady H., Disclosure of Evidence, in Lee R.S., The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence, Transnational Publishers 2001, p. 424.
33 Schoun C., International Criminal Procedure a Clash of Legal Cultures, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010, p. 298.
34 Klamberg M., Evidence in International Criminal trial: Confronting Legal Gaps and the Reconstruction of Disputed 
Events, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher 2013, p. 318. 
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knowledge of the case. This is in contrast to the adversarial system that envisages 
the judge as a passive umpire in a party-led trial. This understanding of the judge’s 
role becomes impossible when the judge has prior knowledge of the case.
The creation of the record of the pre-trial proceedings is a feature that significantly 
resembles the dossier of inquisitorial tradition where the material collected during 
the preliminary investigations is gathered.35 The ICC may have laid the foundation 
for the departure from technical and complex rules of procedure as the preferred 
approach to achieve disclosure in international criminal proceedings. 
The Italian criminal law system is also of interest in this respect. As we have seen, the 
structure of the Italian criminal procedure is based on the “double dossier system”. 
The first dossier where the material collected during the preliminary investigations 
is merged and the second dossier which is used at trial. What is peculiar is that the 
system of procedure which clearly moved towards the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition 
with the adoption of a new code did not embrace the procedural nature typical of an 
adversarial procedure but rather preferred to retain what was probably considered 
a more suitable way to achieve disclosure.36
These two examples seem to reinforce the argument that disclosure can be better 
achieved through the creation of a case file containing the material gathered 
during the investigations both by the prosecutor and the defence; particularly in 
the context of international criminal proceedings where the amount of material 
collected is enormous and the defence’s resources for investigation are a fraction 
of those available to the prosecutor. This issue will be discussed later dealing more 
specifically with disclosure in international criminal proceedings.
5. Disclosure and the Prosecutor
 5.1 Introduction
The prosecutor is the main actor in the disclosure process. In the procedural systems 
analysed it is on the Prosecutor’s shoulders that most of the disclosure obligations fall, 
regardless of whether disclosure is achieved through access to the dossier or through 
procedural rules. The following subsections assess the results of the comparative 
analysis conducted giving account, on the one hand, of the legal obligations to 
disclose which must be fulfilled by the Prosecutor and on the other hand of the 
different nature of the role played by this figure in different criminal systems.
 5.2 Legal obligations to disclose
While in criminal procedures which adopt a dossier model the prosecutor’s legal 
obligations to disclose can be attributed to the creation and discovery of the 
Conclusion
_______________________
35 Simon De Smet submits that the ICC Pre-Trial record could be used as a “quasi dossier”. De Smet S., A Structural Analysis 
of the Role of the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Fact-Finding Process of the ICC, in: Stahn C. and Sluiter G., The Emerging 
Practice of the International Criminal Court, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009, pp. 204-240.
36 For the adoption of the same system in the ICC framework see Heinze A., International Criminal Procedure and Disclo-
sure: An Attempt to Better Understand and Regulate Disclosure and Communication at the ICC on the Basis of a Compre-
hensive and Comparative Theory of Criminal Procedure, Dunker & Humblot, Berlin, May 2014.
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dossier, in procedures which regulate disclosure through procedural rules the 
defence’s participation in the disclosure process assumes significant importance 
for the effectiveness of its operation. 
In England, for instance, the disclosure procedure adopted by the Criminal 
Prosecution and Investigation Act was originally based on a two-stage disclosure 
scheme. A primary disclosure concerning all undisclosed material that in 
the opinion of the prosecutor “might undermine the case for the prosecution 
against the accused” was followed by a secondary disclosure made in the light 
of the defence’s statement highlighting the nature of the accused’s defence. The 
secondary disclosure covered all previously undisclosed material, which, in light 
of the defence’s statement, “might be reasonably expected to assist the accused’s 
defence”. 
The amendments adopted by the Criminal Justice Act ended the prosecution’s 
double disclosure and introduced one single test where the prosecution carries 
out an assessment of what must be disclosed to the defence. The secondary 
disclosure triggered by the defence’s statement was removed. The new test requires 
the prosecution to disclose all the material that “might reasonably be considered 
capable of undermining the case for the prosecution against the accused or of 
assisting the case for the accused”.37
However, although the prosecution’s secondary stage of disclosure was removed 
from the procedure the prosecution is still under similar duties once the defence 
has given the statement underlying the nature of the accused’s defence.38 It is 
indeed the defence’s statement that allows the prosecutor to know more of the 
defendant’s case and to assess the material in his possession in the light of the new 
information. There is therefore a strong tie between prosecution’s and defence’s 
disclosure. The disclosure scheme needs the defence to engage in the process in 
order for it to function. 
An essential aspect of the law on (the prosecution’s) disclosure in the English legal system 
is the process of revelation by which the police inform the prosecution of the material 
gathered in a criminal investigation. This is a very delicate juncture of the disclosure 
procedure. Scheduling is particularly important as it is the formal link between the 
investigator’s role and that of the prosecutor.39 A mistake made at this stage will potentially 
compromise the effectiveness of the disclosure process and the fairness of the whole trial. 
The police are given significant responsibility in relation to the assessment, classification 
and registration of the material gathered during the investigation. 
The ICTY and the ICC present consolidated texts regulating legal obligations to 
disclose. The main instruments are the Statute and the Rules of procedure and 
evidence that contain the provisions regulating disclosure. 
Chapter 8
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37 Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 3(1)(a).
38 Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 7A(5).
39 See the Review of Disclosure in Criminal Proceedings, Lord Justice Gross, September 2011, para. 120.
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The Rome Statute covers certain procedural areas that at the ICTY are regulated by 
the Rules of procedure and evidence, of which disclosure is one. Article 54 of the ICC 
Statute sets two important obligations for the Prosecutor regarding disclosure. On 
the one hand, it stipulates the Prosectutor’s obligation to investigate incriminating 
and exonerating circumstances equally. On the other hand, it provides the 
possibility for the prosecutor to avoid the disclosure of documents or information 
obtained through confidentiality agreements, which were made for the purpose of 
generating new evidence. Furthermore, the Statute touches upon the Prosecution’s 
disclosure, direct or indirect, in relation to the rights of the accused (Article 67), the 
confirmation of the charges before trial (Article 61) and the functions and powers 
of the Trial Chambers (Article 64).
The ICTY and ICC’s different procedural structures entail differences concerning 
the Prosecution’s legal obligation to disclose before trial. At the ICTY, the 
indictment is confirmed by a Single Judge (so-called reviewing judge) through a 
swift ex parte hearing not involving the Defence and where the Prosecutor will 
produce evidence supporting the indictment without any counter argument or 
counter production from the other side. Consequently, the first disclosure by the 
Prosecutor occurs within thirty days of the initial appearance of the accused and 
it requires him to provide copies of the supporting material that accompanied the 
request for confirmation of the indictment as well as all prior statements obtained 
by the Prosecutor from the accused.40 
The ICC procedure has a more structured procedure for confirming the charges. 
We have seen that a confirmation hearing is held where the Defence can participate 
by testing the Prosecutor’s evidence and submitting its own. This procedure entails 
significant disclosure obligations for the Prosecutor. In fact, no later than thirty 
days before the hearing, the Prosecutor must disclose a detailed description of the 
charges and a list of the evidence he intends to present at the hearing. Moreover, 
written submissions lodged with the Pre-Trial Chamber for the purposes of the 
confirmation hearing must be disclosed to the Defence. 
Therefore, at the ICTY the Prosecutor’s disclosure in relation to the charges 
takes place ex post facto after the confirmation of the indictment and it is rather 
limited in its scope. Unlike at the ICC, the Defence’s ability to participate in the 
confirmation hearing (which is adversarial in nature) anticipates the Prosecution’s 
legal obligations to disclose and broadens their scope.
In the preparations for trial both systems envisage two different kinds of disclosure 
obligations for the Prosecutor; an obligation to disclose to the Defence in its more 
traditional meaning of revealing and delivering material in the possession of the 
prosecutor and an obligation to allow the other party to inspect books, photographs, 
maps and tangible objects at the OTP premises. While disclosure between the 
parties (in its traditional sense) requires the Prosecutor to play an active role who 
is called upon to reveal and hand over material to their counterpart, inspections 
Conclusion
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40 ICTY RPE, Rule 66(A)(i).
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entail a more “passively open” attitude on the part of the prosecutor who must allow 
his opponent access to certain material in his possession. Examples of inter partes 
disclosure are the Prosecutor’s delivery of exculpatory material to the Defence and 
the disclosure of the names and statements of the witnesses he intends to call at 
the trial; material relating to the general use of child soldiers in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo was found to belong to the second category.41  
 5.3 Role of the Prosecutor: party to the proceedings, impartial figure or both?
  
  5.3.1 Introduction
Among the systems investigated, England and France present the two classical 
opposite configurations of the prosecutor in criminal proceedings: party to the 
proceedings and impartial figure. However, the criminal procedure in Italy, the 
ICTY and the ICC embrace sui generis connotations of the role of the prosecutor 
where features of one legal tradition are blended with elements of the other. 
  5.3.2 The two ends of the spectrum
In England, the prosecution is a party to the proceedings who confronts the defence 
at trial. From this struggle the truth as to the guilt or innocence of the accused will 
eventually emerge. The state is not involved and criminal proceedings are left in 
the parties’ hands. 
We have seen that the prosecution in England is a tripartite structure involving the 
police, the prosecutor and the barrister. Each of these figures plays a clear role in 
criminal proceedings. Therefore, when considering disclosure we cannot limit our 
ambit of analysis to the prosecutor in the most classical meaning. 
One of the criticisms to the tripartite structure of the English prosecution is that 
it prevents the prosecutor from having ownership of his case. At least in relation 
to disclosure such criticism appears to be valid. However, a review of disclosure 
in criminal cases carried out in 2011 did not suggest the abandonment of the split 
structure of the prosecution although it stressed the importance of the prosecutor’s 
involvement in matters of disclosure.
The French criminal law system offers the opposite understanding of the role of 
the prosecutor where the prosecutor is portrayed as an impartial figure. In France 
the public prosecutor, the investigating judge and the trial judge belong to the 
same judicial body, namely the magistrature. They are appointed following the 
same competition and the same training at the National School of the Judiciary 
(École nationale de la magistrature). It is believed that the affiliation to the 
magistrature instilled in its members a “universal professional ethos”42 and the 
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41 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, AC, Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Lubanga Dyilo against the 
Oral Decision of Trial Chamber I of 18 January 2008, 11 July 2008, para. 82. 
42 Hodgson J., French Criminal Justice, A Comparative Account of the Investigation and Prosecution of Crimes in France, 
Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland Oregon, 2005, p. 69.
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society entrusts them with the protection of the public interest. However, while 
the judges enjoy constitutional independence, the prosecutors are hierarchically 
subordinated to the Ministry of Justice. The prosecution service is conceived, in 
fact, as the means of implementing the government’s criminal policy and therefore 
it is guided in the performance of its functions by general instructions and specific 
directives from the Ministry of Justice.43 The prosecutor must remain accountable 
to the government which, even if indirectly, is the expression of the people’s will. 
In addition, the hierarchical structure is seen as a way of enforcing a uniform and 
coherent government policy on crime at the national level.
The code of criminal procedure states that the prosecutor “exercises the public 
action and formally requests the law to be enforced”.44 The prosecutor enjoys 
considerable discretion in relation to the judicial qualification to give to the acts 
investigated as well as in relation to the timing of the transfer of the case to the 
investigating judge.
The English and French systems belong to the two different models of government 
approach to criminal justice depicted by Damaška.45 The English system provides 
an example of a reactive state model where, in essence, the state considers legal 
proceedings as a contest between individuals and limits its action to “providing 
a supporting framework within which its citizens pursue their chosen goals”.46 
Proceedings in reactive states are “conflict solving” and the state is called into 
play only when the parties, which are conceived as equal, are not able to solve the 
conflict between them.
The French system however, is an example of an activist state model where the 
state takes the administration of criminal justice into its own hands. In active state 
models state interests have priority over individual interests.47 Proceedings in an 
activist state are “policy implementing” as through the justice system the state 
implements its policy of crime prevention and repression.48
  5.3.3 The sui generis connotation of the role of the prosecutor
So far we have seen the two opposite extremes of a hypothetical spectrum. However, 
the analysis carried out brings to light different, and somewhat more sui generis, 
configurations of the prosecutor in the legal systems of Italy, the ICTY and the ICC. 
For instance, in Italy the reform of the criminal procedure in the direction of an 
adversarial legal tradition introduced changes to the role of the prosecutor. 
In the current system there is a clear distinction in the preliminary investigation 
stage between the investigative and the judicial functions. The former is assigned 
to the prosecution and the latter to the judge for the preliminary investigation.49 
Conclusion
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43 Article 30 Code de procedure penale.
44 Article 31 Code de procedure penale. 
45 Damaška M., The Faces of Justice and State Authority. A Comparative Approach to the Legal Process, Yale University 
Press, 1986. See also Damaška M., The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary transplants: Anglo-American and Continental Ex-
periments, American Journal of Comparative Law, 1997. 
46 Damaška, above n. 45 at p. 73.
47 Ibid. at p. 87.
48 Ibid. at p. 82.
49 See Articles 326-328 of the CPP.
313 314
The figure of the investigating judge (giudice istruttore) clearly inspired by the 
inquisitorial tradition of French origin, which combined both functions, was 
abolished.
The prosecutor conducts the investigation assisted by the police. The scope of the 
preliminary investigation is no longer the finding of the truth as it was under the 
former code but to determine whether or not to prosecute the case. The Code of 
criminal procedure states that “the prosecutor completes every activity necessary 
under article 326 CPP and also assesses the facts and circumstances favouring the 
person under investigation”.  However, in the course of the preliminary investigation 
the prosecutor also collects material favourable to the accused in order to assess 
the strength of his own case before deciding whether to request its committal to 
trial.50 Consequently, it is in the interest of the prosecutor to assess all the elements 
available to him, which however does not equate to carrying out an investigation in 
the interest of the suspect in an impartial fashion as it was under the previous code.
Nevertheless, certain inquisitorial features remained. The cultural aspect of this 
figure still plays a role. For instance the inquisitorial principle of the obligatory 
nature of the prosecution was not relinquished in favor of the discretion to 
prosecute.. Therefore, prosecutors are obliged under the Constitution to initiate a 
preliminary investigation once they are informed of a criminal act. 
Furthermore, the prosecutor maintains his predominant, and sometimes 
monopolistic, role in the preliminary investigation. The possibility that a suspect 
might not know he is being investigated until the completion of the process is 
tolerated because the prosecutor is still considered as having the same impartiality 
that was a crucial element of the previous system. This is understandable if we 
consider that, as far as its professional collocation is concerned, the prosecutors 
continue to belong to the same judicial body of the preliminary investigation 
judges, preliminary hearing judges and trial judges. They are all appointed through 
the same national competition and they can, upon request, move back and forth 
from one position to another with no formal restriction.51 In other words, they 
are colleagues belonging to the same professional group but exercising different 
functions within criminal proceedings. Furthermore, prosecutors, unlike in France, 
are not subordinated to the Ministry of Justice and therefore are independent from 
the executive power. 
When the criminal systems of the ICTY and the ICC are analysed together they 
seem to occupy different stages of a common pattern in the evolution of the 
configuration of the prosecutor’s role in criminal proceedings. 
The ICTY Prosecutor is expected to prosecute in an adversarial context and at the 
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50 Cordero F, Procedura Penale (8th Edition), 2008. Cordero states that if the prosecutor disregards [evidence favourable 
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51 Grande E., Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and Resistance, American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 48, 2000, pp. 
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same time to act as a super partes entity of an inquisitorial nature. This construct 
is predominately the product of the jurisprudential interpretation of the RPE. We 
have discussed how the Tribunal’s criminal system moved away from its original 
strong adversarial connotation adopting elements of inquisitorial legal tradition, 
which were considered more suitable to the management of complex international 
criminal proceedings. 
The Prosecutor is in fact considered not only a party to adversarial proceedings but 
also an organ of the Tribunal and more in general an organ of international criminal 
justice. The role has been described a “Minister of Justice with an overriding 
obligation of ensuring fairness in the proceedings”.52 While the Prosecution 
must be conducted vigorously the Prosecuting counsel “ought to bear themselves 
rather in the character of ministers of justice assisting in the administration of 
justice.”53 His goal is not only to obtain a conviction but also to present the case 
for the Prosecution assisting the Chamber to discover the truth in a judicial 
setting. Therefore the presentation of the Prosecution’s case must include not only 
incriminating but also exculpatory evidence.54
The Prosecutor is a party to the proceedings and therefore is not required to 
be neutral but he is “not a partisan” which is the ratio behind the Prosecutor’s 
disclosure obligations particularly in relation to exculpatory material. 
This construction was developed by the jurisprudence and imposed on the 
Prosecutor whose initial connotation was more adversarial in line with the adopted 
criminal tradition. 
The Rome Statute foresees the Prosecutor’s obligation of investigating 
incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally. This provision marks 
a significant change of direction when compared to the ICTY procedure and 
brings the role of the Prosecutor closer to the inquisitorial legal tradition of an 
investigating judge. 
In the light of the above what is the preferable configuration of the role of the 
prosecutor in a criminal law system? While there is not a single and straightforward 
answer to this question, several characteristics that should define the role of the 
prosecution in criminal proceedings can be identified and will be discussed in the 
final part of this section.
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52 McIntyre G., Equality of Arms – Defining Human Rights in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
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March 2000, Separate Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabudden, para. 68. 
54 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., IT-95-16, Decision on Communication between the Parties and their Witnesses, 21 Sep-
tember 1998, p. 3. 
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6. Disclosure and the defence
 6.1 Introduction
Disclosure is always relevant for the defence’s position in criminal proceedings 
regardless of whether it is carried out by the prosecutor, as discussed above, or 
when it is the defence itself who is asked to disclose elements and/or material of its 
case. It is on this second aspect that the following subsections will focus through an 
assessment of the defence’s legal obligations to disclose under some of the criminal 
law systems investigated. This assessment will be followed by a description of the 
different role that a defence counsel can play in criminal systems.  
The defence represents the defendant and ensures that the criminal proceedings 
against him are fair. Defence lawyers pursue the best interests of their client and 
protect their procedural rights. However, the role that the defence can play in 
criminal proceedings differs, sometimes significantly, according to the legal setup 
of the criminal procedure in which they operate. Moreover, the degree to which 
the defence participates may depend on the phase of the proceedings. The defence 
may also be required to disclose to the prosecutor, and sometimes to the court, 
information concerning its own case. 
In an adversarial procedure, as discussed in relation to the prosecutor, legal 
obligations concerning the defence’s disclosure can be part of a mechanism where 
the defence’s disclosure assists the prosecutor to assess the material in its possession 
in the light of the information provided by the defence about its case. 
 6.2 Legal obligations to disclose
The concept of the legal obligations to disclose that lie with the defence is something 
that was alien to Anglo-Saxon legal systems where the approach, which was based 
on the contest between two parties before a passive umpire forbade the adoption of 
such duties. The notion of defence disclosure was considered to be “the anathema 
to the adversarial system of justice”.55 In the adversarial tradition the accused’s right 
to keep his defence secret until the commencement of the trial was strictly linked 
to the right to remain silent and to the prosecution’s burden of proof. 
However, things changed and nowadays several common law systems place legal 
obligations on the defence to disclose. Moreover, disclosure obligations have been 
broadened to compel the defence to reveal more about its case in an approach to 
disclosure defined as having their “cards on the table”.56
In England, for instance, we have seen that the 1996 Criminal Procedure 
and Investigations Act introduced defence disclosure obligations in criminal 
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proceedings. Specifically, following the primary disclosure by the prosecutor the 
defence had to provide the prosecution and the judge with a statement setting out, 
in general terms, the nature of its defence, the matters on which it took issue with 
the prosecution and the reasons for doing so.57
This obligation assists the prosecutor in assessing the material in his possession 
in the light of the newly revealed defence strategy, in order to determine whether 
the disclosure of any of such material may be considered capable of undermining 
the case for the prosecution or of assisting the case for the accused. Moreover, it 
allows the prosecutor to evaluate whether the investigators should undertake any 
further enquiries. This innovation was not well received by defence counsels and 
consequently their track record in disclosure was quite poor.
The 2003 Criminal Justice Act (CJA) strengthened the defence’s disclosure 
obligations. The defence is still required to set out the nature of its case, but the 
expression “in general terms” has been removed from the text because it was 
considered too vague and prone to narrow interpretation by the defence counsel. 
The statement must also indicate any specific defence the accused intends to 
rely upon at trial. This change suggests that the court expects a more detailed 
description of the defence’s case. 
Furthermore, the defence’s statement must set out any particular matter of fact 
on which the defendant intends to rely for the purposes of his case. It also has to 
indicate any point of law (including any point as to the admissibility of evidence) 
that the defence wishes to take, and any jurisprudence it intends to rely on for that 
purpose. The defence is also obliged to give notice of its intention to use an alibi as 
well as to disclose the identity of the witnesses it intends to call to testify for this 
purpose. Moreover, the accused must give the prosecutor and the court details in 
advance (i.e. name, address and date of birth) of any witnesses he intends to call at 
trial as well as details of any expert for the defence regardless of whether or not they 
intend to use them at trial. 
While under the previous system the defence’s disclosure took place fourteen 
days after the prosecution’s disclosure and ended that very same moment, the CJA 
states that the defence must provide a further updated statement or a statement 
indicating that the accused will make no further changes to his previous statement 
of defence.58
The CJA also strengthened the possibility of enforcing the defence’s disclosure. The 
jury may draw negative inferences from the defendant’s conduct at trial if it is not 
coherent with the statement provided by the defence unless there is a justification 
for it, which is accepted by the court.
The disclosure obligation concerning the details of defence’s witnesses envisaged 
by the Act is problematic insofar as it allows the police to interview them while no 
such possibility exists for the defence in relation to the prosecutor’s witnesses. The 
Conclusion
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57 The 1996 CPIA, chapter 25, article 5(6), Compulsory Disclosure by the Accused.
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prosecution, in fact, in serious cases, may apply to the court for an order that forbids 
the accused from seeking contact directly or indirectly with certain prosecution 
witnesses. 
Similar obligations on the defence to disclose can be found in the criminal procedure 
of the ICTY whose regulation of disclosure is common law inspired. The Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence refer to the defence’s disclosure as additional disclosure.59 In 
the original formulation of the RPE Defence disclosure obligations were circumscribed 
to the notice of an alibi and nothing more. However, several amendments to Rule 
67 adopted in 2008 broadened these obligations significantly. Therefore, the same 
trend detected in England can be seen in the Tribunal procedure. 
In proceedings before the ICTY, the Defence disclosure obligations (as with those of 
the prosecutor) can be divided into an obligation “to reveal” to the Prosecutor and 
an obligation “to let [the Prosecutor] inspect” the material that the defence intends 
to use at trial. The Defence, at the latest one week before the commencement of its 
case, must disclose to the Prosecutor statements of witnesses it intends to call at trial 
as well as copies of all written statements taken from witnesses whose attendance 
is required by the Trial Chamber (Rule 92 bis), who have given testimony in other 
proceedings before the Tribunal (Rule 92 ter) or who are unavailable (Rule 92 
quater).  The adoption of this obligation marked a major shift from the mechanism 
in place before where the Defence did not have any obligation to disclose the names 
of its witnesses to the Prosecutor before the trial unless it intended to rely upon 
an alibi or a special defence.60 Moreover, the Defence must permit the Prosecution 
to inspect and copy books, documents, photographs and tangible objects in its 
custody or control which it intends to use at trial.
As discussed above, the procedural systems of France and Italy are characterised by 
the existence of a dossier in which the material collected during the investigation is 
gathered. However, before the beginning of the trial both parties are under a clear 
legal obligation to disclose information to each other and to the court.
In France, the code of criminal procedure states that the accused must provide 
the prosecutor and the civil parties (and vice versa) and at least twenty-four hours 
before the beginning of the trial with the list of his witnesses and experts.61 The list 
must indicate the name, profession and residence of the persons concerned. 
Similarly, the Italian code of criminal procedure stipulates that when the parties 
intend to request the admission of the testimony of witnesses, experts and technical 
counsel they must deposit a list indicating their names and the circumstances on 
which these witnesses will testify with the Registry of the Court, at least seven days 
before the date set for the beginning of the trial.62 The ratio of this provision is to 
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60 See Klamberg, above n. 34 at  p. 294.
61 Article 281 Code de procedure penale. 
62 Article 468 Code of criminal procedure.
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avoid one party submitting surprise evidence directly at trial without any previous 
warning to the other party. It performs a function of the discovery of the evidence 
(rectius evidence whose admission will be sought at trial) before the beginning 
of the trial.63 This may be the first moment where the prosecutor discovers the 
elements of the defence case.64 The discovery mechanism regulated by this 
provision assists the prosecutor’s understanding of the strategy that the defence 
will follow rather than benefitting the defence.65
 6.3 Role of defence counsel: party to the proceedings or officer of the Court?
In none of the criminal law systems investigated is the defence an organ of the 
Court. Defence counsel are hired by the defendant on a private basis. Even when 
duty counsel are appointed by the Court to represent indigent defendants the 
counsel in question has no direct link with the structure of the Court. However this 
does not mean that defence counsel have no duties vis à vis the court before which 
criminal proceedings take place. 
The role played by the defence depends in a criminal systems depends on whether 
that system is inspired by a more adversarial tradition or an inquisitorial one. The 
defence’s ability to carry out an investigation is an interesting example in this 
regard. An adversarial criminal procedure should grant and safeguard the defence 
right to investigate its case in order to find favourable evidence to submit at trial. 
This approach differs from the inquisitorial one where the figure of the giudice 
istruttore or the prosecutor, is predominant in the preliminary investigations and 
his impartiality safeguards the defence’s rights. The defence counsel’s role will be 
more active in the pre-trial stage in common law systems than it is in civil law ones. 
The Italian criminal procedure provides an interesting model insofar as, due to 
its deep-rooted inquisitorial legal tradition, it was difficult to allocate lawyers for 
the defence with such investigative powers even when the system embraced an 
adversarial criminal procedure. In 2000, Law n. 397 introduced the regulation of 
the defence’s investigation into the criminal system. The lawmaker’s intention was 
to guarantee the effectiveness of the right of the accused to defend himself putting 
forward evidence to prove his case in a trial that should be run by the parties. In 
sum the defence was granted the right, inter alia, to receive or solicit statements 
from people informed of the facts relevant to the proceedings,66 to request the 
relevant public authority for the documents useful for the investigations directly,67 
to access places in order to describe their state and to perform technical, graphical, 
photographic or audiovisual surveying,68 as well as to access, following judicial 
authorisation, places not accessible to the public.69 The result of the defence’s 
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64 See Grilli L., Il Dibattimento Penale, Padova, 2003, p. 44. 
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66 Article 391 bis CPP.
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investigation is included in the defence dossier that will be presented to the judge 
(the judge for the preliminary investigation, the judge for the preliminary hearing 
or the trial judge).70 The reform has created the possibility for the defence to carry 
out investigative activities before the proceedings begin, as well as an investigation 
following the issuance of the decree that commits the case for trial.71
The Defence can play different roles at different stages of the criminal proceedings. 
The differences are clearly marked in the French criminal procedure where the 
defence cousel has very limited involvement in the investigation. The defence 
counsel’s role then becomes more involved once the instruction phase begins.
During the investigation the lawyer discharges his function by providing the 
suspect with moral support and general legal advice about his rights assessing 
whether they have been respected. He monitors the legality of the investigation 
and detention.72 Anything that goes beyond this conception of legal assistance 
in this phase is regarded as an undue imbalance in favour of the suspect. Even if 
some improvements were achieved through the reform of the garde à vue system 
and through the influence of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, there is still no room 
for the development of active participation for the defence lawyer in the ongoing 
investigation and in the formation of the dossier.
The role of the defence changes once the criminal proceedings reach the instruction 
stage and a suspect is mise en examen by an investigating judge. This moment 
marks a turning point at which the defence can play a more active role. During the 
instruction the defence lawyer is granted access to the dossier putting him in the 
position to develop a more informed defence strategy with his client responding to 
the evidence gathered against him. However, the period of time between the arrest 
of the suspect and the moment at which his lawyer can have access to the dossier 
affects the effectiveness of his counsel, particularly in relation to statements that 
the suspect might have given before the counsel intervened.
Finally, the trial stage demonstrates a more “adversarial” understanding of the 
defence’s involvement. Full disclosure of the case file and an exchange of the lists 
of witnesses allows each party to have a clear picture of the material gathered and 
of the other side’s strategy.
 6.4 Structural imbalance 
The examples discussed show that the defence counsel’s involvement in criminal 
proceedings in general, and in disclosure in particular, may take different forms. 
However, what seems to characterise the systems analysed is that the defence’s 
position in criminal proceedings is at a disadvantage in comparison to that of 
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the prosecutor who, directly or indirectly, represents the public interest and 
enjoys considerable resources in the execution of his functions. Furthermore, the 
prosecutor directs and supervises, or at least benefits the investigation carried out 
by the police. These are benefits that the defence does not enjoy. In international criminal 
proceedings this imbalance is even clearer. The effectiveness of the defence’s investigations 
is affected by a lack of resources, the difficulties in securing states’ cooperation as well as 
access to the crime sites where a conflict occurred or may still be ongoing. 
In the light of the above what is the function of the defence’s disclosure? We have 
seen how the classic common law approach to the defence’s disclosure is somewhat 
limited, perhaps even non-existent. This approach has been blurred in favour of 
more robust disclosure obligations for the defence. The defence’s disclosure in its 
broadened form appears to pursue a more open disclosure in which the prosecutor 
gains a more or less clear idea of the defence’s case. This approach, unlike the one 
envisaging limited disclosure from the defence, does not redress the structural 
imbalance that exists between prosecutor and defence. 
One may wonder whether, in the light of the trend described above in the regulation 
of disclosure, a scheme based on a case file containing the result of both parties’ 
investigations which would be accessible to the prosecutor and the accused equally 
and from an early stage would not be a more suitable option for addressing the 
defence’s difficult position. I will return to this point in the final part of this chapter
7. Disclosure and the judiciary
There are two main conceptions of the role that the judges can play in criminal 
proceedings: a passive umpire and manager of the proceedings. The discerning 
element that may lead to one or the other model is the extent of the authority and 
powers granted to the judges to actively direct and participate in the proceedings. 
The relationship between the judges and the disclosure of information has several 
implications. First, the judges may monitor the disclosure of evidence by the 
parties. Second, they may solve disputes between the parties concerning disclosure 
matters. Third, they can be the recipients of disclosure. Finally, the judges have 
the important function of dealing with disclosure violations by the parties, to 
determine their impact on the fairness of the proceedings and to establish the 
adequate remedy or sanction.
This subsection compares the diverse approaches of the systems investigated 
to the function of the judges in criminal proceedings, highlighting the different 




 7.1 Role of the judge: passive umpire or manager of the proceedings?
  7.1.1 The passive umpire approach
 
The English criminal system envisages the judge as a passive arbiter. However, even 
in this deeply rooted common law system significant developments broadened 
the judicial power in criminal proceedings. This trend has implications on the 
disclosure process. The domestic acknowledgment of the necessity to vest judges 
with more ability to manage the case was caused by concerns related to the fairness 
of the proceedings. Moreover, the cost in terms of time and money of the disclosure 
process as well as the significant number of documents it generated was a concern 
that helped move the process in this direction. Another factor which contributed to 
the advancement of a more involved judge was the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights which criticised the English criminal procedure on more 
than one occasion. 
As for the domestic empowerment of the judge, the recent assessment of the 
disclosure process in criminal cases carried out in 2011 at the request of and for 
the Lord Chief Justice is of interest. This review was prompted by concerns over 
the operation of the disclosure regime contained in the CPIA as amended by the 
CJA. The review envisaged a “robust management of disclosure matters” by the 
judiciary as an essential contribution to the improvement of the disclosure process. 
Specifically, judges should be prepared to give guidance for the prosecution on 
disclosure earlier as well as excluding material from the trial that was disclosed too 
late.73 The review found “considerable attraction” in the early judicial guidance for 
the prosecutor’s disclosure.74 Moreover, it anticipated that late disclosure by any 
of the parties “may be capable of resulting” in the exclusion of evidence from the 
proceedings.75
The Strasbourg Court on its part emphasised the cardinal role of the judiciary in 
relation to disclosure; particularly where the right of the accused to the disclosure 
of favourable material must be assessed against competing public interests. 
Specifically, the Court stressed that the “procedure, whereby the prosecution itself 
attempts to assess the importance of concealed information to the defence and 
weigh this against the public interest in keeping the information secret, cannot 
comply with the requirements of Article 6 (1)”.76 It is the trial judge who holds the 
best position to make such assessment as he is “versed in all the evidence and issues 
of the case”. 77 
The involvement of the judiciary in the prosecutor’s decision to withhold material 
from the defence on public interest grounds was the crucial element in assessing 
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the compliance of the criminal procedure with the Human Rights Convention. 
In the cases of Jasper v. the United Kingdom and Fitt v The United Kingdom, the 
Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg Court, albeit by a small majority, stressed the 
importance of the role of the trial judge in the evaluation of the relevant material 
whose non-disclosure was pursued. The fact that the prosecutor had made his ex 
parte application to the trial judge was deemed an essential factor in the assessment 
of the fairness of the procedure. The defence’s interests were safeguarded by the 
impartial role of the trial judge called to examine the nature and the relevance of 
the evidence the defence intended to present, which the prosecutor intended to 
withhold. The Court moved the judge to a more central and involved position in 
the disclosure process.
Despite the classical adversarial conception of the judiciary, the English criminal 
procedure shows that a disclosure process regulated by complex and technical 
provisions requires more robust case management of disclosure by the judge. The 
judicial involvement in the disclosure process seems to have two goals. The first is to 
give order to the disclosure process indicating the timing of the parties’ obligations 
and ensuring their engagement in the process. Judges with case management 
skills and the necessary determination to take charge of disclosure matters, make 
a remarkable difference to the effectiveness of the disclosure process. The second 
goal is to supervise the prosecutor’s assessment of the material in its possession, 
which is an important safeguard for the accused’s rights. This is particularly relevant 
in situations where the balance between disclosure and a competing interest such 
as, for instance, the public interest must be struck, as ultimately this exercise 
determines what will be disclosed to the defence.   
  7.1.2 The active judiciary approach
Interesting developments (or lack thereof) in the role of the judge in criminal 
proceedings can be observed in the Italian criminal procedure. Even though the 
Italian criminal system departed from its longstanding inquisitorial criminal 
procedure, it did not abandon the judicial activism that characterised it. Due to 
its procedural structure the judicial involvement in the proceedings, which begins 
at a rather early stage, is characterised by different judicial figures and it is shaped 
by different parts of the proceedings. The Italian criminal procedure in fact, can be 
roughly divided into three stages: the investigation, the preliminary hearing and 
the trial. In each of these phases the judiciary retained powers to act and intervene.
The prosecutor’s activity during the investigation is somewhat monitored by the 
judge for the preliminary investigations whose role is important in relation to the 
rights of the suspects who might be unaware of the investigation until it come to an 
end. Therefore, it is the preliminary investigation judge and its supervisory function 
that safeguards the suspect’s rights. If the prosecutor considers it necessary to adopt 
measures that impinge on the individual freedom or privacy of the suspect (e.g. 
wiretapping) he cannot proceed motu proprio but needs to submit a request to the 
judge for the preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the judge for the preliminary 
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investigation ensures that the prosecutor abides by the time limits set by the code 
on the length of the investigation.78
Following the prosecution’s request for committal, the so-called preliminary 
hearing takes place before a judge. The preliminary hearing judge cannot be the 
same judge who sat on the bench for the preliminary investigation.79 The accused 
is notified of the hearing and can participate by putting forward his arguments 
countering the prosecutor’s request. The judge analyses the investigation dossier, 
hears the accused and assesses the strength of the prosecution’s case in order to 
decide whether the case should be referred to trial. If he cannot reach a decision 
on the basis of the information provided he can order further investigations by the 
prosecutor on the points he considers necessary of more in depth investigation.80 
The judge for the preliminary hearing can also introduce motu proprio the evidence 
he believes indispensable.81 
As far as the trial stage is concerned, the Trial Chamber is vested with significant 
powers in relation to the production of evidence. Article 507 of the code of criminal 
procedure, in fact, states that the trial judge, once the parties have presented their 
evidence and when it is “absolutely necessary” can sua sponte decide to get more 
evidence. This provision clearly derogates from the adversarial principles showing 
a certain reluctance to abandon the traditional judicial activism completely.  The 
Supreme Court clarified that the evidence that the trial judge can admit motu 
proprio includes the evidence that for any reason has not been discovered by the 
parties through article 468 of the code of criminal procedure. Moreover, the judge 
can also do so when upon request of the party that did not discover the evidence in 
due time.82 This is supplementary to the parties’ power to introduce evidence but 
it is not uncommon.83
A similar trend, although from a different starting point (an adversarial procedure), 
can be detected in the ICTY’s criminal procedure which was initially was common 
law based and, as such, envisaged the judges of the Trial Chambers as arbiters of 
the contest between the Prosecutor and the Defence. The judges had scarce ability 
to influence the course of the proceedings, the chambers were unaware of the facts 
of the case pending before them prior to its commencement and the evidence at 
trial was mainly oral.84 These characteristics of the procedure also hampered the 
effectiveness of the few provisions granting the judges some inquisitorial power. 
For instance, the judges’ powers to question a witness (envisaged by Rule 85 of the 
RPE) was defeated in its purpose as the bench had no previous knowledge of the 
case and, consequently, its capacity to ask meaningful questions was rather limited. 
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As Judge Antonio Cassese put it “it became clear fairly soon that, to expedite 
proceedings which, being grounded on the adversarial model were rather 
lengthy, it was necessary to depart from the system whereby the court acts as a 
referee and has no knowledge of the case before commencement of trial, and 
even during trial only becomes cognizant of the evidence offered by the parties”.85 
Iain Bonomy, a British ICTY judge, concurred affirming that “it is a simple fact of 
life that adversarial proceedings can tend to lack focus and can lead to lengthy, 
unproductive and largely irrelevant exchanges between examiner and witness…In 
the absence of judicial control….it is plain that the conduct of war crimes trials in 
classical adversarial form results, and inevitably will result, in the proceedings in 
some cases lasting for several years”.86
Therefore the passive umpire model of adversarial tradition in the context of 
complex international criminal proceedings was not sufficient to ensure their 
fairness and expeditiousness.
The subsequent amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence moved in the 
direction of vigorous judicial management. The establishment of a pre-trial judge, 
appointed by the president of the Chamber from among its members, aimed to 
ensure a more efficient regulation of the pre-trial stage. The pre-trial judge adopts 
any measure necessary to prepare the case for a fair and expeditious trial among 
which the redaction of a work plan containing the obligations that the parties are 
required to fulfil in the pre-trial stage and the relative deadlines. These obligations 
also include duties to disclose. Moreover, after the parties have complied with their 
obligations the pre-trial judge shall submit to the Trial Chamber “a complete file 
consisting of all the filings of the parties, transcripts of status conferences and 
minutes of meetings held in the performance of his or her functions pursuant to 
this Rule”.87 This file, which is reminiscent of the dossier of inquisitorial tradition, 
gives the Trial Chamber knowledge of the case before its commencement, assisting 
the judges in their increased involvement in the proceedings. 
Furthermore, the Trial Chamber was given considerable power to reduce the length 
of the prosecutor’s and defence’s cases. It may determine the number of witnesses 
each party is allowed to call as well as the time within which they must complete 
the presentation of their case. Moreover, the Trial Chamber can request that the 
Prosecutor reduce the number of counts in the indictment and may limit the 
number of crime sites or incidents comprised in one or more of the charges in 
respect of which evidence may be presented by the Prosecutor. 
Concluding, the amendments to the RPE removed many of the adversarial features 
of the judiciary’s configuration that had proven unfit to run war crimes trials. They 
granted the judges wide judicial control over the proceedings following the pre-
trial stage. The appointment of a pre-trial judge allowed the Tribunal to ensure, 
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from the onset, that a case is focused on the most relevant issues raised in the 
indictment.
  7.1.3 The ICC approach
The analysis of the ICC criminal procedure appears to show a further development 
in the judge’s role. The procedural system envisages a clear separation between the 
pre-trial and the trial stage. More specifically, three different stages can be detected 
in the ICC procedure: the investigation, the hearing to confirm the charges and 
the trial. This tripartite structure bears remarkable resemblance to the Italian 
procedure discussed above.  
The creation of the Pre-Trial Chambers is an interesting feature of the ICC legal 
system which has significant implications for the disclosure process. The Pre-Trial 
Chamber discharges an active function during the investigations. Among other 
things it issues orders and warrants, provides for the protection of victims and 
witnesses and authorises the Prosecutor to take specific investigative steps within 
the territory of a State Party without having previously obtained the cooperation of 
that state.88 Moreover, if the PTC believes that the Prosecutor has failed to secure a 
unique investigative opportunity to gather evidence favourable to the Defence, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber may take the necessary measures on its own initiative.89
In other words, the Pre-Trial Chamber monitors and supervises the Prosecution’s 
performance during the investigations in line with an inquisitorial judicial 
tradition. As noted by Boas, the role of the Pre-Trial Chamber can be compared 
to the function of the preliminary investigation judge envisaged by the Italian 
Criminal Code.90
It is noteworthy in this context that the Pre-Trial Chamber supervises, to a certain 
extent, the Prosecutor’s discretion in assessing the exculpatory nature of the 
material in his possession. However, the Chambers can only act at the parties’ behest 
which therefore limits the effectiveness of their powers. It is up to the Prosecutor 
to request the hearing (under Rule 83) to have a Chamber rule on the exculpatory 
nature of certain material and his discretion appears immune from scrutiny.91 
The hearing to confirm the charges was an unknown feature in international 
criminal law before the adoption of the ICC Statute and RPE. For the purpose of 
disclosure in preparation to the confirmation hearing the Pre-Trial Chamber may 
issue orders and take the necessary decisions regarding disclosure between the 
Prosecutor and the person in respect of whom a warrant of arrest (or a summons to 
appear) has been issued.92
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When the proceedings reach the trial stage the Trial Chamber is engaged in the 
disclosure process. Rule 84, headed “disclosure and additional evidence for trial”, 
invests the Trial Chamber with the comprehensive authority to make any necessary 
orders for the disclosure of documents or information not previously disclosed. 
Such orders can be made to enable the parties to prepare for trial and to facilitate 
the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings.93
Regulation 54 of the Regulations of the Court states that in preparation for 
trial (at a status conference) the Trial Chamber may issue orders on, inter alia, 
“the production and disclosure of the statements of the witnesses on which the 
participants propose to rely” and “the disclosure of evidence”.94
Moreover, the judges of the Trial Chamber have the power to order, prior or during 
the trial, the production of additional evidence as well as to demand the attendance 
and testimony of witnesses and production of documents and other evidence.95
This provision allows the judges to intervene in the proceedings when they consider 
it necessary to complete the picture with further elements not presented by the 
parties. The judges may add to the evidence when they deem it necessary in order 
to unveil the truth in relation to the crimes the accused is charged with. This power 
has a clear inquisitorial flavour reflecting a conception of the proceedings which 
goes beyond the simple contest between the prosecutor and the accused. 
In the light of the above it appears that the ICC seems to have learned from the 
ICTY’s experience insofar as its legal framework foresees a more active and earlier 
involvement from the judiciary in the organisation of the disclosure process. 
  7.1.4 Remarks
From the comparison of the differing role of the judiciary in several different 
procedural systems it appears that the judge’s active participation (at every stage of 
the criminal proceedings) is the preferable way to improve the disclosure process. 
Also in relation to this issue it is remarked that one judicial system (Italy) which 
intended to move towards an adversarial procedural model did not abandon the 
judicial activism which characterised the inquisitorial former procedural structure. 
Meanwhile an international criminal system (ICTY), which was born adversarial, 
amended its procedure to introduce judicial activism for the purposes of case 
management to deal with the excessive length of its proceedings. 
Finally, drawing from the ICTY’s experience the ICC established Pre-Trial Chambers 
that enjoy a supervisory role over the prosecutor’s performance and have significant 
powers in relation to disclosure with the aim of ensuring the proceedings are on the 
right track from the very beginning.  The Pre-Trial Chambers present interesting 
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potential in relation to disclosure in general and disclosure of exculpatory material 
in particular. 
As far as disclosure is concerned, criminal procedures that regulate disclosure 
through technical procedural rules and/or provisions require more robust judicial 
supervision of the process. There appears to be a paradox as common law systems 
embrace this kind of regulation of disclosure regulation but see the judge as an 
impartial and passive arbiter. 
However, particularly in complex international criminal trials, early and far 
reaching judicial participation brings order to the disclosure process and provides 
a safeguard for the suspect’s rights. 
These considerations will be elaborated in the final part of this chapter.
 7.2 Consequences of disclosure violations
A fundamental function of the judiciary is to ensure that the parties abide by 
the procedural rules in place, or, to put it differently, that the players play by the 
rules of the game. This duty bears important implications in relation to disclosure 
violations. However, the comparison shows that not every system sanctions 
violations of disclosure obligations strictly and that even following repeated 
violations a remedial approach can be preferred to a sanctioning one. It also 
emerges that the preference for this approach in certain systems is not dictated by 
the provisions of their legal instruments but rather by a judicial inclination. 
In the Italian criminal procedure Article 468 CPP foresees the inadmissibility of 
the testimony not included in the list or included in a list whose deposit infringed 
the “seven days” deadline. Furthermore, a testimony can be declared inadmissible, 
ex officio, by the judge when the list does not mention (or it mentions them only 
vaguely), the circumstances that will be covered by the testimony, or does not 
indicate the names of the witnesses. The sanction does not affect the list but the 
subsequent request for the admission of evidence at trial.96 
However, when one of the parties has their evidence rejected on the above grounds, 
the criminal procedure code envisages a “safety net”. Article 493 CPP, second 
paragraph, states that the acquisition of evidence not listed ex article 468 CPP is 
permitted when the party that is requesting its admission, proves that it could not 
indicate it on time. The rather lenient wording of this provision leaves ample room 
for the admission of oral evidence not previously disclosed to the other parties. In 
this case the other party has the right to obtain the suspension of the trial. 
Moving to the international plane, we have seen that the ICTY Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence provide the judges with the power to impose sanctions in response to 
disclosure violations. Rule 68 bis was adopted in 2001 and states that “the pre-trial 
Judge or the Trial Chamber may decide proprio motu, or at the request of either 
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party, on sanctions to be imposed on a party which fails to perform its disclosure 
obligations pursuant to the Rules”. This provision does not indicate what kind 
of sanctions can be imposed nor the specific circumstances that should trigger 
their adoption.97 Moreover, the Rule does not go into detail as to the nature of the 
sanctions it envisages. It is therefore left to the judges’ discretion to single out the 
remedies they consider appropriate for a particular disclosure violation. 
The Appeals Chamber emphasised the judges’ discretion in the adoption of possible 
sanctions and made it clear that a Trial Chamber could not be considered to have 
abused this discretion when it did not impose any sanctions on the Prosecutor for 
its disclosure violations.98 
The ICC judicial system does not explicitly provide remedies or sanctions for 
non-disclosure. Only Rule 122(8), in relation to disclosure in preparation for the 
confirmation hearing, stipulates that the Pre-Trial Chamber does not take charges 
and evidence presented into consideration after the time limit has expired. The 
adoption of measures in response to disclosure violations has been left to the 
discretion of the judges whose role, also in this procedural system, is crucial in 
relation to this issue. The judges’ approach is to assess to what extent a disclosure 
violation affected the fairness of the proceedings in order to evaluate the suitable 
measure to be adopted.  
For instance, the Lubanga case confronted the Trial Chamber with significant 
problems regarding disclosure. We have seen that the Prosecutor had recourse 
to confidential agreements when gathering the majority of the material in his 
possession rather than using it for the purpose of generating new evidence, as the 
rule stipulates. Consequently he was in the problematic position of not being able 
to disclose potentially exculpatory material to the Defence nor to the Chamber. 
Faced with this situation the Trial Chamber concluded that there was no prospect 
of a fair trial and ordered a stay in the proceedings.
 
The remedy of a stay in the proceedings is not contemplated in any ICC legal 
instruments but was derived from the inherent powers of the Court and developed 
by its jurisprudence. 
The judges emphasised that before resorting to the drastic remedy of a stay in 
proceedings a Trial Chamber must first use tools within the trial process itself to 
try to cure underlying obstacles to a fair trial and to allow the trial to promptly 
proceed to a conclusion on its merits.99 Only when the Chamber considers that a 
fair trial has become impossible is the resort to a stay in proceedings  appropriate. 
In reaching this conclusion the Chamber enjoys a certain margin of appreciation 
based on its “intimate understanding of the process”.100
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The imposition of a stay in the proceedings with a subsequent order to release the 
accused is a strong response to disclosure violations. The ICC reaction to severe 
disclosure violation appears more vigorous than that of the ICTY. However, the 
difference is less clear when we consider that the TC imposed a provisional stay 
in the proceedings which was lifted once the Prosecutor had complied with his 
disclosure obligations.101 The Trial Chamber did not order the discontinuance of 
the proceedings. The measure adopted seems to have therefore had the aim of 
offering the Prosecutor the possibility to bring the trial back to a point of fairness 
rather than sanctioning him for his grave misconduct. This approach resembles the 
ICTY’s preference for a remedial rather than a sanctioning approach. 
  7.2.1 Remarks
We have touched upon the difference between the conflict solving and policies 
implementing proceedings.102 In conflict solving proceedings procedural violations 
such as non-disclosure or delayed disclosure are tackled with procedural sanctions 
which may lead to the exclusion of the evidence affected. Concerns that the 
imposition of such a sanction may jeopardise the prospects of reaching a verdict on 
the guilt or innocence of the accused are irrelevant. In other words, the respect for 
the rules is of the utmost importance in these criminal proceedings. In contrast, 
in policies implementing proceedings, reaching the conclusion of the proceedings 
is a value per se which must be safeguarded. Therefore procedural violations must 
be addressed but not at the cost of the proceedings coming to a premature end.103
Systems where criminal proceedings are intended as a contest between two 
parties are more suited to accomplishing the goals of a conflict-solving model.104 
Alternatively, procedural systems where proceedings are based on and structured 
around an official enquiry reflect a policy implementing approach.105  
However, it is of interest to note that systems supposedly based on or leaning 
towards an adversarial procedure use an approach to sanctions of procedural 
violations typical of the policy implementating model of proceedings rather than 
to the conflict solving one. 
The importance of codified procedural sanctions should not be underestimated. 
Disclosure violations can undermine the fairness of the trial bearing severe 
consequences for the accused as well as for the credibility for the justice system as 
a whole. Sanctions have a twofold goal as they attach consequences to the violation 
of the procedural rules and deter future violations. I will return to this aspect in the 
final paragraph of this chapter.
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8. Summary and concluding remarks on the comparative analysis
At the end of the comparative analysis of the main features of the regulation of 
disclosure in the national and international criminal procedural systems it is 
possible to summarise the main findings and to make some final remarks. 
The regulation of disclosure in criminal law systems may be implemented in 
different ways. The common law/civil law divide, although their pure forms are 
absent from modern criminal procedures, are useful for depicting the two main 
approaches for achieving disclosure. 
Common law systems present a complex disclosure mechanism articulated in 
different stages that requires the full engagement of the prosecutor and the defence 
on which the effectiveness of the system depends. This disclosure process begins 
with the prosecutor’s disclosure, followed by the defence’s disclosure and by further 
disclosure by the prosecutor. The system is regulated by complex and technical 
rules and provisions and it leaves ample room for litigation between the parties.
The inquisitorial approach to disclosure is based on the creation of the dossier or 
case file in which the material gathered during the preliminary investigation is 
found. The central element of this approach is the investigating judge’s impartiality 
whose investigation focuses on the discovery of the truth and therefore also on 
exonerating circumstances. In inquisitorial systems disclosure coincides with the 
defence’s access to the case file which can be more or less restricted depending 
on the stage of the proceedings. In the case file approach it is essential that the 
material that will form part of the dossier is properly regulated as its composition 
may be different depending on its purpose; whether it is for the confirmation of the 
charges or in preparation for trial.
In addition to these methods for achieving disclosure the research showed 
interesting procedural transplants where elements of one legal tradition have been 
imported into a procedural structure based on the other. For the purposes of this 
research procedural hybrids are interesting as they allow the investigation of the 
possible interaction of elements of different legal traditions in order to achieve a 
more efficient disclosure process. However, it is noted that a procedural transplant 
is a risky exercise which does not always give rise to the best result.106
The investigation conducted showed that disclosure is an all-present issue that 
runs through all stages of criminal proceedings. It plays a role in the pre-trial stage 
in relation to arrest warrants and indictments insofar as the supporting material 
may be the object of disclosure for the purposes of challenging the arrest or arguing 
against the confirmation of the charges. Moreover, it clearly comes into play at the 
trial stage in relation to the material that forms part of the prosecution and, to a 
certain extent, of the defence’s case. Furthermore, disclosure also remains relevant 
after the trial stage throughout the entire proceedings in relation to exculpatory 
material, for example. 
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However while disclosure matters may be present at every stage of criminal 
proceedings the scope of disclosure can vary according to the different juncture 
of the proceedings. For instance, while non-disclosure of the identity of a witness 
may be granted in the pre-trial stage such information will be disclosed in the 
preparation for trial. Similarly, access to the case file can be restricted during the 
investigation and postponed to a later stage. 
In relation to the subject matter of disclosure, the study showed that it is not 
limited to evidence in its classic sense of material presented during trial and 
turned into evidence but it also covers material and information which has not 
yet become evidence as well as material and information which ultimately will not 
become evidence but is nonetheless relevant to the defence’s case. The findings 
of a criminal investigation form part of the facilities within the meaning of 
article 6(3)(b) of the European Convention on Human Rights.107 In principle, all 
material collected during the investigation should be the object of disclosure to 
the defendant as long as it is relevant for the preparation of his defence (unless 
competing interests conflict with full disclosure). The Strasbourg Court clarified 
this principle stating that “if the element in question [collected by the authorities] 
is a document, access to that document is a necessary facility” if it concerns an act 
for which the defendant is accused. 108
Another interesting aspect of the regulation of disclosure concerns the legal 
instruments adopted by a system to implement it. In the absence of codification, 
common law systems present a multitude of texts, guidelines, regulations, 
manuals and protocols to guide implementation of disclosure practices in criminal 
proceedings. This approach appears confusing particularly in light of the fact that 
the disclosure scheme employed is already complex. Another instrument which 
plays a role in the regulation of disclosure is the jurisprudence concerning litigation 
over matters of disclosure which, as mentioned above, is significant in common 
law systems. The jurisprudence is of assistance in indicating the right disclosure 
practices. 
The adoption of one single code, such as a code of criminal procedure, containing 
the provisions to be followed when carrying out disclosure obligations seems 
preferable insofar as it confers certainty and clarity to the operation of a complex 
procedural matter. 
Disclosure is also a tool used to enhance the principle of equality of arms in systems 
where there is a structural gap between the prosecutor and the defence in terms 
of available resources. The European Court of Human Rights considered non-
disclosure as affecting the overall fairness of a criminal trial through the principle 
of the equality of arms.
Bearing this in mind, the analysis conducted showed a tendency to increase the 
strength and frequency of obligations to disclose incumbent on the defence in 
common law procedural frameworks. 
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This appears to clash with a legal tradition that regarded the defence’s disclosure 
obligations as limited or even non-existent. Limited defence disclosure obligations 
in fact, compensate for the disadvantaged position of the defence which cannot 
count on the same investigative abilities enjoyed by the Prosecutor. It is therefore 
through the disclosure of the prosecutor’s material that the defence’s position can 
be brought more in line with that of the prosecutor whereas broadened defence 
disclosure obligations fail to redress this structural imbalance. 
Moreover, this trend seems to reflect a change in the understanding of disclosure 
which moves away from being a tool to redress the inequality of the parties to 
become an instrument for achieving a more open confrontation between them. 
However, while this approach can function in systems where procedural equality 
and equality of resources both exist, it appears more problematic when the defence 
does not have the same resources as the prosecutor in relation to the investigation. 
 
In addition to this, the trend seems to create a dependency between the effectiveness 
of the prosecutor’s disclosure and the defence disclosure insofar as it enhances a 
mechanism by which the more the defence discloses about its case the more the 
prosecutor will be able to assess the relevance (for the defence case) of the material 
in its possession. This dynamic frustrates and changes the function of disclosure 
in common law systems that use a more open approach to disclosure characteristic 
of civil law. 
Disclosure is a complicated legal issue due to its inherent problem stemming from 
its literal meaning. In fact, to disclose information implies that such information 
is not known by the party to which is disclosed. Therefore, disclosure depends on 
the will of the subject in possession of the information. While the good faith of 
the parties involved must be assumed, an effective disclosure process cannot rely 
exclusively on such assumption.
The unsupervised discretion of one party (the prosecutor) to decide what material 
will be disclosed is dangerous insofar as it jeopardises the effectiveness and 
transparency of the process as well as the enhancement of the rights of the recipient 
which in most cases is the defence. 
This is also the European Court of Human Rights’ position which stated that a 
procedure whereby the police or the investigating authority itself, even when co-
operating with the prosecution, attempts to assess what may or may not be relevant 
to the case, cannot be considered as being in compliance with the requirements of 
article 6(1).109 In the same sense it held that a prosecutor’s individual decision to 
withhold information, weighing it against the defence’s right to disclosure violates 
the defence’s right to due process.110 
This problematic aspect of the disclosure of information is particularly clear in the 
Anglo-Saxon management of disclosure where the assessment of the material for 
the purposes of disclosure is central to the process and the discretion conferred to 
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the prosecutor is significant. 
A consequence of the wide discretion given to the prosecutor is that the system 
requires him to reconcile conflicting priorities such as building a case against the 
suspect/accused and safeguarding his interests by assessing the relevance of the 
material gathered for the defence’s case. This construct is unsatisfactory as it puts 
the prosecutor in a rather uncomfortable position, which can affect the quality of 
his performance and weaken the safeguarding of the defence’s rights. 
This consideration leads to the function of the judiciary in disclosure matters. The 
research proved that the role of the judge is crucial in the disclosure process and 
that the role appears to have developed and become more incisive and managerial 
departing from a more passive understanding of this function. 
In systems adopting an Anglo-Saxon model of criminal procedure the classic notion 
of a passive arbiter lost popularity and judges became more active and involved 
in the management of the proceedings and in the disclosure process. However, 
while the involvement of the judiciary in disclosure matters helps to safeguard 
the defence’s rights it cannot be a substitute for the defence’s participation in the 
process. 
At this point an important distinction must be drawn between judges who are 
called to decide on the merits of the case and judges who are not. An inquisitorial 
system envisages the first kind while a common law system envisages the second. 
The latter has a jury who decides on the guilt or innocence of the accused while the 
trial judge’s function is simply summing up all the evidence that has been presented 
to the jury. However, also in common law systems a judge may have to decide on 
an important issue that may have important repercussions on the situation of 
the accused.111 In such cases the common law judge should also be protected by 
the influence that undisclosed material, not seen by the defence, may have on his 
judgment. 
The ECtHR tackled this issue indicating that the trial judge should not be put 
in the uncomfortable and dangerous position of seeing material, whose non-
disclosure is sought by one party, when such material can have an impact on an 
issue of fact that the same judge is called upon to decide. In the latter scenario, 
the trial judge’s impartiality would be jeopardised by the potential influence of the 
material showed to him.112
This scenario, which presents itself in ex parte prosecution applications for non-
disclosure where the defence cannot participate, underlines the importance of 
having an impartial subject who is versed in disclosure matters but foreign to the 
trial proceedings. 
In this context the inquisitorial distinction between a pre-trial and a trial stage 
with the involvement of different judicial figures appears a viable solution for 
dealing with disclosure matters throughout the whole proceedings safeguarding 
the position of the trial judges. 
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An additional and interesting aspect of disclosure is given by the consequences 
attached to non-disclosure or disclosure taking place too late. This point will be 
discussed further in the next section, however it can be anticipated that the research 
revealed a lenient approach towards disclosure violations in criminal systems, such 
as those of the ICTY and the ICC, whose disclosure process is similar to a conflict 
solving model of proceedings.113 This approach is characterised by the preference 
for a remedy to the violations rather than for sanctioning them in order to ensure 
that the proceedings continue without problems. In practice this means that 
disclosure violations tend to be addressed by making concessions to the damaged 
party. For instance, in cases of the prosecutor violating his disclosure obligations it 
is common that the defence is granted extra time to assess the material disclosed 
late or the permission to re-call one or more witnesses. 
The findings summarised above show that systems of a common law origin, which 
adopt a disclosure scheme articulated in different stages, retain this approach to 
disclosure while adding procedural features of an inquisitorial flavour to their 
criminal procedure.114
The combination resulting from these transplants appears peculiar and seems to 
indicate that in order to function effectively this disclosure process needs more 
robust judicial supervision and management, broader disclosure from the defence 
and a prosecutor also capable of investigating exonerating circumstances and 
assessing the material gathered through the perspective of the defence. 
On the other hand, a procedural system such as France, whose civil law legal 
tradition is indisputable, has undertaken a process of improving the suspect’s 
procedural rights at the pre-trial stage while maintaining its approach to disclosure 
based on access to the dossier.115
Finally, Italy shows a third procedural approach of an inquisitorial criminal 
procedure moving towards an adversarial model but choosing to maintain 
the regulation of disclosure through the dossier approach. Italy in fact did not 
relinquish the feature and did not fully embrace the common law approach to the 
disclosure of information.
While in relation to other characteristics of their criminal procedure inquisitorial 
and adversarial systems appear to be more inclined to procedural transplants 
and experiments, in relation to disclosure they seem to stick to their chosen long 
standing approach as if it represented one of the few distinguishing elements of 
their own legal heritage. 
When moving to the international plane similar considerations apply. The ICTY, 
for instance, adopted significant changes to its procedure inspired by a more 
inquisitorial managing approach to the proceedings. Nevertheless it did not 
abandon the regulation of disclosure through a common law procedural scheme. 
However, a less conservative approach to the common law regulation of disclosure 
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appears to have been embraced by the ICC procedure. This approach lends itself to 
further discussion, which is developed in the following section. 
9. Disclosure in international criminal trials
 9.1 Introduction
In this work the ICTY and the ICC have been chosen as representatives of the 
international criminal justice scene. The ICTY was chosen due to its rather long 
and comprehensive experience and in view of the significant jurisprudence over 
matters of disclosure from its trials. The ICC was chosen due to its innovative 
procedural structure, the relevance that disclosure had already acquired in its 
proceedings, as well as in the light of its permanent nature making it unique in 
comparison to other international criminal courts and tribunals.
The ICTY and the ICC were established by the international community through 
the adoption of UN Security Council resolutions (ICTY), or by the ratification of a 
treaty (ICC). The determination to reject state immunity and to bring to justice the 
perpetrators of mass atrocities is channeled into and reflected by the international 
community’s creation of international courts and tribunals. From this perspective 
we can compare this approach to an activist state model where “the administration 
of justice provides the state with a vehicle for implementing its policies”.116
What procedural model can better serve international criminal proceedings and 
achieve a fair and efficient disclosure process?
This question cannot be answered having recourse to traditional schemes tout court. 
International criminal trials are very peculiar and present characteristics not common 
to domestic proceedings. Also the analysed jurisprudence of the ECtHR is of limited 
assistance as it does not have a propensity for one specific procedural structure as the 
most suitable to guarantee the fairness and effectiveness of the disclosure process. 
However the research conducted enables several weak aspects of the regulation of 
the disclosure process in the criminal procedure of the ICTY and ICC to be singled 
out. In addition, it suggests a possible means of addressing these problems in order 
to improve the disclosure process in international criminal trials. 
 9.2 Differences with national proceedings
In my view, the main purpose of international criminal proceedings, just as with 
national courts, is to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. By the same 
token international criminal courts and tribunals, even if not bound directly by 
international human rights instruments, embrace the respect for human rights as 
one of their main goals and features.117 
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International criminal trials present several unique elements and characteristics 
that contribute to differentiating them from national criminal proceedings. 
First of all, while domestic criminal courts must tackle any kind of crime, the 
jurisdiction of international criminal courts and tribunals is limited to certain types 
of crimes such as crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide (depending on 
developments on the crime of aggression at the ICC). These crimes are particularly 
heinous, were committed during or after a conflict, span many years in a vast 
geographical area and involve delicate political issues. Their magnitude and nature 
is not comparable to even the most severe crimes prosecuted by domestic courts. 
Second, significantly fewer defendants (than in domestic criminal systems) are 
prosecuted through international criminal proceedings. 
Defendants who face international criminal trials are, almost always, high profile 
military or political figures, while the status of an ordinary person in domestic 
jurisdictions is utterly irrelevant. These peculiarities must not be overlooked as 
they raise concerns regarding the smooth conduct of the trial. Political and military 
leaders through self-representation may be determined to use the platform 
of their trials to promote their own ideas and campaign rather than to defend 
themselves against the charges against them.118 Such attitude unavoidably delays 
the proceedings and requires vigorous case management by the bench. 
Third, international prosecutors cannot count, unlike their domestic counterparts, 
on the assistance of the police to carry out the investigation. There is no international 
police force to carry out investigations or to execute the Courts’ warrants. 
International cooperation and judicial assistance are essential for the effectiveness 
of the investigations which inevitably present difficulties unfamiliar to the national 
level. The prosecution in fact must collect evidence in crime scenes where an armed 
conflict may still be ongoing. In contrast, domestic courts have “the capacity, if not 
directly, at least through the extensive enforcement powers of the State, to control 
matters that could materially affect the fairness of a trial”.119
Fourth, the legal professionals called to act as judges, prosecutors and defence 
lawyers in international criminal bodies come from different criminal systems with 
diverse legal traditions.120 They bring with them their own professional experience 
and background which can be extremely different from that of their colleagues. 
Fifth, while domestic criminal proceedings are run on the basis of well-settled codes 
of both substantive and procedural criminal law, international criminal law does 
not present the same consolidated structure. As far as substantive international 
criminal law is concerned, there is consistency in the definitions of the constituent 
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In contrast, there is not a unique international criminal procedure applicable to 
every international or internationalised court or tribunal. International criminal 
procedure draws from human rights law and domestic criminal laws; it is therefore a 
hybrid field of law. 
What differs in the procedures at the international criminal tribunals and courts is 
the extent and the scope of what they import from domestic systems. The melting 
pot in which this results dictates the main features of the criminal procedure adopted 
which may be lean more or less towards one or the other main legal tradition. 
Finally, as far as disclosure of information is concerned, differences stem from the 
complex nature of war crimes cases as well as the volume of the material disclosed. 
Disclosure is a major exercise that is “extremely resource-intensive”.121 Furthermore, 
disclosure in international criminal proceedings, unlike in domestic criminal 
trials, often involves extensive translation of the documents (at least in relation to 
the charges and the supporting material) disclosed which must be provided in a 
language which the accused fully understands and speaks. 
 9.3 Critical aspects
  9.3.1 Introduction
The study conducted revealed a number of weak aspects of the regulation of 
disclosure in the disclosure regimes of both the ICTY and ICC, which were outlined 
in the previous sections. 
The following subsection does not intend to be exhaustive. Rather, it aims to sum 
up those problems that appear to be the most pressing in disclosure in international 
criminal proceedings. It further suggests possible improvements in the direction of 
a more efficient and defence rights friendly disclosure procedure in international 
criminal proceedings.
  9.3.2 The unrealistic expectations of the Prosecutor’s role
The structures of the ICTY and ICC criminal proceedings remain adversarial 
despite the injection of inquisitorial features into their procedures. 
The imbalance between the Prosecutor and the Defence in terms of investigative 
resources is evident and structural. The defendant will consequently have to rely 
on the Prosecution’s disclosure of material relevant to both the Prosecution’s and 
the defence’s case. That makes the Prosecution a source of valuable information for 
the defence’s case. 122
Both procedural systems expect their Prosecutor to play a double role as he is 
considered not only a party to adversarial proceedings but also an organ of the 
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Tribunal and in general an organ of international criminal justice. The ICTY’s 
jurisprudence went as far as defining him a “Minister of Justice with an overriding 
obligation of ensuring fairness in the proceedings”.123 The research carried out 
shows that the Prosecution seems to struggle “to establish the equilibrium between 
these two characteristics assumed to be achievable”124 and that the disclosure of 
information is one of the ambits in which such difficulties appear more evident. It 
has been remarked that the Prosecutor’s inability “to adopt this double character 
imposed on it suggests that the expectations that the prosecution can function 
consistently under both hats in criminal proceedings of the nature heard at the 
Tribunal may be an unrealistic one”.125
This understanding bears negative implications for the Defence’s position in 
different segments of the Prosecution’s disclosure process. The first of these 
segments is the investigation stage where material that will be subsequently 
disclosed is collected.
The ICC Statute states that the Prosecutor must investigate all facts and evidence 
relevant to the assessment of the suspect’s criminal responsibility and in doing 
so incriminating and exonerating circumstances must be investigated equally. As 
outlined above, this is a step forward when compared to the ICTY Statute where 
no such obligation appears. However, while the Defence appears to be better 
served by the codification of the Prosecutor’s obligation to investigate all facts and 
circumstances this is not necessarily sufficient to ensure an effective disclosure 
process. 
From the perspective of a third party the main problem seems to be the merging 
of inquisitorial and adversarial functions attributed to the prosecutor, which 
prove difficult to reconcile. It appears unrealistic to expect that, while carrying out 
investigations which aim to build a strong case against the accused, the Prosecutor 
may actively search for exculpatory evidence which would weaken his case at trial. 
In other words, the Prosecution finds itself in the somewhat awkward position of 
being expected to go against its adversarial character in the attempt to fulfil its 
inquisitorial task. Damaška’s warning about the dangers of mixing procedures for 
the effectiveness of the fact-finding result also appears applicable to the connotation 
of the Prosecutor’s role in international criminal proceedings.126
The Prosecutor’s function also leads to concern in relation to the unsupervised 
assessment of exculpatory material. The concepts of exculpatory and potentially 
exculpatory material are rather broad and their actual meaning depends 
significantly on the nature of the specific case in question. The assessment of such 
material is a crucial point of the procedure where an error may affect the overall 
fairness of the proceedings.
The above-mentioned struggle between the Prosecutor’s “two souls” is one of the 
issues which can lead, even involuntarily, to disclosure violations. The Prosecutor 
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of the material in his possession. At the same time he has to bear in mind that 
he has to build a case to prove the accused guilty. The possibility that the latter 
may influence the Prosecutor’s appraisal cannot be excluded and it is against this 
background that the lack of effective judicial control over the correct use of the 
Prosecutor’s significant discretion appears unsatisfactory. 
It is worth recalling the ECtHR’s position on this issue. The Court stressed that the 
“procedure, whereby the prosecution itself attempts to assess the importance of 
concealed information to the defence and weigh this against the public interest in 
keeping the information secret, cannot comply with the requirements of Article 6 
(1)”.127 It is the trial judge who in in the best position to make this assessment as he 
is “versed in all the evidence and issues of the case”.128  
Second, non-disclosure may occur because the Prosecutor does not fully understand 
the exculpatory nature of certain material for the Defence’s case.129 This might be 
the result of the Prosecutor’s professional background and leads to the problem of 
a lack of training for international criminal law professionals. 
An example can illustrate this point. The Prosecutor in the Furundžija case, before 
the ICTY, was informed by his deputy of a failure to disclose a document to the 
Defence, but only after the closing of the hearings and once judgment had already 
been given. The document in question was a medical certificate concerning the 
psychological treatment received by the main witness and victim in the case. The 
Defence was informed and applied to the Trial Chamber seeking to have that 
witness’ evidence struck out. The Trial Chamber re-opened the case.130
What is of interest is what was at the origin of the non-disclosure. The document 
should have been disclosed as it concerned the psychological trauma suffered 
by the victim of sexual violence who had appeared as a witness. As such it had 
the potential to affect the credibility of the Prosecution’s evidence. However, the 
Trial Attorney responsible for the case had decided that disclosure of the medical 
evidence would have amounted to a gross invasion of the witness’ privacy. The 
decision was taken “in an environment in which one inevitably draws from one’s 
own legal tradition and from a sense of professional responsibility that is very 
much the product of that tradition”.131 The prosecutor had committed an error of 
judgment probably influenced by the Canadian jurisprudence where the defendant’s 
interest in disclosure of a third party’s medical records in cases of sexual offences 
was balanced against the third party’s right to privacy. In this balancing exercise 
several factors ought to be taken into account including the dignity, the privacy 
or the safety of the third party, as well as whether denying disclosure would be a 
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reasonable limit to the ability of the accused to prepare his case. Other factors are 
the society’s interest in reporting sexual offences and in encouraging counselling 
for survivors as well as the effect of disclosure on the integrity of the trial process.132
These examples illustrate how the unsupervised assessment of the material in the 
Prosecutor’s possession (for the purposes of disclosure to the Defence) puts the 
Prosecutor in a rather uncomfortable position, which may lead to mistakes that the 
public will have difficulty understanding and accepting.
  9.3.3 The disadvantaged position of the Defence
One of the critical points of the disclosure regime in international criminal 
proceedings is the position of the Defence. Besides the above-mentioned structural 
imbalance in the level of resources available to the Defence it is also at a disadvantage 
vis à vis the Prosecutor in the light of the broadened scope of its disclosure as well 
as the fact that the Prosecution can request the Trial Chamber’s intervention to 
order further disclosure. 
The ICTY’s current system of disclosure broadened the Defence’s obligations 
through the procedural rules and through intervention by the judges. The 
amendments adopted brought the Defence closer to the Prosecution in terms of 
its disclosure commitments therefore diluting the previously clear difference in the 
roles played by the parties at trial. This feature creates a link between the scope 
of the defence’s disclosure and the efficacy and completeness of the prosecutor’s 
disclosure. In fact while the timing and nature of Defence’s disclosure should 
not alter the scope of prosecution disclosure133 in practice the more the Defence 
reveals its strategy the better the position the Prosecutor will be in to evaluate his 
material from the perspective of the Defence’s case. On this point the ICC Appeals 
Chamber considered that non-disclosure of certain limited material caused by the 
“unjustifiably and unreasonable” late disclosure of a line of defence may not per se 
compromise the fairness of the proceedings. It therefore implicitly acknowledged 
the possibility that the Defence’s conduct in the disclosure process may have 
repercussion on the material it receives from the Prosecutor. 
In addition to this, the judicial activism embraced by the ICTY and the ICC further 
amplified the defence’s obligations to disclose, sometimes even beyond the scope 
of the RPE. We have seen that the Chambers have been willing to intervene in the 
Defence’s disclosure beyond the limited obligations envisaged in order to assist 
the disclosure process and therefore expedite the trial. On several occasions the 
ICC Trial Chambers recalled Rule 79(4) which grants the Chambers the power to 
order the Defence to disclose any other evidence as well as Regulation 54 of the 
Court which provides the Chambers with the authority to order the production and 
disclosure of the statements given by witnesses the accused intends to call. 
Examples of this judge led approach can be found in several of the ICC’s proceedings. 
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For instance, in Lubanga, in preparation for the confirmation hearing, the Single 
Judge ordered the Defence to file in the record of the case and as soon as practicable 
after the Defence’s description of evidence had been filed, the statements given by 
witnesses it intended to rely on at the confirmation hearing.134 In Abu Garda the 
Defence was ordered to submit “information as to the proposed subject matter and 
scope of the prospective questioning of the witness” to the Pre-Trial Chamber.135 
Moreover, in Katanga and Chui the Trial Chamber remarked that the Defence’s 
decision to challenge the testimony of a Prosecution witness by using documentary 
evidence triggers an obligation to disclose the documents to the Prosecution in 
sufficient in advance of the witness’ testimony.136 
It emerges that broadened defence disclosure obligations reduce the difference in 
scope between the defence and the prosecutor’s disclosure affecting the possibility 
to redress the structural imbalance, in relation to the information available, that 
exists between them.
Furthermore, the second problematic aspect of the defence’s position touches upon 
the inherent problem of disclosure in criminal proceedings and can be summarised 
by a question: how can somebody make a request for the disclosure of a specific 
item of material if he is not aware of its existence or content? 
The Defence’s ability to challenge the Prosecution’s assessment of the material 
in its possession is limited. Vague requests by the Defence tend to restate the 
Prosecutor obligations envisaged by the RPE and are often dismissed as “fishing 
expeditions”. However, establishing a prima facie case on the existence of the 
material, its possession by the Prosecution and its relevance to the Defence’s case is 
a daunting task. It is indeed nearly impossible for the Defence, in the absence of an 
indication or partial disclosure on the part of the Prosecution, to have knowledge 
of exculpatory material in the possession of the Prosecution.137 
  9.3.4 Disclosure of confidential exculpatory material
Evidence in international war crimes trials is of a unique nature due to the crimes 
prosecuted as well as to the political context surrounding their perpetration. States 
that provide documents may have an interest in preserving their confidential 
nature. Disclosure is not an absolute right and there are competing interests which 
may arise and need to be taken into consideration in determining whether a piece 
of information must be disclosed or not. National security is one of the most 
recurrent concerns linked to the evidence for war crimes trials. 
The ICC Statute authorises the Prosecutor to enter into confidential agreements 
with third parties in order to obtain documents or information for the sole purpose 
of generating new evidence. This provision is necessary in a context in which the 
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Prosecutor is highly reliant on state cooperation to carry out the investigation. 
Confidential agreements are essential for the effectiveness of the investigation. 
However, it cannot be left to the Prosecutor to evaluate whether potentially 
exculpatory material should be withheld from the Defence. This provision poses the 
problem of how to safeguard the Defence’s right to disclosure when the Prosecutor 
is provided with confidential evidence of exculpatory nature and cannot disclose 
it to the Defence or the Court without the provider’s consent. The Court has a 
limited ability to supervise and prevent misuse of confidentiality agreements to 
the detriment of the defendant.138 
This research shows that the safeguards installed to protect the Defence’s rights as 
envisaged by the procedures are not satisfactory. For instance, Article 67 of the ICC 
Statute stipulates that in case of doubt as to the exculpatory nature of evidence, the 
Court shall decide. Rule 83 underpins the provision envisaging an ex parte hearing at 
the request of the Prosecutor to rule on exculpatory evidence. However, it is evident 
that the Court’s intervention is possible rather than certain. It is the Prosecution’s 
action that triggers this provision which has its effectiveness hollowed out in case 
of the Prosecution’s inaction. The structure appears to threaten the efficacy of the 
disclosure process. The potential scenario is that exculpatory evidence gathered or 
known by the Prosecutor remains hidden from the defendant and the Court. 
The disclosure of this material to the judges is a step in the right direction. 
However, it generates further questions linked to the necessity of not influencing 
the judges, to the effectiveness of their scrutiny and to the Defence’s participation 
in the process. 
Without the Defence’s participation in the ex parte hearing (concerning material 
gathered through confidential agreements) the judges will have to monitor the 
procedure to ensure the protection of the accused’s rights. However this seems to 
come at some cost. It is self-evident that disposing of non-disclosure application 
involves the access to confidential material, which cannot be shown to the Defence. 
The Trial judges will see and assess material, which in case of non-disclosure will 
not form part of the trial and as such will have to be discarded by the judges when 
reaching their verdict. It is worth recalling that potentially exculpatory material 
may also include evidence which contains both exculpatory and incriminating 
circumstances. On this point the jurisprudence from the ECtHR states that the trial 
judge should not be put in the “uncomfortable position of having to see material 
and then having to discount it at a later stage of the proceeding”. 139
Moreover it is noted that even if the judges are involved in the assessment of the 
material in question this is not necessarily sufficient to safeguard the Defence’s 
position; at least according to the ECtHR jurisprudence which stated that in 
proceedings where non-disclosure is invoked on national security grounds, 
the judicial review without any of the Defence’s adversarial involvement in the 
procedure is not sufficient to comply with the Defence’s guarantees envisaged by 
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the Convention.140 In other words, the judge is not in a position to compensate for 
the lack of the Defence’s participation. 
While it is true that international criminal judicial bodies are not bound by the 
jurisdiction of the ECtHR their instruments contain provisions proclaiming 
respect for the highest human rights standards. The ICC Appeals Chamber stated 
(in relation to the possibility for the defendant to challenge his detention) that 
based on the ECtHR jurisprudence the Defence must, to the largest extent possible, 
be granted access to documents in order to ensure both the equality of arms and an 
adversarial procedure.141
Doubts remain even when the ECtHR is left aside and a more  pragmatic perspective 
is embraced. Can the Trial Chamber’s scrutiny of the confidential exculpatory 
material be effective? In order to assess whether the non-disclosure of potentially 
exculpatory material to the Defence would have repercussions on the determination 
of the guilt or innocence of the accused and therefore impair the fairness of the 
trial, the Trial Chamber should have a detailed knowledge of the case.142 This would 
go against the adversarial nature of the procedure. We have seen that at the ICC 
the question of the record of the pre-trial proceedings was highly debated in the 
negotiations and the Rules are ambiguous as to whether the Trial Chamber should 
have access to those records. But how can the Trial Chamber determine the weight 
of a piece of information for a case if it has limited knowledge of it? 
Against this background improvements in the regulation of non-disclosure of 
confidential material appear necessary.
  
  9.3.5 The lack of codified procedural sanctions for disclosure violations
“Playing by the rules is a value in itself, and violating the rules may lead to 
punitive consequences irrespective of the concrete outcomes of the trial”.143 
This is a characteristic of the process administration which Damaška defines 
a “conflicts solving” model where procedural violations are responded to with 
precise and severe penalties regardless of the fact that this approach may impede 
the proceedings, preventing them from reaching an end.144 This type of system is 
related to the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition and to the accusatorial procedure. In 
relation to disclosure this is an important principle as well as a concrete safeguard 
for the accused vis á vis the Prosecution’s poor disclosure. 
However, we have seen through the analysis of the ICTY’s jurisprudence how a 
criminal law system, which is influenced by the common law procedure, does not 
include a precise system of procedural sanctions for disclosure violations. 
The Tribunal’s practice shows that the “sanctioning approach” is not the primary 
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option.145 In practice the Trial Chambers have felt more at ease in granting the 
Defence some sort of relief in the form of additional time to study the newly 
disclosed material or the possibility of re-calling the Prosecutor’s witnesses, rather 
than in imposing sanctions on the Prosecutor or ordering a stay jn the proceedings. 
In other words, the application of Rule 68 bis has focused more on the remedy than 
on the sanctions.
It is not uncommon to come across statements such as “disclosure practice of the 
Prosecutor had not been satisfactory”146 or “the numerous disclosure violations 
reflected badly on the Prosecution”147 while analysing the Trial Chambers’ assessment 
of the way in which the Prosecution discharged its disclosure obligations. However, 
despite the Appeals Chamber’s statement that it “will not tolerate anything short of 
strict compliance with disclosure obligations” reacting timidly to the Prosecution’s 
disclosure violations appears to be common practice at the Trial Chambers.
This is unsatisfactory insofar as recurrent disclosure violations have a negative impact 
on the “clear and cohesive view” of the Prosecution’s case that the Defence should 
have and on its resources regardless of the specific prejudice suffered in relation 
to any single episode of non-disclosure or late disclosure. The cumulative effect of 
multiple disclosure violations cannot be overlooked.  Disclosure should be prompt in 
order to be effective and allow the Defence to prepare and present its case. 
The ICC’s procedure also leaves the choice of appropriate sanctions to the judges 
based on the specific violation and on a case-by-case basis. The Rome Statute 
and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not foresee any sanction in case of 
disclosure. The only exception is the exclusion of evidence disclosed too late in 
preparation for the confirmation hearing pursuant to Rule 121(8). 
Nevertheless in Lubanga the Trial Chamber seemed to mark a difference with the 
ICTY’s approach insofar as it ordered a stay in the proceedings when confronted 
with Prosecutor’s non-disclosure of exculpatory material. The Prosecutor had 
indeed entered into confidential agreements with the UN and other providers 
which prevented him from disclosing the material to the Defence as well as to the 
judges. The Trial Chamber considered that the trial process had been “ruptured to 
such a degree” that it was “impossible to piece together the constituent elements 
of a fair trial”.148
However, as discussed, the difference with the ICTY is less evident when we 
consider that the TC imposed a provisional stay in the proceedings which was 
lifted once the Prosecutor had complied with his disclosure obligations.149 The 
Trial Chamber did not order the discontinuance of the proceedings. The measure 
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adopted therefore seems to aim towards offering the Prosecutor the possibility of 
bringing the trial back to a point at which it was fair rather than sanction him for 
his grave misconduct. As Caianiello puts it “even when applied, sanctions are not 
meant to hit the party which disregarded its duties, but rather to act as a threat that 
remains effective as long as the party continues to behave unfairly.”150 This approach 
resembles the ICTY’s preference for a remedial rather than a sanctioning approach 
or to use Damaška’s terms this is a policy implementing approach to procedural 
violations.
Likewise, the second major disclosure issue that arose in the Lubanga case is of 
interest in relation to the issue of sanctions. The Trial Chamber was faced with the 
Prosecutor’s resistance to disclose the identity of his intermediaries.151 The latter 
can be described as in situ assistants to the OTP who, among other things, establish 
contacts with potential witnesses in areas and cultures which often are challenging. 
The Prosecutor refused to obey the judges’ order to disclose to the defence the 
identity of an intermediary and the Trial Chamber ordered a (temporary) stay 
in the proceedings.152 The Trial Chamber noted that “the Prosecutor has chosen 
to prosecute this accused. In the Chamber’s judgment, he cannot be allowed 
to continue with this prosecution if he seeks to reserve to himself the right to 
avoid the Court’s orders whenever he decides that they are inconsistent with his 
interpretation of his other obligations”.153
However, the Appeal Chambers reversed this decision and found that Trial Chamber 
should have sought to induce the OTP’s compliance through the imposition of 
measures, such as reprimands or pecuniary sanctions, pursuant to Article 71 of the 
Statute to address the Prosecution’s misconduct before resorting to the imposition 
of a stay.154 Specifically the AC found that “sanctions under article 71 of the Statute 
are the proper mechanism for a Trial Chamber to maintain control of proceedings 
when faced with the deliberate refusal of a party to comply with its orders. Before 
ordering a stay of proceedings because of a party’s refusal to comply with its orders, 
a Trial Chamber should, to the extent possible, impose sanctions and give such 
sanctions reasonable time to bring about compliance”.155
The Appeals Chamber therefore opted for a professional sanction rather than a 
procedural ones in line with the previous trend.
  9.3.6 The amount of litigation over disclosure matters
Finally, the last critical aspect of the current disclosure system in the ICTY and 
ICC procedures that worth mentioning is the enormous amount of litigation over 
Chapter 8
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disclosure matters that both systems generate.
The adoption of technical and complex procedural rules to regulate disclosure in 
international criminal trials leaves a significant amount of room for such litigation 
and the parties do not hesitate to exploit it. Trial Chambers of the ICTY and ICC 
have been swamped in motions concerning disclosure at the pre-trial, trial and 
also post-trial stage.156 This extensive litigation inevitably delays the conduct of 
criminal proceedings. 
On this point it is worth citing an explanation for the inefficiency of the common 
law approach to disclosure in international criminal trials given by an English 
Queen’s Counsel.157 He argues that common law provides significant opportunities 
for defence lawyers to litigate on disclosure matters and that at the domestic level 
they and the judges know the limits as they have been forged by longstanding 
practices. In contrast, in international criminal trials there is not such a clear 
understanding of the limits to this litigation as defence counsel and trial judges 
come from different legal cultures and “what could work at national level could be 
a disaster at the international level”.158
 9.4 Possible improvements
Twenty years of ICTY experience seems a reasonable enough time to assess the 
result of the Anglo-Saxon procedural approach to disclosure in international 
criminal trials. In addition, the relatively young ICC has already offered an 
interesting contribution to the discussion through the substantial jurisprudence 
over disclosure stemming from its first cases. 
This study suggests that the current disclosure scheme is too complex and intricate 
and that it affects the expeditiousness of the proceedings without properly 
protecting the Defence’s right to disclosure. 
In the light of the results of the research carried out it is possible to suggest a few 
possible improvements in the attempt to achieve a more efficient disclosure process 
in international criminal trials. 
The ICC’s procedural structure, which envisages the creation of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber and the hearing to confirm the charges, seems a suitable setting to be 
taken as the base on which to implement the proposed suggestions.
The unrealistic expectation that the Prosecutor may effectively manage disclosure 
while reconciling adversarial and inquisitorial souls should be abandoned in 
favour of a more realistic configuration of its role. It is submitted that the role of the 
Prosecutor should be revised in an inquisitorial light in order to address the negative 
implications on the disclosure scheme of its current untenable connotation. The 
investigation stage and the complex procedural rules regulating disclosure should 
be reconsidered in order to leave for more substantial judicial involvement in the 
former and to the adoption of a dossier approach in relation to the latter. 
Conclusion
_______________________
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The investigative phase should contemplate the active involvement of a super 
partes judicial organ whose goal would be to investigate in order to find the truth 
over a specific situation rather than to investigate with the aim of building a case 
against the suspect. De Hemptinne suggests the creation of investigating chambers 
to direct the investigations or to confer the power to intervene in the investigtion 
when the Proseutor refuses to take specific investigative initiatives to existent Pre-
Trial Chambers. 159
While it is true that a newly created investigative body could serve this purpose, 
this solution would require significant structural changes and considerable 
financial resources and appears too ambitious and unlikely to be implemented. 
The second possibility appears more attractive and involves staying within the 
structure depicted by the ICC procedure and using the Pre-Trial Chamber as the 
judicial body playing that role.160
On this point it is noted that the ICC’s procedure already envisages a supervisory/
monitoring role for the Pre-Trial Chamber over the Prosecutor’s investigative 
activity. Specifically, it goes as far as empowering it to intervene, by taking the 
necessary measures on its own initiative, when it deems that the Prosecutor failed 
to secure a unique investigative opportunity to gather material favourable to the 
Defence’s case.161 Taking this provision as a starting point, the proposed approach 
would represent a major further step in the direction already indicated.
As suggested by De Hemptinne, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s investigative powers 
should be increased in order to guide the Prosecutor’s activity rather than limiting 
its action to supervision.162 The Pre-Trial Chamber would be fully aware of the 
investigation and follow their developments through regular updates from the 
Prosecutor. Furthermore, it would direct the Prosecutor’s search ensuring that all 
lines of enquiry are followed. It would have compulsory powers over the investigative 
activities and it would be composed of, inter alia, professionals specifically trained 
for these complex investigations. This solution would benefit the Defence which 
would be safeguarded by the PTC’s impartiality and unique function and at the 
same time would solve the conflict that the Prosecutor experiences in the current 
system where he must investigate both as an inquisitorial judge and prosecute as 
an adversarial counsel.
As far as disclosure is concerned, once the investigations are concluded the material 
gathered could be merged into a case file available to the parties and the Pre-Trial 
Chamber. As suggested by several authors, the switch to system of disclosure using 
an open case file could prove beneficial to the efficacy of the process as well as 
safeguarding the Defence’s position in the process.163 In this context it should be 
noted that the creation of a record of the pre-trial proceedings is already envisaged 
by the ICC’s procedure. One may wonder whether such a feature could be the first 
Chapter 8
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159 De Hemptinne J., The Creation of Investigating Chambers at the International Criminal Court, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, 5 (2007), 402-418.
160 Ibid.
161 ICC Statute, Article 56(3).
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step of an attempt to move away from an adversarial regulation of disclosure towards 
an inquisitorial one where both parties are granted access to the case file.164 On this 
point it is of interest that the solution proposed by Heinze concerning the adoption 
of the double dossier system employed by the Italian criminal procedure.165
This approach would permit the departure from technical and intricate procedural 
rules of disclosure which can lead to major litigation over disclosure matters. 
Moreover, it would remove the Prosecutor’s unsupervised discretion in the 
assessment of the material in his possession. The current system in fact, requires 
the Prosecutor to evaluate the material gathered from the Defence’s perspective 
in order to assess its relevance to the Defence’s case or its exculpatory nature. This 
section of the disclosure process would be avoided by allowing the Defence to 
assess for itself the material gathered through the investigation.  
Therefore, the Defence would have access to the case file of the investigation 
created by the Prosecutor under the Pre-Trial Chamber’s guidance and supervision 
The results of the Defence’s investigations (if carried out) would also merge into 
the case file. In an ideal world a different Pre-Trial Chamber could hold the hearing 
to confirm the charges. However, bearing in mind the costs of such a solution it is 
submitted that once the Pre-Trial Chamber is more involved in the investigation a 
faster confirmation procedure could be envisaged in order to balance the resources 
of the Pre-Trial Chambers. 
All the motions concerning disclosure would be dealt with by the Pre-Trial Chamber, 
which being foreign to the trial proceedings, could supervise the disclosure 
procedure without running the risk of being prejudiced against the accused at a 
later stage of the proceedings. This approach would spare the Trial Chamber from 
any contamination with, for instance, confidential material which may ultimately 
not become evidence and will have to be discarded at a later stage when reaching a 
verdict. It is noteworthy that in the ICC procedure the PTC already has the power to 
issue orders concerning disclosure.166 The Pre-Trial Chamber would dispose of all 
the disclosure motions filed by the parties not only before the confirmation of the 
charges but throughout the entire proceedings. Notably, ICC’s procedure already 
envisages the possibility for the Trial Chamber, if necessary for effective and fair 
functioning, to refer matters to the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
On this point, while this approach would probably lessen the amount of disclosure 
litigation there would still be competing interests to be accommodated. The 
protection of witnesses and national security concerns play an important role 
in war crimes trials. The Pre-Trial Chamber would be the consignee of motions 
seeking non-disclosure on which it could decide being knowledgeable of the 
material gathered through the investigation and their relevance for the Defence. 
Moreover, a system where a judicial body such as the Pre-Trial Chamber is 
Conclusion
_______________________
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actively involved in the investigations makes it difficult if not impossible for the 
Prosecutor to enter into confidential agreements that prevent the Chamber from 
the disclosure of the material (sometimes exculpatory) provided. At the same time, 
Pre-Trial Chamber’s involvement in the investigation does not seem to be a strong 
deterrent for third parties providers to enter into such agreements. The Pre-Trial 
Chamber would indeed be bound by the same confidentiality clauses foreseen for 
the Prosecutor.
On the delicate issue of confidential exculpatory material the approach should 
be rather strict conceiving its disclosure as the rule and non-disclosure as a very 
limited exception which should be adequately counterbalanced. If the Pre-Trial 
Chamber is persistently prevented from disclosing the confidential exculpatory 
material to the Defence it should order the Prosecutor to drop the charges involving 
the evidence in question.167
Furthermore, the Defence’s position in an ex parte application for non-disclosure 
could be improved by the adoption of creative measures. On this issue the English/
Canadian solution outlined above envisaging the creation of a special advocate 
could be explored. A somewhat similar and creative approach was suggested 
(but not adopted) in the ICTY in the Blaškić case where the Defence, while filing 
a motion for disclosure of exculpatory material, suggested the appointment of 
an ombudsman who could examine the Prosecution’s files in order to assess the 
exculpatory character of the material in its possession.168 The creation of a figure 
not directly linked to the defendant who could participate in such a hearing to 
guard the defence’s interests could improve the fairness of the disclosure process. 
In addition to this, the disclosure process could benefit from the adoption of a 
codified system of procedural sanctions for disclosure violations. This system, 
not as important but nonetheless useful in the system proposed, would have a 
deterrent effect and at the same time it would provide certainty and credibility 
to the entire procedure. Not every procedural violation should be followed by 
procedural sanctions. However, as stated by Caianiello, disclosure violations, 
particularly those concerning exculpatory material, should lead to a sanction 
which produces its effects within the process rather than outside it.169 In other 
words, sanctions for a disclosure violation should reflect on the procedure rather 
than on the subject who committed it. An example of the first is the non-admission 
of evidence disclosed too late. An example of the second is the imposition of a 
deontological sanction on the counsel responsible of the disclosure violation as in 
the Lubanga case in relation to disclosure violations pertaining to the identity of 
the Prosecutor’s intermediaries. 
Disclosure violations should not automatically lead to extreme consequences such 
as the non-admission of the evidence in question. There are instances, such as the 
_______________________
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late disclosure of information, where additional time is capable of remedying the 
late disclosure. However, when non-disclosure of significant exculpatory material 
occurs it seems difficult to envisage any solution other than the withdrawal of the 
charges to which such material pertains. Let us suppose that an accused stands 
trial for war crimes and/or crimes against humanity allegedly perpetrated in several 
municipalities of a specific region/country during an armed conflict. Let us further 
suppose that in relation to the accused’s conduct in one specific municipality 
there exists clear exonerating evidence that the prosecutor is not in the position 
to disclose to the defence. Assuming that the judges have access to the material it 
appears complex to envisage a third option beyond the disclosure of such material 
or the withdrawal of the charges related to that specific municipality. 
One may argue that this is a somewhat Defence friendly perspective. I submit that 
it is a human rights friendly one. Can we consider proceedings where an accused is 
found guilty of specific conduct regardless of the ascertained existence of material 
able to exonerate him from such accusation to be fair?
Finally, it should not be underestimated that “disclosure is only as good as the 
person doing it”.170 The more or less adversarial or inquisitorial characterisation of 
the disclosure process loses some importance insofar as the professionals carrying 
out disclosure will bring their own professional experience and background to the 
table. It would be desirable to envisage specific training for international criminal 
law experts before being admitted to practice as Prosecutors, judges or Defence 
counsel in international criminal proceedings. This step would be easier to take 
should a unified criminal procedure to be adopted for all international criminal 
trials. 
A unique criminal procedure applicable to international criminal trials would 
be a welcome step that could contribute legitimacy and coherence to a relatively 
young field of law avoiding the counterproductive proliferation of different types of 
criminal procedures at the international level. This procedure should be tailored to 
the needs and circumstances of international criminal trials. It could draw from the 
significant experience of international criminal courts and tribunals that indicate 
what procedural rules can better address such needs. Unfortunately, it is unrealistic 
to expect that a common international criminal procedure will be established at 
any time in the near future.
_______________________ 




The subject of this work is the disclosure of information in national and 
international criminal proceedings. Disclosure and the procedure regulating it 
represent a subject matter in which crime control and human rights find their 
synthesis. Disclosure is a complex subject that covers different branches of law as it 
involves aspects of a procedural nature as well as considerations that belong to the 
realm of human rights law. 
Disclosure is also complicated by its inherent imperfection caused by the fact 
that the system entrusts a party to a trial with the discretion to decide on what 
to disclose to the other side. It has been characterised as the “battleground of the 
modern legal system”.1
The purpose of the study is to scrutinise and evaluate the regulation of disclosure 
in national and international procedural systems in order to gain knowledge of the 
different ways in which the disclosure of information can be achieved. 
The research project investigates, on a comparative basis, the rules of procedure 
and evidence regulating disclosure in five criminal procedural systems. Three of 
these systems are national (England, Italy and France) and two international (ICTY 
and ICC). 
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the right 
to a fair trial and, more specifically, on the disclosure of information provides the 
background against which these systems and their disclosure processes can be 
assessed.
The comparative analysis singles out and addresses the main critical aspects of 
the disclosure of information in each procedural framework. This analysis gives 
account of the different characteristics that the prosecutor, the defence and the 
judges present in the system scrutinised as well as of the ramifications that these 
differences bear in relation to the disclosure process. Several questions arise such 
as: What is the influence that different legal traditions such as common law and 
civil law exercise on disclosure? What role should the defence, the prosecutor 
and the judges play in the disclosure process? What judicial supervision, if 
any, should be envisaged in the disclosure process and at what stage? How can 
disclosure accommodate competing interests? And what should the consequences 
of disclosure violations be?
The pattern followed and the order chosen in the redaction of the chapters present 
the characteristics of a pyramid structure where the analysis of the three domestic 
legal systems, through the filter of the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights, guides us to the International plane. 
Finally, this work attempts to suggest possible improvements for the current 
regulation of disclosure. 
The research, after a brief introduction, is developed in chapters 1 to 8. 
Chapter 1 describes and analyses the disclosure of information in the English criminal 
_______________________
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law system that has been chosen as a representative of the common law tradition 
in the regulation of disclosure. However, as the research unfolds it becomes clear 
that, while the disclosure process made up of different stages involving both parties 
remain a feature of adversarial legal origin, several elements of the procedure of 
more inquisitorial flavour have permeated the criminal procedure.  
The English law on disclosure has been in constant development over the past 
thirty years. Case law and statutory law have characterised it alternatively more or 
less narrowly. The process has been compared to a pendulum swinging periodically 
between more open and more controlled disclosure of unused material.2
After the Middle Ages, England developed its criminal system in an adversarial 
fashion where the disclosure process is regulated by technical procedural rules, 
involves different stages and relies on the engagement and accuracy of the parties.
From the analysis carried out it emerges that pre-trial disclosure of the prosecution’s 
case and evidence against the accused is a settled and somewhat uncontroversial 
principle of natural justice. What appears to be more controversial and difficult to 
reconcile with the adversarial tradition is the prosecution’s duty to disclose unused 
material, which is all the material generated and gathered in the course of a criminal 
investigation. In addition, the introduction of defence disclosure obligations, has 
proved difficult to digest for the defence practitioners and its application has been 
poor. 
One of the main critical aspects of the English system of disclosure appears to be the 
expectation placed on the prosecutor in relation to the assessment of the material 
in his possession. Specifically, the prosecutor while deciding upon disclosure has 
to apply a test that, although objective in nature, requires him to assess material 
from a defence perspective or, in other words, to empathise with his opponent. 
Upon these premises, the effectiveness of the system depends on the way in which 
the prosecution handles the conflict between the responsibilities and expectations 
placed on it and its cultural tradition. This issue also features in the disclosure 
process of the international criminal systems assessed in chapter 6 and 7.
Chapter 2 describes and assesses the disclosure of information in the Italian criminal 
law system. The Italian criminal procedural experience is interesting insofar as the 
criminal procedural system migrated from its deeply rooted inquisitorial legal 
tradition to a criminal procedure oriented towards and inspired by adversarial 
principles. 
The new characterisation of the criminal law system has important bearings on the 
regulation of the disclosure of information to the suspect/accused during criminal 
proceedings. 
The study of the Italian criminal procedure on disclosure reveals that, despite the 
proclaimed migration of the criminal procedure towards an adversarial model, the 
system did not relinquish several important features of its inquisitorial tradition. 
For instance the system, being reluctant to leave the truth seeking process entirely 
in the hands of the parties, maintained a rather strong judicial power, inter alia, 
in relation to the admission of evidence that, if it is considered necessary can be 
_______________________
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admitted motu proprio by the judges. In addition, the role played by the prosecutor 
remains closer to the inquisitorial tradition, although the system formally requires 
him to act as a party on the same footing as the defence.  In relation to the disclosure 
of information, the system preferred to maintain the dossier approach to achieve 
disclosure. The research also reveals that disclosure assumes different meanings and 
characteristics in accordance to the stage of the proceedings in which it operates. 
It is possible to configure two different types of disclosure. An “external disclosure” 
referring to the information to the relevant person of the beginning/existence 
of criminal proceedings (although at its embryonic phase) against him and an 
“internal disclosure” that refers to the material gathered through the investigations 
and to the evidence the parties intend to present at trial and therefore the essence 
of the case.
Chapter 3 investigates the disclosure of information in the French criminal law 
system. France has been selected as a representative of the classical civil law legal 
tradition in which disclosure is achieved through the suspect/accused access to the 
dossier in which the results of the investigations conducted by the investigating 
judge are gathered. A brief description of the roots of the criminal law system 
facilitates an understanding of the main elements that characterise the modern 
criminal procedure. An overview of the three main phases of criminal proceedings 
(police investigation and the prosecution, the judicial investigation and the trial) 
as well as of their protagonists and their main procedural characteristics allows the 
singling out of the segments of the criminal procedure in which disclosure plays 
(or should play) a role. An important element of this chapter is the assessment 
of how the disclosure of information to the suspect/accused functions with 
particular attention (also in the context of the garde à vue regime) paid to the right 
to be informed of the nature of the accusations, the right to have access to legal 
assistance and the possibility of access to the dossier. The research shows that the 
French criminal law system experienced difficulties in finding the balance between 
the suspect’s right to a fair trial and the inquisitorial pre-trial stage. Disclosure, 
intended as the suspect’s right to be informed of the accusations and the evidence 
gathered against him, is a concept that seems to conflict with the inquisitorial 
nature of the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the research 
revealed that recent changes in the law improved the condition of the suspect 
detained in relation to the information provided to him. Divergently, the trial stage 
presents a more “adversarial” characterisation of the rights of the accused. Full 
disclosure of the case file and the exchange of the witness lists allow each party to 
have a clear picture of the material gathered and of the other side’s strategy. The 
question is to what extent this openness can be effective when it takes place in the 
final stage of the proceedings where the dossier has already been formed.
Chapter 4 and 5 investigate and describe the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) case law on the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights as well as more specifically on the issue of disclosure. 
The study of the Court jurisprudence allows some of the critical aspects of 
disclosure to be singled out stressing its solid nexus with human rights law as 
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well as appreciating the contribution that the ECtHR jurisprudence gave to 
the development of disclosure in their criminal proceedings. In fact, while the 
Strasbourg Court does not tell us which is the preferable way to regulate disclosure 
it tells us which features of the criminal procedure conflict with the right to a fair 
trial and with the right of disclosure. The jurisprudence of the Court is therefore 
of assistance in the assessment of the disclosure process in national systems and 
that is why the procedural systems chosen are all subjected to the jurisdiction of 
the Court. However, also in relation to the International criminal bodies selected in 
this work the ECtHR case-law is useful considering that, even if they are not bound 
by its jurisprudence, their legal instruments enshrine the obligation to respect 
the right to a fair trial. The research shows that disclosure has been recognised by 
the Court as an element of the right to a fair trial through different angles of the 
provisions and principles of Article 6 of the Convention. Moreover, the study of 
the ECtHR reveals the essential principles concerning several interesting elements 
of the disclosure of information. Specifically it shed light on the subject matter 
of disclosure, the relation between the non-disclosed material and the issue of 
actual prejudice, the managing of the conflict between the right to disclosure and 
the public interest as well as on the possibility of remedying the lack of disclosure 
on appeal. This analysis provides a valid tool for assessing the rules regarding the 
disclosure of information in the national and international criminal procedural 
systems examined in this book.
Moving to the international plane, chapter 6 assesses the disclosure of information 
in the legal system of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY). The ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) initially established a 
criminal procedure oriented significantly towards an adversarial model. However, 
this approach to a war crimes trial soon proved unfit to run expeditious proceedings. 
The adoption of new rules of procedure and evidence and several amendments to 
the existing rules have marked, since 1998, a departure from the original adversarial 
orientation of the RPE. The new procedural system features a more active judicial 
control over the proceedings, which is described as judicial management of the 
case. In relation to disclosure, the ICTY maintained an adversarial approach based 
on a process regulated by a set of technical rules. The assessment of the Tribunal’s 
disclosure regime carried out in this chapter showed that the role of the Prosecutor 
is sui generis as he has characteristics which belong to different legal models. He is 
indeed expected to prosecute as in an adversarial context and at the same time to 
act as a super partes entity of inquisitorial origin. This duality of the Prosecution’s 
functions (envisaged by the Tribunal’s jurisprudence) appears to have negative 
repercussions on the disclosure regime. Moreover, the study highlights other critical 
aspects of the disclosure practice such as the broadened Defence disclosure; the 
Prosecution’s in camera applications for non-disclosure which do not grant a real 
opportunity to the Defence to make its case for disclosure; the issue of prejudice 
in relation to Article 68bis sanctions; the Tribunal’s practice of not imposing 
procedural sanctions for disclosure violations and the limited effectiveness of the 
safeguards envisaged by the RPE in relation to confidential material ex Rule 70. 
Chapter 7 scrutinises the disclosure of information in the criminal procedure of 
the International Criminal Court. The analysis carried out shows that the ICC legal 
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system established through the adoption of the Rome Statute and the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence has been injected with significant inquisitorial elements. 
However, these elements operate in a context that maintains features of the 
common law tradition such as the trial hearing in which the parties present their 
cases and, more importantly, the disclosure of information that is regulated by an 
clear set of technical rules. 
The ICC legal framework grants to the judiciary a position of control over and 
intervention in the proceedings at both pre-trial and trial stage. The creation of 
Pre-Trial Chambers (PTC), which is reminiscent of an Italian giudice per le indagini 
preliminari, is an interesting feature as well as the establishment of a potentially 
adversarial hearing to confirm the charges. The PTC monitoring function over the 
Prosecutor and its power to ensure that disclosure takes place under satisfactory 
conditions in preparation for the confirmation hearing reveals an inquisitorial 
flavour. Significant in this sense is the emphasis placed on the Chamber as the 
organ designated as having the final word on the exculpatory nature of the material 
in possession of the Prosecutor. The codified super partes role of the Prosecutor 
during the investigation is welcome when assessed against the developments of his 
ICTY counterpart. Moreover, the creation of the record of the pre-trial proceedings 
is another noteworthy innovation that seems to be prone to be developed in the 
direction of a more open and simplified disclosure process.
Finally, in chapter 8 the comparative analysis is developed summarising its main 
findings in relation to the disclosure of information in the different criminal 
procedures investigated. This process provides the indispensable tool for suggesting 
possible improvements in the current regulation of disclosure.
In this context, particular attention is paid to modern international criminal 
proceedings as they are relatively new and because of the ongoing debate on the 
possibility of establishing a single common criminal procedure applicable to all 
International criminal Courts and Tribunals. The study conducted suggests that 
the current disclosure scheme is too complex and intricate and that it affects the 
expeditiousness of the proceedings without properly protecting the defence’s right 
to disclosure. 
I argue in favour of the adoption of a more inquisitorial disclosure process in which 
the investigation stage and the complex procedural rules regulating disclosure 
should be reconsidered to leave room for substantial judicial involvement in the 




Het onderwerp van deze studie is het verschaffen van toegang tot informatie in 
nationale en internationale strafprocedures. Het verschaffen van toegang tot 
informatie en de procedurele regeling daarvan betreft een onderwerp waarbij 
enerzijds het belang van een adequate reactie op strafbare feiten en anderzijds 
mensenrechten een rol spelen. Het is een complex onderwerp omdat het meerdere 
onderdelen van het recht bestrijkt. Het onderwerp is tevens lastig door de onbalans 
die veroorzaakt wordt door het feit dat één van de partijen de beoordelingsruimte 
is toebedeeld om te beslissen tot welke informatie de andere partij toegang moet 
krijgen. Daarom is het wel gekarakteriseerd als het ‘strijdtoneel van het moderne 
rechtssysteem’.
Het doel van deze studie is het onderzoeken en beoordelen van de regeling 
inzake het verschaffen van toegang tot informatie in nationale en internationale 
strafrechtsstelsels om zodoende kennis te verwerven over de verschillende wijzen 
waarop die toegang kan worden bewerkstelligd.
In deze studie zijn, rechtsvergelijkend, de strafvorderlijke beginselen en regels over 
het verschaffen van toegang tot informatie in vijf strafrechtsstelsels onderzocht. 
Drie van deze stelsels zijn nationaalrechtelijk: Engeland, Italië en Frankrijk; twee 
zijn internationaalrechtelijk: het Joegoslavië-tribunaal (International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) en het Internationaal Strafhof (International 
Criminal Court).
De rechtspraak van het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens (EHRM) over 
het recht op een eerlijk proces en, specifieker, over het verschaffen van toegang 
tot informatie geeft het kader waarbinnen de drie nationaalrechtelijke regelingen 
kunnen worden beoordeeld. Maar ook voor de internationaalrechtelijke stelsels die 
in dit onderzoek zijn geanalyseerd is de jurisprudentie van het EHRM van belang 
gelet op het feit dat in deze procedures – zelfs al zijn zij niet aan de rechtspraak van 
het EHRM gebonden – het recht op een eerlijk proces moet worden gewaarborgd.
De rechtsvergelijkende analyse concentreert zich op de belangrijkste punten 
van het verschaffen van toegang tot informatie in ieder processueel systeem. 
De analyse schetst de verschillende kenmerken van de rechtsposities van de 
vervolgende instantie, de verdediging en de rechters, alsmede de gevolgen die 
deze verschillende kenmerken hebben in de regeling van het verschaffen van 
toegang tot informatie. Verschillende vragen rijzen, zoals: wat is de invloed die 
de verschillende rechtstradities, zoals de Angelsaksische en continentale traditie, 
hebben op de regeling inzake het verschaffen van toegang tot informatie? Welke 
rol spelen de verdediging, de vervolgende autoriteit en de rechters in die regeling? 
Welke vorm van rechterlijk toezicht, indien noodzakelijk, zou een plaats moeten 
krijgen in de procedure van het verschaffen van toegang tot informatie en in welke 
fase? Hoe kan bij het verschaffen van toegang tot informatie rekening worden 
gehouden met tegenstrijdige belangen? Wat zouden de consequenties moeten zijn 
van schendingen van regels inzake het verschaffen van toegang tot informatie?
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De volgorde van de hoofdstukken heeft  in zeker opzicht een piramidale opbouw, 
in die zin dat de analyse van de drie nationale rechtssystemen, ingekaderd door 
de rechtspraak van het Europees Hof van de Rechten van de Mens, ons naar het 
internationale vlak brengt. Ten slotte beoogt deze studie aanbevelingen te doen 
betreffende thans vigerende regelingen die de ontsluiting van informatie betreffen.
In hoofdstuk 1 wordt het verschaffen van toegang tot informatie in de Engelse 
strafprocedure beschreven en geanalyseerd. Het Engelse stelsel is gekozen als 
representant van de Angelsaksische traditie. Het centrale kenmerk van de regeling, 
een proces van verschaffen van toegang tot informatie in meerdere fases waarin 
beide partijen participeren, is aan een accusatoire rechtscultuur ontsproten. Uit het 
onderzoek blijkt echter ook dat diverse elementen van meer inquisitoire afkomst in 
het Engelse strafprocesrecht zijn binnengedrongen.
Het recht op het verschaffen van toegang tot informatie in het Engelse recht is 
constant in ontwikkeling geweest gedurende de afgelopen 30 jaar. Jurisprudentie 
en wetgeving hebben het afwisselend meer of minder ruim gedefinieerd. Deze 
beweging is vergeleken met een slinger die van een meer open naar een meer 
beperkt recht op toegang tot ongebruikte informatie beweegt.
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt het verschaffen van toegang tot informatie in het Italiaanse 
strafrechtelijke systeem beschreven en geanalyseerd. De procedure in het Italiaanse 
strafproces is interessant aangezien het strafprocesrecht van Italië vanuit een diep 
gewortelde inquisitoire traditie is overgegaan naar een procesrecht dat geïnspireerd 
is door accusatoire beginselen.
De karakteristieken van dit nieuwe strafvorderlijke systeem hebben belangrijke 
gevolgen voor de regulering van het verschaffen van toegang tot informatie aan de 
verdachte gedurende het strafproces.
Het onderzoek van de Italiaanse regeling van het verschaffen van toegang tot 
informatie laat zien dat, ondanks de beweerdelijke overgang naar een accusatoir 
model, het systeem nog steeds belangrijke kenmerken heeft van de inquisitoire 
traditie. Het systeem kent bijvoorbeeld, omdat het de waarheidsvinding niet 
volledig overlaat aan de partijen, een vrij sterke rechterlijke invloed. Die betreft 
onder andere de mogelijkheid van het inbrengen van bewijs. Indien dat nodig wordt 
geacht, kan dat ambtshalve door de rechters zelf geschieden. Daarnaast blijft de rol 
die door de aanklager wordt gespeeld dicht bij de inquisitoire traditie, hoewel het 
systeem formeel gesproken van hem verwacht dat hij als een partij opereert, net 
zoals ook de verdediging dat doet.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt de regeling van het verschaffen van toegang tot informatie in 
het Franse strafrechtsstelsel onderzocht. Frankrijk is gekozen als vertegenwoordiger 
van de klassieke continentale rechtssystemen waarin het verschaffen van toegang 
tot informatie wordt bewerkstelligd door de verdachte toegang te geven tot het 
dossier waarin de resultaten van het onderzoek dat door de onderzoeksrechter is 
verricht, zijn verzameld.
Het verschaffen van toegang tot informatie, dat het recht van de verdachte 
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om geïnformeerd te worden over de beschuldigingen en het bewijs tegen hem 
effectueert, is een concept dat op gespannen voet lijkt te staan met de inquisitoire 
aard van het Franse vooronderzoek. Echter, uit het onderzoek blijkt dat recente 
veranderingen in de wet de rechtspositie van verdachten die van hun vrijheid 
benomen zijn verbeterd heeft met betrekking tot de informatie die aan hen 
verstrekt wordt.
In de hoofstukken 4 en 5 wordt de jurisprudentie van het Europees Hof voor 
de Rechten van de Mens (EHRM) inzake het recht op een eerlijk proces zoals 
gegarandeerd door artikel 6 van het Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de 
Mens, en meer in het bijzonder ook inzake het recht op toegang tot  informatie, 
onderzocht.
De analyse van de jurisprudentie van het Hof maakt het mogelijk om een 
aantal belangrijke aspecten te identificeren die de band met de mensenrechten 
benadrukken en laat zien op welke wijze die jurisprudentie heeft bijgedragenaan 
de ontwikkeling van het recht op toegang tot informatie in het strafproces. Hoewel 
het Straatsburgse Hof niet aangeeft welke vorm van regeling van het verschaffen 
van toegang tot informatie de voorkeur verdient, geeft het wel aan welke elementen 
van een strafproces strijdig zijn met het recht op een eerlijk proces en met het recht 
op toegang tot informatie. 
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt het verschaffen van informatie in het rechtssysteem van 
Joegoslavië-tribunaal onderzocht. De regels van procesrecht en bewijs (RPE) van 
het tribunaal brachten bij de oprichting een strafproces tot stand dat in belangrijke 
mate op accusatoire leest was geschoeid. Dat procesrecht droeg echter niet bij 
aan een voorspoedige behandeling van zaken. Het aannemen van nieuwe regels 
van procesrecht en bewijs en diverse wijzigingen in de bestaande regels leidden er 
vanaf 1998 toe dat meer afstand werd genomen van de accusatoire uitgangspunten 
van de RPE.
Met betrekking tot het verschaffen van toegang tot informatie behield het 
Joegoslavië-tribunaal een accusatoire benadering, waarin het proces van 
verschaffing wordt beheerst door een verzameling technische regels.
In hoofdstuk 7 wordt de ontsluiting van informatie in het strafproces bij het 
Internationaal Strafhof onderzocht. De analyse wijst uit dat het systeem zoals dat 
door het Statuut van Rome en de regels van procesrecht en bewijs is gecreëerd 
belangrijke inquisitoire elementen kent. Deze elementen maken echter deel uit van 
een context waarin eigenschappen van de Angelsaksische rechtscultuur behouden 
zijn, zoals de trial hearing waarin de partijen hun zaken moeten presenteren en, 
belangrijker, de regulering van het verschaffen van toegang tot  informatie door 
een verzameling technische regels.
Ten slotte bevat hoofdstuk 8 een rechtsvergelijkende analyse. Daarin worden de 
belangrijkste bevindingen met betrekking tot het verschaffen van toegang tot 
informatie in de verschillende strafrechtelijke procedures die zijn onderzocht, kort 
samengevat. 
Bijzondere aandacht wordt daarbij geschonken aan moderne internationale 
strafrechtelijke procedures, met het oog op hun relatief korte bestaan alsmede 
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het voortdurende debat over de mogelijkheid om tot één gemeenschappelijk 
strafprocesrecht te komen dat toepasbaar zou zijn voor alle internationale 
strafhoven en -tribunalen. Uit het onderzoek vloeit voort dat de huidige regeling 
van het verschaffen van toegang tot informatie te ingewikkeld is en de voortgang van 
de procedures negatief beïnvloedt, terwijl zij tegelijk het recht van de verdediging 
op toegang tot informatie niet voldoende waarborgt.
Gepleit wordt voor het aannemen van een op inquisitoire leest geschoeide 
regeling van het verschaffen van toegang tot informatie, waarin de fase van het 
vooronderzoek en de ingewikkelde procesrechtelijke regels over het verschaffen 
van toegang tot informatie heroverwogen zouden moeten worden. Daarbij zou 
gekozen moeten worden voor een grotere rechterlijke bemoeienis  en voor een 
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